CIVIL SOCIETY AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN INDONESIA: 1998-2006

A SUMMARY OF "TAKING STOCK OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION ADVOCACY STRATEGIES IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN INDONESIA 1998-2006"

CIVIL SOCIETY AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN INDONESIA: 1998-2006

CIVIL SOCIETY AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN INDONESIA: 1998-2006

A SUMMARY OF "TAKING STOCK OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION ADVOCACY STRATEGIES IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN INDONESIA 1998-2006"

Rights & Democracy
International Centre for Human Rights
and Democratic Development

IDSPS
Institute for Defense Security and Peace Studies

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACRONYMS

BIN	State Intelligence Agency
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
DOD	Department of Defense
DPR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People's Representative Council)
MPR	Majelis Permusyawaratam Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly)
POLRI	Indonesian Police
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TNI	Indonesian National Army

SUMMARY

In January 2006, a group of Indonesian civil society organizations (CSOs)[1] and security sector reform (SSR)[2] networks from Europe, Canada and the United States gathered in The Hague, Netherlands to review the progress of SSR in Indonesia. One of the conclusions of the meeting was that a comprehensive study of the achievements, constraints and opportunities of civil society advocacy on SSR in Indonesia was needed. Meeting participants thought that this research would be helpful for the development of future CSO advocacy strategies, and provide important and timely information for the general public, the Government of Indonesia, policymakers, and other SSR stakeholders in Indonesia and the international community. This paper is an executive summary of the resultant study, or "stock taking," carried out by the Institute for Defense Security and Peace Studies (Jakarta), with support from Rights & Democracy (Montreal).[3]

The study examined Indonesian CSO efforts to promote SSR from the beginning of the reform era in 1998 until 2006. In order to examine the dynamics and degree of change during this period, the research focused on security sector policies and laws that have been adopted, as well as legislation that is still being developed and deliberated.

---

1   In this report, *civil society organizations* (CSOs) are defined as any independent, non-governmental actor that promotes democratic principles in SSR.

2   The term s*ecurity sector reform* (SSR) in this report refers to the transformation of the Indonesian state security system (which includes security sector policies, institutions, and security actors' roles, responsibilities and practices) from the authoritarian system of the past, to a new system that is managed and operated in a way that is subject to civil authority and is more consistent with democratic norms, human rights law and the principles of good governance. The term *security sector* refers to all organizations and institutions that have the legal authority to use or mobilize physical power or the threat of physical force to protect the state and its citizens. This includes the Indonesian National Army (TNI) and the Indonesian Police (POLRI), as well as civil institutions responsible for their management and supervision, such as the President, the Department of Defense, and the Parliament. The State Intelligence Agency (BIN) is also considered part of the security sector.

3   The full study is available in Bahasa and English on IDSPS' Web site: www.idsps.org.

For the study, in-depth interviews and focus groups were conducted with SSR stakeholders such as CSOs, security institutions, government officials and policymakers at the national, provincial, and municipal levels. Primary data was collected from interviewees in Jakarta and cities in selected regions across the country, including Medan, Bengkulu, Solo, Malang, Pontianak, Kupang, Ujung Pandang and Ambon. This study also drew on secondary sources such as media reports, research and writing on issues related to security sector reform and Indonesian parliamentary MPR & DPR proceedings.[4]

---

4   Indonesia's legislative branch of government is composed of the People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* – MPR) and the People's Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* – DPR).

BACKGROUND: THE CONTINUED NEED FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

A strong push for security sector reform emerged in 1996 with public demands for an end to the "dual function" (defense and political roles) of the Indonesian Armed Forces, and for the demilitarization of Indonesian society. After the fall of President Suharto in 1998, an agenda for security sector reform was further developed to include concerns such as accountability for crimes and human rights violations committed by security actors, and the need to professionalize the security sector. Momentum and support for SSR reached its height between 1998 and 2000, but the reform agenda has been increasingly ignored since then. Overall, there has been slow and uneven progress, and even backsliding on SSR, with state responses to public pressure shifting toward more symbolic rather than substantive reform.

Progress has been stalled by political interests that have trumped public interests, compounded by conflicts between the state's security sector elites. Hence, after eight years of SSR advocacy, the basic objectives of SSR—which are to create democratic policies in the security sector and form a professional and accountable military, police force and intelligence agency under civilian control—have not yet been achieved. The security apparatus continues to resist change by denying occurrences of human rights violations, and enjoying impunity for past and present abuses. Security institutions and actors also continue to carry out political roles and resist being subject to civil political authority, including civil law. For instance, in the view of many CSOs, the Indonesian National Army (TNI) continues to direct Department of Defense policy and there is a lack of civilian oversight at the ministry level for the Indonesian Police (POLRI). Despite the fact that the Supreme Court ruled that the civil courts had the capacity to bring military personnel to

justice, the military continues to oppose revisions to the Military Court Law which seek to hold the military accountable to civil law. These are just a few examples of many security sector laws and policies that have been shaped by the political interests of security institutions.

Although there has been some normative progress since 1998, the Indonesian government has been weak in implementing and ensuring compliance with various policies and laws. The research shows that the substance of security sector legislation is not fully consistent with human rights law and the principles of democracy and good governance—indeed they are still far from meeting these standards. Thus, there is a need to review and make amendments to many pieces of security sector legislation. As well, a number of security sector bills have not yet been passed into law, such as those related to intelligence, national security, the freedom to obtain public information, and the Presidential Regulation on the Takeover of TNI Businesses.[5]

In addition to the reasons outlined above, it is imperative to maintain and step-up efforts to promote security sector reform in Indonesia given the current global context. The international "war on terror" has granted far-reaching powers to POLRI, the TNI and the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) that override human rights protections, and has justified the use of repressive force by the security apparatus. These are worrisome developments that threaten to erode whatever progress has been made in SSR.

---

5   Since this research was conducted in 2007, some of these bills and policies have become law, specifically the Law on Public Information Openness (*Undang-undang Keterbukaan Informasi Publik*) and Presidential Decree Number 7 Year 2008, establishing a "National Team on the Transformation of TNI Businesses Activities." Both initiatives are discussed further below.

OVERVIEW OF GAINS MADE IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

After the fall of President Suharto in 1998, the parliament, government and security institutions adopted several policies and laws in response to demands for reform. Some of these include amendments to Indonesia's 1945 Constitution; MPR-RI Decree Number VI/MPR/2000 on the separation of TNI and POLRI; MPR-RI Decree Number VII/MPR/2000 on roles of the TNI and POLRI; community-based policing models; and gender mainstreaming initiatives in the police force.

Perhaps the most important gains in SSR were made through constitutional amendments that provided better human rights protections in Indonesia. The substance and spirit of these amendments formed the basis for MPR Decrees VI and VII/2000, related to the TNI and POLRI. These decrees institutionally separated the police from the army, and assigned the TNI a strictly defense role, and POLRI the responsibility of maintaining public security and order. These decrees also stipulated that both institutions and their members not be involved in political life, and that they respect democratic principles, the rule of law and human rights. By making such fundamental changes to the security sector, these decrees responded to some of the public's demands for reform in 1998.

Some gains were also made through the enactment of Law No. 34/2004 on the Indonesian Army (TNI Bill), and Law No. 2/2002 on the Indonesian Police (POLRI Bill). The TNI Bill incorporated CSO recommendations regarding TNI professionalism, civilian control, and the abolition of military businesses. The enactment of the POLRI Bill motivated POLRI to strengthen its institutional performance and become more professional and accountable. To this end, one of the measures taken by POLRI in partnership with CSOs

was the development of a gender mainstreaming programme to improve services for women victims of domestic violence as well as for children. One result of this programme is that the number of women in the Indonesian police force has increased, and every police office in the country now has a special desk that provides women with legal and counselling support. Special counselling services are also available for children.

POLRI has also become more responsive to civil society protection needs through the adoption of a community-based policing model in which communities and the police work in partnership to maintain public security and order. The model was first implemented in 2001 by regional police in Yogyakarta, in cooperation with international and Indonesian CSOs. Through this programme, public trust in the police has increased, and there has been more openness, accountability, and respect for human rights on the part of the police. In fact, the Yogyakarta programme was so successful that it was replicated in Surabaya and Bali. The community-based policing model has also been extended to include cooperation between security actors, corporations, communities, and local governments in areas where there is corporate activity such as mining and oil extraction.

Another positive development in SSR is the elimination of the Subversion Law, which has led to greater freedom of the press and increased government transparency. CSOs have advocated for the Freedom to Obtain Information Act (KMIP Bill) to be passed into law because it is also critical in ensuring transparency and good governance (see below). Thus far, CSOs have succeeded in pushing for the bill to include an Information Commission—an independent institution that would settle disputes in an efficient and equitable manner, without cost to the user.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Openings for civic engagement

The era of reform has led to increased respect for freedom of expression and an openness to civic engagement in legislative and policymaking processes that was not possible during President Suharto's 32-year regime. Between 1998 and 2006, CSOs carried out a number of advocacy campaigns and efforts related to legislative design, policy formulation, and the abrogation of laws and policies that did not comply with the values and principles of democracy and human rights.

During this period, some government officials, parliamentarians and security institution leaders have been receptive to CSO advocacy, although to different degrees. By and large, the DPR, the Department of Defense and POLRI welcomed CSO involvement in legislative and policy-making processes. For example, interviewees stated that CSO advocacy on the KMIP bill was received well by political parties and individual members of parliament, government officials, and government institutions. Parliamentarians and government officials have also reported that they value the role of CSOs in broadening their perspectives and deepening their understanding of SSR issues. For instance, the Defense Minister and members of the legislature were supportive of the alternative intelligence bill drafted by academics and CSOs; and the Department of Defense (DOD) acknowledged that they learned a lot from CSO involvement in the formulation of the National Security Bill. In fact, this study found that the DOD is exploring a "multi-track approach" that would involve military and non-military actors in the development of Indonesia's defense system. The DPR also acknowledges that

CSO input is needed to build a professional defense and security force, and to ensure that security actors fully abandon their political roles.

Increased space for civic engagement has created opportunities for CSOs to work together with government and parliament. Apart from the SSR issues mentioned above, this study identifies a number of areas where cooperation is possible, including capacity building for the TNI and POLRI members, the takeover of military businesses, the delineation of the TNI and POLRI roles in domestic security, and the transformation of the TNI's Territorial Command Structure.

Looking towards the future, this study suggests that CSO advocacy conducted between 1998-2006 sets a positive precedent for public participation in policy-making processes. CSOs can use this as an opportunity to push for civic engagement at every level of policy formulation and implementation, and to facilitate open discussion of state problems including sensitive issues related to SSR. The growing number of political parties in Indonesia also presents an opportunity for new forms of SSR advocacy in the future. CSOs can play a role in pressuring parties to respond to citizens' concerns, and also create opportunities for civil society to partner with political parties.

Domestic & International Support for SSR

It is important to acknowledge the role of international and domestic support in creating the spirit of political reform and openness for change in the security sector. Within Indonesia, there were calls for democratization long before 1998, and public support for reform grew over time, culminating in the push for MPR Decrees VI & VII/2000 on the TNI and POLRI. Along with various CSOs, a wide cross-section of groups from civil society—including university students, academics, professional associations, religious and public figures, workers, fisher-folk, and victims of human rights violations—applied massive external and internal pressure for the abolition of the military's political role, and the separation of the police and the army.

During this time, there was a heightened awareness and shared understanding of the importance of reform among civilians, government, and even some military officials. Civil society support for reform has been sustained over the years by CSO advocacy that has facilitated greater public understanding of, and engagement in, SSR issues. CSO advocacy has also provided a means through which the public can hold security actors to account, and monitor government efforts toward democratic reform.

While this study suggests that commitment to SSR on the part of government, parliament and security apparatus has diminished over time, there is still rhetorical and even some real support among these actors. Most still speak of the importance of democracy and good governance for Indonesia's success as a nation, which is rhetoric that provides some opening for SSR advocacy. Offering more promise, however, are examples of substantive commitment to reform, as exemplified by local governments that have guaranteed people's right to access to information from their institutions.

In addition to domestic support for reform, this study acknowledges the important role of the international community. International pressure for democratization in Indonesia was a significant factor in building general support for reform and receptivity to CSO advocacy demands on the part of the government, legislators and security actors. Since 1998, many countries and funding agencies have supported CSO and government efforts toward security sector reform.

OBSTACLES AND CHALLENGES TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Global interests that jeopardize SSR and democratization in Indonesia

While global interests have had a positive influence on SSR in Indonesia, international financial support has shifted to supporting the security sector's capacity to fight terrorism. CSOs point out that the international "war on terror" is jeopardizing democratization and reform in Indonesia, and is paving the way for security actors to resume the repressive roles they had in the past. For example, a serious cause for concern is the TNI's role in anti-terrorism operations, which has served as the rationale for the United States administration's decision in 2005 to normalize military trade and cooperation with Indonesia, listing respect for human rights as a precondition.

Other priorities such as the need to secure international investment in Indonesia are also working against SSR. For instance, there was pressure to expedite enactment of the POLRI bill despite serious CSO concerns because foreign aid for Indonesia's economic recovery was conditional on Indonesia's ability to guarantee internal stability.

Limits to cooperation between CSOs, government, parliament and security institutions

In this changing international context, political enthusiasm and support for SSR has waned over time. While commitment to reform was strong in 2000 when important and fundamental changes were made to the security sector through MPR Decrees VI and VII, this level of support no longer exists today. As noted above, there has been some openness to civil society engagement

with SSR. However, the study also documents how public access to, and influence on, parliament and government has hit a glass ceiling, and how the substance of policy and legislative changes has not yet met civil society demands or democratic standards.

While the government and legislature want CSOs to legitimize their policies, they tend to only accept CSO recommendations that align with their own objectives. The government also provides financial support for CSOs that then support the government agenda. In fact, this report documents a growing number of CSOs being formed by government or government officials. According to CSOs that do not receive this kind of government support, these practices seriously compromise the "independent and non-governmental" nature of CSOs.

Some officials in government, parliament and security institutions will disregard CSOs advocacy in SSR based on the argument that they are funded by foreign states/institutions and that they are promoting the interests of their funders. Other policymakers consider CSOs to be disruptive to governmental stability, and believe that they actually impede reform. CSO involvement in security sector reform is not fully welcomed by security institutions either. For instance, cooperation with POLRI is not regularized and is only at the operational level, as CSOs are not invited to take part in the development of strategic policies or change at the systems level. Military intelligence is the least receptive to CSOs because they believe that the reform movement was driven by foreign-backed CSOs that promoted anti-military sentiments. For this reason, CSO advocacy with intelligence actors is increasingly conducted at the personal rather than the institutional level.

Different understandings of "Security"

This study suggests that one of the most important differences between CSOs on the one hand, and government, parliamentarians, security actors on the other, is their understanding of the concept of "security." This difference in understanding poses a major obstacle to achieving progress on SSR, and particularly to the development of policies and legislation that comply with democratic principles.

Currently most legislative debate on security sector reform focuses on defense and military issues. For CSOs, however, SSR must be related to the broader democratization process and integrated into a human security framework. Central to CSOs' conception of national security is human security, which includes the need to protect and uphold civil, political, social, economic and

cultural rights. From this perspective, security threats are much wider and diverse in scope, and security is not limited to the role of the military and the police in protecting the nation. For government, parliament and security actors, however, the concept of security pertains strictly to situations of war, military threats and maintaining public order.

These different understandings lead to disagreement over what constitutes a threat to state interests and whose security needs to be protected. For instance, intelligence actors continue to view groups or individuals who carry out activities that are incompatible with Pancasila[6] as state enemies, although the requirement to submit to the principles of Pancasila has been amended in the Constitution. Although the newly amended Constitution enshrines human rights, the security apparatus wants these rights to be derogated when they decide that national security is under threat. Hence, the persistence of human rights violations and abuses of authority involving the security apparatus, as well as their lack of accountability for both past and present abuses. This study found that public distrust and fear of the security apparatus is especially high in the regions, where there continues to be widespread violence and abuses of power by the security apparatus, in addition to continued security sector involvement in criminal activities. For this reason, CSOs in the regions were pessimistic about any progress being made in SSR.

Resistance to civil political authority

Another major obstacle to SSR is security actors' resistance to civil political authority. The TNI, POLRI and intelligence institutions (which are dominated by the military elite) continue to be involved in politics and to evade accountability to civilian rule of law. Examples of this include the military's participation in the political controversy during President Gus Dur's administration (1999-2001), and its reluctance to accept the results of the investigation into human rights violations in East Timor.

This study suggests that resistance to the democratic principle of civilian control of the military can be explained by security actors' reluctance to relinquish their privilege and power, and the marginal position of pro-reform elements in their institutions. Security institutions also justify their continued role in the political arena by arguing that they are part of civil

---

6   Pancasila was used by Indonesia's future President Sukarno in June 1945 to describe the five principles upon which the Indonesian state was to be established, namely: a belief in one God, a just and civilized state, the unity of Indonesia, democracy with responsibilities, and social justice. Pancasila was enshrined later that year in Indonesia's first constitution.

society. For instance, the TNI continues to operate according to the Doctrine of the "Peoples' War," which defines the "army as the people" rather than as a separate, professional entity. The TNI, PORLI and BIN also maintain that civilians do not understand defense, security and intelligence matters, and therefore continue to play a central role in formulating their own reform agendas. This has created a situation where the legislators and government leaders have to engage in political bargaining and struggle with these institutions on issues of SSR. Indeed, the TNI, POLRI and especially the military-dominated BIN continue to hold and exercise considerable power in the legislature and in politics despite the fact that the military do not hold reserve seats in the legislature anymore (dual functions)

Given their enduring influence in political affairs, civil authorities such as the executive, the legislature and political parties are dependent on the support of security actors to gain and maintain power. While security actors resist civilian supremacy, civil authority is further weakened by the recruitment of retired TNI and POLRI officers into elite political party structures. This paves the way to many compromises between the civil political and military elite. CSOs have also noted that back room negotiations often take place between politicians, the police, military and security actors. In the legislature, this results in many impediments to security sector reform, such as the enactment of security sector laws that are inconsistent with democratic principles (e.g. President Megawati's decision to expedite the TNI Bill that has the potential to revive the military's dual function, in return for the TNI's political support).

Lack of political will and commitment to SSR

While security actors pose a significant obstacle to advancing security sector reform, this study found that some CSOs consider some civilian politicians even more problematic than conservative elements of the military. In the regions, CSOs must contend with "local strong men" who control important economic and political assets and resources, as well as regional security actors' activities at the provincial and local levels. At the national level, the government exercises considerable influence in determining when and which security sector laws and bills will be implemented or debated in parliament. For example, the Presidential Regulation on the Takeover of TNI Businesses suffered many delays. Indonesian and international CSOs insist that the abolition and takeover of military businesses are crucial for Indonesia's democratic transition and the development of a professional defense force.

Indonesia's President finally passed the Decree on April 16, 2008. However, the Decree only establishes a national team on the transformation of TNI businesses with a mandate to make proposals only to the President.

The legislature itself is an arena of struggle among multiple and competing interests that are not always consistent with the spirit of SSR. Many parliamentarians have yet to demonstrate genuine and explicit political commitment to SSR and related democratic principles. To date, commitment to SSR is still at the individual level and not yet at the level of commissions or political parties. Generally, legislators wait to see the strength of CSO pressure before deciding to act, and they have a poor track record on following up with CSO demands and recommendations. Apart from a lack of political will, many parliamentarians also have limited knowledge of defense and security issues, which also weakens their ability to promote SSR.

CRITIQUES OF SECURITY SECTOR LEGISLATION & POLICIES

As a result of the obstacles and challenges outlined above, there have been many problems with the development and implementation of security sector legislation and policies. CSOs have been critical of policy and legislative processes, the substance of proposed and passed legislation, as well as the lack of monitoring and enforcement of new laws. The following are some of their critiques and recommendations for improvement.

While significant gains were made through MPR Decrees VI & VII, CSOs suggest that the definition of defense and security functions be revised so that there is no ambiguity between TNI and POLRI, which used to be the same institution. Furthermore, these institutions must be held accountable to civil authority (e.g. by placing the TNI Commander and POLRI chief under the Minister of Defense and the Minister of the Interior or Justice and Human Rights respectively).

The TNI Bill drew much sharper criticism from CSOs. In their view, this law contradicted the spirit of reform and democratic principles because most articles accommodate the TNI's wish to remain in politics. Problematic articles included those that re-affirm old military principles (e.g. Doctrine of the "Peoples War"), assign the TNI commander the position of political official and cabinet member, allow soldiers to hold civilian posts in the bureaucracy, give the TNI responsibility for handling domestic threats such as communal conflicts, maintain the TNI's territorial command structure and affirm the use of military courts to try criminal cases involving TNI soldiers. Despite strong objection from CSOs, this law was passed without the proposed amendments and calls for a longer deliberation period.

CSOs also criticized the POLRI Bill for having been passed too quickly and without sufficient public input. The substance of the law was also criticized for assigning an exceedingly broad role to the Indonesian police, not providing for enough civil supervision and oversight (e.g. by placing the POLRI chief under the President and removing the article on public services complaints which would have been an important supervisory mechanism), creating openings for the politicization of POLRI, and maintaining a militaristic and centralized organization which contradicts the SSR objectives of a civil police force and regional autonomy. The latter poses a serious problem for POLRI's community-based policing model, because while police work most closely with local governments, they are not accountable to them. Other problems identified by CSOs include ambiguity in sources of police financing, the lack of clarity in the division of responsibility between the TNI and POLRI, and limits on the use of POLRI's Mobile Brigade (BRIMOB).

CSOs have also been critical of a number of proposed pieces of legislation such as the Intelligence Bill. This bill, which was drafted by BIN, violates Indonesian criminal law and international human rights law, and gives the BIN broad, unrestricted powers in the intelligence and policing domains. Furthermore, CSOs fear that BIN's definition of "threats to the nation" makes room for serious abuse and the targeting of opposition groups and parties, non-violent political activists, and indigenous groups. As part of their advocacy efforts, CSOs developed an alternate intelligence bill, but there has been a lack of openness to civic engagement on issues of intelligence reform. Nevertheless, CSOs continue to push their alternate bill because a legal framework to govern BIN's roles and duties is urgently needed to ensure that it is held accountable to civilian leaders.

Another bill that some CSOs fear could return extraordinary powers to security actors is the National Security Bill drafted by the Department of Defense. Many CSOs are apprehensive about the proposed changes to the relationships and authority structures of various security institutions, and have called for the bill to be rejected altogether. However, other CSOs believe that bill's goal of coordinating and synchronizing various pieces of legislation in the defense and security sectors is an important part of security sector reform agenda. Despite this difference in opinion, there is agreement among all CSOs that: first, the bill is problematic because it gives the TNI a role in anti-terrorism activity; second, the bill includes a "coup d'État" article which would allow the TNI Commander to deploy forces in an emergency situation without prior consultation with the President; and third, the bill is too focused on TNI roles and functions when security threats and actors

are broader than military threats. CSO advocacy on this bill continues, but political controversy over the bill between the TNI and POLRI led President Yudhoyono to delay further deliberations until after the 2009 elections.

Another bill that faced serious delays is the Freedom to Obtain Public Information Act (KMIP Bill). This bill is important for improving government transparency and accountability by guaranteeing the public's right to monitor public officials, obtain information, participate in public policy development, exercise freedom of expression, and enjoy witness protection. Although there is much political rhetoric about the ways in which this bill will promote good governance and uphold truth and justice, political manoeuvres hinting at resistance to transparency are increasing. The bill was finally passed in April 2008 with a new name: the "Law on Public Openness." However, the expected problems and weaknesses remain: freedom to information is subject to numerous exceptions with respect to what is interpreted as public information and what are considered state secrets.

While SSR advocacy carried out by CSOs based in Jakarta is primarily focused on the development of policy and legislation, CSOs in the regions are mainly concerned about the implementation of these policies. Regional CSOs maintain that there has been no significant or positive correlation between changes in legislative or institutional policies, and increased professionalism or reduced violence and human rights violations on the ground. For instance, they report that military and police practice and conduct are the same as before their separation by law. In the context of community policing, a CSO partner in the Yogyakarta program reported that in recent years, the police have gone back to their old militaristic ways, and have turned their attention once again to pursuing business and economic interests. Regarding the implementation of the police's gender mainstreaming program, this study found that there are still not enough women in the police force to effectively provide women victims of violence with legal services.. Furthermore, police women are not assigned strategic roles and their specialized training in human trafficking is not put to use.

CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION ADVOCACY STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE

In addition to taking a critical look at the role of security actors, government, and parliament in SSR, this study also gave CSOs the opportunity to critique and reflect on their own work. A key area for improvement highlighted by CSOs was the need to develop more effective advocacy strategies. While not abandoning traditional "watch dog" and "external pressure" strategies such as lobbying, public campaigns, and direct actions, CSOs want to experiment with new ways of applying pressure for change. Some of these approaches include working in close collaboration with government, parliament and security actors, and forming tactical coalitions with political parties. Both these "external" and "internal" approaches to advocacy are seen as complementary and necessary to successfully push for reforms.

CSOs also want explore taking on a greater monitoring role to ensure the implementation of security sector laws and policies. Furthermore, they recognize the need to strengthen their capacity in media and public relations, and to deepen their understanding and analysis of SSR issues and political processes so they can connect micro to macro issues and carry out more effective SSR advocacy and policy work.

Another area for improvement that CSOs identified is networking and cooperation between various types of CSOs (e.g. pressure groups and think tank groups), different sectors of society, and CSOs across the country. Currently, SSR advocacy is dominated by Jakarta-based CSOs, but CSOs recognize the need to involve a wider cross-section of society for SSR advocacy to succeed. Thus, they expressed their desire to build strong alliances between

themselves, social organizations, various communities and sectors of society (e.g. university, labour, urban poor, rural), media, and political and economic groups who are concerned about and would benefit from SSR.

While working in coalition holds great promise, it also presents a number of challenges. CSOs have gleaned a number of lessons from their past experience with coalitions that were short-lived and struggled with internal problems that affected the quantity and quality of their advocacy work. In order to build stronger and more effective alliances in the future, they recommend that coalition members develop a shared vision and focus on one issue at a time. Recognizing that SSR advocacy is a multi-faceted, complex and challenging endeavour, CSOs also propose the development of a mechanism to administer inter-institutional relations so that coalitions can be sustained over the long-term.

RECOMMENDATIONS

General

1. The consolidation and reformulation of CSO strategies are urgently needed in order to follow up or to design future SSR agendas.

2. Parliament, as the body that determines SSR direction through its legislative function and laws, must show serious political commitment in order to welcome CSO engagement on SSR.

3. Government, as the executor of the 1998 Reform agenda, should be consistent and fully committed to ensuring that none of the 1998 Reform demands advocated for by CSOs and the Indonesian public are hampered or neglected.

4. All security sector legislation should be evaluated in order to assess its effectiveness or ineffectiveness in encouraging SSR. By doing so, action can be taken as needed to improve these laws through amendments, revisions, or additional supporting instruments.

5. All security sector bills that have not been passed into law must receive serious attention from the DPR and the government. There is an urgent need to ensure that SSR continues to progress during this period of political transition.

6. Political support is still needed from the international community for SSR advocacy conducted either by the government or CSOs, especially to ensure that SSR is consistent with the principles of democracy and in the interests of society.

To Civil Society Organizations

7. CSOs need to maintain and to further develop their functions and roles. This includes an evaluation and reformulation of their strategies for future use in SSR advocacy.

8. CSOs need to employ strategies aimed at strengthening the active role of communities in security sector law and policy making processes related to the security sector.

9. CSOs need to publish SSR recommendations and alternative policies that are relevant, effective, sustainable and in accordance with the context and the capacity existing in Indonesia (i.e. that offer a moderate SSR solution). CSOs should also formulate ideal strategies that may possibly require additional time and capacity in future.

10. The advocacy strategy of influencing policies from within government and policy making institutions should also be taken into consideration. Such a strategy might involve gathering allies, placement of personnel, or partnership with DPR, Government and Security actors.

11. There is a need to extend SSR discourse to the regions and to develop an advocacy network that monitors regional CSO issues within the context of national issues.

To the DPR and the Government

12. A Strategic Plan or "blueprint" for the Security Sector that covers defense and security issues is needed. This plan would include various strategic policies that take into account geopolitics, geography, predictable threats, capacity and functions, and the authority and duties of each state instrument, democratic principles and the Indonesian people's aspirations.

13. A comprehensive evaluation of laws, policies and the implementation of SSR agendas are needed. This will ensure government and DPR's political accountability in performing their mandate from the state and the people. Evaluation results should then be reported to the public through available governance mechanisms.

To the International Community

14. Various international or state interests should not facilitate or legitimatize a return to the repressive roles that government and security actors played during the "New Order" era. The SSR agenda and Indonesia's overall democratic transition needs to be safeguarded.

15. The international community should continue to give support to CSOs that advocate for SSR, and not assume that the reform process is going well merely by looking at normative change indicators and listening only to rhetoric from certain government officials or parliamentarians.