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Editorial

Good Teaching

In this issue we may be viewed by readers as "washing our dirty linens in public" because we are opening up for public examination questions and issues that most people outside the field of education would assume had been answered and agreed upon long ago. It seems that there is little, if any, consensus on what is good teaching, how to supervise teachers, and what criteria determine the content of the curriculum.

Can teaching be improved? And, furthermore, should we even have the audacity to suggest that people "learn how to teach"? Questions like that can cause professional educators to deliberate about their **raison d'etre.** Prof. James Sanders questions the value of much of the research on teacher effectiveness and its impact on teaching practice. Could it really be, as he says, that if **effective teaching** is both a "mundane capacity and a rare ability," we have been testing for and theorizing about an elusive behaviour too nebulous to be gathered under one concept or construct? And have we overlooked, in our research, the distinct variables of nature and nurture as key components of teacher effectiveness?

If we define effective teaching, we are then confronted with the problems inherent in the approach to the supervision of teachers. What does a supervisor actually supervise? asks Prof. Thomas J. Ritchie. How do we answer the critics who say that just as "beauty is in the eye of the beholder," good teaching is also a personal preference because it often is defined in terms of the supervisor's political base, personal image, or public relations agenda? Is "good teaching" simply that which meets the individual supervisor's criteria?

And, finally, how shall we decide the curriculum content? In a society assailed by economic turbulence shall we permit the

curriculum to be dominated by "practical" market-place subjects? But, on the other hand, can we justify a curriculum that caters primarily to students' interests and imagination? Prof. John P. Portelli attempts to bring a balance to these two views that are purported to be so much in opposition to one another.

When one considers the countless volumes of theory and research that have been published on these topics just since the days of John Dewey, one is almost led to exclaim how preposterous it is that in this ninth decade of the 20th century we are still asking such questions as: What is effective teaching? What does a supervisor of teachers use as a criterion measure of good teaching? and, What guidelines do we use to justify the content of the curriculum?

Maybe the answers change in relation to the times.

W.M.T.



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Why Teaching Cannot (and Need Not) Be Improved

Abstract

It is generally conceded that research on teaching has not significantly improved teaching practice. There have been two common explanations for this problem and its persistence: (a) an inadequate body of empirical research and/or (b) the reluctance of teachers to adopt the recommendations of this research. This article argues, however, that the theory/practice gap is a pseudo-problem which derives from a basic misconception about teaching that is endemic to effectiveness research, namely, that teaching is a complex skill which is susceptible to substantial improvement. It is further argued that teaching, in the limited behavioural sense, is more likely to represent a common capacity that neither can nor need be improved.

The failure of teacher effectiveness research

This article assumes the following general claim to be uncontentious: that the research on teaching has yet to identify the components of effective teaching, and thus has so far failed to lead to any significant improvements in the practice or technology of teaching. By "uncontentious", I do not mean to imply that none dispute this general appraisal. Certainly, some people (most obviously, those engaged in teacher effectiveness research) take a more sanguine view about the progress and promise of this research. For example, B.O. Smith (1983) has recently asserted, quite to the contrary, that "it cannot be

reasonably denied that research has made a significant contribution to the practice of pedagogy" (p.489). Indeed, he goes so far as to announce that "we are now able to specify the requirements for an effective classroom" (p.490).

But such unqualified optimism is rare -- even among those most committed to research on teaching. By and large, the general assessments or periodic, state-of-the-art reviews of this research have been far more modest and, often, even despairing about the achievements of this research (Darling-Hammond, Wise, & Pease, 1983; Doyle, 1978; Dunkin & Biddle, 1974; Fenstermacher, 1978; Forman & Chapman, 1979; Heath & Nielson, 1974).

The generally acknowledged failure of research on teaching to improve significantly the practice of teaching, however, has usually been mitigated by appeals to two extenuating circumstances: (a) an as yet inadequate body of cumulative, empirical research on effective teaching or (b) an inability or reluctance on the part of teachers to use the results of this research. The first alibi pleads a lack of wisdom; the second, a lack of will. These two, general explanations for the failure of teaching research to improve significantly practice, ironically, also explain its continued "success". That is, the first explanation, by faulting the shortcomings of the research, succeeds by creating the obviously self-serving "need for further research." The other explanation succeeds by simply denying the failure. Instead, it blames the victim or victims, that is, the teachers who either cannot or choose not to heed the findings of this research which promises to improve their lot.

However singularly persuasive these two explanations may be, surely both can't be correct? Is it that we don't have the research to use or that we don't use the research that we have? Like the contradictory dynamics of economic "stagflation", one explanation claims the root cause is "underproduction"; the other, "underconsumption".

Although these twin, conventional explanations for the problem's persistence are at odds with one another, they nevertheless agree that there **is** this problem, namely, that knowledge about teaching has been unable (for whatever reason) to inform or improve the practice of teaching. Contrary to this basic consensus, however, I claim that there is no problem to be solved. I will argue that the theory/practice gap is a pseudo-problem whose persistence derives from a basic misconception about teaching that is endemic to the effectiveness research. Specifically, this research has wrongly assumed that teaching represents a complex skill that is susceptible to substantial improvement with training. I contend, on the other hand, that it is more plausible to view teaching, as defined by this research, as a common capacity. Moreover, the happy, if

paradoxical, moral of the story is that teaching cannot and, indeed, need not be improved.

The complexification of teaching as process

I want to be clear at the outset that by "teaching", I am referring to a rather special, and therefore limited, conception. It is a conception that emphasizes the form, as opposed to the substance, of classroom teaching. In linguistic terms, it is a conception more concerned with the syntax than with the semantics of teaching. Despite this self-inflicted limitation, it remains, nevertheless, the most influential behavioural conception of teaching within the effectiveness research, namely, the so-called "process-product" or "process-outcome" paradigm. (Again, note the emphasis upon "process" as distinct from "content".) "Teaching" in this empirical research tradition is represented as the causal linkage between specific teacher characteristics or teaching behaviours (process) and student learning or achievement (product or outcome). The general goal of this research has been to discover those **relatively** content-free, as well as context-free, teacher behaviours that are associated with (read: "cause") superior student achievement. this is how this research empirically defines "effective teaching".

More importantly, there are two, other fundamental presuppositions built into this binary model of teaching that have gone unchallenged. One is that these generic, classroom-based teacher behaviours (that is, the "process" half of the paradigm) are, in fact, skills or competencies or abilities. The other closely-linked assumption is that these teaching skills or abilities are extraordinarily complex. For example, Brophy and Evertson (1976), whose research is "paradigmatic" in every sense, maintain that:

> Effective teaching requires the ability to implement a very large number of diagnostic, instructional, managerial, and therapeutic skills, tailoring behavior in specific contexts and situations to the specific needs of the moment. Effective teachers not only must be able to do a large number of things; they also must be able to recognize which of the many things they know how to do applies at a given moment and be able to follow through by performing the behavior effectively. (p.139)

The kinds of "process" variables which this research has considered as constitutive of teaching skills or abilities are too numerous and varied to list. They range all the way from such discrete, countable bits of teacher behaviour as frequency of questions, wait-time, etc., to such vague, abstract "behavioural" characteristics as warmth, clarity, indirectness, etc. The latter

are sometimes referred to euphemistically as "high-inference variables" -- meaning that the identification of such constructs requires a sizeable inferential leap up from the classroom behavioural data.

Rare ability or common capacity?

Categorizing and calling such teaching behaviours as these "skills", "competencies", or "abilities", however, implies that they show wide and stable individual differences or variation ranging from skillful to inept, competent to incompetent, or high to low. Indeed, any ability construct, as part of its core meaning, implies that its human distribution is necessarily both unequal and invidious. Therefore, what is at issue is whether or not it is correct to assume that the kinds of teacher behaviours examined within the "process-product" paradigm constitute skills or abilities in the usual sense. Is it even plausible to assume that these classroom behaviours are analogous to such skills as musical talent, mathematical aptitude, intelligence or general ability, or any of the other abilities for which wide and stable individual differences are expected? I think not. As Johnston (1975) points out:

> Most of the acts performed by teachers in the classroom could probably be performed by any intelligent adult and by some children, if they knew what should be done. Teachers probably vary little in their abilities to execute performances called for in a detailed instructional plan. The improvement that is possible in the actual performance is limited primarily to the achievement of somewhat greater poise and efficiency of action. (p.50)

Similarly, and counter to the claim that "teaching requires the ability to implement a very large number of skills," J.M. Stephens (1967) also contends that "the basic mechanisms responsible for teaching reside in some very earthy, primitive tendencies. Although more pronounced in some people than in others, these tendencies are quite prevalent" (p.137). As part of an admittedly speculative theory of schooling, Stephens asserts that for the most part teaching reduces to a few "spontaneous communicative tendencies." Specifically, he maintains that all of us are nearly equally possessed of spontaneous tendencies:

1. To talk of what we know.
2. To applaud or commend some performances and correct others.
3. To supply an answer which eludes someone else.
4. To point the moral. (p.58)

Furthermore, Stephens suggests that such nativist tendencies do not require much conscious improvement or refinement.

> These forces, let loose within the existing school, would, in and of themselves, induce a substantial measure of educational attainment even in the absence of rational, deliberate decisions - in the absence, indeed, of any intent to teach (p.58).

To transpose the old saw: It is not just that teachers are born, but rather that we are all born teachers. However, leaving aside for the moment the nature/nurture issue, the immediate point here is that classroom "skills" (to stick with the misnomer) can be seen as more akin to widely distributed human capacities for which there is little need and, perhaps, little room for improvement.

There are then these two conflicting conceptions of teaching and teaching effectiveness. One holds that teaching competence or effectiveness expresses an uncommon ability; the other, a rather commonplace capacity.

The extraordinary use of the ordinary

There is a slightly different view of effective teaching that tries to reconcile these opposing views by conjoining them -- by, in effect, having it both ways. It characterizes good teaching as both a mundane capacity and a rare ability. The sense of this two-way conception of teaching is captured in David Cohen's felicitous phrase, "an ambiguity of competence" (quoted in Sykes, 1983, p.90). The phrase is meant to make the point that although the component knowledge and skills of teaching are, in and of themselves, broadly available to everyone, their deployment and orchestration in effective teaching defines a rare ability. As Sykes (1983) puts it, "...competence in teaching depends to a much greater extent on the extraordinary use of ordinary knowledge" (p.90).

The demand for extraordinary ability, by this account, derives from certain inherent contextual features of teaching-in-action which include "large measures of uncertainty, instability and uniqueness" (Sykes, 1983, p.90). This extraordinary ability is presumably defined by significant individual differences in the ability to deal effectively with these intrinsically problematic features of "real-time" practice -- but using, however, only common knowledge and ordinary skills.

These conditions of practice (that is, uncertainty, instability and uniqueness) which call for the "extraordinary use of ordinary knowledge" thus underwrite teaching's claim to be a complex skill or ability. But at the same time, these conditions of practice seemingly undercut the likelihood that social scientific research

on teaching can ever improve this complex ability. Again, as Gary Sykes (1983) puts it, "...a serious disjunction exists between the knowledge about instruction generated through social science research and the nature of teaching practice" (p.90). It seems that the fickle conditions of practice make the problem of relating knowledge and practice in teaching fundamentally incorrigible. The disjunction exists (and persists) because of a profound mismatch between (a) the epistemological requirements of research for predictability, replicability, generalization, and the like and (b) the kaleidoscopic, existential conditions of practice. These dynamic, everchanging conditions imply that "the act of teaching may just not be hospitable to an analytic approach..." (Sykes, 1983, p.91). Teaching, as transcendent "ordinary-knowledge-in-use", just won't stand still long enough to be analysed.

But how plausible is this characterization of the practical context of the teacher's work? Does teaching truly consist of "large measures of uncertainty, instability, and uniqueness"? Because as against this perplexingly random version of classroom events, there is an equally, if not more, compelling stereotype which emphasizes the humdrum repetitiveness or (less pejoratively) the comfortable predictability of classroom routine. And surely whatever uncertainty **is** inherent in the interactions of teachers and students is considerably offset by the mutual or shared expectations which define these social roles and which regularize classroom behaviour. In short, for classrooms, as for Holiday Inns, the reassuring norm is that "the best surprise is no surprise at all."

It seems to me then that the assumption that effective teaching represents a significant, even extraordinary, skill or ability depends upon "seeing", either (a) teaching, itself, or (b) the work setting where it takes place as far more complex, problematic and difficult than either, in fact, is. It is as if only by either (a) dramatizing the sheer number of component instructional "skills" or "competencies" or (b) evoking the buzzing, blooming confusion of "life in classrooms" that the claim that teaching is a complex ability can be made plausible. This "complexification" of teaching, of course, serves to legitimate it as a skill worthy of social scientific interest and research. The research, in turn, keeps alive the hope that a thorough understanding of teaching will in time lead to significant improvements in performance, that theory will eventually improve practice.

Walking, talking, and teaching

The empirical research on teaching, however, in its commitment to the "process-product" paradigm has limited its inquiry to the behavioural or manifest performative attributes of

classroom teaching. In so doing, it has collapsed the study of teaching to the study of the classroom "delivery system", that is, the everyday, communicative behaviours that teachers exhibit in the classroom. And "teaching", in this highly restricted sense, does indeed seem well within the capabilities of, as Johnston (1975) suggests, "any intelligent adult and ... some children" (p.50). These sorts of garden-variety classroom behaviours are thus more indicative of a well-developed human capacity than of a widely varying individual skill or ability. Such a reconceptualization of teaching as a well-developed capacity also alters the prevailing expectation that it can be significantly improved through social science research. As Schrag (1981) suggests:

> In spheres where our practical accomplishments are already considerable (e.g., cooking, talking and, if I am right, teaching) it may be unreasonable to expect that any strongly corroborated theories would lead to practical measures or strategies substantially at variance with those we either already employ or which have at least been tried out. (p.272)

For example, talking, for all practical, communicative purposes, occurs at a sufficiently high order of performance that we neither need nor expect theory and research in linguistics to provide any important improvements. Moreover, talking is not, I submit, **just** an example of Schrag's category of considerable practical accomplishments; talking is not here merely illustrative. Rather talking, itself, is nearly synonymous with teaching in much of the empirical classroom research. For Ned Flanders (1970), in fact, classroom teaching can be exhaustively dichotomized into either "Teacher Talk" or "Student Talk". In short, the common classroom is plainly one of those "spheres" (as Schrag calls them) where the considerable, practical, human accomplishment of talking is most evident.

Apart from its considerable overlap, even synonymy, with just talking there are additional reasons why "teaching", in the narrow, performance-based sense, is likely to be a well-developed human capacity. For one, the "spontaneous communicative tendencies" (to use Stephens' phrase) that make up teaching no doubt have considerable survival value. As Schrag (1981) points out, human beings, as a species, confront a number of biogenetic limitations:

> Human instinctual equipment is underdeveloped... Human survival depends on living in groups. Humans are not capable of reproducing for at least a dozen years... and the human gestation period is almost a year. The survival of the species depends, therefore, on our ability to communicate with each other, to cooperate and coordinate our actions, and to care for and initiate children into the human community. (p.273)

In short, our survival as a species is tied to our capacity to teach one another. "Good teaching" (as Stephens' theory also suggests) is part of our hard-won biological nature; it confers selective advantage.

Moreover, our pedagogical nature enjoys considerable nurture throughout our childhood and adolescence. Nearly all of us who become classroom teachers will have served a very long "apprenticeship of observation" (Lortie, 1975, p.61). Lortie reckons that "those who teach have normally had sixteen continuous years of contact with teachers and professors" or, more precisely, he estimates that "...the average student has spent 13,000 hours in direct contact with classroom teachers by the time he graduates from high school" (p.61). In speculating on the implications of this long apprenticeship, Lortie (1975) suggests that:

> It may be that the widespread idea that "anyone can teach" (a notion built into society's historical reluctance to invest heavily in pedagogical research and instruction) originates in this; what child cannot, after all, do a reasonably accurate portrayal of a classroom teacher's actions? (p.62)

I hasten to add that Lortie subsequently makes it plain that he, for one, rejects the idea that "anyone can teach". But his rejection is based upon a much richer notion of teaching, both as an enterprise and an occupation, than the one constrained within the "process-product" paradigm. Moreover the empirical, "process-product" research bent on improving teaching **does** more or less define "teaching" as "a classroom teacher's actions." And for "teaching", in this limited behavioural sense, we have all been well-prepared by both nature and nurture to give "a reasonably accurate portrayal." Such a common capacity needs no improvement.

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WILD HORSE 16/20

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L'Ecole au Pays de l'Utopie Neo-technicienne

Abstract

When the computer was introduced in school, it trailed behind it a procession of promises. Lost illusions, new hopes: teacher's perceptions span a wide range. This paper offers some thoughts on this new phenomenon, by putting it back in the historical context of the evolution of technology and educational utopias.

Le filon manquant

Course folle, rythme déchaîné, recherche du sens, absence, chute libre, à quoi s'accrocher... A quoi rêver... Quoi construire... L'utopie? Peut-être. La rejeter serait malhonnête. Elle s'impose à nous, elle nous habite. Elle est l'exutoire de nos déceptions, de nos frustrations, de notre quotidien. Elle constitue la forme symbolique de nos réves, de nos désirs, de nos tensions vers le mieux-être, de notre imaginaire. Mais l'utopie fut d'abord un "lieu imaginé", est-il besoin de le rappeler; étymologiquement "lieu de nulle part" pour les uns, "lieu du bien être" pour les autres.

Thomas More, du fond de son Angleterre natale, décrit dès 1516 son île UTOPIA: ce pays imaginaire où un bon gouvernement règne sur un peuple heureux. La pensée contemporaine s'est appropriée l'idée datant du 16e siècle pour en faire au 19e "(un) idéal, (une) vue politique ou sociale qui ne tient pas compte de la réalité et apparaît comme chimérique" (dictionnaire Robert, 1981).

Plus les siècles et les décennies accélèrent leur course, plus le concept d'utopie prend des connotations péjoratives au point d'y voir le fait de lendemains paradisiaques alors que les problèmes contemporains ne sont pas encore résolus. L'utopie, c'est le projet irréalisable qui a cependant pour but le bonheur des sociétaires qui y prennent part. Est-ce le rêve éveillé ou le foment de la révolution? L'un et l'autre peut-être. Est-ce encore une forme de religion, épargnant à l'homme la réflexion sur l'angoisse de sa condition pour tendre vers un au-delà plein de promesses? Peut-être aussi. Mais dans tous les cas, l'idée d'utopie est liée à la recontre de la connaissance d'un savoir-faire historique et d'un projet humaniste. Plus ou moins évoluée, la machine y est présente. "Les utopistes attendent de la machine qu'elle facilite la vie de l'homme en lui laissant le temps de cultiver son esprit, d'améliorer son corps et son âme. Le progrès technique devient le moyen de perfectionner l'homme", nous rappelle Jean Servier (1974).

Les vecteurs de l'espérance

De tout temps, l'humanité est obsédée par l'espérance. L'espérance qui a pris des formes diverses à travers l'histoire. Sans remonter à l'antiquité, voyons ce qu'en disaient certains poètes visionnaires. Victor Hugo par exemple: "L'utopie, c'est la vérité de demain". Ou encore Lamartine: "Les utopies ne sont que des vérités prématurées". En ce sens, elles pourraient nous apparaître comme des révolutions. Une constante se retrouve dans la pensée des utopistes: la science et la cité radieuse sont étroitement liées. Thomas More lui-même, juriste de son état, eut recours à un navigateur expérimenté pour décrire son île UTOPIA. L'utopie est une île divisée en 54 cités comme l'Angleterre de l'époque l'était en 54 comtés. La capitale est située sur une rivière et on y accède par un pont merveilleux. UTOPIA est peuplée de marins et de commerçants mais tous connaissent depuis l'enfance les travaux de l'agriculture et chacun pratique un artisanat spécifique. Le principe de l'alternance des tâches y a place de même que celui de l'emploi du temps est réglé: 6 heures de travail, repos, initiation aux lettres, aux arts ou aux sciences, audition de musique, pratique des jeux de sociétés, etc... Il y a en germes dans le plan directeur de l'UTOPIA plusieurs principes de la sociologie contemporaine. Mais arrêtons-nous à l'élément plus technique encore comme élément moteur de l'utopie. Ainsi nous retiendrons six inventions qui ont provoqué l'imaginaire à travers l'histoire.

D'abord l'HORLOGE AUTOMATIQUE fut une invention technique qui alimenta la pensée utopique. La maîtrise des engrenages était antérieure au Moyen-Age, mais du XIIe au XVe siècles, les mécanismes régulateurs ont connu un perfectionnement tel que l'heure put désormais être annoncée avec précision. Ce progrès technique a peu à peu éloigné

l'homme de la nature pour régler ses activités sur une norme très vite acceptée en Occident. Les moines dans leurs micro-sociétés - utopiennes - virent rapidement leur vie réglée par l'horloge. Bientôt ce fut la société entière qui se trouva régie par l'heure, si bien que les utopistes y virent très vite un facteur d'efficacité dans la cité idéale.

Plus tard, la CARTOGRAPHIE fut une autre invention technique qui alimenta la pensée utopique. Elle apparut de façon nette, c'est-à-dire régie selon des règles précises, au XVe siècle. Avec ses lignes invisibles de latitude et de longitude, la carte permit alors d'insérer la représentation d'un lieu dans un réseau de références abstrait et universel. La ville devint visible d'un point de vue. L'idée du lieu idéal put désormais être matérialisée dans une image globale qui alimenta le discours même de l'utopie. Thomas More s'est servi lui-même de cette représentation pour présenter son idée.

La troisième invention marquante qui favorisa l'élaboration de l'utopie fut la MACHINE A VAPEUR. Ses nombreuses applications qui réduisaient l'effort physique de l'homme ont permis de rêver à une société où l'effort serait singulièrement réduit, pour le bonheur des sociétaires.

Plus près de nous, l'ELECTRICITE a permis d'imaginer un univers sans contrainte, dominé par le confort, le plaisir et l'efficacité.

La cinquième invention déterminante pour l'organisation de l'espace idéal fut sans doute l'AUTOMOBILE, qui a donné naissance à un urbanisme nouveau, de modèle américain, fort contesté aujourd'hui par nos voisins de sud eux-mêmes; les "villes nouvelles" des années 50 et 60, ont été fondées sur des principes artificiels d'intégration des services et de séparation des activités de vie. Inséparables des réseaux d'autoroutes, elles se désagrègent petit à petit à une époque où l'automobile tend à se banaliser tout en restant accessible à une partie de la population seulement.

L'ORDINATEUR constitue la sixième invention qui provoqua l'imaginaire, dans la mesure où il a permis de rêver de nouveaux rapports sociaux. C'est cette invention qui est maintenant au coeur de l'utopie néo-technicienne.

Les mythes entretenus

Utopie et mythes ont toujours été reliés à travers les temps. Les utopies sont toujours apparues à des moments critiques de l'histoire, à des moments où la réalité historique présentait un conflit en apparence sans solution, mais où les inventions représentaient elles-mêmes la résolution mythique d'un

problème. Thomas More constitue un exemple éloquent à ce sujet. Il proposa l'UTOPIA au moment où il était en conflit avec son roi Henri VIII sur la manière de diriger l'état et sa vie personnelle. Il a par ailleurs emprunté à la cartographie récente, sa puissance de représentation pour imaginer son île et la donner à voir, retenant ce qu'il voulait de la réalité historique anglaise. Il s'est d'ailleurs fortement inspiré des récits de son contemporain Christophe Colomb pour imaginer la félicité. Effectivement, les premières lettres du navigateur décrivent sur le ton de l'idylle la bonté naturelle, enfantine des habitants de ce "paradis" qu'il venait de découvrir. L'égalité absolue qui soit disant y régnait, donna naissance plus tard au mythe du "bon sauvage" car la beauté physique des Indiens devait aller de pair avec une bonne nature: une pureté primitive.

Les problèmes sont occultés. C'est en ce sens que l'utopie donne naissance à la résolution mythique d'un problème. Ce qui s'est vérifié à l'époque de Thomas More, s'applique maintenant de façon étonnante. Les principaux mythes véhiculés par les utopies reliées à l'informatique et plus particulièrement à la télématique prennent en compte le changement de la relation espace-temps présente dans toute élaboration utopienne. A titre d'exemples: mythe du télé-travail; mythe du télé-divertissement; mythe de la télé-consultation professionnelle. Nous savons par ailleurs combien la situation "présentielle" est au contraire génératrice d'une prise sur le réel irremplaçable.

Mais en dehors des résolutions mythiques de problèmes, il convient de réfléchir à la pensée utopique contemporaine.

La pensée utopique contemporaine

Après avoir voyagé d'Angleterre en Tchécoslovaquie en passant par l'Espagne et bien d'autres pays, l'utopie nous vient maintenant d'est, du pays du soleil levant. Elle nous apporte le concept de société d'information, largement explicité par le Japonais Masuda. En effet, ce concept s'est substitué à d'autres, annoncés antécédemment par des prophètes de l'évolution sociale. Le village global de McLuhan a disparu du discours récent. La société des loisirs n'est plus qu'un vestige de la pensée des années 70. La société de consommation a qualifié également les débuts de l'ère post-industrielle mais tend aussi à disparaître du discours très contemporain. Les idéologies sous-jacentes ont néanmoins donné lieu à des tentatives d'organisation sociale sur un modèle différent du modèle dominant. Faut-il rappeler par exemple l'éclosion des nombreuses communes dont on a vu la naissance au cours des années 60 et 70. Elles étaient animées par la pensée écologique ou le désir de la communication médiatisée démocratique. Cette appropriation de l'utopie a donné les résultats que l'on sait: grand enthousiasme initial, refus des codes de travail établis, difficulté d'installer la continuité et

désintégration de la plupart de ces communes pour des raisons psycho-socio-économiques.

La société d'information elle, a vu apparaître sa définition avec l'invasion de l'ordinateur dans tous les champs d'activité, même culturels. Elle est UTOPIE dans la mesure où elle constitue un projet imaginaire dans lequel les rapports sociaux sont définis selon une approche qu'il n'est pas encore possible de percevoir dans les faits. Elle permet aussi de rêver à une autre qualité de vie où chacun des intervenants sociaux aurait sa part de ce qui devrait constituer une denrée également partagée. Laquelle? L'information. L'industrialisme est révolu. Il a échoué aux yeux des hommes. Il a prouvé que les biens produits appartenaient à une infime partie de ceux qui les produisaient, que l'inégalité était évidente dans les instances de la chaîne de production. Dans cette nouvelle société d'information, les rapports sociaux pourraient changer puisque le produit qu'est l'information serait accessible. Tant que le produit informatique trouvait comme canal le macro-ordinateur, les prophètes sociaux étaient peu nombreux. Mais l'avènement fulgurant du micro-ordinateur a provoqué le discours, a réveillé ceux qui somnolaient encore. L'obstacle économique s'est levé pour laisser monter l'espoir de l'accessibilité. La télématique de son côté a fait éclater le privilège individuel d'une minorité pour faire miroiter le réseau accessible à tous par des moyens largement apprivoisés comme la télévision et le téléphone. Le système peut faire rêver il est vrai. Cependant, il est des questions que l'on doit se poser pour que l'évidence des changements structurels ne favorise pas l'écolosion d'une utopie stérilisante à l'usage. Dans cette nouvelle société régie par les systèmes intégrés de communication, l'ordinateur est roi. Mais qui seront les scribes privilégiés de cette culture informatique dont on annonce l'imminence? Pourrons-nous nous approprier les changements technologiques au point d'intervenir sur la définition des nouveaux rapports sociaux, ce projet de société? Saurons-nous éviter l'instauration de nouvelles classes sociales qui risqueraient de reproduire un modèle aliénant: une société faite de ceux qui créent les contenus et de ceux qui les consomment. Autant de questions dont les réponses ne sont pas évidentes. Projet ou utopie? L'histoire est à suivre.

L'utopie et l'éducation: le cas Coménius

Comment situer l'éducation dans ce contexte? Historiquement, l'utopie éducative existe bien, et depuis longtemps. J'aimerais rappeler ici un cas historique étonnant, celui de Coménius. Pédagogue, il a vécu au 17e siècle en Tchécoslovaquie, tout en parcourant le monde occidental. Il réagissait non seulement à la loi de la férule mais de façon générale aux pratiques éducatives de son époque, cherchant une solution aux malaises sociaux en cours et proposant un projet

éducatif pour y remédier. Ses deux ouvrages principaux: **Le monde sensible illustré** et **La grande didactique,** nous permettent de dire aujourd'hui qu'il était un visionnaire comme il y en eut peu en éducation. Coménius fut le seul, à son époque, à avoir parcouru intégralement le champ de la question pédagogique. Pour lui, l'école se situe dans un projet de réforme du genre humain visant à mettre en accord l'homme et la nature. Pour supprimer les luttes sociales et politiques ainsi que leurs conséquences, il pense qu'il n'y a que la voie de la réforme universelle, la ré-Education. Il propose un cadre matériel initial, un nouvel ordre de la ville dont il élabore le plan. Il déclare ensuite que l'art du pédagogue consiste à éveiller le désir et le plaisir d'apprendre. Sa pédagogie se veut joviale et attrayante, intégrant l'image le plus possible. "L'élève n'apprendra rien s'il ne l'a pas décidé et s'il n'y trouve pas un agrément". Il propose que l'enseignement se fasse par le jeu, cultive la diversité et amène à agir et à créer par l'emploi de méthodes actives. Il préconise la multiplication des expériences sensibles. Au 17e, il incite déjà à la pédagogie du processus. Mathématicien, métaphysicien, professeur de langues et organisateur d'écoles, il comprend que l'éducation est l'un des aspects des mécanismes formateurs de la nature et fait du processus éducatif l'axe fondamental du système social. Sa conception des classes sociales est très progessiste pour l'époque. Il prône une éducation pour tous, même pour les femmes (cela fera sourire les moins féministes d'aujourd'hui) et pour tous les peuples. Il entrevoit même l'intérêt de l'organisation internationale de l'instruction publique. Cinquante ans de recherche, de luttes politiques, d'entreprises polémiques pour mourir isolé, à Amsterdam, à 78 ans.

Autre cas...

Mais où en sommes-nous maintenant? Que comprendre de cette avalanche de sigles qui envahit le discours presque monolithique sur l'école: APO, EAO, EAT, XAO, EGO? Que discerner dans les appellations Platon, Logo, Tutor, Natal, Télidon, Pascal, Socrate, sans faire l'histoire de sciences et de l'éducation? Que fréquenter: IBM PC, Commodore, Micral, Logabac, Comtern, ou vaut-il mieux croquer la pomme Mcintosh? Des pièces d'un immense puzzle pour distraire peut-être des textes devenus publics sur "La condition enseignante" au Québec. Cherchant le fil d'Ariane dans ce labyrinthe de l'informatique scolaire, irons-nous jusqu'à parler à l'instar d'un collègue du "désordinateur de l'éducation" (Larose, 1984)?

Les enseignants de chez nous voient bien la difficulté, tirant eux-mêmes les leçons de l'audio-visuel oublié. Quels usages faire de l'informatique sans apprivoiser "la bête", sans réfléchir de façon différente à "l'acte d'apprendre"? Mais où trouver le temps à une période où les enseignants connaissent maintenant

au Québec les effets d'un décret augmentant leur tâche? Et où trouver cette formation - apprivoisement, à l'heure, par exemple, où les pouvoirs politiques encouragent d'avantage les universités à se tourner vers l'entreprise plus que vers l'école...

Face à ce temps qui nous échappe et devant la menace déclaratoire du "virage qu'il est possible de manquer" ... le danger est grand d'accélérer l'implantation coûte que coûte de l'ordinateur, pour être "de son époque".

Qui proposera le système le plus accessible et le plus séduisant, appuyé d'une pensée pédagogique (noblesse oblige)? Nous n'avons pas la réponse, mais c'est peut-être ce qui explique le succès de Logo en éducation, sécurisant avec son à priori piagétien. Seymour Papert serait-il un des gourous de la pensée utopique contemporaine en éducation?

Et si l'utopie était nécessaire

Déception apportée par l'utopie? Souvent. Mais faut-il tuer les penseurs, les rêveurs de la pédagogie? Sans doute pas puisqu'ils sont le signe vivant d'une société en transformation, en devenir. L'école change, tout comme la société change. L'avènement d'une société de service, où par exemple près de la moitié des forces de travail américaines seraient consacrées à la production et au traitement de données informationnelles, provoquera un changement de rôle chez les intervenants de l'école. Un rapport nouveau maître-élève reste à préciser mais plus fondamental encore, un rapport nouveau élève-savoir reste à inventer. Une nouvelle éthique du travail devra prendre place afin que nous n'assistions pas à une nouvelle élitisation et par conséquent, à l'aliénation informatique. A qui profitera la révolution télématique? A nous de voir. Nous avons eu les leçons de l'audio-visuel, mais les enjeux de l'ère informatique sont nettement plus engageants puisque c'est une société entière dont elle modifie les formes post-industrielles. Dans un tel contexte peut-on bâtir un projet de démocratisation des savoirs et des activités culturelles? Peut-être, si nous travaillons à la réappropriation utopique. L'histoire nous a appris que les utopies ont un effet sur la réalité sociale même si elles ne se réalisent pas totalement. En ces années difficiles, le moyen de faire face à la crise est peut être de développer l'utopie.

Au terme de cette réflexion, ma pensée se porte vers cette jeunesse actuelle que l'avenir angoisse. Quelle est l'utopie de ceux qui ont 20 ans? La technologie informatique y est-elle présente? Pour eux, ce pays de l'utopie est-il sans écoles? Si oui, quel drame pour les pédagogues qui ont érigé en système l'éducation formelle. Où est donc le virage?

L'histoire de l'école et de l'éducation se ferait-elle à coup d'utopies successives?

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Education, Work, and Imagination:

A critique of Mary Warnock's views

Abstract

This paper deals with the question of the justification of curriculum content which has attracted the attention of philosophers of education since the time of Plato. It examines the justificatory approach proposed by Mary Warnock who attempts to resolve this problem by focussing on the imagination and work as the two, equally important, criteria for inclusion or exclusion of curriculum content. While Warnock's position might be seen to promise a more adequate and balanced solution to this problem, it is argued, however, that her position is not devoid of problems. It is suggested that a more adequate justification might be arrived at by viewing education as a form of work, and work as a form of education.

This paper discusses the role of the imagination and work in relation to the justification of the content of the curriculum in the writings of Mary Warnock (1), notable in her book **Schools of Thought** (1977). The choice of considering Warnock's position is not arbitrary. As it will soon be explained, her position tries to merge the rift between two main and influential justificatory approaches, and also attempts to bridge theoretical and practical considerations. However, one might question whether she succeeds in this project.

The aim of this paper is three-fold: (i) to analyze Warnock's position with regard to the justification of the content -- a justification that rests on the notions of work and imagination; (ii) to identify some possible problems with this position which at

face value seems quite plausible and adequate; (iii) to make some proposals with regard to how one might view the relationship between work and education -- a relationship that might provide us with an adequate justification for the content of the curriculum.

Justifying curriculum content

In recent writings about the philosophical justification of the content of the curriculum, one can identify two major approaches on the question of how to justify the content of the curriculum. The first approach represented, for example, by R.S. Peters (1966), contends that some "educational activities" given their nature, are necessarily and intrinsically worthwhile (2). This view is usually referred to as "the knowledge-centred view" which can be traced back to Plato. The second approach is couched essentially in terms of "what interests someone." This approach, which has its roots in Rousseau and was elaborated by Dewey, is, for example, today defended by P.S. Wilson (1967, 1971) who argues for the intrinsic value of "what interests someone" as the major criterion for justifying the content of the curriculum.

These two approaches have been criticized and to some extent rejected by various philosophers of education and educationists. (White, 1973; Woods & Barrow, 1975; Barrow, 1976; Pring, 1976; Martin, 1981; Kleinig, 1982; and Bailey, 1984). Critics of these positions have argued that neither "the knowledge-centred approach" nor "the interest-centred approach" **alone** can provide us with adequate justification. These philosophical approaches, it is maintained, do shed some light on the issue but these kinds of approaches **alone** do not resolve the problem of justification.

The renowned British educational theorist G.H. Bantock (1980) recently proferred just such an attack on attempts at justifying educational matters solely or primarily on philosophical grounds (pp.127-137). In Bantock's view, philosophical justification, irrespective of relevant qualifications and/or specific arguments they may provide, face two major problems. First, philosophical justifications do not take into account empirical considerations such as the limited time which may be allocated to the teaching of certain subjects or the social and cultural backgrounds of students and their intellectual ability. Second, Bantock notes that philosophical justifications attempt to justify the content in terms of a single principle. For example, for Peters the ultimate principle is the value of truth, and for Wilson it is the notion of "interests".

While Bantock (1980) states that "curriculum decisions are essentially practical decisions" (p.131), he does not believe that all we have to take into account are practical and empirical

considerations. He speaks of the need for "a balance of argument" (p.131). The basis upon which we justify the content of the curriculum must attend "both to the values served and the empirical facts supporting rejection or implementation" (Bantock, 1981, p.131). In short, according to Bantock, when we attempt to provide a justification we must take two things into account: (i) values such as truth, happiness, and self-expression, and (ii) empirical considerations such as the ones mentioned above. In addition to taking values into account, empirical evidence to support our decision must be provided. Bantock advocates a balance of theoretical and empirical considerations.

This position seems plausible but how are we to reconcile these two considerations? (I do not mean to suggest that these two considerations ought to be at odds). Bantock sketches the way a process of justification should proceed, but he does not flesh out his position. In other words, he has not worked out the details of a justificatory position that resolves possible conflicts between these two considerations.

Warnock's proposals for justifying the content of the curriculum in **Schools of Thought** (1977) seem to be in line with Bantock's work, but she does more than sketch her position. In a nutshell, Warnock proposes that a process of justification must take at least two things into account: work (which corresponds to empirical considerations) and imagination (which corresponds to theoretial considerations).(3) Work and imagination are two of the basic components, according to Warnock, of "the good life." Education, Warnock maintains, should aim at helping people achieve "the good life." This is possible if what is taught helps students to reach such a goal. I propose in this paper to investigate briefly Warnock's position, to see whether or not she has, by taking into account both theoretical and practical considerations, resolved the issue of the justification of the content of the curriculum. It is important to consider this attempt because on face value, the position seems quite plausible.

The popular view

Before proceeding to this investigation, I would like to sketch briefly a "popular view" of how one ought to justify the content of the curriculum. This view is frequently voiced by members of the general public, politicians, and some educational theorists (4). This view is considered at this stage because it proposes justification of content primarily (in some cases **essentially**) in terms of empirical considerations, more specifically, in terms of those considerations which determine whether what is taught will enable students to find jobs.

Let us take a bird's eye view of this position. Peters (1966) distinguishes two categories of things that could be included in

the content of the curriculum. Category A includes such subjects as mathematics, languages, history, literature, and technical and vocational subjects (all subjects traditionally accepted as part of the content of the curriculum), while Category B includes such things as bingo, soccer, and billiards. I would like to make a distinction, within the former of these categories, between non-useful and useful subjects. The point is that while the popular view explicitly agrees with the distinction made by Peters between Category A and Category B, it seems to assume this further distinction and to advocate the inclusion in the content of the curriculum of **useful** subjects. The popular view insists that we should teach, principally, and perhaps solely, those subjects that are useful. "Useful" is a relational term: A thing is useful **to someone,** in view of **something.** On the popular view, subjects are useful to students in virtue of the role such a view proposes for education, namely that education ought to prepare students to function properly in society.

According to the popular view, decisions as to the content of the curriculum ought to be directed primarily -- and some maintain essentially and solely -- by a principle which I shall refer to as "Principle P.V.". This is that education should aim at producing people who function properly in society, that is, to get along well in their lives. And proper social function cannot be achieved without a job, that is, an activity involving financial compensation. Therefore what is taught should be useful to the student in the future, that is, should help in the securing of employment. This insistence on a strict correspondence between what is taught and employment is the mark of what I label "the popular view." While this vision of education is not new, it has been increasingly evident in recent years in response to the economic recession with which we have had to cope.

According to Principle P.V., in forming any decision as to the content of the curriculum, an investigation of areas where manpower will be needed in the next "X" number of years is necessary. Once this is established (if it can be established), one ought to propose the teaching of those subjects which will prepare students to work in those areas where jobs are expected to be available. Strictly speaking, one ought to discourage, perhaps even to abolish, the teaching of "non-useful" subjects.(5) Ultimately, what goes on in schools is determined by what goes on, or is expected to go on, outside schools.

Underlying this view is the assumption that proper functioning in society requires a job. A corollary assumption is that if one is successful in learning "useful" subjects in school, one will get a job (and, conversely, if one is not successful in learning "useful" subjects, one will most probably find it very difficult, if not impossible, to get a good job or, perhaps, to get any job).

Various objections have been made to this position, both by conservative and by radical educationists (including the "de-schoolers" and those with a socialist bent). The main objection voiced by the former group is that if one were to follow Principle P.V., we would end up with a process which should not be called "education", but "training". We would be robbing human beings of an experience -- education -- which is uniquely human.(6) Radical educationists object to the popular view on at least two grounds:

1. Principle P.V. does not take into account the varied capacities or inclinations (interests) of students. Even if it were argued that, by fitting students for employment, it does take their capacities and interests into account, can one really determine what are the capacities of students with regard to what kind of job they will be able to do? How does one determine such capacities? At what time should one attempt to determine them? These are delicate questions involving serious moral considerations.

2. Application of Principle P.V. does not lead to the exercise of freedom: we must distinguish "work" from "mere employment" or "labour". In most cases, a rigid application of Principle P.V. does not lead to "work" but to "labour". Labour it is argued, does not "free", it "alienates" employees. A rigid correspondence between education and jobs has a hidden by-product: inequality. It convinces "the majority that they are not good for anything but the most menial occupations" (Wringe, 1981, p.129).

This latter point was also made by Dewey, who while condoning the vocational aspects of education, wrote:

> There is a movement in behalf of something called vocational training which, if carried into effect, would harden these ideas (i.e., what he earlier termed "the aristocratic ideals of the past") into a form adapted to the existing industrial regime. This movement would continue the traditional liberal or cultural education for the few economically able to enjoy it, and would give to the masses a narrow technical trade education for specialized callings, carried on under the control of others. (Dewey, 1966, p.319)

This comment is very similar to those made by Antonio Gramsci who held that too much emphasis on vocational education would jeopardize any possibility of forming working class intellectuals (Entwistle, 1981).(7)

One might argue that this picture of the popular view depicts an extreme stance. One might agree that employment is frequently, especially today, adduced as a criterion in decisions

about the content of the curriculum, but it is never the sole criterion. A less extreme version of this view is maintained by some educational theorists, however, and since this version might seem more plausible, it is worthwhile to consider it. Warnock's position might be seen as an example of the less extreme position as she attempts to incorporate a balance of empirical and theoretical considerations.

Warnock's position: review and critique

Warnock seems to accept the distinction drawn by Categories A and B in Peters' work (1966), as well as the further distinction between useful and non-useful. Her general argument is that the subjects in Category A should be included in the curriculum content because they are "useful". The criterion she applies to determine whether or not something is useful shall be referred to as Mary Warnock's Principle W.P., which can be formulated thus:

- Something ought to be included in the content of the curriculum if it is deemed that by having learned such a thing, life on leaving school will be better, that this thing will help the student achieve "the good life."

- The essential considerations to be taken into account when one talks of "the ingredients of the good life" are work and the imagination.

- So, the "determinants of the curriculum" are work and the imagination. These are equally important.

Warnock's position seems to combine the two major approaches to the justification of curriculum content, i.e., the knowledge-centered view and the interest-centered view. It also takes into account theoretical and practical considerations mentioned by Bantock. Does Warnock resolve the issue of the justification of the content of the curriculum, or does she actually account for justification in terms of one but not both of the positions mentioned earlier? Can one produce a coherent way of justifying the content of the curriculum, by considering both work and the imagination, or does such an attempt lead to a principle or criterion too encompassing to be of any real help? Before attempting an answer to these questions, we must look closely at Warnock's position.

Let us start by looking at imagination and its implications. By imagination Warnock (1977) means "a human capacity shared by everyone who can perceive and think, who can notice things and can experience emotions" (pp.151-152). It is "involved in all perceptions of the world, ... it is that element in perceptions which makes what we see and hear meaningful to us" (p.152). It

is also an "image-making capacity" related, but not confined to, creativity. It is that by virtue of which "the significance of the world we live in" (p.152) is increased.

According to Warnock, educating one's imagination involves educating one's reflective and perceptive capacity, which may lead to creativity, but definitely leads to a life which is more interesting and meaningful. She includes "the imagination" as one of the essential criteria which we should take into account when making content decisions not only because educating one's imagination may lead to "good" things, but also and primarily because it is a good in itself. In her words, "there is no need to raise the question, 'Why do you want it?' ... if understood, it will be seen to be good" (p.153). Such a perspective resembles the one Peters adopts with regard to the notion of truth, and the one Wilson adopts with regard to "what interests someone."

Another argument Warnock adduces in favour of educating the imagination is that such a process will be helpful in eliminating boredom. She argues that such a process will lead students to focus their attention on specific subjects in which they are particularly interested. This will diminish boredom as she believes that: "It is only by considering a thing deeply and for its own sake that one can properly begin to enjoy or to understand it" (p.152). A corollary of Warnock's view is that students should have a variety of subjects to choose from and should be allowed to follow their inclinations as much as it is possible and thence, to specialize, "to become experts, even if this is in a relatively narrow field" (p.164).

Can the criterion of imagination as Warnock describes it be reconciled with that of work? Although work is only one of the ingredients of the good life, Warnock believes it is an essential one. She believes a life with work (by which she understands paid work) is **always** better than one without work even if that work is a "nasty job", a job which is "bad in all kinds of ways" (p.144). By the inclusion of work as a criterion in curriculum decisions, she means that what we teach children at school ought to be directed toward helping them to find employment when they leave school. Warnock feels that work involves an effort on our part to transform, order, and control the environment. This leads to satisfaction and a manifestation of our freedom. "Work", she says, "is ... a proof of human freedom" (p.146). The direct relation of work to freedom makes it an essential ingredient of the good life.

The first implication of applying the criterion of work to decisions about curriculum content is that information about what employment will be available in the future must be obtained. Planning must involve predictions and take into account as to the kinds of jobs which will be available in the future. In Warnock's view, this will inevitably involve control, and it is a responsibility

which should be largely borne by government. According to this criterion, then, an "educational activity" ought to be included in the curriculum content if it is "useful", and its usefulness is determined by whether or not it is a step in the series of steps which ultimately lead to employment. She writes:

> The ideal of a curriculum should be that what everyone begins with should be useful for the next step, so that at the stage where some people leave school they will be qualified for the next bit of education. (1977, p.147)

Those who have the opportunity of "the next bit of education," will find it to be a further stage which will lead ultimately to work. She admits that the application of such considerations will lead to a scheme that is "ruthlessly utilitarian" (p.151). She believes such a scheme, on its own, is unsatisfactory. It neglects the other essential dimension of education -- imagination.

Has Warnock succeeded in producing a coherent justification by combining the two components of "the good life"? Or does each of the components have characteristics and involve considerations such that they cannot be merged without creating new conflicts? Warnock believes they do not conflict, that ultimately each can be viewed as "a means to freedom" or "as a contributing part of freedom" (p.170). She concludes that the dilemma of the justificatory issue can be resolved by considering both work, and imagination, treating them on a par. "The crucial point in curriculum-building must be to ensure that none of these aspects of freedom is forgotten..." (Devlin and Warnock, 1977, p.67).

Can we always proceed in a way that allows us to consider "these aspects of freedom" on an equal footing? Given the way Warnock describes imagination and work, and given her views about how they are related to the educational process, is her position consistent? Can one offer a justification in which one essential criterion -- work -- involves control, and the other essential criterion -- imagination -- involves diversity?

Perhaps an adequate justification ought to take into account the two general considerations mentioned by Bantock. Although Warnock attempts this, and her position seems plausible on face value, the issue is not as simple as Bantock suggests. Warnock has not really resolved the conflicts that arise when one attempts to combine work and the imagination. At least two rifts arise from her position. This will be indicated by the following schema:

Work components

1. This component encourages and at times restricts, students to direct their efforts toward an occupation according to the directions dictated by those in power (government and/or industry). And she thinks "there is nothing ideologically harmful in this" (p.148).

2. The range of subjects to be included in the curriculum content will be restricted in accordance with whatever jobs are expected to be available.

Imagination component

1. This component encourages the utmost development of such capacities as creativity and reflectiveness and involves an emphasis on what "interests" the students even if these interests are not related to employment (p.155). (And there is no guarantee that what interests students will tally with what is proposed by those in power.)

2. This component encourages a wide range of subjects.

Although Warnock believes that the two "ingredients" do not conflict, she seems aware that they might be seen to do so. This is why she argues that work and imagination are related to each other via the notion of "human freedom." Even here there is a problem, for her notion of "work" is such that it admits of what she terms "a nasty job," a job that is "bad in all kinds of ways." Is it really the case that any activity for which one receives financial recompense is a form of work that involves a crucial relationship to and manifestation of freedom?

Warnock raises another point which might be seen as an attempt to resolve the impasse. In the section on work she says that "someone must try to work out roughly what kinds of jobs there will be for them...," that there has to be a "kind of central control" and that "schools must, if they are not to fail in their duty, consider the state of the market" (pp.146,147 and 149). But in the same breath she adds that "within the framework there should be enough diversity to accommodate different interests" (p.148). She does not tell us how to determine what should count as "enough diversity". Where do we draw the line and on what grounds? While she says that this will become clearer when she considers imagination, when she does consider this component the conflict becomes sharper. In the concluding section of her book, while she does not deny the charge of paternalism she reiterated the importance of considering the two components as "twins" (p.170).

Faced with such problems, it might be suggested that the

issue will be resolved if we accept a compromise between the two components. The two might become alternatives rather than conjuncts. On certain occasions priority would be given to work and on others to imagination. If one accepts this, one would not really be following Warnock's principle, but would have reverted to either the popular view or to a view which took only theoretical considerations into account.

Concluding remarks

From this brief investigation of Warnock's position it is evident that the justificatory issue is itself very complex and that agreement with regard to this issue is not close at hand. In this concluding section some suggestions will be made and some conclusions will be drawn about this issue.

The problem of justification. The issue of justification is unresolved: the major proposals or arguments offered are problematic in various respects. The issue remains a pressing one: crucial decisions must be made and made seriously. Some plausible and adequate justification needs to be found.

Some curriculum theorists, such as Denis Lawton, argue that since none of the main "theories" usually adduced for the justification of the content (the child-centered view, the knowledge-centered view and the society-centered view) provides on its own complete justification, "each one may have something to contribute to planning a curriculum as a whole" (Lawton, 1978, p.4). In other words, as Lawton maintains, "neither philosophy, nor sociology, nor psychology, can on its own justify a curriculum..." (p.4). Lawton concludes that in justifying the curriculum one has to take into account: (i) philosophical criteria, such as the issues of aims, worthwhileness, and the structure of knowledge; (ii) sociological considerations, such as social change and technological and ideological changes; (iii) the nature of the culture in question; and (iv) psychological theories of development, learning, instruction, and motivation. He fails to show us how to combine these components without creating serious conflicts. Each might lead to good reasons for making necessary curricular choices. But on what grounds do we establish priorities? How do we arrive at the best reasons?

Ethical theory. Given the nature of the justificatory issue we have been dealing with, it is obvious that any resolution of this issue must, at one stage or another, incorporate an ethical theory.

Political theory. Another important consideration which must be taken into account is the question "who should decide such curricular matters?" (This issue becomes more crucial if we are not able to produce a coherent and acceptable justification).

And this presupposes a political theory.

Labour and work. Although a "balanced position" seems to be more adequate, further work must be done to resolve the rifts such a position faces if it is to be workable. One consideration here would be to try to utilize a broader notion of "work" than that suggested by Warnock, whose notion of "work" is too narrow. It refers primarily to a job -- any job. It does not take into account the important distinction between work and labour made for example in the work of Hannah Arendt (1959) or Ivan Illich (1973). The major distinction between work and labour is that the former involves activities in which one utilizes some skill in order to create a product which can be seen as being the direct result of one's efforts and imagination, and one feels responsible for such a product. As Marx puts it, "One not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he realizes a purpose of his own that gives the law to his **modus operandi**, and to which he must subordinate his will" (quoted by Entwistle, 1983, p.6).

Again, in the same vein, Arendt considers work as "essentially expressive activity", an activity in which human beings realize themselves (i.e., they become more fully human) and the result of work is not seen as a product for consumption but exchange. And Illich identifies work as a process in which one uses tools "for fully satisfying imaginative and independent" (p.35) activities. Work, as an activity, cannot "be purchased or sold in the marketplace... only the result of convivial work can be marketed" (p.35).(8)

More recently, Robin Attfield (1984) elaborates on this distinction thus:

A. "Work may be contrasted with labour in that the product of work is the objective of the worker; whereas the point of labour is the rewards that it brings" (p.142). Labour is exclusively connected with contingent and extrinsic considerations; work is not. This does not mean that the process of work may not lead to extrinsic and contingent advantages. In essence, however, work is connected with the intrinsic relation between "the product of work" and "the objective of the worker." Thus Attfield concludes that "work can itself **be** a pleasure" (p.142). It is a pleasure when the objective of the worker is fulfilled in the realization of the product, irrespective of the extrinsic considerations. In this respect work can be included under Aristotle's notion of "schole" (leisure), that is, being involved in something worthwhile and valuable for its own sake, and, in Aristotle's own words, "of itself gives pleasure and happiness and enjoyment of life" (Quoted by Ozmon and Craver, 1981, p.69).

B. "Work, unlike labour, must have a point which the worker can endorse, involving standards of excellence which he or she can also endorse for the kind of product to be produced" (p.142). This point is not unrelated to the first one since according to Attfield, the second point implies that the worker will identify with his or her work. And this involves that the worker "works, or can work, autonomously," which, in turn means that work "displays our part in making, ... the presence of skill or judgment" and that the workers are "enabled to have some say in deciding how their work is to be executed" (p.143).

Proposal: Education-as-work. Taking such considerations about the distinction between labour and work into account might make it possible to develop a justification which views education as a form of work and work as a form of education.

The image Warnock's position suggests is that education is distinct from work. Education leads to work and therefore "preparation for a job" should be one of the principal aims of education. In my view the connection between education and work need not be limited to a cause-effect relationship. If education is viewed as a form of work and work as a form of education, then the strict division between education and work might be lessened. "Education-as-work" may lead to "work-as-education" but this does not mean that education ought to continuously and exclusively direct students to a specific type of job. As J.P. White remarks:

> Work being ideally an expression both of one's innermost reflections and of one's fraternal links with others, vocational education is merely one aspect of education for citizenship. **It has nothing to do with steering pupils into particular kinds of jobs:** its objective is to acquaint all pupils with the whole pattern of work within the community ... both as a background to their own choice of a career and so that they come to understand the mutual reliance of each on each. (1979, p.171)

Such a view is beginning to be expressed also by some people in business. For example, John Stoik, President and Chief Executive Officer of Gulf Canada Ltd., although perhaps still restricted to the cause-effect relationship between education and work, has recently stated:

> We must produce people who have been taught how to think; who understand and can deal with rapid changes; who have learned how to discipline their efforts. We need a system that positions graduation as a beginning and not an end; positions it as a focal

> point in an education process that continues through life regardless of age or position. (Stoik, 1984, p.A10)

The process of education and process of work could merge into a broader process which incorporates both and which goes on over a life-time.

If such a perspective is workable, planning that is based on predictions abut the employment market will be less important and perhaps not important at all. There are, at any rate, serious questions as to whether such predictions are reliable at all (Heyneman, 1981; O'Toole, 1981; and Silberman, 1982). The element of control which results from such limitations would be diminished thereby. And it might, in turn, be less difficult to resolve conflicts between work and imagination.

Resolving the conflicts between work and imagination is not an easy task. As early as 1916 Dewey wrote:

> The problems of education in a democratic society is to do away with the dualism (by which he understands "a division between a liberal education, having to do with the self-sufficing life of leisure devoted to knowing for its own sake, and a useful, practical training for mechanical occupations, devoid of intellectual and aesthetic content") and to construct a course of studies which makes thought a guide of free practice for all and which makes leisure a reward of accepting responsibility for service, rather than a stage of exemption from it. (1966, p.261)

Today we are still struggling with this problem.(9)

NOTES

1. Mary Warnock, a renowned British philosopher at Oxford University, has acted as a principal of a secondary school in England and more recently has chaired an inquiry for the Government into the education of the handicapped children. Warnock was also actively involved in the so-called "Great Debate" in England which was launched by the Prime Minister, Mr. James Callaghan, on October 15, 1976, when he gave an address on the nation's education at Ruskin College, Oxford.
2. A similar view has been defended by Bantock (1963) and Adler (1982).
3. One might argue that Warnock's consideration of work does not really correspond to Bantock's empirical considerations since Bantock is referring to relevant facts. It is true that

for Warnock work is seen as a value and a goal. But she goes beyond this. She proposes that we have to consider certain factual considerations related to this value, for example, see what kind of jobs will be available, balance out economic dilemmas, "listen to what the outside work demands" (Warnock, 1977, p.148), and give advice to students what to do. She refers to work as "the practical part after school" (1977, p.171).

4. A discussion and/or a reference to what I label the popular view can be found in the following: Entwistle (1970); Broudy (1978); Wringe (1981); Barrow (1982); Silberman (1982); White (1982); Apple (1983); and Feinberg (1983).
5. For example, in 1977 the Maltese Government abolished the Faculties of Arts and Science at the University of Malta, deeming the courses taught in these faculties to be "non-useful".
6. It is worth noting that such a position is also held by "old fashioned socialists" such as Gramsci, Simon, and Entwistle. The point is that mere training does not lead to the development of an autonomous, creative and responsible individual. Ideally, **all** students should be given the opportunity to acquire knowledge accumulated through cultural inheritance and do so critically, and then try to apply such knowledge in practice. (For references, see Simon, 1978, and Entwistle, 1981).
7. In the same vein McNeil (1983, p.120) writes: "Before W.W. II, British education accorded highest status to the cultural forms of the classical education of the gentleman class, and kept the technical knowledge of working people at lowest status. This legacy persists in subtle forms; one's perceived job future, inferred from one's class background, helps determine which kinds of knowledge one has access to."

   The following is another criticism of the popular view. This might be seen as an extension of the second criticism put forth by radical educationists. It is argued that if there is a strict correspondence between what is taught and employment, and given that the kind of employment that will be available in the future is determined by people outside the realm of education, then the value of what is taught is defined by others: the teachers, it is maintained, are simply acting as agents of those in power and the students will feel "estranged from much academic work" (Everhart, 1983, p.185). And this has several undesirable results: (i) education "is a totally determined institution," i.e., schools become merely "passive mirrors of an economy" (Apple & Weis, 1983, p.21); (ii) teachers and students "fail to be active agents in the processes of reproduction and contestation of dominant social relations" (Apple & Weis, 1983, p.21); (iii) there will be a dichotomy between conception and execution (Apple, 1983, p.148).
8. The distinction between labour and work is also made and applied by Pope John Paul II (1981, p.33).

9. Earlier versions of this paper were read at the St. Lawrence Institute, Montreal, and at the Department of Education seminar series, Dalhousie University. I benefited from the comments of the participants. Special thanks to William Hare who made several helpful suggestions.

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Dr. de Bono's Mechanical Philosophy:

Commentary and critical questions

Abstract

The following paper attempts to show that de Bono's "mechanical philosophy," in rejecting those qualities of mind which are not reducible to the characteristics of a passive mechanical system, of necessity also rejects the very criteria in terms of which that system might be understood. The result is that de Bono's mechanical philosophy is self-contradictory and comes to stand as its own refutation. The paper also attempts to show that where de Bono's concept of "lateral thinking" is taken to be the practical expression of his mechanical philosophy, such lateral thinking is necessarily incoherent since the principles of the mechanical philosophy preclude rather than establish its exercise. On the other hand, where lateral thinking is not to be taken as the practical expression of the mechanical philosophy, its injunctions, being without theoretical foundation, are to be dismissed as trivial.

Introduction

If the brochure one receives at seminars on Edward de Bono's "CoRT Thinking Program" is to be credited, his concept of "lateral thinking" is taking the educational world by storm (1). The Program is proclaimed as a "revolutionary breakthrough in the art of thinking and learning," heralded as "the most widely used thinking program in the world (over six million students)." The benefits of the Program, so the brochure assures us, are hailed

"by children from the jungles of South America and by top executives of the Ford Motor company." "Teach your children to think," the brochure trumpets, "and you'll teach them to succeed."

But what, exactly, is involved in this revolutionary breakthrough in the art of thinking and learning? What is to be understood by de Bono's concept of "lateral thinking"? And what is the nature of that theory of knowledge of which such lateral thinking is the practical expression?

According to de Bono, lateral thinking "has to do with rearranging available information so that it is snapped out of the established pattern and forms a new and better pattern" (de Bono, 1969, p.229). This ability to rearrange available information is derived from de Bono's underlying theory of knowledge where he points out that, "Instead of the usual philosophizing as to what goes on in the mind, the system offers a mechanical philosophy" (p.30). In this mechanical philosophy the mind is seen as constituted by the mechanical operation of its neural units. For de Bono, "the brain is described as the mechanical behavior of mechanical units. It is the organization of these units that provides the mechanism of mind" (pp.7-8).

The following analysis of de Bono's mechanical philosophy attempts to establish two points, the first of which is self-contradiction. If de Bono adheres to his mechanical principles he will be unable to account for those non-mechanical qualities of mind by virtue of which those principles acquire what coherence they do possess and his mechanical philosophy, as a consequence, comes to stand as a refutation of the criteria it was designed to demonstrate. Of course, if de Bono does not adhere to his mechanical principles in the course of explicating his mechanical philosophy he avoids the charge of self-contradiction but does so at the expense of rejecting his own system as to what goes on in the mind. Secondly, where lateral thinking is taken to be the practical expression of the mechanical philosophy - indeed, what it is to think laterally can be identified only in terms of the mechanical philosophy - its exercise is necessarily incoherent since the principles of the mechanical philosophy preclude the very things which lateral thinking demands. In other words, if de Bono adheres to his mechanical philosophy, he will not be able to re-arrange available information so that it is snapped out of the established pattern and forms a new and better pattern. Of course, if de Bono does not take his lateral thinking to be the practical expression of the mechanical philosophy, its exercise, lacking theoretical foundation, will be idiosyncratic and trivial.

By way of establishing these points, de Bono's mechanical philosophy will be considered under the following headings: (1) the nature of the "special memory surface"; (2) the epistemological premises of the mechanical philosophy; (3) the functioning of the

special memory surface; and (4) the concept of lateral thinking as an outcome of the mechanical philosophy.

The special memory surface

The organization of the mechanical units that provides the mechanism of mind is embodied in de Bono's "special memory surface", that which allows incoming information to organize itself by being processed by information patterns already established on the surface. "Old patterns can actually determine how the new ones are received," de Bono points out.

> This can mean that new information may only be received in terms of the old patterns. It is not the surface itself which is processing the incoming information but the previous patterns which have themselves altered the surface. It is the memory of previous patterns that processes the new ones. (de Bono, 1969, p.60)

In this scheme of prior pattern determinism the crucial feature of the special memory surface is that of its passivity, the fact that it does not process the incoming information but merely provides the conditions for previous patterns to process new ones. "The essential feature of the special memory surface," de Bono maintains, "is that it is a passive system which provides an opportunity for information to organize itself" (p.274). It is this characteristic of passivity which bestows on the special memory surface in particular and on de Bono's philosophy in general their mechanical quality, a quality he illustrates in a series of models. The "polyethylene and pins" model, for example, shows how hot water (new information patterns) poured over a polyethylene sheet suspended on pins will distribute itself into patterns conforming to those left by previous pourings (old information patterns). "The interesting thing," de Bono notes, "is that the memory surface does not actually do anything. It is quite passive" (p.59).

The quality of passivity determines the other characteristics of the surface. Thinking, for example, is a passive exercise, being nothing more than "a flow of activation across a passive memory surface, not an active stringing together of items from a memory store" (p.102). Further, there is no "thinker", no autonomous self who does the thinking. "The important point is that there is no separate agent which picks information out of the environment, stores it on the memory surface, then picks it off the surface in order to play around with it or use it" (p.274).

The difficulty, however, that immediately crops up in connection with theories such as de Bono's is obvious. How does he know all these things? If, like the rest of us, de Bono is himself possessed only of a passive special memory surface, how

is he able, in the absence of an actively conscious self who transcends the processing of incoming information by established patterns, to reflect on his flow of activation and report his findings in his theory of the special memory surface? If thought is a mechanical activity in which information organizes itself into patterns on our passive surfaces, could it be that the principle of such organization lies in the source of that information, in an environment which is meaningful independently of our knowledge of it? But to say this is to merely drive the question of the sources of de Bono's knowledge one step further, for, in order to know of such an independently meaningful environment consisting of an infinite range of information patterns there must be some further information pattern of which he is in possession and which has revealed to him that these external patterns are, in fact, independently meaningful. This is the only way de Bono is able to recognize the very existence of such patterns which, by definition, are both prior to and independent of his awareness of them. Put simply, de Bono must be in possession of some special access to reality-in-itself. As it happens, this is precisely what de Bono does claim.

Epistemological premises of the mechanical philosophy

What is to be understood when de Bono uses words to describe the mechanism of mind is that such use is sanctioned, on the one hand, by an unmediated knowledge of reality-in-itself, and on the other by the dispensation of a "special universe", one which is so different from our own that one plus one may well equal only one. When de Bono uses words, for example, such use is to be sharply distinguished from, say, that of an academic sitting in his academic tower. The reason for this is that:

> ....an academic sitting in an academic tower never need descend to examine the vagueness of the real world where complete data are impossible. Instead he examines the semantic consistency of the argument, the words themselves rather than the thoughts the words so imperfectly convey. (de Bono, 1978, p.38)

When de Bono descends to examine the vagueness of the real world where complete data are impossible, what he finds are his models of the mechanism of mind, things like the polyethylene and pins model and so on, and when he describes these models what his words do is to simply and impartially account for their functioning. Unlike the academic sitting in his academic tower whose words merely examine the semantic consistency of the argument, de Bono's words function as bare descriptions of reality-in-itself. When he sets up his models of the mechanism of mind, for example, what he does is merely watch "what happens when various processes and relationships are put together."

> There is no question of words chasing other words, creating and justifying each other in an endlessly circular fashion. Words are only used to describe the behavior of the model and this is independent of the words used. (de Bono, 1969, p.33-34)

The picture is that of two parallel tracks, the one representing reality and the other language. Where the academic's words merely chase each other about on the language track, de Bono's words make that transcendental leap over to the reality track where they then come to function as the objective description of such reality, a desription of that which is independent of the words used to describe it. de Bono's words, in other words, merely hold up a mirror to reality-in-itself.

The difficulty with all of this, of course, is the same as it was in the case of de Bono's knowledge of the existence of the passive special memory surface. How does he know that his words as descriptions of his working models do, and the words of the academic sitting in his academic tower do not, make contact with reality-in-itself? Could it be that de Bono enjoys privileged access to that "special universe", the one where one plus one may well equal only one?

The thing about de Bono's special universe is that what happens there,

> ....need not parallel what happens in the physical universe or even in the universe we know. Nor need the processes be the processes we take for granted as the only possible ones because we have grown up with them. It is possible to have a universe in which one plus one equals one and not two. (de Bono, 1969, p.56)

Undoubtedly, it is from this universe that de Bono speaks when, in respect to his memory surface, he reveals that, "The special universe of the surface leads to totally different behavior which can only be understood in terms of that universe" (p.125).

Since the behaviour of the special memory surface can be understood only in terms of that special universe to which de Bono has access, such behaviour, of course, must remain forever veiled from the eyes of the academic sitting in his academic tower. However, could the academic be blamed for protesting that de Bono has offered absolutely nothing beyond his simple stipulation for his claim that his words make exclusive contact with reality-in-itself? Could he be blamed for protesting that de Bono has offered absolutely nothing beyond his simple say-so that his special universe exists anywhere else than in his imagination? Could he be blamed for protesting that de Bono's appeal to a special universe, in which meaning as understood in the universe

that we (and de Bono) know does not exist is to come to serve as the sanction for meaning in the universe that we (and de Bono) have grown up in, is not to strike a blow for breadth of thought but is rather to engage in fantasy?

The functioning of the special memory surface

We have learned, so far, that the distinguishing feature of the special memory surface was its passivity. There was to be no agency associated with its behaviour, whether in the sense of one who initiated and directed thought, or in the sense of one who could transcend the contents of the surface and reflect upon them. In de Bono's determinism of prior patterns, new information was to be received only in terms of the old, established patterns. Can de Bono adhere to his mechanical principles in explaining the functioning of the special memory surface, or does such explanation come to stand as a refutation of the mechanical principles it was designed to demonstrate?

Brevity dictates limiting discussion of the memory surface to its three distinguishing features. These are (a) the "limited attention span", (b) the "short-term memory", and (c) the "internal patterns".

The limited attention span

Where it is not the memory surface itself which processes incoming information but the previous patterns which have themselves altered the surface, what, exactly, is involved in such processing? What do the established patterns do to the incoming information?

"When a large pattern is put onto the surface," de Bono explains,

> ....only a small part of the pattern is retained. The rest is simply ignored. The area of activation of the memory surface is strictly limited and cannot exceed this size. This limited area settles on the most easily activated part of the surface and this just means the part that has been used most frequently.... A limited attention span means that something is left out, but it also means that something is actively selected. It is this selection process, this ability to select, that is so important. Selection means preference and choice instead of total acceptance of all that is offered. It is this selection which is so often assumed to be impossible in a passive system. (de Bono, 1969, pp.84-85)

Semantic, conceptual, and functional difficulties can be seen to attach to de Bono's limited attention span. Initially, one can only wonder **why** there is no good reason to assume that this selection is impossible in a passive system, particularly in view of the fact that de Bono offers no reasons to assume it **is** possible. One can only wonder how, in particular, can the memory surface actively select something, can exercise preference and choice instead of totally accepting all that is offered yet, at the same time, be seen as a passive system which does not actually do anything. It can only be that de Bono's words, here "active" and "passive", have made contact with that special universe where what happens need not parallel what happens in the physical universe or even in the universe we know.

Conceptual confusion surrounds what is to count as a "large pattern." Does it correspond, say, to a dogbone lying on a carpet where the dog ignores the carpet-pattern and retains the bone-pattern since the area of activation on the dog's memory surface is strictly limited and cannot exceed bone-pattern size? Or does a large pattern mean something like de Bono's awareness of the fact that when a large pattern is put onto his surface only a small part is retained? The point, of course, is that de Bono, like all mechanists, tacitly invokes non-mechanical concepts to bestow meaning on his mechanical terms. Here the concept of "pattern size", one which is strictly meaningless in mechanical terms, is invoked to lend the semblance of intelligibility to his notion of "limited attention span", but, since derivative concepts share the attributes of their exemplars, both must be relegated to the realm of incoherence.(2)

Finally, functional confusion beclouds what is actually happening on the memory surface. For if "the area of activation of the memory surface" is strictly limited, what sense is there to the view that this limited area of activation then "settles on the most easily activated part of the surface," since the most easily activated part of the surface happens to be **identical** with the area of activation of the memory surface. The area of activation, in other words, must settle on itself. While the area of activation is settling on the most easily activated part of the surface, what has happened to that small part of the large pattern which was retained? By some process of transubstantiation intelligible only in the special universe, has it, perhaps, become transformed into the area of activation which then settles on the most easily activated part of the memory surface? And, of course, just what has all this to do with establishing how the limited attention span serves as a mechanism of selection in a passive system?

De Bono's attempt to secure the passive nature of the special memory surface's selection process by reference to spatial criteria, i.e., the limited attention span, has not met with success.

It is now time to attempt to secure it by reference to temporal criteria, i.e., the "short-term memory".

The short-term memory

Where the limited attention span consisted of a restricted area of attention determined by the established patterns on the special memory surface leading to active selection and discrimination, it is the short-term memory, consisting of those patterns just presented to the surface, which leads to active combination of those patterns. The short-term memory has considerable significance for education since, according to de Bono, "The combining property leads to association and learning" (p.90). While de Bono observes that: "The whole tendency of the special memory surface is to establish separate patterns and to go on reinforcing that separateness" (p.90), the short-term memory over-rides that tendency by means of alternating attention between two recent patterns presented in sequence.

> If the patterns occur in sequence so that attention moves from one pattern to the other and back again, then the short-term memory properties of the surface may combine them into a single pattern. From the alternation of the two patterns may emerge a third pattern which combines them both. This combining property of the special memory surface ultimately depends on the necessity of the activated area to be single and coherent. (p.90)

Semantic difficulties in connection with the short-term memory do not revolve around the simple meaning of words as with the limited attention span but rather appear in the form of de Bono's rendering the combining properties of the special memory surface analytical with the attributes he inscribed in the concepts in terms of which such properties are to be understood. In other words, the function of the short-term memory is to combine patterns occurring in sequence into a single pattern provided that the activated area on the special memory surface is single and coherent. But to be "in sequence", to be "single" and "coherent" is what it **means** to be combined. Explanation, however, requires more than analytical presupposition.

Conceptual difficulties arise in connection with the sharp distinction some behaviourists make between their own and other's mental processes. With his short-term memory he attributes to others a process of learning in the form of some simple associationism, but his own claim to knowledge of that short-term memory, of course, is inexplicable in terms of de Bono's alternating his attention from one pattern to another and back again.

Functionally, the principles of the mechanical philosophy rule out the short-term memory alternating recent patterns occurring in sequence since prior-pattern determinism requires information to be received only in terms of old, established patterns, that is, in terms of the long-term memory. In addition, de Bono is silent as to just **why** the short-term memory combines patterns ocurring in sequence. In the absence of that separate agent, there appears to be no particular reason to do so.

Of course, that separate agent who picks information out of the environment, stores it on the memory surface, then picks it off in order to play around with it or use it, is inscribed but unacknowledged in de Bono's account of the short-term memory. For, in order that two patterns may be perceived **as being** in sequence such that attention may move from one to the other in order **to establish** those similarities in terms of which a third pattern which combines them both may emerge, there has to be that separate agent who performs the operation. In his absence the whole performance of the short-term memory is incoherent. Where previously de Bono tacitly invoked that separate agent to bestow intelligibility on the selection of the limited attention span, it is now only by covertly appealing to that separate agent which the mechanical philosophy rejects, that short-term memory acquires some coherence.

The internal patterns

To resolve the contradiction contained in the view that, according to the mechanical philosophy, there is no separate agent who picks information out of the environment, stores it on the memory surface, then picks it off the surface in order to play around with it or use it, on the one hand, and on the other, according to the limited attention span and the short-term memory, the special memory surface actively selects some features from the environment and ignores others as well as combines patterns occurring in sequence so that a new pattern may emerge, de Bono re-defines what is to be understood by the "self". While he admits that the special memory surface "behaves as if it had a self" (p.120), and, indeed, "This self has a unity of consciousness" (p.120), what must be understood is that: "In spite of having a self the special memory surface has no trace of selfishness.... In the eyes of the special memory surface all features of the environment are equally desirable and there is total impartiality in dealing with them" (p.120). But why does the limited attention span select some features from the environment and ignore others? Does the short-term memory combine all patterns which are presented to it in sequence? To engage these perplexities, de Bono introduces his "internal patterns".

The internal patterns, for de Bono, are to be taken as being,

> ....the things usually examined under the headings of emotion, mood, motivation, drive. By internal pattern is simply meant some effect on the memory surface that is over and above the pattern left by information coming in from the environment. (p.206)

This "some effect" on the memory surface over and above the pattern left by information coming in from the environment shortly comes to constitute "the only contribution which the memory surface makes to these information patterns" (p.272). In turn, this "contribution" soon comes to "intrude on the memory surface and help(s) direct attention. Instead of the external information being left to self-organize on its own there is now an additional influence which picks out some things rather than others" (p.123). Further still, this "additional influence" comes to assume mastery over the special memory surface. "The only important point about these internal patterns", de Bono observes, "is that they dominate the memory surface" (p.206). Finally, we find that the internal patterns,

> ....provide the substance of self and individuality. Without the emotional aspect exactly identical information patterns would be formed on memory surfaces which had a similar exposure to information. On account of emotional variability these patterns may be very different. (de Bono, 1969, 1972) (3)

De Bono's introduction of his internal patterns to account for individual variability which was inexplicable in terms of the limited attention span and short-term memory has been costly. It has resulted in the collapse of his entire mechanical philosophy. It was the distinguishing feature of the special memory surface - itself the distinguishing feature of the mechanical philosophy - that it was a passive system which did not actually do anything. But we find that its contributions come to dominate the surface. Since the internal patterns are over and above the patterns left by information coming in from the environment, de Bono's scheme of prior-pattern determinism breaks down. The things usually examined under the headings of emotion, mood, motivation and drive which are over and above the pattern left by information coming in from the environment overturns the view of mind as the mechanical behaviour of mechanical units. Thinking ceases to be a mechanical flow of activation across a passive memory surface. Finally, if the internal patterns provide the substance of self and individuality without which incoming information patterns would be identical for those having similar exposure, then there appears to be no distinction between such internal patterns and that separate agent ruled out by the mechanical philosophy, the one who picked information out of the environment, stored it on the memory surface, then picked it off the surface in order to

play around with it or use it. With his internal patterns, de Bono purchased the beginnings of coherence as to what goes on in the mind, but he did so at the cost of surrendering the principles of his mechanical philosophy.

Lateral thinking

"To realize that a dominant idea can be an obstacle instead of a convenience," de Bono points out, "is the first principle of lateral thinking" (Harmondsworth, 1972, p.29).(4) As its name implies, lateral thinking aims at going beyond sequential or what de Bono calls "vertical" thinking.

> Lateral thinking is a generative process. Instead of waiting for the environment to change established patterns these are deliberately disrupted in various ways so that the information can come together in new ways. If any of these new ways are useful they can be selected out by any of the selecting processes. (de Bono, 1969, p.229)

The deliberate disruption of established patterns is effected by the use of "PO." This is de Bono's "new word". It is intended to signify neither acceptance nor rejection of a proposition but rather a temporary suspension of judgement. "The whole purpose of PO," de Bono explains, "is to provide a temporary escape from the discrete and ordered stability of language which reflects the fixed patterns of a self-organizing memory system" (p.259). Information can come together in new ways during this temporary escape by means of selecting processes embodied in CoRT techniques such as PMI (Plus, Minus, Interesting), CAF (Consider All Factors), and OPV (Other People's Viewpoints).

The difficulty, however, with de Bono's concept of lateral thinking is that, far from being supported by his mechanical philosophy from which it might seek to derive theoretical coherence, the deliberate disruption of established patterns is precluded by that philosophy. In order to realize that a dominant idea can be an obstacle instead of a convenience some further pattern or perspective is required to ground that realization. But in the mechanical philosophy, there is no further pattern or perspective, for the dominant idea is dominant by virtue of its domination of the memory surface. That is what constitutes a dominant idea. Oddly, this dilemma is explicitly recognized by de Bono.

> The errors, faults and limitations of information processing on the special memory surface are inescapable because they follow from the nature of the organization of the surface.... Nor can the faults be eliminated by deliberate avoidance since the system is

> a passive one. Nor is the recognition of the faults as they occur possible because this implies an alternative pattern for comparison. (p.210)

For the smooth functioning of lateral thinking, the mechanical philosophy has now become an obstacle rather than a convenience. Not only are errors, faults, and limitations inescapable and cannot be avoided by deliberate effort, they cannot even be recognized as being errors, faults, and limitations. One cannot satisfy the first principle of lateral thinking since one cannot even realize that a dominant idea has become an obstacle rather than a convenience. How, then, can established patterns be deliberately disrupted so that information can come together in new ways and how can any of these new ways be selected out if they are found useful? Who is it who will rectify these errors, faults, and limitations of information processing on our special memory surfaces? As a matter of fact, de Bono will.

> The only form of compensation for the faults is an awareness that they are inevitably followed wherever possible by techniques of using the surface that minimize the faults. Such techniques are then fed into the surface as organizing patterns that can possibly influence information processing. (de Bono, 1969, p.210) (5)

It is de Bono, after all, who not only has recognized our faults, errors, and limitations, but who is also aware that they are to be followed wherever possible by his techniques to minimize them, techniques such as "PO", "PMI", and so on, which he will feed into our surfaces as organizing patterns that can possibly influence our information processing. It is de Bono, after all, who excuses himself from the injunctions of his own mechanical philosophy - he **is** able to recognize his errors, faults, and limitations as they occur; his errors, faults, and limitations **are** escapable; his errors, faults, and limitations **can** be eliminated by deliberate avoidance. It is de Bono, after all, who continues to make his somewhat behaviouristic distinctions between his and others' mental processes, distinctions which he fails to support in terms of his own behaviourist criteria. For, if one wonders just how it is that de Bono can exempt himself from the principles of his own mechanical philosophy, the one which w3s to replace the usual philosophizing as to what goes on in the mind, de Bono can only remind us that he alone enjoys access to that special universe where what happens need not parallel what happens in the physical universe or even in the universe we know, a universe where one plus one may well equal only one.

Conclusion

I have attempted to show that de Bono's mechanical philosophy suffers from self-contradiction, that his explanation of his philosophy tacitly appeals to criteria which he explicitly rejects. I have also attempted to show that his concept of "lateral thinking" is incoherent since the principles of the mechanical philosophy preclude rather than establish its exercise. It is suggested, in view of these things, that the claim that lateral thinking constitutes a revolutionary breakthrough in the art of thinking and learning be given re-consideration.

NOTES

1. The initials "CoRT" stand for "Cognitive Research Trust". The "o" is added for purposes of pronunciation.
2. Where de Bono's concept of the "limited attention span" is meaningless in terms of its relationship to "incoming information", his notion of "area of activation" is internally incoherent. This area of activation involves "a single, coherent and limited area of illumination which moves about the surface according to what has happened in the past and what is happening at the moment" (p.83). The reason why this area of illumination is moving is because of the "tiring factor", which means that: "If there is a row of units with decreasing thresholds so that the threshold of each is less than that of the preceding unit, then activation will flow along the whole row without any pause" (p.101). However, since incoming information activated the most easily excited unit of the special memory surface, i.e., that with the **lowest** threshold, the single, coherent and limited area of illumination will **not** move about the surface according to what has happened in the past and what is happening at the moment. To say nothing about the ontological status of this moving area of illumination and its relationship to the rejected notion of the separate agent, its connection with the ability of the special memory surface to select on the basis of preference is obscure.
3. The derivation of the internal patterns is inconsistent with the notion of area of activation. de Bono maintains that the patterns emerge as a result of a "mismatch", where "a pattern of activation (which) tends to try to develop in two different directions at the same time. This unstable state could well give rise to an internal pattern such as fear or tension" (p.218). Since, however, patterns of activation are single, limited and coherent, it is not clear what it would mean for one to try to develop in two different directions at the same time. Again, in the absence of that separate

agent, it is not clear just how the mismatch could be perceived as being a mismatch.

4. The other principles of lateral thinking, "different ways of looking at things," the principle that "vertical thinking by its nature is not only ineffective in generating new ideas but positively inhibiting," and, finally, "the use of chance in the generation of new ideas," are either synonymous with or follow from the first principle.

5. When de Bono feeds his techniques into the memory surface what happens is called the "insight phenomenon". By way of describing the insight phenomenon de Bono employs his "D-line" diagrams, where "D-lines" are to be understood as depicting the flow of activation across the memory surface. Where X and Y are two entry points into the insight D-line diagram, de Bono explains that: Depending on what the previous patterns were, the flow might lead into the pattern shown at either X or Y. The usual entry point would be X, but if one day, because one had been thinking of something quite different, the entry point was to be Y, then the flash of insight would occur (p.164).

What de Bono is saying reduces to the claim that there is a pattern called the "insight pattern" - it is what the pattern would look like if insight were taking place - and there is an entry point to the insight pattern called the "insight entry point". If the insight pattern is entered by the insight entry point then insight occurs but if the insight pattern is not entered by the insight entry point then insight does not occur, since that is what the "insight entry point" means.

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Supervision and Anarchy

Abstract

Supervision is an important task performed in schools. This paper examines some of the problems with supervision identified in the literature. It explores the inconsistencies in supervisory practice.

Supervision and anarchy: the conjunction of these words strikes one as paradoxical. The claim that an important administrative task might be anarchistic seems far-fetched. The rational and reality-oriented world of management appears remote from claims that it is confused, disordered, and arbitrary. Yet the literature has acknowledged the anarchy in teacher supervision for many years, although little research has attempted to understand it.

The purpose of this study is not to apply a philosophy of anarchism to supervision but to explore the anarchy that already inheres in supervision. This is done by examining the literature and the dialogue of a collection of people who define themselves as supervisors. The study illustrates how supervisors make sense of their work.

Literature survey

There exists in the literature some suggestion of the anarchy. Most of the writing is prescriptive rather than descriptive. However, it has been recognized by some that supervision is plagued by, "...the persisting lack of an adequate theoretical base for either teaching or supervision...." (Storey and

Housego, 1980). It has been said of the present situation:

> The problem is ... an internal one: that in the absence of some cogent framework of educational values and of powerful theoretical systems, operational models, extensive bodies of case materials to consult, rigorous programs of professional training, and a broad literature of empirical research, supervision has neither a fundamental substantive content nor a consciously determined and universally recognized process - both its stuff and its method tend to be random, residual, frequently archaic; and eclectic in the worse sense. (Goldhammer, 1969, viii)

The inadequacy of the literature prompted Sullivan to comment upon the "great gulf" between theory and practice. She cautioned that, "Beginning supervisors are in for a surprise if they believe the description of their work in the literature" (Sullivan, 1982, p.448). McNeil and Popham further state that supervisors must resort to highly subjective procedures since there is "a lack of objective criteria for evaluating performance" (McNeil and Popham, 1973, p.228). Ryan (1967) adds:

> Value systems concerning teaching are relative rather than absolute. So far as specific characteristics of the teacher are concerned what is judged "good" teaching by one person, one community, or at one time, may not be similarly viewed as "good" by another person, another community, or at some time later. (p.51)

Some standard is necessary as a precondition for measurably improving performance. Such standards are the means whereby supervisors can move beyond relativity and subjectivity. Social science research has not provided conclusive answers to practitioners. The state of research on teaching was summarized two decades ago by Biddle who said, "after forty years of research we do not know who to define, prepare for, or measure teacher competence" (Biddle and Ellena, eds., 1964, p.3). More recently it has been acknowledged that, "research on teacher performance and teaching effectiveness does not lead to a stable list of measurable teaching behaviours effective in all teaching contexts" (Darling-Hammond, Wise, and Pease, 1983, p.285-328). It is generally agreed that, "the definitive theory for teaching has not been formulated" (Ryan and Hickcox, 1980, p.77). Experts have stated that, "there is little hope that research will bring authoritativeness to supervision" (McNeil, 1982, p.32).

Ann Lewis offered this overview:

> The practices are unclear and the principles are "shoddy" charges Michael Scriven of the Evaluation Institute at the University of San Francisco.

> "Effective systems of evaluation do not exist in schools today", reports Rory Natrillo of the Stanford University Center for Research and Development in Teaching after looking at a ten year accumulation of literature on the subject. Teacher organizations suggest their members to be wary of it. And principals, "feel very vulnerable about it", says Stanley Schainker, an evaluation expert with the San Francisco Far West Laboratory for Educational Research and Development. But as we are too aware, "Yet everyone does it." (Lewis, 1972, p.7)

The organizational fact of the matter is that supervisors do supervise with or without adequate theory. In Canada, collective agreements between teacher associations and school boards increasingly specify certain procedures be observed, and, in the United States, state legislatures have become involved by mandating in law procedures for the review of teachers' performance (Ryan and Hickcox, 1980).

To do their job supervisors must rely on their professional judgment. It is felt that with experience and training an administrator can develop the judgment required to fairly assess the quality of instruction and even assist teachers with their work. Problems with this reliance on professional judgment have been recorded. Worth (1961) reported that sixty-three school superintendents and sixty-five school principals, after viewing a fifteen minute videotape of a grade one teacher at work, ranged in their ratings of her teaching performance from "Exceptional: demonstrates a high level professional skill" to "Doubtful: has not demonstrated suitability for teaching." Worth's study reinforces the fact that professional supervisors do not necessarily agree, even about the same teacher.

Educators have evidence to further indicate that different practitioners observing the same teacher will make very different evaluations of that teacher. The following experience is typical:

> One of the writers recalls - somewhat painfully - participating in a carefully controlled reliability study of supervisory ratings. Five experienced, skilled supervisors did two separate evaluations of each of four student teachers. Ratings were made of eleven aspects of their teaching. The rating scale seemed both sophisticated and simple to complete. All of the experimental classes were tape recorded and rated independently by an experimenter... The results? The supervisors' disagreement about the teaching they were evaluating ranged from 50 to 100 percent. (Mosher and Purpel, 1972, p.50)

Obviously, the supervision of instruction under such conditions is

a difficult undertaking. The meaning of "good teaching" has more to do with the perspective a supervisor brings to the situation than with the application of eternal truths.

It is by exploring supervisory practice that researchers can find out how supervision works in the absence of adequate theory. This fact has been emphasized by writers who suggest that supervisory effectiveness depends on situational factors (Stogdill, 1974, p.74; Darling-Hammond, Wise, and Pease, 1983, p.320).

The possibility of multiple conceptualizations of role has been forwarded in theory. Goldhammer, Anderson, and Drajewski (1980) state:

> In such a loosely organized situation, it is possible that some individuals in each group perceive the supervisor's role as emphasizing quality control, or the production of new courses of study and curricula. Others may conceive of the role as being largely concerned with evaluating curriculum and/or instruction. Still others see it as working with professional personnel to seek new answers, or releasing the potential energies of teachers who wish to find answers for themselves. Many other possibilities come to mind. (p.13)

Multiple conceptualizations in actual practice have been recorded. Two cases recently cited are as follows:

> From my view of the documentation of a typical case of teacher dismissal, for example, I noted that the teacher had received a negative evaluation from the principal because s/he was not using a variety of materials; the ensuing evaluation by a superintendent was negative because the students, in using a variety of materials, were not studying the same topic. In another case I reviewed, the teacher was told by the principal to use more seatwork and to lecture less; the superintendent, on a subsequent visit, criticized the teacher for using too much seatwork and not teaching to the whole class. I would argue that neither the principals nor the superintendents concerned had solid evidence to suggest that their particular directives would improve the performance of the teacher in helping students learn the intended content. (Ryan, 1983, p.20)

Investigation of the meaning of supervision for trained practitioners has documented confusion. From interviews, Haughey (1980) collected these definitions:

> I have the responsibility that the curriculum is being taught and taught well, and that children have a good

> environment for learning. I never think of going in to supervise and would hope teachers feel the same. I am going in to help -- it is because I see what is going on. I do need to know and I should know.
>
> It means dispatching of duty... making sure that what is expected to be taught is taught and taught well.
>
> Supervision? - the improvement of instruction. It can be separate from evaluation and it is an unfortunate role for principals that they are required to do both. It is easiest at the beginning of the year but as the year goes on it becomes harder to help. It is not difficult to combine the roles when you are positive about what is happening. Basically I may withdraw from the supervisory process when it is likely that it is going to be negative -- it is a contradictory role. (p.10)

The consequences of the anarchy associated with supervision have been felt in the everyday lives of educators. Teachers have reported that the time spent with supervisors was "utterly wasteful" (Blumberg & Amidon, 1965). Supervisors have been met with "open and hidden opposition" (Canadian Education Association, 1979, p.52). Supervision has been called, "a private cold war", by Blumberg, who suggests that, "Teachers tend to say they find their supervision of little value" while "Supervisors tend to say they find their work has a lot of value" (Blumberg, 1980, p.19).

Proponents of supervision have been unable to find much evidence to show that any kind of supervision makes a difference (Dussault, 1970, p.57; Mosher and Purpel, 1972, p.50). In cases of teacher dismissal even the courts have shown reluctance to accept the credibility of supervisory practice (Martin, 1983). The literature's exhortations and detailed process statements have not met the challenge. Policy documents further reflect this failure. There is even evidence to suggest that the net effect of a supervision system on teachers may be an overall decline in their performance (Brown, 1962, p.178-184).

There is an anarchy associated with supervision. Evidence to support this statement is readily available in the literature. The goal of this study was to further understand the variance in supervisory behaviour, to make sense of the anarchy. The achievement has been to produce an explanation, a way of understanding the meaning of supervision through understanding individual supervisors.

The study

This research investigated the subjective meanings that supervisors place on the experience of supervision. The problem was to "see" supervision through the eyes of those who supervise. In question form: How do supervisors understand their actions as supervisors? This approach to the study of formal organization implies that, "the attention of the researcher be focused not on specific organizational behaviour but on the way organizational members interpret their own organizational world..." (Jehenson, 1973, p.220). What do supervisors think they are doing?

An in-depth, open-ended interview format emerged from some initial pilot work as the most appropriate research method to use. The strength of this kind of interview lies in its ability to elicit personal opinions, knowledge, and understandings, and to be open to divergent views. It is questionable at best to assume that the retrospective impressions of administrators about their supervisory practices constitute adequate support for constructing a picture of what really occurred, but it is not the specifics of behaviour actually exhibited which were of primary interest in this investigation. The meanings that inform individual behaviour were under investigation. In the words of Bogdan and Taylor (1975), "the important reality is what people imagine it to be" (p.2).

The study did not take the simplistic position that perception is reality. It does, however, consider anything that has effect as real. Perceptions of the social world are real in the sense that they have an effect in the social world through individuals' actions. It is in this sense that people are killed by "empty" guns.

Five supervisors were interviewed on site and the interviews were taped and later transcribed. A follow-up interview was scheduled with each one after the previous interview had been transcribed. The researcher reflected back on the transcript to note points that needed clarification and to note areas that had not been fully explored. Interviews took place so that the researcher and the participants were satisfied that the supervisor's understanding of supervision had been explained. An average of three interviews of approximately one hour exhausted the topic.

Five educators with supervisory responsibilities - a superintendent, a high school principal, an elementary principal and vice-principal, and a department head - are reported on at this time. The variance in the behaviour of these supervisors was analysed and accounted for by way of an interpretive tool labeled "supervisory orientation". It was found that each behaved in a unique but consistent manner. Each was guided by his or her own supervisory orientation. Since no two supervisors had the same orientation it is difficult to speculate on the number of orientations possible. This aspect of the study will be reported

on in detail in the following section of this discussion.

Supervisory orientation

Supervisory practises were characterized by unique and preeminent orientations identified by the researcher. These emerged as the researcher reflected upon the common themes and differences in supervisors' accounts. A description of each orientation "grounded" in the supervisors' own words can be reported.

Supervisor as politician.

Participant one's orientation to supervision was as "politician". He appeared to define his supervisory situation mostly in terms of manoeuvering for power in a group. He suggested that he himself was being supervised through a "whole informal network of supervision that dictates how well you're doing." "Everything's laid on in response to perceptions." He further stated that there was, "a huge network out there that's constantly talking to one another, constantly evaluating, constantly shifting, constantly generalizing." And, "That is very much on my mind most of the time." He followed group pressure over personal conviction.

This superintendent identified several "audiences" or groups with whom he had to work. These included principals, fellow workers in the immediate office, region-wide administrators, parents, and trustees. In any given issue, "one of those audiences can predominate." Survival entailed, "getting feedback from everybody." Negotiation was essential since very often as in the case of a trustee, "She's going to need me and I'm going to need her." In this view, it seems that "There are no blacks and whites. It's all greys and shades." Successful negotiation with the appropriate audience determined the perception of his effectiveness. In his subjective organizational environment he believed, "I guess I'm effective as long as I'm not fired." Developing authority was discussed as a critical factor. Authority could be enhanced with information. His associations with other superintendents gave him knowledge that others did not possess, and thus respect. Past experiences, self-reliance, and reliability also added to that respect, and so to his authority. Symbolic authority was exercised by his presence at school events where he represented an order who approved and was interested in what is taking place in schools. Inclusion of the discussion on getting and maintaining authority and influence was an indicator of the political orientation.

Knowledge about events lower down the organizational hierarchy was described as necessary as it could be used to get respect and authority from peers and superiors. Toward this end the superintendent said, "If I can develop a network of people who

trust me or whatever, to communicate with me so I know what's going on out there, then I am perceived not as a fountain of knowledge, but as if they want to know, he'll know kind of person." Once again the theme of manoeuvering for power in a group emerged.

The superintendent's duties reportedly revolved around principals more than teachers. His comments on both, however, further revealed his "politician" orientation to management. Guidelines for principals were negotiated with a principal's group in a retreat setting. The parties support one another in day-to-day activities although the superintendent maintained that when final decisions were are made, "it's my perceptions that count, not theirs." The areas suggested by the superintendent as part of principals' evaluations were derived from research. They were consensual norms not the superintendent's personal criteria.

Principals, it would seem, were also evaluated on their ability to manage everyday conflict with a minimum of public controversy and negative repercussions for the superintendent's image. A good principal could capably manage perceptions. Political skills were similarly valued in teachers. Good teachers could effectively control and manage students and yet maintain good rapport.

Teachers who did not follow orders or who were ineffective at the exercise of power in class would reportedly be dismissed. The superintendent described how most ineffective teachers would be negotiated out. The teacher, administrators, and teacher federation representatives would be involved. The "politician" orientation was apparent again in the superintendent's view of his role in support of dismissal. In one case he seemed to see his role as supporting a principal and gave the researcher the impression that a teacher should be fired not entirely for undesirable classroom performance but for having been a "troublemaker" in a school.

A political orientation to teacher evaluation was apparent in other statements. He acknowledged that a supervisor's perception of a teacher was influenced by others' comments. He stated, "what parents are saying, what the kids are saying to their parents about that teacher -- it's a form of supervision" especially when it is, "reported to a superior". Similarly, "If I get fifteen phone calls that say the same thing about the principal, I've got to think the guy has a problem relating with his community or problems with his supervision practises or there is a problem somewhere."

The exercise of authority was described in terms of will and power. He felt that all things being equal, persistence (i.e., unrelenting will) would prevail. A supervisor had to have the "guts" to make a decision and stand by it. The everyday

technique of management involved staying in tune with the political environment and exercising legal bureaucratic power over the principals he supervised.

The superintendent would appear to have perceived himself as working in an essentially political environment where people's perceptions determined effectiveness and he had to perform to meet the expectations of various audiences. He exercised his influence on events through negotiations, will, and power. In light of this, the everyday paperwork was relatively insignificant, little more than, "the paper chase, trying to make it rational as possible, and analysing it."

Supervisor as judge

Participant two's orientation to supervision can be described as "judge". This high school principal's primary concern was with making a good assessment of a teacher. Even though he felt the supervision policy tried to be "more helpful" he meant by this only that judgments could be better communicated.

The supervisor seemed to emphasize judging teachers' performances instead of cooperatively working with teachers on classroom improvement. Consequently, he felt that, "seeing someone every third year from the school is adequate." His purpose for a visit would be, "as simple as I'm coming in to see what kind of teacher you are." He might want to evaluate "things that had been suggested to a teacher" or simply anything else he felt like commenting on. Judgments were made outside classrooms too. The principal stated, "I'm supervising a teacher if a teacher comes in and asks me what I think of a program..."

His practice, as he described it, was to act in a judgmental role. If he thought a teacher was adequate he did not return to the class. Once judgments were made and communicated to a teacher in a report he did not work with the teacher to make the changes. In contravention of formal policy the supervisor did not ask teachers to sign reports to acknowledge having seen them. This practice is in keeping with the logic that the goal is to pass judgment, not to look for agreement or an acknowledgement of the judgments made.

If teachers were judged to meet minimum expectations the principal claimed not to involve himself with them. In cases where complaints from parents or students were received he would encourage the parties to talk directly to one another and not through him. "Hard core problems" that met his minimum standards he would similarly, "tend to live with." This applied even where he did not personally like a teacher.

In practice he, "sat there in class, and you do this off the top of your head, depending on the nature of what class it is and

how things strike you, part way through, I just started numbering different activities." If he judged the class in question to be acceptable he simply offered compliments and suggested a few ideas on a report.

If the supervisor judged something to be inappropriate about a teacher, he acted. He once withheld a teacher's salary increment because the teacher dressed too flamboyantly. He compared this problem to a teacher who had bad breath saying, "Kids won't go for extra help to a teacher who's got bad breath because they can't stand being breathed upon." To the flamboyant dresser he said, "I think you're competent but you haven't demonstrated it in what the kids are doing, and here's the reason. I think clothes are the reason." Criteria for effective teachers were not articulated in any detail.

Consistent with his orientation, this supervisor reported he made judgments and ordered compliance. Difficult supervision was described in terms of: "Tough is where the teacher is not very good and won't admit it." Teachers thought to be poor were moved or fired. The principal seemed to use few, if any, techniques for compliance other than direct orders.

Supervisor as bureaucrat

Participant three's primary orientation to supervision can be described as a bureaucrat. His approach to supervision was guided by a basic concern for the fulfilling of obligations within the context of his understanding of the organizational environment. The operative definition of the supervisory situation, his understanding of effective teaching, and his techniques for influencing others all reflect this orientation to responsibilities.

The elementary principal defined the supervisory situation in terms of an organizational hierarchy. "And it's the same old story whether it is supervision, whether it is home and school, whether it is an activity outside of the school, so goes the principal, so goes the school, so goes the superintendent for his schools." The principal was most concerned with the teachers under his charge and his immediate superior. At one point in casual conversation during the study the principal suggested he would not want to be a superintendent because then he would have several immediate bosses rather than one clearly defined superior. He was comfortable in a well defined bureaucratic hierarchy.

Initiative in his case meant implementing an idea even before his superior requested it. He said of his latest new school thrust, "I thought, well, this is coming down the pipe anyway so why not get in with all two feet." He took pride in teachers who had implemented an idea that was strongly promoted by the superintendent. He viewed the school organization as a process

where an idea, "...trickles down the line to the principal and teacher." Formal policy was less significant than formal policy his immediate superior supported.

Effective teaching meant doing something consistent with the latest policy. Moreover, it included not being complained about by others. Teachers who had once been satisfactory became unsatisfactory if they failed to adopt the latest policy fad, which was equated with improving the lot of kids. With this background it is possible to make sense of the statement, "If we can't improve the lot of kids in the classroom it doesn't matter how good a teacher you are." Complaints from others (i.e., parents, teachers) could also be interpreted as signs of ineffectiveness. In the principal's example, "and no way do I want to be getting phone calls from parents.... You just can't take it. It will drive you around the bend."

Staff was managed partly in a bureaucratic style. The principal accepted his statement of goals from the superintendent. He implemented these goals closely following the policy procedures and adding any new ideas sanctioned by his superior. He also employed peer pressure and reinforcement. For example, in order to promote a change, an individual teacher who would willingly choose to implement one of the approved ideas was sought out. Once successfully implemented, he would create a public situation where the same teacher then would be held up as an example to others. The principal commented, "I find they pack things up right, left, and centre" and "That goes over bigger than me telling them that this is a good idea, the vice-principal, the superintendent, forget it." All this was done in as friendly a manner as possible.

His anecdotes about supervision typically ended with an exhortatory testimonial like, "Experienced teachers admit every year that they have done a better job because of the supervision practice." Teachers would be checked on and encouraged to take on a goal, like that of the exemplar teacher, in their formal supervision cycle. Formal procedures were eventually used to ensure that teachers changed.

Supervisor as nurturer

Participant four's orientation to supervision can be interpretively described as "nurturer". His inclination was to want to help people grow in ways they saw fit although he recognized that both he and the teacher worked under outside constraints. He was reluctant to impose his will. The source of his reluctance he attributed to his "philosophical background". His "Rogerian approach" suggested that, "I should be promoting growth, and I should involve people from within themselves and help them grow that way - and from my own makeup it's just not natural for me to have to say look, that is it." He refused to discuss supervision

situations where conflict had arisen because he was not "comfortable" discussing them.

As to the goals of supervision, the participant reported, "I don't know really what they were before and I'm not sure that we can agree what they are now." His preferred way of establishing goals emerged in his comment, "In the business of supervision... the teacher has definite goals which I look at and work on and spend a lot of time on with the teacher...." He wanted supervision goals to come from teachers. He concluded that, "supervision is more open, more free" than a formal teacher evaluation.

The supervisor distinguished between supervision and evaluation. "I'd see supervision as just growth without the evaluative component." At the same time he recognized that certain "we" expectations had to be met. He was reluctant to be in the role of enforcer since supervision was best if it was not overly "directive, arbitrary, and artificial" in the way that he himself had experienced it. Ideally, he wanted to, "Try to work with them rather than imposing something, if possible."

The vice-principal's orientation to supervision may have been in transition. He was uncomfortable in talking about supervision. The political nature of supervision was recognized. The question he asked himself was:

> Are there people too, from a different set of experiences, who don't know about Carl Rogers for example, active listening for example, but who know the expectations and know they can get their way... authoritatively? If so I want to find out about that because if it would be better to take a different stance from time to time than the one I'm accustomed to, I should know about it.

This supervisor wanted to know if he could "handle it."

Supervisor as salesman

Participant five's orientation to supervision was characterized in his own words as "salesman". He described his role as that of presenting the policy to teachers in such a way that they "bought" it. His work was "marketing" to teachers. The supervisor complained about the process of supervision policy implementation. What he had was a policy that he wanted to support but with limited opportunity to use his own "marketing" strategy to sell it. Some aspects of implementation used by the school system were criticized on the grounds that they were "bad marketing". He defined the supervisor's role saying, "When they are the messengers of administrative policy they at least are administrators' lackies."

The department head did not offer a description of good teachers except to say that he would not receive negative feedback from peers, students, or parents about them. He was concerned with influencing teachers as opposed to evaluating them. Evaluation was the responsibility of the more senior administrators.

The present supervision policy asked teachers to identify areas of weakness with which they would like assistance. The supervisor noted that in training workshops this was said to work. In practise it was extremely difficult to get teachers to give up their defensiveness and work in trust and cooperation. High school teachers in particular liked to use subject knowledge superiority to reduce the credibility of supervisors. The supervision policy in general had created a sense of no involvement, of imposition, and even of fear. Teachers thought of it as just another "bandwagon". His problem was to overcome client resistance and "get results".

The supervisor stated that he tried to "sell" teachers on looking at the aspects of their teaching that were identified in broad policy. He felt that the process helped him to reason a common definition of teaching. From the senior administration's point of view, he felt, "the most important thing is that we all do the same thing." He was concerned with imparting common understandings whereas formal policy emphasized a common supervision process.

Techniques were employed to "sell" the policy to teachers. In a casual setting he would, "Essentially enter into the conversation through analysis of action." Teachers would typically be asked what they thought was happening and he would offer, "to come in and take a look and see what's happening with that other set of eyes." He would try to negotiate with the teacher to identify a problem with which he could be seen to help. An invitation of some kind was sought. He would try to help so, "they decide, well he isn't out to get me, then away we go." Next he would make suggestions and thus his influence would be exercised.

The formal imposition of the supervision policy was inconsistent with the participant's natural leadership style. Consequently, he resisted the explicit formalizing of influence which, by his personality and wit, he could accomplish informally. He felt restricted by the formal process. It interfered with his casual-disarming style. He complained that formal supervision was lengthy, time consuming and only one facet of his job. "For all the nitty gritties that make the plant operate, avoid the (prescribed) approach...." He described his practise as working in the "spirit" of policy while not, technically, following it.

Conclusion

Theory and research have failed to provide an adequate body of knowledge to guide supervisors. Policy documents reflect this failure. Nevertheless, supervisors do supervise. It is important, then, that we understand this everyday phenomenon. What do they think they are doing?

There is an anarchy to supervision. Evidence to support this statement is readily available in the literature. The achievement of this study has been to produce an explanation, a way of understanding the meanings of supervision through understanding individual supervisors. It has made sense of the anarchy at the level of individual supervisors.

The study found that supervisory behaviour was guided by a specific orientation to the task. Consider how the orientations that were described might affect supervision with a teacher. The first supervisor would supervise a teacher by keying to whatever political forces were at work and had most influence. A good teacher would generally be in control and exercising influence in a reasonable way. However, teacher effectiveness would be mainly judged using the supervisor's criteria and that judgment would be determined by the political realities surrounding the situation.

Participant two's orientation was that of judge. If no complaints had been received and teachers had a reasonable appearance they would be judged competent. Some comments for changing behaviour might be made but would not normally be followed up. If something was unacceptable in the supervisor's view there would be action taken to eliminate the teacher from the situation with no inclination toward trying to help the teacher change.

The third supervisor would try to get a teacher to implement an idea sanctioned by his immediate superior. His bureaucratic orientation resulted in his following very closely whatever procedures were outlined in policy. Success would be measured in terms of how a teacher implemented a new idea without weight being assigned to the possible impact on student performance. Most importantly this supervisor's superior should be informed and pleased.

A nurturing orientation guided supervisor four. He would try to make teachers identify their own developmental ideas. The supervisor's role was to support and encourage. If teachers' plans proved inconsistent with board policy the supervisor would have to act even in opposition to his own orientation.

The supervisor was uncomfortable with imposing ideas and making judgments. The inconsistencies of these beliefs and his

obligations made him helpful to some teachers but unhappy and perhaps ineffective at imposing administratively sanctioned values.

The last supervisor's "salesman" orientation meant that his focus was on process. A natural style of influencing others would, whenever possible, be employed instead of the formal process. He understood his role as the selling of sanctioned ideas to teachers. Success was in convincing others through his personal marketing strategy.

Therefore, the single line teacher working in a school district in which all the supervisory personnel had been trained in a similar manner could be transferred, dismissed, safeguarded due to political reasons, ignored if properly dressed, encouraged to implement a superior's idea, supported and encouraged in their own priorities, or subjected to a "hard sell". These orientations to the supervisory function guided everyday practice and could better predict the experience of supervision than a reading of formal policy.

The variance in supervisory behaviour has been accounted for by way of the heuristic tool labelled supervisory orientation. It was found that each supervisor had a unique and recognizable core orientation that guided supervisory practise. Supervisors made their own sense of their role responsibility. The literature about supervision does not recognize the full effect of orientations such as those identified and described in this work. Administrative science needs more tools like this if it is to move beyond broad generalization to understand the variance, the way in which each person is and makes the organizations we experience in everyday life.

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Book Reviews

Canadian Education Association Report
Suzanne Tanguay, Editor.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NATIVE EDUCATION
Toronto, Ont: Canadian Education Association, 1985
91 pp. $6.00.

This report offers a brief survey of the developments in native, that is Indian, Inuit, and Metis, education during the last ten to fifteen years, focusing particularly on developments occurring since the national Indian Brotherhood's 1972 publication of the landmark paper "Indian Control of Indian Education," and the subsequent acceptance by the Federal Government of the basic objectives detailed in that paper.

After acknowledging the sorry plight of educational programs and opportunities for native peoples that has existed in this country for decades, the report focuses on "the governments, school boards and schools that are actively involved in native education," giving emphasis to, "the more positive developments of the past decade." The CEA absolves itself for this unrealistic bias by pointing out that its "reports are apolitical" and are intended to make educators aware of what is happening in other school boards across the country.

It is axiomatic that education programs for Canada's native peoples are not good enough. After fifteen years of involvement in native education, I have yet to meet a native person who is satisfied with the educational programs and opportunities available for native peoples. On the other hand, I have met many non-native educator-bureaucrats who are certain that all is well, or at least that everything possible is being done and that tremendous progress has been made. Asking such bureaucrats to describe the condition of and developments in native education is akin to asking Brer Fox and Brer Wolf to comment on the physical and intellectual well-being of Brer Rabbit. This is precisely the format followed in the CEA report.

Responses to questionnaires on key issues in native education provide the gist for several sections of the report. These key

issues include relationships between school boards and native students, local control, the training of native teachers, teacher in-service, and the development of relevant curricula and materials. While these are without doubt the central issues, it is unfortunate that in most instances the wrong people were asked the questions, or the wrong person was given the responsibility for answering. In the second and major section of the report, The Departments of Education: New Directions, where responses are attributed to particular officials, I only recognize one native respondent. She, not insignificantly, holds a senior position in one of the few provinces where native educational issues are being given the priority they deserve. Several of the responses smack of bureaucratic insincerity and in two cases of outright tokenism. Rating the twelve provincial and territorial responses, one can only conclude that more than two-thirds of the country's departments of education have no more than a token commitment to improving native education.

Similarly, the optimistic nature of the responses from school boards and other educational agencies across the country regarding the issues noted above is sullied once the reader realizes that "only school boards judged to be in an area with a significant native population" were contacted, and that of those contacted less than half responded (45.8%: 93 out of 203). Obviously even someone who is as leary of statistics as this writer can recognize half a picture when he sees it. Had those who did not respond nothing to say? Had there been no changes or developments? Could it be that nothing is happening in terms of improving the educational lot of native peoples in the areas served by the non-respondents? One must suspect that this is the case. And what of those who were not asked? The issue is not only the provision of glamorous and high profile survival schools in inner cities, of the production of glossy native studies kits and media presentations on totem pole carving and "our native heritage," but of down-to-earth, nitty-gritty but realistic, high quality education for those original peoples of this country who have traditionally lived with the land, and who still choose to do so.

I have commented elsewhere that what is needed to underpin effective and realistic educational programs for whatever people can be summarized in the simple paradigm of policy, structure, and practice (Wilman, 1981). Policy is provided through legislation which enables and requires the delivery of educational programs appropriate to a region and or people, and which clearly establishes who is responsible for the direction of those programs. Structure pertains to the services, materials, and administrative and communication arrangements required to deliver those programs, that is to the provision and training of teachers, the development of curricula and materials, and to the sort of interdepartmental, and intergovernmental communications which facilitate these. Practice refers to the actual delivery of programs at the school level, and should depend on established

policy and structure. In terms of educational programs for the majority of Canadians it does. For many of our minorities, including native peoples, it does not. As can be seen in the CEA report we have policy without structure or practice in some cases, and this can only lead to frustration and failure. We also have practice without structure or policy which leads to failure and recrimination. Essentially it is a hotch-potch of partial solutions, of well-meaning but misguided efforts, of bureaucratic indecision and procrastination. Despite the advances detailed in the report, and please don't misread me because some of the developments described are excellent, in general terms education for native peoples in Canada is still second rate. Its second rateness must be attributed to the ethnocentricity of our educational bureaucracies who have never accepted the fact that minority groups have the innate ability to act in their own best interests and to direct their own affairs, including the education of their children.

Spolsky (1978) points out that in the Center for Applied Linguistics' (1973) report, "Recommendations for Language Policy in Indian Education," local or community control of education is given first priority, and that the role of parents should be paramount in this control. Dewey, writing almost fifty years ago, almost prophetically discussed this sort of issue. He argued that educational planning should never take place without careful regard to the experience of those planned for. It is not possible to ensure a good educational experience in the present if what is planned does not relate to, is not derived from, the experience of the past. He suggested that "the trouble with traditional education was not that educators took upon themselves the responsibility for providing an environment. The trouble was that they did not consider the other factor in creating an experience; namely the powers and purposes of those taught" (Dewey, 1938).

A little closer to the present, in 1969, Harold Cardinal took up the same theme in his review of the social condition of Canada's Indian peoples, **The Unjust Society.** In the chapter entitled "The Little Red Schoolhouse: Gallons of White Paint," Cardinal attacked the issue of control:

> The whole question of education has to be rethought in the light of the total needs of the Indian people. The obvious first step is the transfer of power from the people responsible for the administration of education to the people whose lives will be determined by it. No educational programme can be successful and, it follows, no society can be successful, where the people most directly concerned and affected have no voice whatsoever in their own education. (p.51)

Cardinal's concerns were reiterated in **Indian Control of Indian Education.** However, despite the advances, large and small,

made since that time and detailed in this report, progress has been and remains too slow. It is no longer sufficient to lay plans that may never reach fruition and to then blame the failure on the inadequate education or on the lack of determination of native peoples. It is no longer acceptable to offer prescriptions for cultural salvation and expect native peoples to gladly rubber stamp them. A total shift in the way educational programs for native peoples are funded, planned, and delivered is required throughout this country. First and foremost this involves the transfer of control over these educational matters to the native communities. After all, as Cardinal puts it, "How could even the most stupid Indian create a worse mess than has been handed him -- over the past one hundred years?" (Cardinal, 1969, p.61).

If you want to get to know the reality of educational programs and opportunities for native peoples in this country, don't read this report. Ask an Indian, a Metis, or an Inuk.

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Jack Keogh & David Sugden.
MOVEMENT SKILLS DEVELOPMENT.
New York: Macmillan, 1985.
426 pp. $9.95.

Movement Skill Development is divided into three sections. The first is a brief introduction to the concept of development in the movement context. The authors stress the development of movement control, rather than perfection, in relation to often changing environmental conditions. Thus, for example, the study of movement development must include the description and explanation of catching projectiles of varying speeds while running instead of simply catching easily predictable balls while standing.

The second section of the text is devoted to a description of movement development from reflexes **in utero** to proficiency

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The second section of the text is devoted to a description of movement development from reflexes **in utero** to proficiency

in adolescence. Included in this section of six chapters are postural control, locomotion (walking, running, hopping, etc.), manual control (writing, drawing, throwing and catching) as well as the development of spatial and temporal accuracy. Movement patterns such as throwing are analysed and described from the earliest attempts of the infant to the smooth execution of the young adolescent.

The focus of the third section is on understanding the descriptive data base presented in the second section. Keogh and Sugden admirably attempt to sketch the influences which may explain the wondrous development of a child who has minimal head control at birth yet will have, in the span of approximately 12 months, attained upright locomotion. They identify three broad influences: biological structures and systems, sensory-perceptual systems, and information processing capabilities. Each of these systems is explained in one chapter and related to movement development in a subsequent chapter. The final chapter of the text deals with general contribution to movement development including personal social influences such as child rearing practices and group membership.

This book is destined to become a standard in the field. The descriptive chapters, while in some ways similar in content to other movement development text, remain among the most comprehensive written to date. Indeed, the book as a whole is well illustrated with graphs and figures which help explain troublesome concepts. Tables are detailed, often including important cross-study and cross-cultural comparisons. Thus the authors do not succumb to the temptation of simply chronicling their own work. Instead they wisely include a host of studies investigating carefully the development of skills.

There is also an excellent mix of summarizing results and the detailing of particularly important or exemplary work. There is a series of "boxes" throughout the text which outline a study or two in some depth. These "boxes" provide additional information about research designs, their rationale, and the findings. In this manner the student can gain some insight into the motor development research enterprise without trekking constantly to the library for primary sources.

The latter chapters, which attempt to explain the movement development previously outlined in earlier chapters, are a particular strength. They are of sufficient detail to avoid a glossy overview but also present a clearly written and illustrated guide for the individual who lacks extensive course work in neurology, physiology, perception, and information processing. Indeed, inclusion of such chapters moves us beyond the all too common motor development treatise which is primarily descriptive rather than explanatory in nature.

Despite its high quality the book is not without its shortcomings. As noted previously, it does not include anything approaching a comprehensive survey of major theoretical positions applicable to motor development. The maturation hypothesis of Gesell, for example, while historical in nature by contemporary standards, is not even mentioned. Also overlooked are the difficulties in ferreting out the relative contributions of nature and nurture.

While development is described in chapter one as a lifelong process of change toward competence there is no discussion of the older adult. Can the changing patterns of movement seen in many persons of advanced age be considered a change toward competence? Similarly the motor development and performance literature dealing with the handicapped was omitted. The fine work of Rarick with non-handicapped children is given particular prominence but his equally influential work with the mentally retarded is absent. It would seem that our textbooks should begin to integrate these researches of elderly and handicapped persons if the student is to gain an appreciation and understanding of the wide variability of movement development from a life long perspective.

In sum, Keogh and Sugden have produced an excellent text which should stand as a significant contribution to those concerned with movement development. Teachers, physical educators, and occupational and physiotherapists are among the professionals who are likely to benefit from reading and studying the contents.

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Viv Edwards.
LANGUAGE IN MULTICULTURAL CLASSROOMS.
London: Batsford Academic and Educational Ltd., 1983.
160 pp. $14.95.

The modern world has rejected the notion of linguistic homogeneity whereby a major language, such as English, would develop into the general language of intercommunication among people. Instead we pay hommage to linguistic and cultural multiplicity and have witnessed in recent years the emergence of numerous school programmes for the promotion of bilingualism and biculturalism, second and foreign language teaching, and mother tongue maintenance. Yet despite these valiant efforts we are at times painfully aware that such programmes have fallen short of their goals.

In **Language in Multicultural Classrooms,** Viv Edwards, a British sociolinguist and educator, confronts sensitively and knowledgeably, the complex issues and problems which arise in

Despite its high quality the book is not without its shortcomings. As noted previously, it does not include anything approaching a comprehensive survey of major theoretical positions applicable to motor development. The maturation hypothesis of Gesell, for example, while historical in nature by contemporary standards, is not even mentioned. Also overlooked are the difficulties in ferreting out the relative contributions of nature and nurture.

While development is described in chapter one as a lifelong process of change toward competence there is no discussion of the older adult. Can the changing patterns of movement seen in many persons of advanced age be considered a change toward competence? Similarly the motor development and performance literature dealing with the handicapped was omitted. The fine work of Rarick with non-handicapped children is given particular prominence but his equally influential work with the mentally retarded is absent. It would seem that our textbooks should begin to integrate these researches of elderly and handicapped persons if the student is to gain an appreciation and understanding of the wide variability of movement development from a life long perspective.

In sum, Keogh and Sugden have produced an excellent text which should stand as a significant contribution to those concerned with movement development. Teachers, physical educators, and occupational and physiotherapists are among the professionals who are likely to benefit from reading and studying the contents.

Greg Reid
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Viv Edwards.
LANGUAGE IN MULTICULTURAL CLASSROOMS.
London: Batsford Academic and Educational Ltd., 1983.
160 pp. $14.95.

The modern world has rejected the notion of linguistic homogeneity whereby a major language, such as English, would develop into the general language of intercommunication among people. Instead we pay hommage to linguistic and cultural multiplicity and have witnessed in recent years the emergence of numerous school programmes for the promotion of bilingualism and biculturalism, second and foreign language teaching, and mother tongue maintenance. Yet despite these valiant efforts we are at times painfully aware that such programmes have fallen short of their goals.

In **Language in Multicultural Classrooms,** Viv Edwards, a British sociolinguist and educator, confronts sensitively and knowledgeably, the complex issues and problems which arise in

British immigrant schools where "half of the ethnic minority children have a mother tongue other than English." Her timely, highly-readable and useful text has many practical implications for all those concerned with the education of immigrant children and provides especially valuable insights for teachers and school administrators.

Throughout the book, Edwards pleads for a change of attitude towards language and for the application in the class room of more recent linguistic and sociolinguistic theories. Indeed, as she points out, the problem in immigrant schools is not one of "linguistic diversity" but rather one of teacher/administrator attitude towards language. Reminding us repeatedly throughout the text's eight well-documented chapters that all languages and dialects are equally adequate, well-formed and rule-governed, Edwards castigates "linguistically naive" teachers who ignore the vast, intuitive knowledge of language which children bring to the class room. Why do teachers not build on this creative source of information? Why do they so often reject (and consequently stigmatize) the child's tongue, preferring to implant an artificial, standard form? Even a superficial understanding of modern linguistic theory would enable these "culprits" to be less prescriptive and dogmatic. In this harsh, judgmental, and essentially ignorant class room, teachers pay attention only to linguistic well-formedness and overlook the content which the child wishes to convey.

A change of attitude as well as a knowledge of the true function of language are imperative in a "school system in which white, male-dominated middle class language and values have until recently remained unchallenged." Reading this volume certainly allows us to travel a long way from the position that the "moral well-being of society depends on the propagation of standard English." It is also refreshing to find several pages devoted to the debunking of Basil Berstein who provided with such aplomb "a veneer of academic respectability to prejudices about the inadequacy of non-standard English and the linguistic shortcomings of dialect speakers."

Fortunately for the practising teacher, Edwards does more than chastise. She provides an informative chapter, for example, on language in the British Black community which includes an over-view of the linguistic features of West Indian Creoles. Teachers will find this information very helpful as well as the excellent and intriguing analyses of the main areas of difference between standard English and the innumerable British dialects.

Other chapters deal with bilingualism as it relates to the teaching of English as a second language and to the teaching of the mother tongue. What is the role of the classroom teacher and how can she/he become a "language assessor", guiding and evaluating the learner through several stages on the road to

linguistic fluency? We need to abandon the relaxed, laissez-faire approach of the 1960s, when bilingualism was considered an "educational handicap", in favour of rigorous teacher education. Language policies need to fit specific needs and must be based on sound linguistic principles.

The final three chapters of the book provide the reader with state-of-the-art information as to what really happens when immigrant children talk, read, and write. At this point Edwards makes us aware of the value of acquiring sophisticated knowledge in the linguistic sciences. She demonstrates very admirably how current theories in psycholinguistics, discourse analysis, second language teaching, and learning theories are applicable in the multilingual class room. Not content only to theorize and preach, she proposes on every page ideas and information which the interested teacher can adapt and use.

It is to be hoped, therefore, that this informative, dense (but never dull) text will find appreciative readers among educators and parents.

Joan White
McGill University

Harold B. Disbrowe
A SCHOOLMAN'S ODYSSEY.
London, Ontario: University of Western Ontario, 1984.
183 pp. $9.95.

The superannuated man, according to Charles Lamb, says: "I am come to be known by my vacant face and careless gestures...I walk about, not to and fro." No such meandering for Harold B. Disbrowe after his retirement in 1965 as principal of Elmira Secondary School to round off a thirty-year career that "brought an extraordinary amount of satisfaction...through the momentous years of the twentieth century."

In his 24-chapter **A Schoolman's Odyssey** he includes stories and articles previously published in Ontario newspapers and magazines. First he focuses on his roots in rural Malahide Township, Ontario, complete with its little red schoolhouse and an eccentric but highly literate English remittance man who stirred Disbrowe's interest in classical culture. (Could the present Minister of Immigration add a few similar literates to the list of preferred immigrants for distribution across Canada?)

In 1918 Disbrowe entered the Ontario Agricultural College, Guelph, which later launched John K. Galbraith into orbit. In 1924 he received a three-year appointment to teach agriculture at the International College, Izmire, Turkey. His opportunity to serve close to the "ringing plains of windy Troy" was a trial run

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for a later generation of young Canadians heading off to the "developing countries" after World War II. Returning to Canada he spent a year of "helpless boredom" at the Ontario College of Education - a "dreadful experience" - to qualify as a certificated teacher. That year of "meatless lectures and related trivia" ended his preparation for his thirty-year career in the Ontario school system.

Disbrowe began his duties as Canadians reached the depths of the "Dirty Thirties" and, as a sadistic school board secretary said, teachers were a dime a dozen. Finally he landed a contract to teach science and agriculture in a two-room high school in Stirling, a village in Eastern Ontario. The Depression had begun to release a wave of criticism of the academically biased Ontario school curriculum. Demands increased for practical subjects such as agriculture, home economics, and farm mechanics. Soon he was helping prepare course outlines for the new subjects. Each newcomer required credit comparable to that for academic studies. World War II accelerated the demand for technically trained workers; and the secondary school seemed for many a logical place for preliminary training for an ever-expanding industrial society. On the horizon was the small shadow of the computer soon to attract the attention of curriculum designers.

Disbrowe became part of a Canada-wide transformation of the Anglophone school systems. Features of the change were the arrival of the large school "plant" with its diminishing core of required humanistic and scientific studies and its smorgasbord of optional accredited vocational and recreational/artistic ones qualifying students for "high school graduation". In effect the schools had been industrialized in the sense used by James Burnham in his 1940 book, **The Managerial Revolution.** In particular a school system required an ever-increasing hierarchy of administrators and specialists of "ancillary services" to manage the branches of its complicated structure.

Ten years after retirement Disbrowe began to feel "a deep concern that all was not well with the schools of Ontario." He accuses "the progressivists and experimentalists...for the chaos and malingering in many systems in the U.S.A....which had been imported into Canada in the late 1920s and 1930s." A soft approach at first had overwhelmed many elementary schools. Then Dr. Thornton Mustard (the "infamous Dick and Jane Readers") and the Roberts Plan (one university entrance stream and several vocational ones) set the schools on the path to deep trouble: the absence of a demanding core program and the decline of discipline. Finally, thanks to the pretentious Hall-Dennis Report of 1968, came the end of the traditional system of formal education founded by Egerton Ryerson.

"Radical experts," claims Disbrowe, seduced the "politicos and senior brass"; but he does not identify the background of

these experts beyond invoking the ghost of John Dewey. Who did and who continues to train or educate the experts? One should first train his sights on university faculties of education. During the past half century they replaced the one-year Normal Schools and university departments of pedagogy. Based largely on American models they expropriated the already ambiguous word "education" to apply it to a dubiously academic discipline, **the Principles, Theories, Practices of Education.** This is a mixed bag of borrowings from the conventional liberal arts and sciences and from the fast moving industrial/business/professional world. Subdivided into special divisions, each with its array of undergraduate and graduate courses, Education became a main source for the graduate degrees for experts managing or planning to manage a complex school system and its satellite boards and teachers' organizations.

Doctoral experts in Education emerged in increasing numbers, particularly after World War II, from both Canadian and American faculties of education. Additional experts - architects, accountants, etc. - joined the professional educators. With generous support from provincial governments, administrative hierarchies helped public schools experience a vast expansion of services, curricula, school "plants", and teaching staffs with specialists for each branch of the curriculum. And a professional educator's language emerged to explain or justify the "sea change" in the complex world of public schooling. In this expansion the central purpose, if any, of a public school system became blurred.

Disbrowe, a schoolman, wants an end to "gimmicks" like the open classroom, cafeteria style "courses", and the nebulous idea of "teaching the whole child." He wants a degree of standardization of ability for incoming secondary school students, the exclusion of unwilling ones for a year or two with their later return in the hands of continuing education facilities. In his view the centre of a school system should be an academic core for all students at different levels demanding disciplined learning under excellent liberally educated teachers.

Such changes require a leaner curriculum with optional vocational and non-credit recreational/artistic courses possibly run cooperatively by the school and other community agencies. Business and industry have already established training programs for beginners and experienced workers. A few teachers and administrators have gained for selected secondary school students access to these programs. This kind of cooperative training is old hat for several Canadian universities. Why not extend it to the secondary schools?

A schoolman's views for rehabilitating a school system suggests a practical solution. Ignore educator-experts and call in teachers - from the universities and the schools. How might it work?

First, a Ministry could convene a meeting of university teachers to identify the substance and learning skills considered to be the **sole** responsibility of the public school. Second, it could convene a meeting of teachers from the schools to prepare a curriculum of the substance and learning skills identified by the university scholars. The Ministry could convene a meeting between the teachers and other community agencies to prepare a supplementary program of non-credit mainly recreational/artistic and "on-the-job" vocational activities run cooperatively by the school and other agencies.

In 1970 Ivan Illich urged the "deschooling of society" because "the right to learn is curtailed by the obligation to attend school." Harold Disbrowe has a more modest proposal to improve schooling, and hence, learning. He wants to restore the main purpose of schooling to what Aldburey Castell called "the teachers' world...the pedagogical encounter in which congenital ignorance is deliberately attacked...where other activities go on, but are derivative and peripheral."

That ignorance can be reduced only by knowledge coming from the Pierian Spring mainly controlled by scholars and teachers liberally educated in the humanities and the sciences. Why not enlist their help to reconnect the public school with the spring of liberal education? One suspects that Harold Disbrowe would applaud the effort.

Francis C. Hardwick
Professor Emeritus
University of British Columbia

Charles T. Mangrum II and Stephen S. Strichart.
COLLEGE AND THE LEARNING DISABLED STUDENT: A GUIDE TO PROGRAM SELECTION, DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION.
Orlando: Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1984.
209 pp. $33.25.

In 1965, when the late Sam Rabinovitch was ready to report on his new program for learning disabled students at the Montreal Children's Hospital, the most interested audience he could find was an international conference on mental retardation. Few at that conference would have foreseen that twenty years later there would be a significant market for a book entitled **College and The Learning Disabled Student.**

Today sophisticated educators no longer confuse intellectual deficits with learning deficits. While the learning disabled student remains a puzzling and challenging pedagogical problem, teachers and parents, and these students themselves, have come to appreciate that learning disabilities are unrelated to intelligence.

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Intelligent learning disabled adolescents, like their intelligent classmates, now aspire to continue their education beyond high school, and into college and university.

That's why this book is timely. As more is understood about the cognitive, linguistic, and academic lags of these students, more learning disabled students have begun to learn and succeed in secondary schools. Their high schools have learned how to make the modifications that these intelligent but disabled learners require to learn more complex and challenging subjects. These do not include all high schools, and not nearly enough of these students, as a 1979 survey by Deshler and Alley revealed, but there are more each year. And those with the requisite intelligence, ambition, and academic skills are beginning to apply for college entrance. This book addresses the problems that will arise as their colleges and universities attempt to appreciate what it means to be an intelligent student with specific lags and gaps.

Unfortunately, the admissions officers and guidance counsellors who read this book won't learn much about that student. Although an entire chapter is devoted to "Characteristics of Learning Disabled College Students," listing four pages of deficits and would give pause to the hardiest and most well-intentioned college administrator, nowhere in this book is there a simple description or definition of learning disabilities. The only definition, included in Chapter 2, is one quoted from the California Education Code, and is a hodge-podge of the prevailing, but unsubstantiated hypotheses extant in 1976, when it became part of that code.

Let me offer a common current definition: a learning disability is a lag or a deficit in one or more areas of cognitive functioning that interferes with learning. Despite their specific deficits, learning disabled students score at average or above average levels on standard intelligence tests. Many sources of these learning deficits have been suggested, and are under investigation, but no direct specific causal link has yet been demonstrated. Simply put, this means that learning disabled students may be competent learners in many domains, but have difficulty, sometimes profound difficulty, learning in other domains.

Some learning disabled students have difficulty learning about space and spatial sequences and relationships, and this group often has much trouble learning mathematical concepts. Other learning disabled students have difficulty understanding and using language. This deficit has an obvious impact on their ability to manipulate and order higher cognitive categories. A third group of learning disabled students have very specific problems in discriminating and remembering symbols, and are most easily recognized by their marked difficulty in learning to read and spell. No individual learning disabled student will fit precisely into one or another of

these three categories, but it is important to recognize the difference between, for example, a linguistically able student who is not a fluent reader, a fluent reader who has difficulty unpacking information from complex texts, and a voracious and efficient reader who cannot comprehend calculus.

If Mangrum and Strichart had based their book on this or a similar definition of the problems that a learning disabled student must deal with to succeed at college, this book would have been presented differently. Instead of beginning with a detailed description of the legislation related to the provision of post-secondary education to this population, and other disabled students (relevant in the United States, but of little interest to Canadians), they would have focused on this student as a learner. When they do begin describing the learning disabled college student, in Chapter 3, what is presented is a detailed, but unselected list of "problems" reported by directors of college learning disability programs -- really a detailed description of the student as a non-learner. Without a frame of reference, anyone reading through this list would expect an incompetent and dependent learner, instead of the reflective student with well defined areas of deficit, but with good coping strategies, that most learning disabled adolescents have become when they are ready to face college.

Of course problem areas, both academic and non-academic, need to be signalled, as these authors note. The goal they describe is not a taxonomy of the correlates of learning disabilities, but success at college for the learning disabled student. It is difficult to see how that goal may be reached through reading this book.

These authors surveyed, visited, and interviewed directors of college programs for the learning disabled, and the strongest sections of their book are the descriptions of good programs they have encountered. They also include some good general suggestions for developing a college level learning disabilities program. However the specifics of their suggestions are open to serious question. For example, the thirty pages they devote to diagnostic testing include little more than lists and descriptions of tests. Many of the tests they list are totally inappropriate for college students -- for example, KeyMath, which is an elementary school measure; or the Bender-Gestalt, of little use after 10 or 12. Once again, without a clear and simple definition of what they are looking for, college guidance officers will have difficulty using this section to locate and assist learning disabled students.

The best chapter in this book is "Teaching the Learning Disabled Student in the College Classroom". Good resources for improving instruction are described, and simple, effective strategies are presented. Every learning disabled student going off to college should have a copy of this chapter as a tactful

prod for any disbelieving professors. The chapter directed towards high school guidance personnel about preparing college-bound learning disabled students is also well done. These two chapters constitute only thirteen pages of this book, and come nearly at the end. They desire more prominence. There are also several useful references and appendices.

The survey of college programs for the learning disabled, which served as the original source of this book, would have been better presented as a journal article, substantiated with more data and less "personal communication", and, thus, available for peer review. Combining clinical hunch, taxonomies of deficit, and unannotated lists of tests, with prescriptive suggestions, does not seem a particularly effective way to reach the obvious goal of these authors, the enhancement of college success for learning disabled students.

Renée Stevens
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Learning Centre

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Gary A. Olson, Editor
WRITING CENTERS: THEORY AND ADMINISTRATION
Illinois: National Council of Teachers of English, 1984
247 pp. $15.50

A collection of nineteen essays by writing specialists at colleges and universities in the United States, this publication offers the first comprehensive study of the theory and practice of individualized writing instruction. Professor Gary Olson, director of the Center for Writing at the University of North Carolina, Wilmington, has assembled a knowledgeable and experienced group of teachers to provide an in-depth study of the writing centre and its purpose and function.

The book's three sections are devoted to a consideration of (1) Theory; (2) Administration; and (3) Special Concerns, all

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related to the operation of a writing centre. In the Preface, Professor Olson emphasizes the need for focussed research in the field of developmental writing. In the Introduction, Thom Hawkins, a leader in writing centre administration at the University of California, gives an excellent overview of objectives and methodologies. Writes Hawkins:

> The growing pains of writing centers are symptomatic of a general state of flux and tension in the humanities, a condition caused by dropping enrollments and a changing student body. Writing centers are coming of age in the midst of this upheaval because they make room, provide space and time, for students to talk about ideas, to explore meaning, and to engage freely in the trial and error of putting their thoughts into writing. (p.xi)

The authors of the first seven essays concentrate on establishing a conceptual basis for writing centres, both theoretical and pedagogical. The material is of interest to all teachers of writing.

Brannon and Knoblauch offer their philosophical perspective on the teaching of writing, recommending a research-based approach as opposed to one rooted in pedagogical technique. Whether product-directed or process-oriented, the authors warn against the stifling effects of prefabricated writing models, and of strategies that undervalue and inhibit a "writer's personal (and personalized) search for meaning." They state that: "Form is a gradually achieved consequence of the search for meaning, not a preconception" (p.39). The authors describe, in vivid terms, the "messiness" of writing that is person-centered and thought-motivated. They emphasize the importance of the teacher-listener in facilitating the release of this kind of writing.

An essay by Tilly and John Warnock, of the University of Wyoming, examines writing as a tool for intellectual liberation, for the re-shaping of concepts. The Warnocks view writing in its psychological context, inseparable from person and purpose. They use the term "Liberatory Writing Center", a place and a function in which revision becomes re-vision, a re-thinking not only of an individual's writing, but of her or his intellectual assumptions.

Considered in other essays in this first section are the effectiveness of peer editing and collaborative learning; the results of research over the past decade on peer tutoring in writing centres; an investigation of the relationship between spoken and written rhetoric; a cognitive model for developmental writing; and priorities and guidelines for the operation of an effective writing centre.

Part two opens with an essay by the editor. Olson offers the fruits of his experience in setting up and maintaining a writing centre. Practical and helpful advice is given on every aspect of the operation, including sample administrative forms for referrals, records, and interviews.

The section continues with an excellent piece on funding. Peggy Jolly, of the University of Alabama, begins her essay with a survey of the historical factors related to funding tutorial services in general, and writing centres in particular. Greater accessibility to a university education and the consequent wide disparity in student writing proficiency increased the need for writing tutorial instruction. Various avenues for obtaining the necessary financing are suggested. Unfortunately, many are not applicable to Canada.

Two essays are concerned with the staffing of writing centres. The authors recommend the recruitment of students, either in partial fulfilment of a lanaguage development program or as volunteers. They stress the importance of having sensitive, perceptive individuals as tutors, and of providing good training in the basic principles of writing development. Advocacy of the use of student-tutors seems to be more closely related to financial expediency, however, than to optimum staffing arrangements.

The final portion of this book consists of six essays in which problems encountered in writing centres are considered. Olson describes those that result from negative attitudes on the part of certain professors towards writing and writing centres. Because writing is a very personal activity, negativism can exaggerate problems to the point where a student loses all confidence in her or his ability to compose. A supportive attitude toward the writing centre on the part of faculty contributes to its effectiveness.

In Essay 15, Mary Croft of the University of Wisconsin, and co-author of one of the few books about writing centres, offers suggestions for meeting the challenge of "the Reluctant Student".

> The need for a nonthreatening, tension-free, friendly, personal atmosphere in writing centers has often been stressed. Indeed, the very nature, the very existence, of a writing center implies a nurturing environment, one that is conducive to work and productivity.... Because such an atmosphere is more important than ever with resistant students, efforts to create and maintain that milieu must be constant. (p.171)

Ways of removing writer's block are suggested by Thomas Nash in his description of useful invention strategies. Such heuristic devices as the tagmemic questionnaire stimulate pre-writing awareness of the many facets of a subject, thereby

helping a student out of that quagmire, the blank page and the mental void.

The new professional role of the writing centre tutor is given serious attention by Rodney Simard of California State College. Writing centres are now firmly and permanently established in many American colleges and universities. They have (to quote Olson) "progressed from the old grammar lab model, in which tutors lecture to students, to the modern writing center, in which tutors engage in a type of Socratic dialogue with their pupils" (p.197). The quality of service to the student depends upon the tutor's mastery of writing and enthusiastic commitment to it. Abilities to diagnose a student's writing problems; to adapt to each student's particular requirements; to find creative ways of encouraging good writing; and, above all, to achieve a rapport with the student in a congenial atmosphere, distinguish the professional tutor.

Subsequent essays consider the needs of students for whom English is not the first language, and of those who require assistance with business and technical writing.

Each essay is well footnoted, with a brief summary of its content. An excellent bibliography of articles, books, and dissertations is included.

This book is a primary source for anyone interested in students' ability to write well, and consequently to think logically and lucidly.

Elizabeth C. Speyer
Centre for the Study and Teaching of Writing,
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EDUCATION IN INDIA

Joseph DiBona.
ONE TEACHER ONE SCHOOL.
New Delhi: Biblia Impex Priv. Ltd., 1983.
306 pp. Rs 150/-.

This book consists of an excellent introduction by Joseph DiBona on the indigenous system of education in Bengal and Bihar based on Reports by William Adam, a Christian Missionary, on indigenous culture in early 19th century Bengal. The rest of the book contains two of three documents popularly known as the Adam Reports (1836-38) which are recognized as containing a unique record of sociological data on Indian institutions in the pre-colonial period.

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306 pp. Rs 150/-.

This book consists of an excellent introduction by Joseph DiBona on the indigenous system of education in Bengal and Bihar based on Reports by William Adam, a Christian Missionary, on indigenous culture in early 19th century Bengal. The rest of the book contains two of three documents popularly known as the Adam Reports (1836-38) which are recognized as containing a unique record of sociological data on Indian institutions in the pre-colonial period.

DiBona is eminently qualified to explore Indian educational systems. As a teacher of Education and South Asian Civilization in Duke University, he has published several scholarly works on **Change and Conflict in the Indian University** (1969), **Language Change and Modernization** (1973), and **The Context of Education in Indian Development** (1974).

The central thesis of the book is that an examination of the Adam Reports confirm through documentation, the knowledge that India was well-known for its highly developed educational institutions in the pre-colonial period. But that the imposition of a foreign system of education and medium of instruction not only cut off the masses from education and its consequent opportunities, but created an English-speaking elite which is even today alienated from the traditions and culture of its masses. The result is a widening gulf between the English speaking elite that controls the government, economy and higher educational apparatus and the much larger population whose vernacular language education has frozen them into a social structure "in which the cement of oppression is the school" (taken from a paper presented by Joseph DiBona at McGill University, June 12, 1985 for the Conference on Education and Social Change in India). The change-over from instruction in the vernacular languages to the metropolitan language of the colonizers, DiBona asserts, is the root of the problem in Indian education today.

The Adam Reports were submitted at a time when Macaulay imposed his policy of Western education on the diverse cultures of South Asia. Adam attempted to deflect this policy by demonstrating the vitality of the extensive vernacular system of education in Bengal and Bihar.

DiBona brings out the scientific nature of Adam's investigations which carefully report the thousands of schools, the caste composition of the population, and other details. By bringing to the forefront the vitality of India's traditional institutions the author has supplied alternative models of approaching rural education in India today. It is a most stimulating work.

Dharampal.
THE BEAUTIFUL TREE: INDIGENOUS INDIAN EDUCATION IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.
New Delhi: Biblia Impex Priv. Ltd., 1983.
436 pp. Rs 250/-

The title of this book "The Beautiful Tree" is taken from a statement Mahatmi Gandhi made on October 20, 1931 in London. Delivering an invited lecture at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Gandhi said that there were more illiterates in India in 1931 than 50 or 100 years ago because the British

administrators began to uproot the indigenous educational system: "They scratched the soil...left the root like that and the beautiful tree perished."

The central idea of the book is that the British greed for revenue stifled the indigenous educational system by syphoning off the resource base, and the British attitude toward contempt of Indian religious and cultural content of education completely destroyed it. This is a continuation of Dharampal's work on the nature of Indian society in pre-British times. It covers two decades of archival research of official documentation in India and England and follows his work on Indian science and technology in the eighteenth century and others.

Dharampal captures the demise of the indigenous educational system by analyzing British policy in the Indian social and political environment in a long (80 pages), but brilliant introduction. The next section deals with important surveys made in Madras (1822-25) and Bengal (1936-38) on the extent and nature of indigenous education. The British House of Commons debate in 1813 on the India Charter Bill prompted their inquiry into existing conditions. All the reports, correspondence, circulars, and proceedings, as well as Thomas Munro's famous minute are reproduced by Dharampal in this section (168 pp.).

The last section contains such interesting material as the entire correspondence on the controversy that ensued between Mahatmi Gandhi and Sir Philip Hartog after Gandhi's speech of 1931 mentioned above. It also contains observations on the education of children in India around 1796 by Fra Paolino Da Bartolomeo. Extracts from the Adam report on education in Bengal and Bihar (1835-38), and Leitner's report on education in the Punjab (1882) are included.

Dharampal has provided a wealth of extremely interesting material. Significant data on caste distribution of teachers and students in both the Madras and Bengal surveys challenge the commonly held view that the upper castes controlled education. Munro's survey in Madras shows that around 75% of the boys in schools were out castes. In higher education, the upper castes (Brahmins) generally went into law, metaphysics, and theology, while other castes dominated astronomy and medicine. The upper castes constituted 40% of students in Bengal and 15% of the total in Bihar, indicating that lower castes were dominant in the educational system, contrary to the picture after British take-over.

The surveys supplied valuable sociological data on fiscal arrangements, content of education, numbers of institutions, lists of books, age of students, and duration of school life. At a time when there was only one year of schooling in England, which rose to two years in 1851, children in India went to school for three

to seven years, and even for 10 years, in some districts around 1822-25 according to the Munro Survey. What is also obvious is the lack of participation by females at any level of education during that period.

Dharampal raises interesting questions regarding education and society in pre-colonial India. "An understanding of that which existed (two centuries ago) and the process which created the irrelevance India has today...could...help devise what best suits India's requirements and the ethos of its people" (p.79).

The message, according to Dharampal, is clear: the British imposed an alien educational system. India must rediscover her own genius and traditions in order to revive.

Ratna Ghosh
McGill University

Books Received

The following is a list of books received by the **M.J.E.** Not all the books received can be reviewed, although reviews of some of these books may appear in future issues. We wish to thank all of the publishers who have sent us review copies.

Bercuson, David, & Douglas Wertheimer. (1985). A trust betrayed. The Keegstra affair. Toronto: Doubleday. 241 pp. $19.95.

Cary, Susan. (1985). Conceptual change in childhood. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 226 pp. $15.

Crespo, Manuel, & Claude Lessard, (Eds). (1985). Çducation en milieu urbain. Montréal: Les Presses de L'université de Montréal. 457 pp. $28.

Czuboka, Michael. (1985). Why it's hard to fire Johnny's teacher. The status of tenured teachers in Manitoba and Canada. Winnipeg: Communigraphics. 314 pp.

Delpit, Lisa D., & Graeme Kemelfield. (1985, April). An evaluation of the Viles Tok Ples Skul scheme in the North Solomons. ERU Report No. 51. Papua, New Guinea: University of Papua New Guinea. 170 pp. K4.15.

Dillon, Ronna F., (Ed.). (1985). Individual differences in cognition, (Vol. 2). Orlando, Florida: Academic Press. 267 pp. $55.50.

The Fun Factory. (1985). A magazine for children, ages 6-12. Toronto, Ont: The Fun Factory. Box 1268, Station T. Toronto,Ont. M6B 4A4. $1.50/issue. $15.00 1 year/12 issues.

Geller, Linda Gibson. (1985). Word play and language learning for children. Urbana, Il: National Council of Teachers of English. 104 pp. $9.75; Members, $7.50.

Gere, Anne Ruggles, (Ed.). (1985). Roots in the sawdust: Writing to learn across the disciplines. Urbana, Ill: National Council of Teachers of English. 238 pp. $15.50; Members, $12.00.

Lauglo, Jon, & Martin McLean, (Eds.). (1985). The control of education. International perspectives on the centralization-decentralization debate. Studies in Education 17. London: University of London Institute of Education. 188 pp. 6.95 pounds.

Lespérance, André. (1985). Une projection du nombre de retraites chez les enseignants de commission scolaires jusqu'en 2005. Çtudes et analyses. Québec: Ministère de l'Çducation. 48 pp.

McLean, Leslie D. (1985). The craft of student evaluation in Canada. Toronto, Ont: Canadian Education Association. 63 pp. $6.00.

Miller, John P., & Wayne Seller. (1985). Curriculum. Perspectives and practice. New York: Longman. 356 pp. $39.10.

National Council of Teachers of English. (1985). Adventuring with books. A book list for pre-K - grade 6. Urbana, Illinois: National Council of Teachers of English. 395 pp. $9.75; Members, $7.50.

Plomin, Robert, & John C. DeFries. (1985). Origins of individual differences in infancy. The Colorado adoption project. Orlando, Florida: Academic Press. 406 pp. $76.50.

Palmer, Imelda, (Ed.). (1985). Melbourne studies in education. Melbourne, Australia: Melbourne University Press. 253 pp.

West, Leo H.T., & A. Leon Pines, (Eds.). (1985). Cognitive structure and conceptual change. Orlando, Florida: Academic Press. 274 pp. $54.75.

Wigginton, Eliot. (1985). Sometimes a shining moment: The Foxfire experience. Garden City, NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday. 438 pp. $19.95.

Wilkinson, Louise Cherry, & Cora B. Marrett, (Eds.). (1985). Gender influences in classroom interaction. Orlando, Florida: Academic Press. 278 pp. $52.50.

Acknowledgment

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Eudice Garmaise was born in Montreal. She studied with such artists as Bercovitch, Lismer, and Reinblatt. A graduate of the Montreal Museum of Fine Arts School of Art and Design, and Ecole des Beaux Arts de Montreal, she is on the staff of Dawson College. Her works in painting, etching, and sculpture are represented in private and corporate collections around the world.

Claire Meunier is Professor in the Educational Technology section of the Faculty of Education at Université de Montréal. She received her doctorate in Education at Université de Paris VIII. Her research interests lie mainly in the field of educational media and more recently, in the computer's educational applications, including school information services (telematics).

John P. Portelli is currently a Killam Postdoctoral Fellow at Dalhousie University. He has taught at the Faculty of Education, University of Malta (1980), Collège Marie Victorin, Montreal (Adult Education Program, 1983-1985) and at the Department of Religion and Philosophy in Education, McGill University (1982-1985). His areas of interest include philosophy of education, curriculum theory and philosophy for children.

Thomas J. Ritchie is Assistant Professor of Educational Administration at the Faculty of Education, University of Manitoba. He is currently engaged in studies that examine the perspectives of administrators on their work.

James Sanders is an associate professor in the Division of Educational Psychology, Faculty of Education, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario N6G 1G7. He was Editor-in-Chief of the **Canadian Journal of Education/Revue canadienne de l'education** from 1982 to 1985.

Collaborateurs

Dennis Cato, Ph.D., enseigne l'histoire à l'école polyvalente de Pierrefonds au Québec.

Eudice Garmaise est née à Montréal. Elle a étudié avec des maîtres comme Bercovitch, Lismer, et Reinblatt. Elle est diplomée de l'Ecole d'art du Musée des Beaux-Arts de Montréal, et l'Ecole des Beaux Arts de Montréal; elle enseigne au Collège Dawson. Ses oeuvres comportent des peintures, des gravures à l'eau forte et des sculptures et se trouvent dans des collections privées du monde entier.

Claire Meunier est professeur à la section de Technologie éducationnelle de la Faculté des sciences de l'éducation, à l'Université de Montréal. Elle détient un doctorat en sciences de l'éducation de l'Université de Paris VIII. Elle intervient dans le champ des médias éducatifs et plus récemment dans celui des applications pédagogiques de l'ordinateur, principalement en télématique.

John P. Portelli est actuellement titulaire d'une bourse post-doctorat Killam à l'université Dalhousie. Il a été professeur pà la faculté des sciences de l'éducation de l'université de Malte (1980), au Collège Marie-Victorin à Montréal (programme d'éducation des adultes, 1983-1985) et au département de didactique de la religion et de la philosophie à l'université McGill (1982-1985). Au nombre de ses champs d'intérêt, signalons la philosophie de l'éducation, ainsi que la théorie et la philosophie des programmes pour les enfants.

Thomas J. Ritchie est professeur adjoint d'administration scolaire à la faculté des sciences de l'éducation de l'Université du Manitoba. Il procède actuellement à des études qui visent à étudier le point de vue des administrateurs sur leurs responsabilités.

James Sanders est professeur agrégé à la division de psychopédagogie de la faculté des sciences de l'éducation de l'université de Western Ontario à London en Ontario. Il a été rédacteur en chef de la **Revue canadienne de l'éducation/Canadian Journal of Education** entre 1982 et 1985.

Résumés

Il est généralement admis que les recherches sur la pédagogie n'ont pas amélioré de façon notable les méthodes d'enseignement. Ce problème et sa persistance s'expliquent de deux manières: (a) insuffisance de la masse de recherches empiriques et/ou (b) hésitation des enseignants à suivre les recommandations de ces recherches. Cet article soutient pourtant que l'écart entre la théorie et la pratique est un pseudo-problème qui tient à une méprise fondamentale sur l'enseignement, courante dans les recherches, à savoir que l'enseignement est une aptitude complexe susceptible d'améliorations notables. L'article affirme par ailleurs que l'enseignement, dans son sens comportemental limité, représente une aptitude courante qui ne peut ni n'a besoin d'être améliorée.

L'ordinateur a fait son entrée à l'école, traînant derrière lui, son cortège de promesses. Illusions perdues, nouveaux espoirs, la gamme des perceptions est étendue chez les enseignants. Cet article propose au lecteur quelques réflexions sur ce phénomène nouveau, le replaçant dans le contexte historique de l'évolution des technologies et de l'utopie éducative.

Cet article aborde la question de la justification des éléments des programmes d'enseignement, question qui préoccupe les philosophes de l'éducation depuis l'époque de Platon. L'auteur

examine l'optique justificatrice proposée par Mary Warnock qui, pour tenter de résoudre ce problème, considère que l'imagination et le travail sont les deux critères d'égale importance qui décident de l'inclusion de certains éléments dans ces programmes ou de leur exclusion. Même si l'optique de Warnock semble promettre une solution plus juste et plus équilibrée de ce problème, d'aucuns soutiendront que sa position n'est pas sans problèmes. Il semble que l'on pourrait parvenir à une justification plus juste en considérant l'éducation comme une forme de travail et le travail comme une forme d'éducation.

Dr. de Bono's Mechanical Philosophy: Commentary and Critical Questions Denis Cato 39

Dans cet article, l'auteur s'efforce de démontrer que la "philosophie méchanique" de de Bono, en écartant les qualités de l'esprit qui ne peuvent être réduites aux simples propriétés d'un système mécanique passif, rejette par la même occasion les critères qui pourraient permettre de comprendre ce système. Il en résulte que la philosophie mécanique de de Bono est contradictoire en soi en plus de se réfuter elle-même. Dans cet article, Cato essaie également de démontrer que lorsque le concept de "pensée latérale" de de Bono tient lieu d'expression pratique de sa philosophie mécanique, cette pensée latérale est forcément incohérente puisque les principes de la philosophie mécanique préviennent son exercice. D'autre part, lorsque la pensée latérale ne tient pas lieu d'expression pratique de la philosophie mécanique, ses injonctions, qui n'ont pas de fondement théorique, doivent être rejetées en raison de leur trivialité.

Supervision and Anarchy Thomas J. Ritchie 53

La surveillance est une tâche importante qui s'accomplit dans les écoles. Cet article se penche sur certains des problèmes que pose cette tâche et qui figurent dans la littérature à ce sujet. Il examine notamment les divergences qui existent au niveau de cette surveillance.

Two Nuns Running Downhill

M.J.E. Le McGill Journal of Education

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The **Journal** looks for English or French articles in the form of essays, interviews, descriptive reports of research, and critical reviews of books. Lighter pieces, humorous material, poetry and graphics of quality are also welcome. All written material should be furnished in the original typescript (following the style outlined in the American Psychological Association Publication Manual), double-spaced, together with two copies; each should have a separate title page containing the author's name, which should not appear on the manuscript itself. A desirable length of article is between 2,000 and 3,000 words.

All such contributions should be addressed to the Editor, McGill Journal of Education, 3700 McTavish Street, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3A 1Y2.

Les futurs auteurs doivent comprendre que les lecteurs du **Journal** dépassent largement le groupe de spécialistes et de professionnels de l'enseignement dont font partie les auteurs. Bien que le contenu d'un article doive être en mesure de supporter l'examen des spécialistes dans le domaine - au cours de l'étape de révision précédent l'acceptation du texte destiné à la publication - la langue et le ton ne devraient **pas** suivre les règles de la rédaction savante au point d'être hermétique aux non spécialistes. (A moins qu'ils ne soient d'une limpidité exceptionnelle, le **Journal** n'accepte normalement pas d'articles destinés à un auditoire composé uniquement de spécialistes.) La terminologie utilisée doit être accessible aux lecteurs intelligents mais profanes; les notes, tableaux et autres éléments en retrait du texte doivent être omis ou du moins réduits au minimum pour répondre à l'intérêt du lecteur. En d'autres termes, le Journal demande aux auteurs de faire preuve de la lucidité qui est un trait propre aux spécialistes.

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