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Pensées

Canadian Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy
Revue étudiante canadienne de philosophie

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- Papers can be submitted in either English or French
- Essays should be between 8-20 pages in length
- All references and citations should be included in the endnotes
- The name of the author should not appear on any page of the paper
- A separate cover page should provide the author's full name, phone number, e-mail address, university, program, year, and the grade received if the paper was submitted for a course
- The deadline for submissions to the third edition of *Pensées* is January 15, 2002

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Contents

Introduction vii

A Brief Look at Socialism:
An Interview with G. A. Cohen 11

Une brève réflexion sur le socialisme:
Un interview avec G. A. Cohen 19

Between the Starry Heavens Above and the Moral Law Within:
Kant & the Grounding of Freedom and Morality 26
Davide P. Cargnello, McGill University

De la ligne du point et de la souffrance 41
Valérie Cayouette Guilloteau, Université de Québec à Montréal

The Responses to Eleaticism of Anaxagoras and Empedocles:
Similarities and Differences 52
Tracy McNicoll, McGill University

The Synthesis of Time 66
Jeremy Proulx, Trent University

Drag's Subversive Potential:
Performativity and the Possibility of Resistance 83
Stephen Thierman, University of Alberta

Contributors 103

Introduction

Since the launch of *Pensées* last year, we have endeavoured to transform the journal into a truly national project. Our goals for this issue included conducting an interview with a well-known Canadian philosopher, expanding the editorial board and making the journal more bilingual. We believe that we have been successful in meeting these goals. First, last fall we conducted an interview with Professor Gerald A. Cohen (All Souls College, Oxford). A transcript of this discussion, concerning the role of socialism in the modern world, appears in this issue in both English and French. Second, our editorial board for this edition included over twenty-five undergraduate and graduate philosophy students from nine Canadian universities. All undergraduate members of the board were responsible for soliciting submissions from their home universities, fundraising for the journal and reviewing papers. We were delighted with the positive feedback that they received from their respective universities and hope that such co-operation between philosophy departments continues next year. If any philosophy students are interested in being a member of the editorial board, they should contact us at cujp@hotmail.com. Third, in an effort to ensure that the second of edition of *Pensées* was bilingual, we created a new editorial position, *rédacteur français*, which has been ably filled by Guillaume Gingembre this year. Guillaume was responsible for soliciting French submissions, co-ordinating the selection and editing of French papers and translating the interview with Professor Cohen. These efforts clearly paid-off as we received several submissions in French, one of which is included in this edition.

Cette année, nous sommes heureux d'avoir pu donner à *Pensées* une dimension réellement nationale. En effet, grâce à une élargissement de comité de rédaction, et à la participation active de nos éditeurs francophones, nous avons reçu plusieurs candidatures pour des articles écrits en Français. Nous en publions un dans ce numéro, qui présente d'une façon originale l'analyse de l'École de Francfort sur la place et le rôle de l'art dans la société marchande contemporaine. Nous publions également dans les deux langues une interview du Professeur Cohen, de Oxford, professeur visiteur à McGill

cette année.

Nous voulons poursuivre dans cette voie pour le prochain numéro, en continuant de bénéficier des apports des cultures anglophone et francophone. Cette double approche, en plus d'enrichir nos contributions, nous permet de présenter dans nos pages deux approches philosophiques complémentaires dont la réunion est propre au Canada. Nous voulons tout particulièrement remercier Guillaume Gingembre qui, en contactant les universités francophones, et en créant des liens avec l'association étudiante de l'UQAM, liée à celle de l'Université de Montréal, a particulièrement contribué au développement de la partie francophone du journal.

We would like to thank all students who submitted papers. In selecting essays, each submission was reviewed by at least three undergraduate editors, each of whom made extensive comments. On the basis of these assessments, the best papers were further reviewed by graduate students and professors. We were very pleased to be able to provide feedback to all those who submitted to the journal. The five papers selected for publication were recognized for their clear exposition of ideas and coherent argument. In addition, they reflect the diverse philosophical interests of departments across the country. In "Between the Starry Heavens and the Moral Low Within: Kant & the Grounding of Freedom and Morality", Davide P. Cargnello (McGill University), argues that neither the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* nor the *Critique of Practical Reason* succeeds in providing a foundation for morality and freedom. The paper "De la ligne du point et de la souffrance", by Valérie Cayouette Guilloteau (Université de Québec à Montréal) offers an analysis of the Frankfurt School's understanding of the role of art in a market-based society. In "The Responses to Eleaticism of Anaxagoras and Empedocles: Similarities and Differences", Tracy McNicoll compares and contrasts the approaches of Empedocles and Anaxagoras to the set of problems that arise from Eleatic monism. "The Synthesis of Time", by Jeremy Proulx (Trent University), argues that Husserl's conception of the constitution of time fails to account for both the subjective experience of the passing of time and the dynamic nature of time as flux. Finally, by appealing to Judith Butler's non-essentialist account of gender, Stephen Thierman's article (University of Alberta), "Drag's Subversive Potential: Performativity and the Possibility of Resistance", argues that drag offers a way of subverting the gender roles perpetuated in society.

We would like to thank those people who have made the second edition of *Pensées* a success. First of all, we would like to thank Professor Cohen for taking the time to conduct not one, but two, interviews with us. It has been a pleasure to discuss his ideas with him and we are grateful for his contribution to the journal. We appreciate the help we received from our faculty advisor, Professor R. Philip Buckley, as well as other professors in the McGill philosophy department, including Alan Patten, Andrew Sneddon and Eric Lewis. In addition, there are many students whose help has been invaluable; Hilary Vipond for conducting the interview with Professor Cohen;

Philippe Lagasse, Chris McTavish and Guillaume Gingembre for copy-editing selected papers; Dominique Michaud for his wonderful lay-out job; Serge Schiller at AGMV printing; and Emily Carroll for designing our ads and helping with fundraising.

Finally, in an effort to improve next year's journal, we encourage you to send us all comments and suggestions that you may have. We hope you find *Pensées*, Vol. 2, a thought-provoking read.

Kimberley Brownlee
Daniel Groll
Montreal, 2001

A Brief Look at Socialism: An Interview with G. A. Cohen

Professor Gerald A. Cohen is currently Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at All Souls College, Oxford University. He is also a regular Visiting Professor in the Department of Philosophy at McGill University.

In Conversations with Isaiah Berlin *by Ramin Jahanbegloo, Isaiah Berlin states that Left-wing thought has collapsed in the West for the first time after two centuries.*[1] *What is your opinion of this statement? What is the place of Analytic Marxism in the modern western world?*

I do not agree with him that it has "collapsed". Left-wing thought is certainly still in being, but, equally certainly, it has lost its social élan, its capacity to recruit widespread support. I believe that there are two big causes of this unfortunate development, the first more obvious than, but less important than, the second.

The first cause of the recession of left-wing thought is the collapse of the non-capitalist world. To be sure, leftists of unprejudiced intelligence were not uncritical fans of the social forms which composed that world. They knew that communism in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, and in parts of Asia, was far too tyrannical to represent an inspiring realisation of the socialist ideal. But those countries nevertheless constituted a non-capitalist space upon which leftists could project their hopes for a non-tyrannical socialism, for a society neither driven by the market, and therefore dominated by the rich, nor controlled by an anti-democratic élite. Now the real-world space in which such hope could be located is gone, and market ideology rides rampant across the globe, destroying every form of public resistance to it.

But more important still than the collapse of state socialism, more important as an element in the explanation of the left's loss of support, is an irreversible transformation in the structure of capitalist class society. This cause of the recession in left-wing thought is more important than the first one, because it operates at the level of the economy: it is rooted in changes in the process of production, changes that are more fundamental than anything that happens at the level of politics. And the irreversible transformation that I have in mind is the withering away of the traditional working class, the class which had been cast in the role of the *agent* of socialist trans-

formation. That class, traditionally conceived, had four characteristics which, taken together, ensured that it would produce a socialist revolution. First, it was the section of society on whose productive activity everyone depended. Second, it constituted the great majority of society. Third, it was composed of the exploited people in society. And, finally, its members were in serious need; they experienced a substantial lack of the essentials of a fulfilling life. Because of the first and second characteristics, the class had the *power* to make a revolution. And it needed only to become clearly aware of that power to exercise it in a socialist direction, since the third and fourth characteristics — exploitation and need — gave it the *motive* to create socialism.

No social group now displays the four characteristics that I have distinguished. There still exist strategically placed producers, exploited people, needy people and, of course, various majorities, but the four features do not coincide (whether or not they ever did coincide fully, outside the realm of socialist hope). And with the fragmentation of the four features[2] goes the disappearance of the class within capitalism that might become *both* committed to equality and socialism, *and* able to bring them about, because of its material position in society. Now equality and socialism are more utopian, ideals that will be realised only if and because millions of people come to think that the ideals are *right*, and that is a much less reliable source of revolutionary change than the one that was available within the earlier conception of the proletariat or working class.

If the old conception of the working class had remained sustainable, the collapse of world communism would not have disoriented socialists as much as it has; had world communism, moreover, persisted, socialists would not then be much less disoriented than they actually are, given the defeating transformation of the western proletariat.

It is necessary to emphasise that the point I am labouring has nothing to do with the scholastic question about what is the correct way to use the phrases "working class" or "proletariat". Under some orthodox Marxist definitions of those terms, where, for example, the essential condition for inclusion in their denotation is that one must sell one's labour power to get one's living, the overwhelming mass of the population is, some would argue, now proletarian. But that, if indeed a fact, is an entirely boring fact, in face of the non-verbal, and politically fateful, truth that the four features that I listed have come apart. That truth has nothing to do with the proper meaning of the expression "proletariat" (or "working class"), and is therefore not refutable on the basis of whatever anyone thinks its proper meaning is.

What happened in Seattle in 2000 might turn out to be the beginning of a left-wing renewal. And it is very important that the site of this possible renewal is capitalism in its international manifestation. It is also very important that much of it is indeed fuelled by the idealist zeal that, so I have argued, is, for structural reasons, more necessary now than it was thought to be in the past. The ugly face of the market, the contradiction between the needs of the market, which means the needs of the rich and powerful, and the needs of humanity, is beginning to receive high-profile exposure.

* * * * * *

The second part of your question concerns analytical Marxism. In order to answer it, let me first try to convey my understanding of what analytical Marxism is.

Analytical Marxism developed from a fusion of Marxism and analytical philosophy, one that I have described in some detail in a new Introduction to the 2000 edition of my book *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defense*, which was first published in 1978. The founding principle of analytical Marxism is the denial that Marxism possesses a distinctive method of its own that distinguishes it from mainstream social science and philosophy. Instead, what distinguishes Marxism, in the view of those of us who have been called analytical Marxists, is a commitment to a society of social ownership and equality, a commitment to social ownership in the *interest* of equality.

Karl Marx founded what Frederick Engels called 'scientific socialism', which is, at least among other things, the study of the nature of, and the route to, socialism, using the most advanced resources of social science, and within the frame of a socialist commitment. I regret that Marxism came to be called 'Marxism', instead of what Engels wisely called it. If the 'scientific socialism' label had stuck, people would be less disposed to put the unproductive question, 'Is analytical Marxism *Marxist*?'.

What would a physicist say if she were asked whether she was still a Galilean (supposing, not implausibly, that Galileo founded physics)? Once she had recovered from the perplexity induced by the strangeness of that question, she would, if sensible, say something like this: 'Look, Galileo founded physics, and much of what he said remains true. But we physicists don't call ourselves "Galileans" or "Newtonians", because physics is a progressive discipline: no-one expects it to *preserve* the theses of its founders. Physics must contradict (much of) what Galileo and Newton said: only so can it be loyal to the tradition which they founded.'

Religions are not supposed to progress, so it's appropriate that they bear names like "Buddhism" and "Zoroastrianism". The great thing about Zoroaster or Buddha or Christ, for those who follow them, is that they revealed the truth, *once and for all*.

It's unfortunate, then, that scientific socialism got called "Marxism". Its name misassimilates it to a religious rather than to a scientific paradigm. If it were not just a fact, but also appropriate, today, that Marxism still gets called "Marxism", then Marx would have failed. He would have failed to found a science. He would have become, as in certain places he has become, a figure to be worshipped, like Buddha or Zoroaster.

There are, of course, big differences between physics and social science. Social science is not, and never will be, as scientifically developed as natural science is. And,

while you do not need to read Galileo or Newton to be a good physicist (reading them is the vocation not of physicists but of historians of physics), we have not progressed so far that it is time to stop reading Marx. The study of Marx and Engels remains an indispensable element in a scientific socialist's education.[3]

Your question asks what "the *place* of analytical Marxism is in the modern Western world". I'm not sure how to answer that question, beyond saying that it takes its place as one current of thought in a wider radical stream which moves towards an understanding of social oppression and which seeks to contribute to its reduction, and to its elimination.

Do you feel that the cannon studied by undergraduates in philosophy today has evolved in a way that silences or undervalues the issues addressed by Left-wing thinkers?

That is a very good question, but not one that I feel very well-equipped to answer, partly because, whether shamefully or not, I haven't thought a lot about it, and partly because I am not thoroughly familiar with the North American undergraduate scene, which I take to be the reference of your question. But if we ask a less difficult question, a less comprehensive question, namely, is there less scope in the contemporary curriculum for radical exploration than there was when I, for example, was an undergraduate, in the late nineteen-fifties, then an optimistic answer is in order. The curriculum was vastly more conservative then, and universities are now filled with teachers in senior positions whose formation in the radical nineteen-sixties continues to inform what they teach.

I am talking here about the *opportunity* for left-wing education, not about the extent to which students actually avail themselves of it. Like everybody else, students are massively influenced by the recent insurgence of market ideology, and they consequently do not gravitate in large numbers to counter-capitalist and counter-establishment courses. But it remains true that there is *much* more radical substance *on offer* than there used to be. Whether there is *enough* is a question that I find difficult to answer. If the supply is too low, that probably reflects deficient demand — as much, at any rate, as it might also reflect administrative repression, and the recent baleful intrusion of big business, and big business values and priorities, into the working of the universities.

Do you feel that your contribution as an academic to the egalitarian debate will play out on the social and political level? What is the nature of the relationship between egalitarian theory and political action?

I do not look at my particular academic work as a cause, operating on its own, that I hope will have a political and/or social effect that is traceable to that distinguishable cause. I am a small part of something much larger, a stream of radical thought, a stream that is always in being, one that is, to be sure, sometimes pretty narrow, but one that is also now and then wider, according to the fortunes of history. Carl Sandburg wrote: Something began me, and it had no beginning; something will end me, and it has no end. If you want to know what the effect of that stream is, try to think of how things would be if it did not flow. There would never have been freedom from feudal bondage, there would never have been universal suffrage, there would certainly never be that society of community and equality for which we continue to struggle. It says, on a plaque above one of the doors in Moyse Hall at McGill University: "La pensée sans action c'est une vaine mirage; l'action sans pensée, c'est un vain effort". You cannot contrast thought and action as avenues of social change. The thought is part of the action.

And that brings me to the second question in the present pair. The answer is that egalitarian theory is part of political action, an essential part of the struggle for equality. It contributes to the analysis of the nature and causes of inequality, to the more or less precise specification of what community and equality are, and to the understanding of the social means to political change. We can do all that intellectual work more or less well, but it is work that must be done. Without radical treatises there would be no radical pamphlets to bring to the streets and the barricades. No one can accuse Karl Marx of a lack of political engagement, but the better part of that engagement was played out among the books of the British Museum. And so it goes on, for as long as oppression and injustice prevail.

Is there room for egoism in a radical egalitarian society? In order for an egalitarian society to thrive, must all citizens be motivated by a concern for the situation of others?

If egoism is the theory that says that each individual has no duties to others, then there is of course no room for it in an egalitarian society, nor, indeed, in any society. *No* society can function when people at large are quite unconcerned about the situation of others, and what distinguishes an egalitarian society is, simply, or not so simply, a higher level of that concern, a broadening of that concern, so that none are prepared to flourish at the expense of, or even in the presence of, the misfortune of others.

But if we replace "egoism" by "self-interest" in the formulation of the first question in that the present pair, then of course there is room for it in a radically egalitarian society. It would be incoherent to propose a society in which each person cares for others but not at all for herself, for it would then contradict the aim of others to care about *them*, since *they*, the people they would suppose to be caring about, would themselves only be caring about others. If everybody cares *only* about the desires of others, if there is *no* self-interest, then there are no desires of others that anyone can identify

and serve. We cannot better, in this context, the motto that appears in the Jewish Talmud: "If I am not for myself, then who will be for me? But if I am for myself alone, then what am I? And if not now, when?" If I am not, *among other things*, for myself, then there is no substantial *me* for others to serve and care about. A society in which each seeks *only* to serve others disappears up its own something-or-other.

How have your political and philosophical views impacted on the way that you have led your life?

My intellectual life has been a very large part of my life, and my intellectual life has been more than forty years of deciding what must be dropped and must be kept from the Marxist and socialist doctrine that I learned in my communist childhood in Montréal. So in that way my political and philosophical views have structured my life. But they have also led me to examine the relationship between such views and the rest of my life, or indeed of the life of anyone who holds such views, and that is a large theme in my recent book *If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich?*. The title of that book is a complicated and vexing question, and I do not want to try to summarise my anyhow unfinished answer to it here, where it must suffice to say that, on the one hand, a life of ease and opulence, at any rate on a scale that, fortunately for my sense of my own consistency, I have never known, is inconsistent with egalitarian views, but, on the other hand, and as I tried to make clear in 4, no one is obliged to live only for equality and for others. We have to strike a difficult balance between personal right and social duty.

I am deeply grateful for the opportunity that you have given me to say these things. It is wonderful to be back at McGill.

Notes

[1] Jahanbegloo, Ramin, *Conversations with Isaiah Berlin*. London, UK: Phoenix Press, 2000, p 126.

[2] Professor Cohen discusses that fragmentation in Chapter 6 of *Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality* (Cambridge, 1995) and also in Chapter 6 of *If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich?* (Harvard, 2000).

[3] The foregoing five paragraphs reproduce material at pp. xxvii-xxviii of *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defense*, Expanded Edition, Oxford and Princeton, 2000.

Une brève réflexion sur le socialisme
Un interview avec G. A. Cohen

Professeur Cohen est actuellement professeur de Théorie sociale et politique à All Souls College, université d'Oxford. Il est en ce moment un professeur visiteur au département de Philosophie de l'université McGill.

Dans l'ouvrage de Ramin Jahanbegloo intitulé Conversations avec Isaiah Berlin, *Isaiah Berlin affirme que la pensée de Gauche est actuellement en échec pour la première fois depuis deux siècles. Quelle votre opinion à ce sujet ? Quelle est la place du Marxisme analytique dans le monde occidental moderne ?*

Je ne suis pas d'accord pour dire que cette pensée est en «échec». L'idéologie de gauche est sûrement encore présente, mais elle est en perte de vitesse, et n'est plus capable de s'attirer un large support. Je crois que ce développement malheureux est dû à deux causes majeures, la première étant plus évidente mais moins importante que la seconde.

La première cause du recul de l'idéologie de gauche est la chute du monde non capitaliste. Bien entendu, les penseurs de gauche qui faisaient preuve d'intégrité intellectuelle ne supportait pas aveuglément les types d'organisations sociales du monde communiste. Ils savaient que le communisme en Union Soviétique et dans les pays de l'Est, ainsi que dans certaines parties d'Asie, était bien trop tyrannique pour représenter un model pour réalisation de l'idéal socialiste. Néanmoins ces pays constituaient un espace non-capitaliste sur lequel les hommes de gauche pouvaient projeter leurs espoirs de socialisme non-tyrannique, et de société dirigée ni par les impératifs du marché, et donc par les riches, ni par une élite anti-démocratique. Aujourd'hui, cette réalité qui supportait leurs espoirs n'est plus, et l'idéologie du marché s'étend inéluctablement à l'échelle mondiale, détruisant toute forme de résistance populaire s'érigeant sur son chemin.

Mais plus important encore que la chute du monde socialiste pour expliquer le recul de la pensée de gauche est une transformation irréversible de la structure de classe de la société capitaliste. Cette cause est plus explicative que la première dans la mesure où elle se situe au niveau économique: elle prend sa source dans une évolution du processus de production, évolution qui est bien plus fondamentaux que tout ce qui

peut se passer au niveau politique. Je pense notamment à la disparition progressive de la classe ouvrière traditionnelle qui avait joué un rôle crucial en tant *qu'agent* de la transformation socialiste. Cette classe, telle qu'elle est traditionnellement conçue, a quatre caractéristiques qui, réunies, rendaient une révolution socialiste quasi-inévitable. Tout d'abord, c'était la classe sur laquelle dépendait la société entière pour ce qui était de l'activité de production. Ensuite, cette classe ouvrière constituait une grande majorité de la population. En outre, elle devait être composée des individus exploités de la société. Enfin, ses membres devaient être dans le besoin, et dans l'incapacité matérielle d'accéder à une vie satisfaisante. Du fait des deux premières caractéristiques, cette classe disposait du *pouvoir* nécessaire pour déclencher une révolution. Et elle devait juste devenir pleinement consciente de ce pouvoir pour effectivement servir la cause socialiste, puisque les troisième et quatrième caractéristiques (exploitation et besoin) lui donnaient le *motif* pour tenter une expérience socialiste.

Or actuellement, aucun groupe social ne réunit ces quatre traits. Il existe toujours des groupes stratégiquement appelés producteurs, exploités, gens dans le besoin, en plus bien sûr de majorités variées, mais ces quatre caractéristiques ne se retrouvent dans un seul et même groupe (si cela a jamais été, ailleurs que dans le monde de l'espérance socialiste). Et avec la dispersion de ces quatre traits vient la disparition de cette classe au sein du capitalisme qui, grâce à sa position matérielle dans la société, aurait pu *tout à la fois* supporter le socialisme et l'idée d'égalité, *et* s'engager dans une lutte pour les réaliser. Or l'égalité et le socialisme, idéaux assez utopiques, ne peuvent être réalisés que si des millions de gens viennent à penser que ces idéaux sont *justes et bons*, et ceci est une source de changement révolutionnaire beaucoup moins sûre que celle qui existait avec l'ancienne conception de prolétariat et de classe ouvrière.

Si cette ancienne conception avait survécu, la chute du communisme mondial n'aurait pas ébranlé autant les socialistes ; et si le communisme avait persisté, les socialistes n'en auraient pas pour autant été moins désorientés, étant donné la transformation du prolétariat dans les sociétés occidentales.

Il est nécessaire de souligner ici que ce point n'a rien à voir avec le débat savant à propos de la bonne utilisation des concepts de prolétariat et de classe ouvrière. Comme d'après certaines définitions marxistes orthodoxes, vendre son travail afin d'acquérir le minimum vital est la condition essentielle pour tomber sous de telles dénominations, il est possible pour certains d'affirmer que la plus grande partie de la population constitue un nouveau prolétariat. Mais ce fait, si c'est réellement un fait, manque tout à fait de pertinence en face de la vérité non-verbal et politiquement fatidique de la disparition des quatre caractéristiques listées plus haut, qui sont indépendantes. Cette vérité n'a rien à voir avec l'acception strictement correcte de l'expression «prolétariat» (ou «classe ouvrière») et ne peut donc être réfutée par le sens propre que certains affirment pouvoir attribuer à ces concepts.

Ce qui est advenu à Seattle en 2000 pourrait se révéler être le début d'un renouveau de la gauche. Et il est très important que le lieu de ce possible renouveau est celui du capitalisme dans son expression internationale. Il est aussi très important que ces réactions soient alimentées par un zèle idéaliste qui, comme je l'ai montré, est, pour des raisons structurelles plus nécessaire actuellement que l'on ne le pensait dans le passé. La disgrâce du marché, cette contradiction entre les besoins du marché — ce qui revient aux besoins des riches et des puissants — et les besoins de l'humanité commence à être réellement exposée.

* * * * * * *

Le deuxième objet de votre question concerne le Marxisme analytique. Afin de pouvoir y répondre, je vais expliquer quelle est ma vue du marxisme analytique. Le marxisme analytique est né d'une fusion entre le marxisme et la philosophie analytique, que j'ai décrite en détail dans ma nouvelle introduction à l'édition 2000 de mon livre *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defense*, dont la première édition date de 1978. Le principe fondateur du marxisme analytique est le refus d'affirmer que le marxisme a une méthode différente qui lui est propre et qui le distingue du courant principal des sciences sociales et de la philosophie. Au contraire, ce qui distingue le Marxisme, pour ceux d'entre nous qui avons été qualifiés de Marxistes analytiques, est cet engagement pour une société d'égalité et de possession sociale, un engagement pour la possession sociale et les *intérêts* de l'égalité.

Karl Marx a fondé ce qu'Engels a appelé le «socialisme scientifique». Cela désigne principalement l'étude qui, teintée par une pure conviction socialiste et utilisant les ressources les plus avancées des sciences sociales, se penche sur la nature du socialisme et de la route qui y mène. Je regrette que le marxisme soit appelé «marxisme», et non comme Engels l'avait si pertinemment qualifié. Si le label «socialisme scientifique» avait percé, on serait moins enclins à se poser cette question vide «le marxisme analytique est il marxiste ?».

Que répondrait un Physicien si on lui demandait s'il est encore Galiléen (en supposant que Galilée aie fondé la Physique, ce qui est plausible) ? Une fois surmontée la perplexité engendrée par l'étrangeté de la question, cette personne aurait, si elle était sensible, répondu quelque chose comme suit: « Écoutez, Galilée a fondé la Physique, et la plupart de ce qu'il a affirmé reste vrai. Mais aucun d'entres nous ne se qualifie de Galiléen ou de Newtonien, car la Physique est une discipline qui évolue: personne ne pense à préserver les thèses de ceux qui les ont fondé. La Physique doit contredire la plupart de ce qu'ils ont avancé. Ce n'est qu'ainsi qu'elle sera loyale à la tradition dont ils sont les pères».

Les religions ne sont pas supposées évoluer, il est donc approprié pour elle de garder le nom de leur fondateur, tel Bouddhisme ou Zoroastrisme. Le génie de Bouddha, de Zoroastre ou encore du Christ est qu'ils ont révélé la vérité, *une fois pour*

toute.

Il est donc malheureux que le socialisme scientifique soit appelé Marxisme. Cette désignation entraîne une fausse assimilation du Marxisme à une religion, alors qu'il relève strictement de la science. Si ce n'était pas seulement un fait, mais aussi une vérité, qu'aujourd'hui le Marxisme est encore appelé «Marxisme», alors Marx aurait échoué. Il aurait échoué dans sa tentative de fondation d'une science, et serait devenu, comme c'est effectivement advenu dans certains endroits, un personnage à vénérer, comme Bouddha ou Zoroastre.

Il y a, bien sûr, d'importantes différences entre les Physiques et les sciences sociales. Les sciences sociales ne sont pas, et ne seront jamais, aussi développées scientifiquement que le sont les sciences naturelles. Et, alors qu'il n'est pas nécessaire de lire Galilée ou Newton pour devenir un bon physicien (lire leurs travaux est la tâche non des physiciens, mais des historiens de la physique), nous n'avons pas suffisamment progressé pour que la lecture de Marx soit devenue superflue. L'étude de Marx et de Engels reste un élément indispensable pour l'éducation d'un socialiste scientifique[1].

Votre question pose le problème de la *place* du Marxisme analytique dans le monde occidentale moderne. Je ne sais trop comment y répondre, sinon en disant qu'il prend sa place en tant que courant dans un mouvement radical plus large qui tente de saisir et de comprendre les phénomènes d'oppression sociale, afin de contribuer à leur réduction, puis à leur élimination.

Pensez vous que les programmes actuellement enseignés aux étudiants de Philosophie ont évolué dans une direction qui ignore la pensée et les problématiques des penseurs de gauche ?

C'est une très bonne question, mais je ne me sens pas très bien placé pour y répondre, en partie parce que je n ai pas beaucoup réfléchi sur ce problème, et en partie parce que je ne suis pas très familier avec la réalité Nord-Américaine, qui, je pense, est votre référence. Néanmoins, si l'on prend une question moins difficile, mais moins exhaustive, si l'on se demande s'il y a moins de place dans les programmes contemporains pour une pensée radicale qu'il n'y en avait quand , par exemple, j'étais étudiant de premier cycle à la fin des années cinquante, alors une réponse optimiste s'impose. Les programmes étaient bien plus conservateurs à l'époque, et les universités ainsi que les hauts postes sont actuellement occupés par des professeurs dont une formation radicale reçue dans les années soixante continue d'influencer leur enseignement.

Je parle ici des *ouvertures* dont la pensée de gauche dispose dans l'éducation et non de l'impact qu'elle a sur les étudiants. Comme tout le monde, les étudiants sont massivement influencés par les récentes percées de l'idéologie du marché, et peu se dirigent spontanément vers des cours anti-capitalistes et anti-establishment. Mais il reste vrai qu'il y a beaucoup plus de cours radicaux *offerts* qu'auparavant. Savoir s'il y en a assez est une question que je trouve difficile. Si l'offre est trop faible, cela peut tout aussi bien

traduire une demande déficiente qu'une répression administrative. En outre, cela peut refléter la récente et maléfique intrusion du grand capital avec ses valeurs et priorités au sein même du fonctionnement des universités.

Pensez vous que votre participation académique au débat de l'égalitarisme aura un rôle social et politique ? Quelle est la nature des relations entre la théorie égalitaire et l'action politique ?

Je ne considère pas mon travail particulier comme une cause clairement définissable des évolutions politiques qui, je l'espère, auront lieu. Je ne contribue que modestement à un phénomène bien plus large, un courant de pensée radicale, un courant qui existe toujours, parfois il est vrai bien faiblement, mais aussi de façon plus importante en d'autres moments plus favorables de l'histoire. Carl Sandburg a écrit: «Quelque chose m'a commencé, et ce quelque chose n'a pas de début ; quelque chose me terminera et ce quelque chose n'a pas de fin.» Si vous voulez vous faire une idée de l'influence de ce courant, imaginez ce qui se passerait si tout était fixe. Il n'y aurait jamais eu d'émancipation de l'esclavage féodal, il n'y aurait jamais eu de suffrage universel, et il n'y aura certainement jamais cette société de communauté et d'égalité pour laquelle nous continuons à nous battre. Il est écrit, sur une plaque au dessus d'une des portes de Moyse Hall à l'Université de Mc Gill: «La pensée sans action c'est une vaine mirage; l'action sans pensée, c'est un vain effort». On ne peut contraster la pensée et l'action dans le procès de l'évolution sociale. La pensée est une part de l'action.

Cela m'amène à votre seconde question. La théorie égalitaire est partie intégrante de l'action politique, un aspect essentiel de la lutte pour l'égalité. Elle contribue à une analyse de la nature et des causes de l'inégalité, à la spécification plus ou moins précise de ce que communauté et égalité sont, et à la compréhension des voies sociales menant au changement politique. Nous pouvons tous remplir cette tâche intellectuelle plus ou moins bien, mais c'est un travail qui doit être effectué. Sans traités radicaux, il ne pourrait y avoir de tracts radicaux entraînant les barricades. Personne ne peut accuser Marx de manque d'engagement politique, mais la plus grande part de cet engagement s'est jouée dans les livres du British Museum. Et il en sera ainsi jusqu'à la fin de la domination de l'oppression et de l'injustice.

Y-a-t-il une place pour l'égoïsme dans une société égalitaire ? Afin qu'une société égalitaire se développe, les citoyens doivent-ils porter toute leur attention à autrui ?

Si l'égoïsme est la théorie selon laquelle chaque individu n'a aucune obligation envers autrui, alors il est clair qu'il n'y a aucune place pour de telles attitudes dans une société égalitaire, ni dans aucune société. *Aucune* société ne peut fonctionner quand les gens ne sont pas concernés par la situation d'autrui. Ce qui distingue la société égali-

taire est un plus haut degré d'attention, un élargissement de cette attention, de façon à ce que personne ne soit préparé à prospérer aux dépends d'autrui, ou même en présence de la pauvreté d'autrui.

Mais si l'on remplace «égoïsme» par «intérêt personnel», il y a bien sûr de la place pour de tels soucis dans une société égalitaire. Il serait incohérent de proposer une société dans laquelle chaque personne ne se préoccupe que des autres mais pas du tout d'elle-même, car cela entrerait alors en conflit avec le but des autres de prendre soin *d'eux*, puisque *eux*, le peuple, seraient supposer prendre soin uniquement des autres. Si tout le monde ne prend soin que des désirs des autres, s'il n'y a pas d'intérêt particulier, alors il ne peut y avoir de désir des autres auxquels il serait possible de s'identifier et qu'il serait possible de servir. Une devise juive, tirée du Talmud, semble très appropriée ici: « Si je ne suis pas pour moi, qui le sera ? Si je ne suis que pour moi, que suis-je ? Et si ce n'est pas maintenant, quand est-ce ?». Si je ne suis pas, entres autres choses, pour moi, alors il n'existe pas de moi tangible que les autres peuvent servir et prendre en considération. Une société qui ne cherche *qu'*à servir les autres disparaît dans un altérité indéterminée.

Vos vues politique et philosophiques ont-elles influencées votre façon de mener votre vie ?

Ma vie intellectuelle a été en grande partie ma vie, et ma vie intellectuelle a été plus de quarante années pendant lesquelles il m'a fallu décider ce qu'il fallait abandonner et ce qu'il fallait préserver dans les pensées Marxiste et socialiste, que j'ai rencontrées dans ma jeunesse communiste à Montréal. Dans cette mesure, mes vues politiques et philosophiques ont structuré ma vie. Mais elles m'ont également conduit à examiner les relations entre ces vues et le reste de ma vie, ou en réalité la vie de tous ceux qui ont de telles convictions. Ceci est un grand thème de mon livre récent *If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich?*. Le titre de ce livre est une question compliquée et vexante, et je ne veux pas tenter de résumer ici ma tentative de réponse. Il est suffisant de dire que d'un coté, une vie de facilité et d'opulence, qu'elle qu'en soit l'échelle, et que je n'ai, heureusement pour ma considération personnelle et ma cohérence, jamais connue, est inconsistante avec les vues égalitaires, alors que d'une autre coté, comme j'ai tenté de l'exprimer en réponse à votre quatrième question, personne n'est obligé de vivre uniquement pour l'égalité et pour les autres. Il faut réaliser un équilibre difficile entre le droit personnel et le devoir social.

Je vous suis profondément reconnaissant pour l'opportunité que vous m'avez donné d'exprimer ces vues. C'est merveilleux d'être de retour à McGill.

Notes

[1] *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defense*, Expanded Edition, Oxford and Princeton, 2000, xxvii-xxviii.

Between the Starry Heavens Above and the Moral Law Within: Kant & the Grounding of Freedom and Morality

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In many ways, the viability of Kant's critical philosophy can be said to hinge upon the notion of freedom. Moreover, it is clear from both the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* and from the *Critique of Practical Reason* that the grounding of freedom and that of morality are intimately related. The central aim of this paper is to determine whether morality and freedom can be grounded according to Kant's attempts to do so in the afore-mentioned texts.

Kant adopts markedly different approaches in the two works. In the *Groundwork*, I will show that he purports to deduce the reality of morality on the basis of the necessity of presupposing freedom. In the second *Critique*, he abandons the attempt to deduce morality proper, saying instead that consciousness of the moral law is a 'fact of reason', one which can serve as the basis for a deduction of freedom. Different as the two approaches may be, there does seem to be a position common to both texts and from which both texts argue. Following Henry Allison in *Kant's Theory of Freedom*, I shall refer to this common argument as the Reciprocity Thesis.[1] It is the claim that morality and freedom reciprocally imply each other. My next concern will be to offer a reading of the relevant sections of the *Groundwork* and of the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Drawing on Allison's reconstruction of the more tenuous strands in the argument, I will show that though the *Groundwork* is unsuccessful, the *Critique* seems, on first blush, to fare better. In the third section of this paper, I will explore the assumption of transcendental idealism, an assumption which is necessary for the Kantian attempt to ground morality and freedom. I will argue that on both the 'two world' and 'two aspect' readings of transcendental idealism, the assumption appears problematic if not unsustainable.

Our first task is to examine Kant's defence of the thesis that "freedom and unconditionally practical law reciprocally imply each other".[2] One form of the Reciprocity Thesis is found in the opening passage of the third chapter of the *Groundwork*.[3] There,

Kant begins by stating that free will is a species of causality proper to rational beings, just as natural necessity or the 'mechanism of nature' is the causality proper to non-rational beings. Free will however, unlike natural necessity, is not determined by 'alien causes'. This is because the ground for the determination of a free will is within the will itself. In other words, free will is self-determining. Moreover, it is not because the will is undetermined by alien causes that it is lawless; on the contrary, the will of rational beings is one which is "a law to itself".[4] Furthermore, a will which is a law to itself is one which acts according to maxims whose object is the universal law (i.e. one which expresses the categorical imperative). In short, a free will is a will under moral laws and a will under moral law is free.

We might pause briefly to examine this claim in greater detail. Focusing on Kant's conception of rational agency, it becomes clear that to act rationally is, for Kant, to act according to maxims or subjective laws.[5] These maxims therefore constitute the ground of the rational agent's will.[6] A free rational agent is one who acts according to maxims. Furthermore, as rational, those maxims must be subject to a criterion or standard of justification: an agent's reasons for acting according to a specific maxim, must, if they are to be rational, be reasons which would hold for any rational being in similar circumstances.[7] However, because the rational agent is also transcendentally free, those reasons cannot be adopted on grounds which appeal to human nature, desires, impulses, or any other 'mechanism of nature', because such an appeal would deny the transcendental freedom of the agent.[8] Thus, all rational action must indeed be law-governed in the required sense. And these laws must themselves be derived from purely rational considerations, independent of empirical facts. In other words, the subjective laws of the rational agent are arrived at by appeal to a rational law devoid of empirical content, one which is always true in virtue of its form. The moral law, as expressed by the categorical imperative, fits this description.

In §§5-6 of the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant offers a claim similar to that of *Groundwork III*. In §5, he writes that a moral will, a will whose "sole sufficient determining ground" is "the mere legislative form of maxims", must also be a free will.[9] A will which is determined solely by the form of maxims or laws and not by their content, is one which is not determined by empirical laws, the laws of nature, and is, therefore, independent of these. But such a will remains law-governed. It is, therefore, law-governed but independent of nature: it is free. In the following section, Kant argues for the complementary claim expressed in the Reciprocity Thesis, that a free will must necessarily be a moral one.

Since, by definition, a free will must be law-governed, and because it cannot be determined empirically (by the content of the law), a free will can be determined only by the legislative form of the law. This legislative form, expressed in the categorical imperative, is the only possible determining ground of a free will. Thus, a free will is also a will subject to the moral law.

A further question emerges, however, from the Reciprocity Thesis. Why is the categorical imperative the only possible practical/moral law? As §§5-6 of the second *Critique* attest, Kant seeks to derive the categorical imperative from the moral law in conjunction with the assumption, warranted by the *Critique of Pure Reason*, that rational agents are transcendentally free. For a rational, transcendentally free agent, maxims must conform to the moral law. Moreover, that conformity must be the agent's subjective ground for acting according to a maxim. As we saw above, no 'mechanism of nature' can serve as a justification for transcendentally free subjects. Of course, if simple conformity is itself the reason behind the adoption of a maxim, then that conformity is the determining ground of the will. A rational, transcendentally free will acts only according to those maxims that can at the same time be considered universal laws, thus meeting the requirements of the categorical imperative.

From this account of the Reciprocity Thesis, we conclude that Kant has shown how a free will must be subject to the moral law, and how a will subject to the moral law must be free. It is equally clear from the preceding remarks, however, that the Reciprocity Thesis relies heavily on the assumption of transcendental freedom, an assumption which will be discussed later. First, I will examine Kant's attempts to justify the application of the Reciprocity Thesis in *Groundwork III* and then in the second *Critique*.

The hypothetical conclusion that the Reciprocity Thesis warrants in the opening section of *Groundwork III* is useless unless it can also be shown either that we are indeed subject to the moral law, or that we are free. Accordingly, Kant seeks to show that rational beings, because they are rational, must also be free.

When we act, Kant contends, we must believe that we are free. Or, to use Kantian terminology, the Idea of freedom is a condition for rational action. As rational beings, we conceive of reason as practical, as "exercis[ing] causality in regard to its objects"; and this practical reason, the will of rational beings, must therefore "look upon itself as the author of its own principles independently of alien influences".[10] But, continues Kant, since it is in virtue of our rational nature that we must act under the Idea of freedom, we must also believe that all rational beings do so.

Quite perplexingly, the next section of *Groundwork III* shifts focal points completely. In it, Kant concedes that we have not yet been able to show how freedom might be actual in us. It has only been shown that we must act under the Idea of freedom and that from this idea emerges the consciousness of a certain rule of action, the consciousness that the maxims of action must conform to the universal law. But why, Kant asks, should we, as rational beings, be bound by this principle? There can be no interest that compels us since an *interest* can only serve as a reason to act upon a hypothetical imperative, not a categorical one. But still, there must be some species of interest; we must somehow feel that the moral law is binding for us. Until it can be shown how the moral law is binding, he concludes, we are merely assuming precisely what

needs to be proven: that the moral law should be a limiting condition of action. Hence, the difficulty that Kant identifies as the 'vicious circle': we first assume freedom in order to show that we are bound by the moral law and then consider ourselves bound by the law because we believe ourselves to be free. In short, Kant seems to be conceding, we have arrived no further than the Reciprocity Thesis.

The third chapter of the *Groundwork* is, in many respects, the most pivotal section of the book. At the same time, it is also one of the most confusing. Part of this confusion stems from the presence of the above-noted 'vicious circle'. Why does Kant inject the idea of moral interest while leaving the deduction of freedom unfinished, when it seems he is on the verge of completing the latter? And, why does he seem to condemn his own argument as circular?

It seems the most plausible explanation for the presence of the circle is one suggested by Reinhard Brandt, which Henry Allison develops further.[11] Briefly, Allison's suggestion is that the vicious circle does not refer to the lacunae of Kant's own position, but rather, points to the difficulties that would arise if Kant insisted on an analytic method (i.e. an analysis of freedom in order to deduce the moral law, or vice-versa).

This interpretation of the circle has a three-fold advantage. First, it allows us to avoid claiming, as H. J. Paton does, that the circle is simply a perplexing ornament in the *Groundwork*, and a problem that Kant did not take very seriously.[12] Second, it allows the hidden circle an understandable and coherent place in the argument of *Groundwork III*. Third, Allison's reading makes comprehensible both Kant's shift away from the line of argumentation that the first sections of *Groundwork III* might have led us to expect and his subsequent introduction of the 'two standpoints' resolution of the deduction.

Given the challenges that the hidden circle has exposed, Kant maintains that "one shift [...] still remains open to us".[13] As rational beings, all individuals may consider themselves from two standpoints. From the first, they see themselves as conditioned receptive members of the world of appearances, the sensible world (*Sinnenwelt*). From the other, they recognise themselves as originators of pure activity, as members of an intelligible or intellectual world (*Verstandeswelt*). The individual sees herself from both standpoints or, alternately, belongs to two worlds. Thus, the problem posed by the hidden circle is resolved in that:

> when we think of ourselves as free, we transfer ourselves into the intelligible world as members and recognise the autonomy of the will together with its consequence — morality; whereas when we think of ourselves as under obligation, we look upon ourselves as belonging to the sensible world and yet to the intelligible world at the same time.[14]

If this is the case, then the presupposition of freedom under which we act is explainable by our membership in the intelligible world.

Though it presupposes the success of the moral law's deduction and the introduction of transcendental idealism, the subsequent section of *Groundwork III* ('How is the Categorical Imperative Possible?') seems to be a separate deduction, one which attempts to account for our experience of the categorical imperative.

As members of the intelligible world, we are conscious of having a will, of being free, and so of being subject to the moral law. As the previously cited passage indicates,[15] even when we regard ourselves as sensible beings, we recognise *qua* intelligible beings, that we are always subject to the laws of the intelligible world. These laws are, therefore, experienced by us as imperatives to which our actions must conform. As Kant puts it, the intelligible world is the ground of the sensible one; our will 'belongs' to the intelligible world and so it alos must, in a sense, be conceived of as a ground for the sensible world. The 'I ought', Kant writes, is merely an 'I will' for the member of the intelligible world. It only becomes an 'I ought' proper when the individual acknowledges her membership in both worlds. Before turning to the *Critique of Practical Reason*, and its deduction of freedom, we might seek to evaluate the argument contained in *Groundwork III*.

One important problem with the deduction, identified by Allison in his attempt to explain Kant's change of strategy between the *Groundwork* and the second *Critique*, concerns the legitimacy of the results that Kant claims to have obtained from the injection of the intelligible/sensible world distinction. Obviously, the distinction is crucial: in Allison's words, it "provides non-moral premise for freedom and removes global doubts about agency".[16] But, Allison insists, the *Groundwork*'s notion of 'intelligible world' is ambiguous. Kant oscillates between two conceptions of the intelligible world: *Verstandeswelt* on the one hand, and on the other, *intelligibelen Welt*, both of which are rendered by Paton as 'intelligible world'.[17] Only the first of these is warranted by the *Groundwork*'s deduction, but it is the other that is necessary to establish the desired result. The *Verstandeswelt* is defined as that which encompasses all that is not-sensible. It is a noumenon: intelligible in the negative sense of 'non sensible'. The *intelligibelen Welt*, on the other hand, can be understood as the positive concept: the supersensible world, the Kingdom of Ends, a world governed by the moral law. The difficulty with the *Groundwork*'s deduction is that the possession of reason, which is the justification for the adoption the 'two standpoints' argument, only allows us certainty of the individual's membership in a non-sensible world, one not governed by the laws of nature (the *Verstandeswelt*). However, the conclusion of the deduction requires a much stronger argument, one that legitimates the claim that individuals belong to the *intelligibelen Welt*. Only membership in this latter intelligible world entails that individuals are subject to a positive moral law. As such, the deduction in *Groundwork III* proves insufficient to warrant the conclusions that Kant draws from the 'two standpoints'

argument. It does establish that we are rational agents, but not that we are genuinely autonomous and free in the strong sense, which the success of the deduction would require. It is, perhaps, in recognition of the shortcomings of the deduction in the *Groundwork*, that Kant revised his approach entirely in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. It is to that new approach which we now turn.

Perhaps the most striking difference between *Groundwork III*'s attempt to ground freedom and morality, and that contained in the second *Critique*, is the latter's distinguishing appeal to the 'fact of reason'. Kant's references to the fact of reason are not only numerous, they are also often ambiguous. Allison notes eight specific references to the fact of reason in the *Critique*, and Lewis White Beck discusses six different interpretations of the 'fact' to which the *Critique* lends itself.[18] Following Allison's lead, I shall understand Kant's 'fact of reason' in the sense that emerges from the following citations:

> The consciousness of this fundamental law may be called a fact of reason, since one cannot ferret it out from antecedent data of reason.[19]

and again:

> [...] the moral law is given, as an apodictically certain fact as it were of pure reason, of which we are a priori conscious.[20]

Indeed, on the most plausible and consistent reading, the 'fact of reason' seems akin to 'common recognition on the part of rational beings, of being subject to moral constraint'; loosely, the fact of moral consciousness. But, what remains to be seen is how this fact is a fact of reason. It would have to be shown that the law of which we are conscious can be inferred from pure practical reason.

Kant's strategy seems to be to state that pure practical reason is a condition for the possibility of the existence of the moral law: we may not be able to show *how* pure reason is practical, but we know that it must be, given our consciousness of moral constraints. With this appeal to a fact of reason, Kant has indeed adopted a different starting point from that of the argument in *Groundwork III*. He no longer claims to have provided a deduction of the moral law (as he does in the *Groundwork*). On the contrary, Kant maintains that such a deduction is quite impossible. The concern in the *Critique* is, therefore, not (as seems to be the case in the *Groundwork*) that morality might be illusory. Kant's claim now, rather, is that we cannot admit that we are conscious of the moral law in experience without also conceding that pure reason is practical. Or, conversely, if pure reason is practical, then the moral law is actual. The fact that we take an interest in morality shows that pure reason must be practical. Thus, through an analysis of our moral consciousness, Kant is able to claim that the moral

law is actual, without either appealing to the 'two standpoints' argument, which proved insufficient, in *Groundwork III*, or attempting to deduce morality at all. As Allison puts it: "[...] in a sense the analysis of morality is its deduction, which in turn helps us to understand why Kant denies that a deduction is necessary".[21]

Now, it might at first appear as though, having established the actuality of the moral law through an appeal to the fact of reason, Kant would now, by the Reciprocity Thesis discussed earlier, be justified in claiming to have deduced the actuality of freedom. However, it is not clear that this would be a valid inference. The moral law has indeed been shown to be actual. Kant, however, has not shown why it should be unconditionally binding, why the obligations that it sets for rational beings, and of which these beings are conscious, should be absolutely over-riding. Since the moral law has not been shown to be necessarily over-riding, as the application of the Reciprocity Thesis would require, we are not justified in appealing to the latter. Two options seem open to Kant.

First, he could attempt to argue from the weaker sense of 'moral actuality', exhibited through the argument from the fact of reason, to the strong sense of 'moral actuality' (and unconditional bindingness), demanded by the Reciprocity Thesis. Alternatively, he could attempt to deduce the actuality of freedom from the fact of reason (without appealing to the Reciprocity Thesis), in order, then, to conclude that freedom is actual. Moreover, from this point, it would indeed be acceptable to apply the Reciprocity Thesis and to conclude both that the moral law is actual and that moral obligations are over-riding. It is this second strategy that Kant seems to adopt in the *Critique*.

To attempt to deduce the actuality of freedom from the weaker sense of moral actuality (arrived at through the fact of reason), Kant must show that the experience of the moral law is sufficient to make the law actual. In other words, if the law of which we are conscious is to warrant the deduction of freedom, then it must be the case not only that we recognise the law as binding, but that we are actually able to live by it; pure reason is practical, an efficient cause, through our interest in the moral law. If pure reason is practical, then freedom is actual. The concern that must be addressed here, is that our interest in the moral law does not necessarily entail that we are able to meet the requirements of the law. For psychological reasons, or because of other, stronger interests or inclinations, it may be the case that we are unable to fulfil our moral obligations.

Allison suggests that we approach the problem from a slightly different angle: Kant's goal is to show that rational beings are free both in the positive sense (autonomy or the capacity to act according to maxims chosen by the will) and in the negative sense (independence of determination by alien causes).[22] Now, given the interest which we manifest for the law, Kant can indeed claim to have established the actuality of autonomy; autonomy does not require that rational agents *succeed* in acting according

to the moral law, only that it must be possible for the moral law to *motivate* their actions. Interest in the law reveals the fact that rational agents make such an interest the ground of the adoption of maxims. This interest is free from external coercion, it is an incentive that has no more fundamental motivation. A rational being, who willingly acknowledges such an interest, must also admit the possibility of being motivated by it. Even ff we grant this, thereby allowing that autonomy has been established, Kant has yet to show how the possibility that sensuous nature might over-ride the moral interest can be precluded. Only if this is achievable, can freedom, in the full sense, be actual. Thus, negative freedom must be deduced from the 'fact of reason'.[23]

Allison provides a reconstruction of the Kantian argument, explaining that negative freedom is, in a sense, already established through autonomy.[24] He quotes a passage from the opening paragraphs of the *Critique*'s deduction, where Kant discusses autonomy:

> By this freedom, the will of a rational being, which as belonging to the sensible world, recognizes itself to be, like all other efficient causes, necessarily subject to the laws of causality, yet, at the same time, in practical matters, in its other aspect as a being in itself, is conscious of its existence as determinable in an intelligible order of things.[25]

The capacity for moral interest, Kant seems to be arguing, is evidence for our membership in an intelligible world. It is important to note that the appeal to an intelligible world is not analogous to the 'two standpoints' argument advanced in *Groundwork III*, which proved to be the latter's undoing. Whereas, in the earlier text, Kant begins by arguing from negative freedom and seeks to establish autonomy, in the present argument, he begins by establishing autonomy, from which negative freedom follows unproblematically. Unlike the actuality of negative freedom appealed to in the *Groundwork*, the proof of autonomy does indeed warrant an appeal to the 'two standpoints' argument and the confirmation of our membership in a genuine *intelligibelen Welt*, a Kingdom of Ends, one that is also independent of the 'mechanisms of nature'. Thus, the substantial difficulties of the *Groundwork* (which could only establish our membership in the lesser *Verstandeswelt*) are circumvented.

In the preceding discussion, I have sought to provide a plausible and consistent interpretation of Kant's attempts to ground morality and freedom as they appear in the *Groundwork* and in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. To do so, I am indebted in no small part to Henry Allison's sympathetic reconstruction of the arguments and deductions of the two works. Perhaps the most appealing aspect of Allison's interpretation of Kant's theory of freedom is that it enables many of the perplexing passages and claims of the two texts to fall into a sound and consistent order of argumentation. Or, perhaps, if this is too strong an appraisal, even on Allison's reading, the interpretation

grants the arguments in each text a clear sense of cohesiveness, despite the sometimes baroque argumentative structure and the terminological inconsistencies of each text. It plausibly explains, for example, Kant's introduction of the hidden circle and his sudden shift of focus in *Groundwork III*. And it also explains what Henrich has termed the 'great reversal' to describe Kant's change in approach between the failed deduction of the *Groundwork* and the second *Critique*. Moreover, Allison's account of the 'great reversal' is able to maintain that the latter is merely a change in strategy and that it does not (with its appeal to a 'fact of reason') bear witness to a return, on Kant's part, to an earlier and less critical dogmatism.

Whether or not all of Allison's arguments and interpretative choices can be confidently attributed to Kant is not, however, a question which I will consider further in this paper. I have appealed to Allison in order to provide as consistent a sympathetic reading of Kant's position as seems available. However, and as Allison readily admits in the conclusion of the last chapter of *Kant's Theory of Freedom*, his interpretation has operated on an important assumption: that transcendental idealism is a viable system. Transcendental idealism, he explains, is necessary "to defend the bare conceivability of freedom as Kant construes it";[26] transcendental idealism provides conceptual space for practical freedom, so to speak.

Furthermore, Allison concludes his analysis with the concession of an additional difficulty, which has not yet been tackled: that of reconciling causal determinism in nature with the freedom of human action, since both of these converge in reality.[27] An action must be explained causally with respect to natural laws (as a natural phenomenon), and causally also with respect to the will (as a rational act). The difficulty is to reconcile the two explanations, the apparent dual-causality of a single event. The two explanations must be compatible. Accordingly, the remainder of this paper will focus on the viability of transcendental idealism and, indirectly, on the nature of the problem raised in Allison's conclusion.

It seems relatively clear that Kant's attempt to ground morality and freedom is heavily committed to the transcendental idealism afforded by the intelligible/sensible world distinction, which is introduced to complete the deductions both in the *Groundwork* and the second *Critique*. As Allison explains, this dependence can be understood as the need to create, through transcendental freedom, a conceptual space, which the idea of practical freedom requires and fills.

One difficulty with this view concerns the relevance of this conceptual space to the question of practical freedom. More specifically, it is not clear how this conceptual space influences and relates to practical freedom, or, put otherwise, why transcendental freedom should matter to practical freedom at all.

To focus the issue, we might examine briefly how it arises in the context of transcendental idealism. One difficulty with the 'two standpoints' argument, developed both in *Groundwork III* and in the *Critique of Practical Reason,* is that nothing seems

capable of consistently bridging the gap between the intelligible and the sensible orders. Put simply, on the one hand, the intelligible and sensible worlds are, by definition, mutually exclusive. Thus, no element of one can belong to the other. This clearly seems to be Kant's intention both in *Groundwork III* (referring to the *Verstandeswelt*) and in the *Critique* (referring to the *intelligibelen Welt*), where these intelligible realms are defined as that which is non-sensible.[28] On the other hand, however, it is also clear that these two mutually exclusive worlds cannot be strictly exclusive as there must be a common thread that provides unity to the system. This is stated frequently throughout the *Groundwork* and the *Critique*. In particular, Kant writes that: "when we think of ourselves as under obligation, we look upon ourselves as belonging to the sensible world and yet to the intelligible world at the same time".[29]

Indeed, it seems that nothing can furnish the two worlds view with the unity which experience demands of it, unless some element belongs to both. As the above-quoted passage intimates, it is the individual's consciousness of belonging to both worlds that is selected to provide this unity, and to explain how sensible and intelligible worlds converge, as it were. But the explanation remains unsatisfying and unconvincing. These two mutually exclusive modes, intelligible and sensible, seem inconsistent. On the one hand they are genuinely exclusive orders, even operating according to entirely distinct causal laws. On the other hand, the idea of these two mutually exclusive worlds is injected in order to explain the individual's experience, or, in the moral context, to account for the nature of our moral consciousness. So, the (moral) individual seems to straddle both worlds, as a member of the two. In this case, the two worlds are not truly exclusive; they are 'almost exclusive' but not completely so. If they were, then they could not explain the unity of the individual, the necessity of which experiential unity is, in a sense, that which makes the intelligible/sensible distinction necessary in the first place. The two dichotomous worlds must converge into an individual.

It is, therefore, often suggested that the intelligible/sensible world distinction is not to be understood as a difference between two worlds, but rather as a difference between the two characters of one world or, alternately, between two viewpoints from which the same world may be considered. The two worlds are not to be seen as ontologically distinct, only epistemically so: when Kant speaks of worlds, he does not really mean 'world'. Rather, he means 'aspect', viewpoint.

Undeniably, there is much textual evidence to support this 'two aspects' or 'two standpoints' interpretation. The by-now familiar version of the 'two standpoints' argument found in *Groundwork III*, is an apposite example. At the same time, however, Kant does indeed clearly state that these two standpoints represent two worlds. The worlds/standpoints ambiguity is one that the Kantian system seems to exploit. In a sense, it seems that Kant needs both the 'two worlds' interpretation and the 'two standpoints' interpretation.

Drawing on what has already been discussed, for example, the ontological and epistemic exclusivity afforded by the two-worlds interpretation is necessary for the grounding of freedom and morality both in the *Groundwork* and in the *Critique* (though, as we have seen, the first attempt fails). But at the same time, and in order to explain the unity of experience (how the individual straddles both 'worlds'), Kant appeals to the 'two aspects' view, which suggests an epistemic distinction between the intelligible and sensible orders, rather than an ontological one. This seems to allow for the individual's membership in both worlds, since both worlds are, in fact, merely different viewpoints from which to consider one and the same world. Thus, it seems both interpretations are needed. We might confront this conjecture with the question concerning the relation between transcendental and practical freedom.

On the 'two worlds' interpretation, there are two ontologically and epistemically distinct worlds; two worlds so different that it seems inconceivable how anything that concerns or involves the first might be relevant to the second. Thus, our concern that the conceptual space opened by transcendental freedom was irrelevant to practical freedom seems more understandable. These two concepts of freedom are incommensurable. It is not clear how they affect each other or why 'conceptual space' needs to be opened up at all in order to make room for practical freedom.

Presumably, it would be helpful to turn to Kant's discussions of practical and transcendental freedom. Unfortunately, the textual evidence seems far from clear and, as Allison argues, there seem to be two plausibly defendable views concerning the relation between practical and transcendental freedom. The first is that transcendental freedom is necessary for practical freedom, the second (maintained by Allison) is that practical freedom is compatible with neutrality concerning transcendental freedom. Moreover, when we turn to the nature of the relation, we distinguish two further accounts of practical freedom. The first is that practical freedom can be seen as a species, or sub-type, of transcendental freedom, a particular form of transcendental freedom. The second, is that practical freedom and transcendental freedom are independent and altogether distinct.[30] It remains unclear which of these views should be attributed to Kant. We shall not, however, dwell on these points. What is clear is that there is textual evidence for the claim that the relation between transcendental and practical freedom remains murky.

Our suggestion is that, on the 'two worlds' interpretation, practical and transcendental freedom are indeed two independent and incommensurable concepts, both ontologically and epistemically distinct. Because of this distinction however, it is difficult to see how one might be used to lead to the other, or alternately, how the possibility of transcendental freedom influences practical freedom and why the theoretical critique of reason must open conceptual space for practical freedom. It is not clear that conceptual space allows for a common element between the intelligible world and the sensible one. It appears, in fact, that no such element can play the necessary unifying

role. In a sense, freedom is intended to bridge a gap between the intelligible and the sensible, but the very presence of that gap creates a distinction between practical and transcendental freedom and it is because of this latter distinction that the unifying role can no longer simply be attributed to freedom *tout court*.

Put otherwise, freedom understood as independence from the phenomenal mechanism of nature, and freedom understood in the sense of the capacity of moral choice, are two fundamentally distinct concepts. For the individual, considered as a member of the sensible world, moral freedom is a non-starter, so to speak: it is unintelligible. The question of freedom of choice between two moral options does not arise, since the laws of morality are valid and conceivable only in the intelligible world. For a member of the intelligible world moreover, causal determinism in the world of appearances is unintelligible as an impediment to moral freedom; whether or not the world of appearances makes room for freedom of action and independence from the mechanism of nature is irrelevant to moral freedom and to the rational agent. For intelligible beings, the world of appearances is of no concern. For sensible beings, there is no right and no wrong, no choice between the two, no moral freedom, and no moral imputability. What the Kantian system lacks is a valid account of how the individual can be a member of both worlds or, alternately, of how these two mutually exclusive worlds can share a common element, the individual. It is, perhaps, for this reason that the 'two aspects' interpretation is sometimes preferred to the 'two worlds' view.

As we have seen, on the 'two aspects' interpretation, the distinction between intelligible and sensible orders is made weaker: it is no longer ontological *and* epistemic, but simply epistemic. The further claim of the 'two aspects' interpretation seems to be that the individual can now be viewed as the common element between the two orders, intelligible and sensible, as these two orders are merely different ways of viewing the same world.

The difficulty with the 'two aspects' interpretation is in fact similar to that of the 'two worlds' view. The objection does not however, concern the ontological possibility of the individual's membership in both worlds; rather, the objection to the 'two aspects' view is epistemic: how can the individual conceive of herself from both standpoints?

Even on the 'two aspects' interpretation, the question remains essentially the same one. If we conceive of ourselves from both standpoints, intelligible and sensible, what is the nature of the standpoint that allows us to claim that it is one and the same individual who shifts vantage points, and that it is one and the same world which is considered? The difficulty is still to identify one common standpoint from which to distinguish intelligible and sensible characters while allowing the two to remain essentially, coherently and consistently united. In other words, the answer that the 'two aspects' interpretation provides to the objection raised against the 'two worlds' view is that it is the individual who provides the common element between two exclusive

standpoints: moral consciousness of the law on the one hand, causal determination in the world of appearances on the other. In fact, however, this response seems merely to beg the question. To posit the individual as the common element (whether epistemically or ontologically) is a *petitio*. How does the individual offer a unified standpoint? Or, better, how can the individual be an epistemically common standpoint if the intelligible and sensible viewpoints are to be what they are in the critical system: epistemically distinct and mutually exclusive by definition?

Our conclusion, therefore, is that the 'two aspects' interpretation of the critical system, by softening the distinction between intelligible and sensible orders into an epistemic, rather than an ontological one, does indeed make the distinction *prima facie* more plausible. However, on closer examination, it proves merely to displace the problem of unity that challenges the 'two worlds' interpretation. The same problem remains: Who is the individual? How is moral consciousness possible in a world of appearances? How can an individual have both an intelligible and a sensible character? On the 'two worlds' interpretation, the answer seems simply to be that the individual is a member of both worlds. On the 'two aspects' view, the answer is that the individual is an entity which can be described from two points of view. But, both of these responses fail to answer the question directly: How is an individual possible? How can these two mutually exclusive worlds/viewpoints converge?

If the preceding arguments prove convincing, it is not clear that the Kantian system can answer these questions. This inability seems to render transcendental idealism problematic. If this is the case, and if, as we have shown, transcendental idealism is a necessary assumption of Kant's attempts to ground morality and freedom in the *Groundwork* and in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, then despite the endeavour's initial appearance of success, the attempt does not succeed.

The further and final suggestion of this paper is that perhaps it would be more fruitful to examine whether or not an individual can truly be described in terms of two fundamentally different and exclusive characters, be they worlds or standpoints. Perhaps, the Kantian conception of empirical nature is to be re-examined. After all, it might not be implausible to suggest that even empirical nature is only meaningful in so far as it is intelligible to us.

Notes

1 Allison, Henry E. *Kant's Theory of Freedom*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
2 Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Practical Reason*. Trans. Lewis White Beck. New York: Macmillan, 1956, 30. All references to this text are taken from this edition and refer to Royal Prussian Academy page number.
3 Hereafter referred to as *Groundwork III*.
4 Kant, Immanuel. *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Ed. & trans. H.J. Paton. New York: Harper, 1964, III 447; 98. All references to this text are taken from this translation. Roman numerals refer to chapter number and are followed by the Royal Prussian Academy page number, as well as the page number of the second edition.
5 *Ibid.*, II 412; 36.
6 *Ibid.*, I 400n; 15n.
7 See: Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom*, 85-106, for a discussion of rational agency in the *Groundwork*.
8 *Ibid.*, 205.
9 Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 29.
10 Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, III 448; 101.
11 See: Brandt, Reinhard. "Der Zirkel im dritten Abschnitt von Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten," 170. As cited in Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom*, 220. Also, see Allison, 218-220 for Allison's account of the presence of the 'vicious circle'.
12 See: Paton, H. J. *The Categorical Imperative, A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy*, 225. As cited in Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom*, 219.
13 Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, III 450; 105.
14 *Ibid.*, III 453; 110.
15 *Ibid.*, III 453; 110.
16 Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom*, 227.
17 Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, III 451;106.
18 *Ibid.*, 231-232 and Lewis White Beck, *Commentary*. 166-175. As cited in Allison. 231.
19 Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 41.
20 *Ibid.*, 47. Kant's appeal to a 'fact of reason' also appears at 6, 42, 43, 55, 91, and 104.
21 Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom*, 238.
22 *Ibid.*, 240.
23 Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 97.
24 Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom*, 241.
25 Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 42.
26 Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom*, 248.

[27] *Ibid.*, 249.
[28] See III 105; 450-113; 455 in the *Groundwork*, and 43 in the *Critique* for passages where the mutually exclusive nature of the two worlds is clearly alluded to.
[29] Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,* III 453; 110.
[30] See, for example, Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom,* 69-70. Allison reconstructs Kant's account of the relation between transcendental and practical freedom, drawing primarily on the Dialectic and the Canon of Pure Reason, and on the Metaphysical Lectures of the 1770s.

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De la ligne du point et de la souffrance

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«Le monde extérieur, les événements contemporains ne cessent d'influencer le peintre, cela va de soi. Le jeu des lignes et des couleurs, s'il ne met pas à nu le drame du créateur, n'est rien d'autre qu'un divertissement bourgeois. Les formes qu'exprime l'individu attaché à la société doivent déceler le mouvement d'une âme qui veut s'évader de la réalité présente, d'un caractère particulièrement ignoble aujourd'hui, puis s'approcher de réalités neuves, offrir enfin aux autres hommes une possibilité d'élévation. Pour découvrir un monde habitable, que de pourriture à balayer !

(…)L'horrible tragédie que nous traversons peut secouer quelques génies isolés et leur donner une vigueur accrue. Que les puissances de régression connues sous le nom de fascisme s'étendent encore cependant, qu'elles nous plongent un peu plus avant dans l'impasse de la cruauté et de l'incompréhension, et c'en est fini de toute dignité humaine.»

Joan Mirò,
Déclarations, Cahier d'art, 1939
à la jeunesse russe

Lorsque Parménide au VIe siècle avant Jésus-Christ se demandait ce qu'était l'être; il cherchait une principe implicite d'harmonie, d'unité dans la description de la réalité. Se posait ainsi pour la première fois la question de l'esthétique. Étymologiquement, le mot « aistesis» signifie la faculté de sentir en général liée à la jouissance, au plaisir. Par contre, lorsqu'au XVIIIe Baumgarten crée le mot «esthétique» il désigne plutôt l'appréhension du beau par l'entendement ou plus précisément par la faculté de sentir. Par la suite, les courants divergèrent, mais tous relièrent intimement la philosophie à l'esthétique. L'époque contemporaine, pour sa part, voit trois grandes tendances se complexifier au fil du temps soit: l'art comme révélation ontologique de la vérité (par Heidegger et Gadamer principalement), l'art comme une intensité indicible (d'un

côté Wittgenstein, et de d'autres Deleuze) et enfin l'art comme potentiel critique et subversif.

Cette troisième voie de recherche esthétique nous intéressa particulièrement dans le cadre de notre étude de la Théorie Critique. Dans un premier travail plus technique nous aurions pu décortiquer les différents éléments de ce que constitue le conflit entre hétéronomie et autonomie de l'art dans la Théorie Esthétique d'Adorno. Nous avons plutôt choisi d'élargir notre horizon afin de replacer la création artistique dans ce qui la constitue et lui donne son potentiel critique. Il s'agit ici de voir ce qui, originairement, la fonde et de considérer en regard de cela, ce qui devient le moteur de sa permanence à travers le temps: la souffrance.

Afin de couvrir cette perspective avec la plus grande précision possible, nous avons décidé de présenter en premier lieu la contestation de l'École de Francfort de la totalité comme volonté unificatrice de la «dangereuse» diversité. Ensuite, nous poursuivrons la thèse qui est directement le corollaire de la précédente, celle de l'irréductible souffrance terrestre. Pour finalement en arriver au domaine de l'esthétique comme possibilité d'ouverture de la conscience critique.

La Totalité comme unification de la dangereuse diversité.

Toutes les questions philosophiques trouvent leur origine quelque part dans l'étonnement du regard humain devant l'existence du monde. Si cette question fondamentale s'était arrêtée sans chercher à trouver de réponse, peut-être une certaine harmonie aurait-elle été possible. Cependant, selon les vues ontologiques d'Adorno et de Horkeimer, la question se transforma en l'espace d'un éclair en une peur originelle de l'homme devant l'inconnu. Devant lui s'étend un vaste champ de diversités dont l'ordre ne semble pas aller de soi. Déjà nous parlons d'ordre. Peut-être n'y en a t il pas, mais l'homme veut en trouver un. Se rassurer devant l'immensité, par tous les moyens possibles ! Voilà en marche l'esprit humain tressaillant devant la grandeur. Cette peur, devenue terreur devant la force de l'éclair, du vent, du lion, de l'herbe, ne pouvait laisser l'homme muet Peut-être cela aurait-il été possible s'il avait conservé avec fierté son statut d'animal intégré au monde sans poser de question, mais après l'interrogation originaire et la peur qui s'en suivit, il n'était plus possible de reculer. La perception humaine du monde se transfigure en une crainte qui elle-même conduira aux constructions rationnelles. Les questions se multiplient, les voies d'approche se ramifient, les tentatives de réponses engendrent d'autres interrogations… Bref, la machine de l'entendement humain entre en marche devant la peur du dissemblable, de l'inconnu, de la diversité terrestre.

L'homme devint ainsi l'animal rationnel dont le progrès inspirera des louanges des siècles durant. Dans la Dialectique de la Raison, Horkeimer et Adorno montrent que le chemin de la peur originelle à la raison triomphante des Lumières est un long

développement dont le début ne se situe pas, comme le répète la philosophie traditionnelle, au dépassement du mythe, mais bien au contraire, avec celui-ci. La raison ne serait en fait qu'une continuité de ce que le mythe avait déjà enclenché. En effet, les mythes cultivés par les civilisations antiques présentaient déjà toutes les composantes d'objectivation de la nature que nous retrouvons dans la science moderne. La dichotomie traditionnelle entre sujet et objet remonte bien avant Platon. Déjà en reconnaissant un certain ordre au monde, l'homme se situait par rapport à celui-ci. Il tentait d'y obtenir un espace d'action par les prières, les offrandes, les sacrifices. La peur originelle se traduisait en une volonté de l'homme de prendre une place et de jouer un rôle sans cesse grandissant dans cet ordre préétabli. L'étude de l'Odyssée de Homère dans le texte *Ulysse, ou mythe et Raison,*[i] démontre en tout point cette continuité entre mythe et raison, et peut-être plus encore: la raison comme une autre forme de mythe. Déjà à l'époque du mythe, l'homme combat des forces qui le dépassent par nature: il résiste aux charmes trompeurs d'éléments naturels dangereux, ne s'arrête jamais en un endroit pour y passer plus de temps, car il doit atteindre un but qui lui est propre, il utilise la ruse pour déjouer les forces surnaturelles. L'homme triomphe ici du monde qui l'entoure par ses facultés. Déjà Ulysse a le choix entre duper et mourir, dilemme que nous retrouverons bien plus tard dans la société bourgeoise. A son retour, Ulysse doit reconquérir le cœur de sa douce afin de conclure l'épopée par un autre élément de nos sociétés modernes: «il fait croître la réconciliation autour de la soumission.»[ii] La tentative de compréhension qui naît de la peur, se transforme rapidement en ces distinctions classiques que nous retrouverons du mythe au positivisme-logique ; sujet-objet, raison-réel, nécessité-liberté, … La raison est en quelques sortes l'accomplissement de l'idée que la nature est menaçante et cette violence naturelle se traduit dans les oppositions que nous connaissons, oppositions qui donnent toute la force et la grandeur au rationnel. *La dialectique de la Raison* étudie donc en profondeur les éléments qui semblent permanents à travers le développement de la pensée humaine. Ici, il nous apparaît que la translation entre le récit mythique et les œuvres de la Raison n'est qu'un changement de discours, mais une étude se consacrant uniquement à cet élément serait nécessaire afin de comprendre toute la complexité du phénomène.

Si nous reprenons le fil de notre propos central, nous revenons à l'étude de la croissance des capacités rationnelles de l'homme. Comme nous le disions, celles-ci prendront rapidement racine dans un sol accidenté afin de se protéger des nombreuses menaces naturelles. L'homme déploiera toutes ses énergies pour construire des médiations entre lui-même et le danger. C'est ainsi que l'évolution des connaissances astronomiques, physiques, techniques, philosophiques, religieuses, civiques, etc, devint l'évolution des moyens de contrôle du danger. À sa maturité, la marche de l'esprit humain devient le progrès de la domination de l'homme sur la nature, de l'homme sur lui-même. La dialectique de la Raison devient donc la dialectique de la domination et engendre des systèmes où l'homme ne reconnaît plus sa propres nature, où la raison est

une arme pour soumettre l'altérité et partant les réfractaires, où il n'a plus d'espace pour imaginer un monde autre. C'est ainsi que les systèmes totalitaires se mettent en place. La peur originelle de la dissemblance a amené l'homme à se bâtir des forteresses où les liens avec la nature ne sont plus que ceux de l'utilité, où la puissance légitime des états est apte à détruire la Terre entière ; où la différence est systématiquement pourchassée, éliminée. Tout doit être unifié. Aucune exception n'est tolérée.

Un des moteurs de cette domination est le principe de réification accompagnant trop souvent les résultats de la science moderne. La réification provient de cette illusion d'objectivité à laquelle l'humanité semble nécessairement soumise. La conséquence d'une telle attitude qui ignore le caractère artificiel des constructions de la rationalité humaine est de transformer notre liberté en nécessité, c'est à dire en soumission aux choses. Peut-être l'exemple illustrant le mieux cela est la main invisible qu'Adam Smith a décrit dans son *ouvrage La richesse des nations...* Celle-ci semble diriger les activités économiques des hommes, alors qu'une analyse plus attentive montrera que cette main invisible est une création humaine. Cette illusion de la réification inverse tellement les pôles de la compréhension humaine que l'individu ne peut plus poser les «vraies» questions, celles qui placeraient l'homme et la nature hors de la création sujet-objet. C'est ainsi qu'un renversement radical s'opère. Les pires irrationalités sont cautionnées par la Raison qui tente maintenant de dissoudre l'écart entre réel et raison, qu'elle a elle-même créé. De nombreux paradoxes s'échappent du solide système ainsi érigé. Une de celle-ci est que si cette contradiction entre réel et raison est résolue (au profit de la raison, bien sûr), la tâche de la rationalité occidentale est accomplie. Mais s'il n'y a plus cette contradiction, la philosophie se dissout d'elle-même. Malgré ces faiblesses, la totalité répressive pour laquelle nous travaillons au nom de la rationalité humaine, est devenue une vérité incontestable, une protection nécessaire contre les dangers du chaos extérieur.

L'irréductible souffrance terrestre.

Le processus de domination entraînant l'aplanissement de la diversité naturelle provient tout de même de la reconnaissance de la liberté humaine. Celle-ci est un autre élément de peur conduisant à la tentative de sa suppression par tous les moyens possibles. Cela nous conduit vers un autre paradoxe prouvant encore une fois la fragilité de l'imposition de ce système de terreur dont l'apogée apparaît comme sa banalisation.[iii] Si le tout doit primer sur les parties, la destinée des particuliers s'accomplit dans le destin de l'universel, et ainsi le sujet se dissout dans ce tout ainsi formé. Par contre, la pensée humaine nous permet d'être conscients en partie de cette situation et de plus en plus nous rendons nous compte de l'impossibilité de s'autodéterminer en tant que sujet éthique, car nous perdons notre autonomie au profit d'une hétéronomie fatale pour notre être-raisonnant. D'ailleurs, le sens éthique pourrait résider dans le fait de

demeurer dans cette impossibilité de l'autonomie sans pour autant accepter l'hétéronomie comme nouveau lieu où le sujet trouverait son auto-conservation. En d'autres mots, d'un côté notre conscience réfléchissante perçoit et analyse la situation en étant pourtant impuissante, alors que d'un autre côté, notre actualité physique est jetée dans le monde sous la domination inéluctable des choses. Le pari devient absurde: rester fidèle à notre autonomie est devenue impossible car le monde nous domine par la réification et notre sens éthique ne peut plus s'ajuster à la réalité de laquelle nous avons encore conscience fragmentée (aux travers des diverses illusions telles les systèmes politiques, les constructions scientifiques et techniques, l'appareil économique, les conditions humaines, etc...). Cette réalisation de notre hétéronomie nous conduit à la souffrance, principalement définie par l'incapacité à s'autodéterminer dans la qualité éthique qui nous rend humain. Cependant, cette conscience impuissante nous rappelle la possibilité utopique de s'extraire de la mécanique de l'immanence à laquelle tout sujet est nécessairement soumis. En d'autres mots, le sacrifice qui nous est demandé de faire afin d'appartenir au Tout ne peut être effectué que partiellement dans la mesure où il est impossible de se séparer complètement de notre raison individuelle. Et le défi est d'autant plus grand et plus douloureux qu'il faut à tout prix rester fidèles aux miettes d'autonomie qu'il nous reste afin de ne pas sombrer entièrement dans l'irrationalisme totalitaire et destructeur. Notre propos se résume en fait à cette image: ek-sister comme se-tenir. L'individu se dresse verticalement devant l'horizon du monde. Il tente de ne pas plier sous le poids de ses déterminations, il regarde au loin, mais des rafales de vent le bousculent, il résiste et se tient droit. Cet homme souffre de sa situation, mais fixe avec défi ce qui l'entoure.

Depuis le début de cette réflexion nous établissons un lien direct entre la peur originelle, le mythe, la raison et le totalitarisme. L'histoire semble être devenue un médium transportant le mal d'hier à aujourd'hui. Mais selon les penseurs de la Théorie Critique, le flux historique représente principalement une dialectique entre continuité et discontinuité. L'histoire est un agrégat d'actions, finalisées ou non, mais elle n'est pas une fatalité sur laquelle nous n'avons aucun contrôle. Adorno affirmait que s'il y avait une ligne directrice entre la fronde et la bombe atomique, ce n'est que celle de la souffrance. A la lecture de Kant, l'histoire humaine nous apparaît comme terrifiante, conduite par la raison de la folie, même si le philosophe de l'Aufklarüng avait foi en la capacité de la raison à entraîner le progrès. Les hommes, et particulièrement les philosophes, ont eu tendance à chercher des causes qui seraient au-delà de notre responsabilité pour justifier tout ce mal. La théodicée de Leibniz est éloquente sur ce point. En effet selon ce penseur du XVIIIe siècle, nous vivrions dans le meilleur des mondes possibles. Ainsi, de tous les autres mondes possibles imaginés par Dieu notre monde, à ce moment précis de l'histoire , et bien que rongé par la guerre, la peste et le viol, serait en quelque sorte le moins désastreux. Cette forme de déculpabilisation de l'homme est catégoriquement rejetée par les penseurs de l'École de Francfort, les géno-

cides systématiques comme ceux que nous a présenté l'ouverture des camps d'Auchwitz et des Goulags ne permettant plus de décharger sa conscience par des croyances qui justifieraient le mal par la poursuite du bien.

Si nous pouvons accorder un principe conducteur à l'histoire, ce serait celui du mal. Non pas un mal tragique, métaphysique, imposé par des puissances surnaturelles, mais bien un mal proprement humain, politique, historique et expliquant nos agissements violents. La justification de son existence dans l'absolu est une hypocrisie de plus qui tente de nous convaincre de la propreté de nos mains et qui veille à ne pas éveiller de soupçons quant à nos responsabilités dans le monde. Le mal est le fruit de notre action organisée, administrée, institutionnalisée et démontre notre incapacité à vivre selon des principes qui ne tendraient pas à dominer par la violence le monde qui nous entoure et nous-mêmes par extension.

Adorno, Horkeimer et le reste du courant de la théorie critique, assènent ainsi un coup très dur à l'innocence humaine. Il n'est plus possible de vivre aujourd'hui sans avoir conscience des terribles mécanismes que nous avons nous-mêmes mis en marche et qui mènent aujourd'hui à notre destruction, ainsi qu'à celle de la Terre entière. La souffrance est désormais toujours intrinsèquement liée à nos raisonnements. Tenter d'oublier ce fait serait un affront à notre propre humanité puisque consentement tacite au totalitarisme mercantile et administratif dans lequel nous vivons. Peut-être cette pensée est difficilement soutenable psychologiquement, mais elle constitue la moindre des solidarités humaines en regard des millions de victimes dont nous sommes socialement responsables. Le pessimisme n'est pas ici de soutenir de telles thèses, mais de se fermer les yeux et de croire que «cela ne va pas si mal que ça».

L'art comme charge utopique et subversive.

La peur originelle contre laquelle nous avons construit cette violence systématisée est co-extensivement celle de l'évanescence de notre propre identité. Devant la diversité du monde, nous avons besoin d'établir des structures à partir desquelles nous construirons cette identité. Paradoxalement encore, nous nous faisons violence à nous-mêmes afin de maintenir notre identité d'animal rationnel devant le monde. La souffrance qui s'en suit fait ressortir deux points. La violence vise à empêcher le contact avec le monde, et la souffrance est ainsi le résultat de notre ouverture nécessaire à la rencontre de l'autre, du monde. D'un côté on tente d'empêcher notre contact avec l'extérieur mais de l'autre, ce contact nous est nécessaire, puisqu'il est le fondement de notre rapport sensible, esthétique. D'ailleurs l'industrie culturelle, résultat des politiques totalitaires, tente d'empêcher ce contact par l'an-esthétique, par l'anesthésie.[iv]

Afin d'expliquer plus en profondeur ceci, nous introduirons brièvement les concepts d'autonomie et d'hétéronomie de l'art. Dans le sens général du terme, l'hétéronomie est admise comme l'impossibilité pour une chose de se déterminer elle-

même. Ainsi, lorsque nous disons de l'art qu'il est hétéronomique nous reconnaissons l'immanence du social dans son processus de production. Autrement dit, nous excluons la possibilité que l'art soit exempt de toutes déterminations extérieures à lui. En effet, selon Adorno, les forces régissant l'émergence d'une œuvre d'art sont une empreinte des rapports sociaux de production caractérisants le contexte historique. Ce serait donc dire qu'une œuvre ne peut se séparer complètement de son contexte de production, que l'œuvre est un moment du processus historique tel que nous le présente la dialectique négative et le matérialisme historique marxien. L'organisation interne de l'œuvre ne peut être indépendant de l'organisation sociale externe à l'œuvre, dans la mesure où travail de l'artiste est un travail social. L'artiste devient ainsi le représentant d'une époque donnée, et l'œuvre objectiverait en quelque sorte celle-ci en figeant le temps et en en faisant ressortir les traits saillants.

Dans cette optique, l'œuvre en tant que production d'un travail social devient une objectivation d'un moment considéré dans la synchronie, et par là un témoin de l'organisation sociale totalisante qui caractérise nos sociétés. Pression sociale totalitaire étant désormais synonyme de l'exercice de domination que l'idéologie capitaliste exerce avec succès; l'art complètement non-idéologique devient impossible. En effet, comme l'œuvre entre dans le mécanisme de la société, le système totalitaire tente par tous les moyens de la récupérer. C'est ainsi qu'en entrant dans le monde administré, l'œuvre acquiert le statut de marchandise, que l'on s'échange pour des capitaux. Ce phénomène est dénoncé sous le nom d'*entkunstung* chez Adorno. Par cette marchandisation, le système économique fondé sur l'accumulation de capital se donne les moyens de gérer l'art. Voici naître la *Kulturindustrie*. L'industrie culturelle est cette entreprise d'administration de la production de biens culturels visant à maximiser les médiations entre l'œuvre et le consommateur de façon à annihiler tout potentiel subversif de la création. C'est ainsi que l'art devient un divertissement de masse, un objet de consommation n'ayant plus chance de provoquer une réaction chez le spectateur. Ce serait même grâce à cela que l'idéologie maintiendrait sa domination.[v] L'administration vise l'intégration totale de l'art à l'intérieur du système afin de s'assurer le contrôle de l'entièreté de cette sphère sociale et de pouvoir ainsi désamorcer avant sa publicisation tout contenu pouvant fragmenter la structure rigide de l'organisation et mener à court ou long terme à son éclatement.

Cela est une reconnaissance du danger que représente l'art. Adorno traite aussi beaucoup de cette autre qualité que peut recouvrir l'art: son autonomie. Avec ce que nous avons vu précédemment, il est difficile d'imaginer un art libre, qui serait totalement délivré de toute influence sociale lors de son procès de création. En effet, le système totalisant est si bien organisé que des voies autres semblent autant improbables qu'irréalisables. Pourtant, certains artistes ont revendiqué leur droit à l'art pour l'art. Cela a bien entendu un côté fétichiste. Ce serait croire que cet art est indépendant des conditions de sa production matérielle. L'œuvre serait donc universelle, abstraite. Hors

des déterminations sociales, l'œuvre toucherait la conscience épargnée d'un public récepteur. Bien entendu, cette conception a aussi sa raison d'être. En effet, l'artiste ne travaille pas seulement pour des œuvres particulières, mais aussi pour l'Art en général. Il participe à un processus, pouvant être vu à part, qui forme une ligne continue dans l'histoire des Idées, dont l'espace se situerait au-dessus du niveau terrestre des réalités sociales et politiques. L'inutilité caractéristique de l'Art reste une arme qui rend difficile son classement parmi les biens culturels tels que nous les avons vu antérieurement. L'ambiguïté qui est constitutive à l'œuvre serait son élément vital qui la préserverait en un certain sens contre cette totalité englobante. Il y aurait donc, selon cette conception, une distance entre l'art et la réalité empirique. L'artiste ne serait plus qu'un représentant, mais il serait avant tout, créateur.

> *«Plus la société se transforme sans vergogne en cette totalité dans laquelle, comme pour tout, elle assigne sa place même à l'art, et plus l'art se polarise complètement en idéologie et en contestation.»*[vi]

Dans ces conditions, l'artiste n'a d'autres choix que de rentrer en lutte contre le système englobant qui tenterait de le récupérer. Il doit protéger ses œuvres de cette administration et sans cesse la contester. Dans ce cas, on peut dire que l'art entre encore dans le processus historique, il s'intègre de nouveau dans ce mécanisme, et il redevient en fin de compte hétéronome. Malgré cela, l'art demeure la seule issue de secours possible contre l'emprise de la domination idéologique. L'autonomie de l'art telle que nous l'avons montrée précédemment dévoile tout de même une partie essentielle de cette sphère d'activité créatrice: l'art rend le système visible puisqu'il est un arrêt dans le temps. Nous pourrions même dire que l'art est a priori polémique puisqu'en quelques sortes sa création demande de poser un regard sur le monde alors que se serait bien après, dans sa réception, qu'il deviendrait idéologique. Dans ce sens, sa création pourrait être polémique, alors que sa réception serait idéologique. Ce qui revient à dire, dans la même voie qu'Adorno, que l'art peut recouvrir une fonction cathartique, au sens où elle extériorise le malaise, mais que celle-ci sera constitutivement en opposition avec le kitsch qui représente ici l'élément toujours présent dans l'œuvre dont le système se sert pour la commercialiser.

> *«car l'absolue liberté en art, qui demeure liberté dans un domaine particulier, entre en contradiction avec l'état permanent de non-liberté dans la totalité.»*[vii]

En résumé, le danger de l'autonomie de l'art pour les organisations politiques de l'époque d'Adorno, mais aussi de la notre qui n'est pas si loin, provient du potentiel critique qu'il permet à l'artiste, par le biais de codes pouvant être reconnus par le peuple, mais non par la censure, comme ce fut le cas dans les systèmes fascistes du début

du siècle. Mais encore beaucoup plus que ça, ontologiquement! La sensibilité esthétique mise à l'œuvre dans la création artistique demande un contact très fort avec le monde tel qu'il est réellement et non tel que nous l'avons construit rationnellement. Cette sensibilité était présente bien avant toute forme de rationalisation du réel, elle est constitutive de notre être naturel et aucun système totalitaire ne pourra déraciner complètement ce germe en nous. L'esthétique pour la Théorie Critique, (a contrario de toutes les réflexions antérieures sur sa dépendance à d'autres domaines de réflexion), est le lieu utopique par excellence: une promesse de revirement de situation, un espace où la pensée peut encore se mouvoir sans les violences de la tradition philosophique, un des derniers lieux où il est encore possible d'imaginer autre chose. Dans un aphorisme de Minima Moralia, Adorno illustre ce potentiel esthétique en parlant de l'*Histoire du Soldat* de Stravinski: «… dans sa violence compulsive et onirique, quelque chose de la vérité négative est devenue sensible à la musique.»[viii] Elle permet de s'ouvrir au dissemblable originel et radical afin de la respecter sans tenter son unification. L'art représente ce qui ne se laisse pas organiser et ce qu'opprime l'organisation systématique et totale. De plus, l'art, lui, ne peut oublier la souffrance … il en est même son expression la plus humaine … il est une ouverture …

Le fil de la dialectique, du paradoxe incessant, que nous avons suivi avec les penseurs de la Théorie Critique nous mena à un constat aporétique quant à la situation de l'art. En effet, finalement, nous arrivons à l'idée que la seule issue possible est de conserver l'espace critique qu'il constitue. La décortication des mécanismes déterminant l'art que nous avons établie (hétéronomie, entkunstung, kulturindustrie et autonomie), se voulait plutôt préparatoire à un travail plus en profondeur. C'est donc dans cette avenue que nous avons décider de chercher son origine par l'environnement dans lequel il semble se mouvoir. Notre lecture de la *Théorie Critique* nous a conduit à établir un lien très fort entre *La Dialectique de la Raison, La Dialectique Négative, Minima Moralia* et la *Théorie Esthétique*. En effet au fil de ce parcourt, nous avons dégagé trois points centraux de l'esthétique issue de leur réflexion. En premier lieu, nous avons présenté leur conception de la Totalité comme tentative destructrice de réduire la diversité terrestre à certains points uniques de façon à s'assurer un meilleur contrôle de ce qui causait originairement peur à l'homme, l'autre. Ensuite, nous avons dégagé le principal effet de cette unification, la souffrance. Celle-ci nous apparut même comme une ligne trans-historiques nous permettant de porter un regard plus précis sur les manifestations artistiques à travers le temps. Cela nous conduisit à clore ce parcourt par une meilleure situation de ce que peut être l'art aujourd'hui, au-delà de l'industrie culturelle: une charge puissante comme rappel de la souffrance, comme retour aux origines, comme possibilité utopique d'un monde qui ne court pas à son autodestruction.

Il est donc encore possible de prendre un pinceau, un bout de charbon, de la couleur et de re-figurer, remodeler notre situation humaine. Lorsque l'art sera réelle-

ment mort, le monde le sera aussi. Même si les pressions, économiques particulièrement, contre les artistes qui disent encore quelque chose de vrai, donc se détachant de la sphère sociale totalisée, sont insoutenables pour tout humain désirant manger, il reste encore certains individus marginalisés conservant un lieu de réflexion et de création aussi protégé que possible des pressions sociales. Tant que ces gens vivront, il y aura encore espoir. La question de savoir s'il existera encore un auditoire est largement ouverte…

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Notes

[i] Horkeimer M. et Adorno T, *La dialectique de la raison*. Paris: Gallimard, 1983, 59 à 91.

[ii] *Ibid.*, 87.

[iii] Nous retrouvons l'approfondissement de cette idée de «banalisation du mal» chez Hannah Arendt.

[iv] Cette idée est traitée dans le chapitre: «La production industrielle de biens culturels, raison et mystification des masses.» (pp.130-176, *La dialectique de la raison*).

[v] Ce propos n'est certes pas spécifiquement contemporain. Nous n'avons qu'à regarder les considérations de La Boétie dans son *Discours sur la servitude volontaire*, pour remarquer que déjà en 1576, le divertissement de masse était un élément clef de la réussite idéologique et dominatrice.

[vi] Horkeimer M. et Adorno T, *La dialectique de la raison*, 33.

[vii] *Ibid.*, 15.

[viii] Adorno T., *Minima Moralia*. Francfort: Payot, 1980, 87.

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The Responses to Eleaticism of Anaxagoras and Empedocles: Similarities and Differences

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The chief mark of cogent thought is the degree to which all that follows must be measured against it. This was the mark left by the Eleatics. Eleaticism was a wrench in the wheel of previous Greek thought, which had attempted to provide systematic physical explanations for the physical phenomena we observe, taking for granted such notions as change and motion in the natural world. Eleaticism questioned this picture of the natural world and argued instead for some sort of monism that left no room for motion, change or diversity of being in spite of appearances to the contrary that, until then, had played a role in explanations regarding cosmogony and cosmology. This new brand of thought was influential to the point that even those who rejected outright the Eleatic conclusion of monism had to take the tenets of Eleaticism into account. To the Post-Eleatics, even if monism could not stand, many of the Eleatic prescriptions for what could count as an explanatory principle would. The reactions to Eleaticism of Anaxagoras and Empedocles are considered, compared, and contrasted in what follows. It will be demonstrated that these two Presocratics, given the likeness of their primary goals and the fact that they both try to reconcile the intrusions on Greek thought of the Eleatics with the physical systems of the Ionians, do have many similarities, including those goals and their approaches to countering Eleaticism. To be sure, however, they do also exhibit salient differences that, in the end, have implications for how well they have satisfied their similar goals and to what extent they have reconfirmed a common sense ontology, which the Eleatics sought to abbreviate.

In surveying Empedocles' and Anaxagoras' systems of explanation about the world, it becomes clear that their similarities are rooted in the continuity of their systems with prior Greek thought. We will see that it is their goal of reconciling the major postulates of Eleaticism, most notably the chief tenet that what is cannot come to be from what is not (which will be shown below to be accepted by both of these Post-Eleatics) with the physical explanations of the "Pre-Eleatics"[1], that gives rise to the

parallels between the two.

A similarity between Anaxagoras and Empedocles, which follows from a desire on the part of each to "save appearances,"[2] is that both attempt to re-establish to a certain extent the validity of the senses in the face of Eleatic scepticism. While each of the Eleatics undercuts the validity of the senses as tools for explaining the nature of the universe,[3] Anaxagoras and Empedocles both develop theories of perception that accord some credit to the senses. While these theories differ in important respects (where Empedocles conceives of perception of like by like in a theory of pores and effluences, Anaxagoras' conception of perception is of unlike by unlike, i.e. we can know something through the minimal presence in us of its opposite), it is the very fact of the status accorded to the senses in their discourse that is salient here. For Anaxagoras:

> (Theophrastus *de sensu* 27ff. [DK59A92]) ...A thing that is as warm or as cold as we are does not either warm us or cool us by its approach, nor can we recognise sweetness or bitterness by their like; rather we know cold by warm, fresh by salt and sweet by bitter in proportion to our deficiency in each...

Yet, given this legitimated (for Anaxagoras) employment of the senses, he also cautions that (Fr. 21, Sextus *adv. math.* vii, 90) "From the weakness of our senses we cannot judge truth" demonstrating, along Heraclitean lines, that another power, i.e. the understanding/reason, must accompany the senses in order to yield useful information about the world. Empedocles' validation of the senses also comes with a Heraclitean caveat, namely, that the understanding must act as a supplement to the senses: (Fr. 2, Sextus *adv. math.* vii, 123) "...who, then, boasts that he has found the whole? Not so are these things to be seen or heard by men, or grasped by the understanding"; also:

> (Fr. 3, Sextus, *adv. math.* vii, 125) Come now, observe with all your powers how each thing is clear, neither holding sight in greater trust compared with hearing, nor noisy hearing above the passages of the tongue, nor withhold trust from any of the other limbs [organs, parts of the body], by whatever way there is a channel of understanding, but grasp each thing in the way in which it is clear.

These passages demonstrate three things: first, that there is a distinct line of continuity between the Pre-Eleatics and these Post-Eleatics; second, that there is credit given to the senses by both of these thinkers, *contra* the Eleatics; and third, that, following from this, the goal of both philosophers is to rescue the principles of explanation from that which wholly discredits the senses. We will see that the continuity with the Pre-Eleatics is a theme that runs through the discourse of both Empedocles and Anaxagoras and that divergence with those early Ionians comes out of attempts to rec-

oncile Eleatic explanatory suggestions with Pre-Eleatic physical explanations. This continuity, thus, in large part explains their similarity.

We can see, for both Empedocles and Anaxagoras, that, while there is a certain respect for the senses akin to that of some of the pre-Eleatics, this comes with an analogous respect for the main tenet of Eleaticism, that what is cannot come to be from what is not. The presence of this sentiment in both Empedocles and Anaxagoras is illustrated by comparing the following similarly worded passages:

> (Empedocles, DK 31 B8): ...there is no birth [*physis*] of any of all mortal things, neither any end of destructive death, but only mixture and separation of mixed things exist, and birth is a term applied to them by men.

> (Anaxagoras, DK 59 B17): Coming to be and perishing the Greeks do not rightly understand; for no thing comes to be or perishes, but from existing things it is mixed and separated. And thus one would rightly call coming to be mixture and perishing separation.

Aside from evincing a clear similarity in Empedocles and Anaxagoras that sets the stage for their responses to Eleaticism, where the Eleatic rejection of coming-to-be and perishing are taken to heart while the notion of indivisibility is rebuffed, these passages demonstrate another similarity in the Empedoclean and Anaxagorean Eleatic responses: their approach.

The notion of mixture, as a means of reconciling the Eleatic principle of no coming into being or passing away with physical explanations of appearances, is present for both of these thinkers. Each, in aiming to get around the problem of a plurality derived from an original unity through coming-to-be, is forced to posit an original plurality of eternal elements[4] (somewhat akin to the originative substances of the Pre-Eleatics, but respecting Eleatic tenets), which display change as a result of their mixing together in different combinations. For both thinkers, the mixture that makes up the sensible universe is derivative of the original and eternal substances that each posits. What is more, the original elements that each thinker posits also display, though in a plurality rather than in a unity, Eleatic traits of being such as changelessness and everlastingness. Though the nature and scope of the original principles differ crucially for each thinker, they do exhibit this broad correspondence in approach as is illustrated in the following passages, demonstrating for both the existence of an eternal plurality:

> (Anaxagoras, Fr.6, Simplicius *Phys.* 164, 26): ...nothing can be put apart nor come-to-be all by itself, but as things were originally, so they must be now too, all together.

> (Empedocles, Fr.17, Simplicius *in Phys.* 158, 13): ...And besides them nothing further comes into being nor does anything pass away. How could it in fact be utterly destroyed, since nothing is empty of these? For only if they were continually perishing would they no longer exist. And what would increase this all? Whence could it have come? No, there are just these [the four roots and Love and Strife], but running through one another they have become different things at different times and yet ever and always the same.

It must be recognised, however, that although at a broad level the approaches of Anaxagoras and Empedocles are similar, in keeping with their respect for both Pre-Eleatic notions and major tenets of Eleaticism, they also differ crucially. This difference has wide-ranging implications for their responses to the monistic arguments put forth by the Eleatics. The differences in the natures of the elements, and the specific patterns of their interaction, that each thinker posits, determine what they are each able to explain (and, as it follows, how effectively they meet their goals of "saving appearances" in the face of Eleatic scepticism). In consequence, their explanations for apparent coming-to-be, which must be explained in any system that acknowledges appearances yet denies birth and death as they are standardly conceived, necessarily differ:

> (From Empedocles Fragment 17, line 14, Simplicius *in Phys.* 158, 13): I shall tell a twofold tale: at one time they grew alone out of many, at another again they grew apart to be many out of one — fire and water and earth and the immense height of air, and cursed Strife apart from them, equal in every direction, and Love among them, equal in length and breadth... there are just these, but running through one another they have become different things at different times and yet ever and always the same.

With this fragment, Empedocles explains his system as a sort of "cosmic cycle" where the four roots (Fr. 17, 1-13, Simplicius *in Phys.* 158, 1) "never cease in their continual interchange, now through Love all coming together into one, now again each carried apart by the hatred of Strife.... thus far do they come into being and have no stable life; but insofar as they never cease their continual interchange, thus far they exist always changeless in the cycle." He posits a system wherein four eternal elements, when united or separated by opposing forces, are put (or, more precisely, are "run together") in different combinations by the continual and equal motion of the cycle of the work of these forces. Different unities appear to be "created" and "destroyed" due to the different properties that come to light as a result of these different combinations of the elements, which themselves have unique properties. This is demonstrated in Aetius' account of the final stage of Empedocles' zoogony wherein (Aetius DK, 31A72) "the various species of animals were distinguished by the quality of the mixture in

them." This manner of the relation of the eternal elements constitutes a pigment model wherein it is the concatenation of the elements, each of which carries its own eternal properties, that explains the appearance of changes in objects and the appearance of the coming-into-being and destruction of those objects. Empedocles illustrates this in his analogy of the painter:

> (Fr. 23, Simplicius *in Phys.* 159, 27): ...when they actually seize pigments of many colours in their hands, mixing in harmony more of some and less of others, they produce from them *forms resembling* all things, creating trees and men and women, beasts and birds and water-bred fish, and long-lived gods, too, highest honour... [emphasis added]

Empedocles is clear that nothing, in fact, exists beyond the four roots and the opposing motive forces; it is only the forms of other things, which come about through concatenation, that make us believe (when [Fr. 23, Simplicius *in Phys.* 159, 27] "deception overcome[s] our mind"), erroneously, that they have independent existence: (Fr. 21, Simplicius *in Phys.* 159, 13) "For there are just these, but running through each other they assume different appearances: so much does mixture [alter their appearances]." Mixture entails an alteration in appearance, not in nature.

This model of mixture, based on the interaction of eternal elements and the properties of those elements linking together to engender the (mere) apparent existence of a plurality of things (beyond those eternal elements), provides an account for apparent coming to be and perishing in keeping with Empedocles' attempt to save appearances while respecting the Eleatic directive that what is cannot come to be from what is not. This represents Empedocles' rebuttal to Eleatic monism. This account, however, only achieves its goal insofar as we can fairly posit that individual organisms (like dogs and people) do not, and do not appear to, enjoy an independent existence beyond the concatenation of their parts. This is because Empedocles, in not being able to resolve the difficulty inherent in the fact that the "eternal nature of the parts which compose substances does not simply yield the eternal nature of the organisms themselves"[5] and in the absence of a mechanism with which to account independently for the eternal existence of these organisms, is effectively cornered. This, though, insofar as the goal remains that of saving appearances, is question-begging, for individual organisms do appear to possess an existence beyond their parts that needs to be addressed. In this sense, then, while Empedocles does posit an account of pluralism that is more in keeping with what appears true to the senses, the fact that he can only account for the existence of four roots and two forces, and that he has no mechanism to explain the actual existence of individual organisms, leaves his account wanting. He does account for the existence of plurality, but the absence of this mechanism makes it a plurality limited to a handful of elements, *contra* appearances. As such, our ontologies are scarcely less challenged than they were under Eleaticism, at least in comparison with Anaxagoras.

A primary difference in Anaxagoras' approach against Eleaticism is that it does, in fact, contain a mechanism that allows us to account for the existence of individual organisms alongside everything else that we take to exist *via* appearances. As such, our more comprehensive, pluralist ontologies are confirmed and appearances are more effectively rescued than they were in Empedocles' account. This mechanism is Anaxagoras' Doctrine of Seeds.

As we will see, Anaxagoras' Doctrine of Seeds forms an integral part of his scheme of explanation. In interacting with the doctrine of everything is in everything and the role to be played by nutrition in the growth of organisms, Anaxagoras is effectively able to confirm that not only is the Eleatic position of monism mistaken, but that positions of dualism[6] and other limited pluralisms are also flawed; indeed, according to Anaxagoras, everything exists. This does not contravene the "what is cannot come to be from what is not" tenet because the scope of things originally in existence for Anaxagoras far exceeds that posited by Empedocles' limited number of elements and two motive forces.

For Anaxagoras, (Fr. 6, Simplicius *Phys.* 164, 26) "in everything there is a portion of everything...." He posits a model of mixture that ventures to account for the appearance of the existence of all things, not in explaining the falsity of their existence beyond appearances as Empedocles does, but in actually allowing all things (including properties, individual substances and individual organisms) to exist eternally and *co-extensively* with all other things. This is best expressed in the following fragment:

> (Fr. 6, Simplicius *Phys.* 164, 26): And since the portions of the great and the small are equal in number, so too all things would be in everything. Nor is it possible that they should exist apart, but all things have a portion of everything. Since it is not possible that there should be a smallest part, nothing can be put apart nor come-to-be all by itself, but as things were originally, so they must be now too, all together. In all things there are many ingredients....

In this, Anaxagoras counters the Eleatic notion of indivisibility while allowing for, in the absence of minima (smallest parts), a co-extensive model of mixture.[7] As such, on this model of the way that the portions of the mixture interact, where these portions comprise "the homoeomerous substances and opposites together,"[8] the separation of portions is always partial in keeping with the presence of everything in everything.

Were Anaxagoras' model to conclude at this point, he would be faced with a problem akin to that of Empedocles, namely, the absence of an account for the existence of individual organisms beyond their parts. After all, it should be clear that, although my dog and I appear to exist, neither of us can be plausibly said to exist in everything or be able to be partially separated off from anything at any point; a portion of a dog can-

not properly be considered a dog. Anaxagoras accounts for this with the mechanism of his Doctrine of Seeds. The notion that everything is in everything, however, does and crucially must interact with this doctrine to account for, *via* nutrition, the growth of individual organisms and, as it follows, what we want explained: the apparent existence of ever-bigger individual organisms. Besides the homoeomers or portions, Anaxagoras figures in to the original state individual and unique seeds:

> (Fr. 4, Simplicius *in Phys.* 34, 21): ...before these things were separated off,... there was much earth in the mixture and seeds countless in number and in no respect like one to another.

These seeds can be inferred from this fragment — by their countlessness, their distinctiveness from the rest of the mixture, the fact of their individual uniqueness, and, semantically, in the fact that they are designated 'seeds,' a term clearly implying eventual growth — to be minuscule embodiments of all of the individual organisms that are ever to exist.[9] This allows these organisms not to have to be, implausibly, everywhere and in everything (which is permissible as the homoeomers or portions in everything are in kinds, not in tokens). To be sure, though, in order to remain consistent with the 'everything is in everything' principle, the seeds themselves would contain a bit of everything. Anaxagoras' principle of nutrition makes this account of seeds plausible. This is illustrated by the following passage from Aetius (DK59A46) about Anaxagoras' conception of nutrition:

> Anyhow we take in nourishment that is simple and homogeneous, such as bread or water, and by this are nourished hair, veins, arteries, flesh, sinews, bones and all the other parts of the body.

Nutrition, thus, bridges the gap between everything being in everything coextensively and the Doctrine of Seeds. By providing an explanatory account for growth, nutrition, in linking the pair of doctrines, also allows for an explanation for apparent coming to be (which necessarily differs from that of Empedocles because, for Anaxagoras, what appears to come to be *actually is and always was*). After all, we (not to mention all of the people yet to be "born") do not appear to be ever-existent. The nexus that nutrition provides allows Anaxagoras to account for apparent coming to be through growth and to claim that individual organisms (embodied in seeds), though eternal, only *appear* to come to be as they are too small to notice before they grow through the nourishment of the relevant homoeomers/the partial separations of the everything that is in everything eternally. As such, Anaxagoras is able to account for both apparent coming to be and the eternal existence of everything, including individual organisms, *via* his mechanism of the Doctrine of Seeds. On the whole, then, Anaxagoras confirms, *per* the appearances, a common sense ontology. With Anaxagoras, in this sense,

where a mechanism is inserted to account for people, dogs, etc., we can preserve our ontologies while heeding the warnings of the Eleatic prohibition against coming to be.

Another important sense in which Anaxagoras' and Empedocles' Eleatic responses parallel each other is that they each posit *external* motive forces (in contrast with the internal motive forces in the originative substances of the Pre-Eleatics as, again, reconciliation of Eleatic thought with Ionian thought is of concern). Both of these thinkers posit an external force with independent existence that causes motion within their systems to activate cosmogonical processes. The fact that the motive forces are external to the (other) eternal elements allows reconciliation of the need for a motive force to initiate change that appears within the system with the desire to obviate change on the elemental level. In this sense, given that the force of change, as it were, is not internal to the originative-type substance, change is only allowed at the supra-elemental level, which explicates the appearance of change yet does not compel changes in the natures of the original substances *per* Eleatic exhortation. Thus, Eleatic entreaties for changelessness, from the position that what is cannot come to be from what is not, are satisfied while the fact of plurality is maintained similarly in the systems of both of these thinkers.

While both Anaxagoras and Empedocles posit motive forces, the natures of these forces, beyond their being extrinsic to the eternal substances of each thinker, diverge. While Anaxagoras posits the motive force Mind, which is separate from his eternal elements or portions and yet also eternal, Empedocles posits two opposing motive forces, Love and Strife. The divergence in the nature of their motive forces equip their systems with different capacities. Though Anaxagoras' Mind ostensibly infuses his theory with an intentionality that is lacking in Empedocles' theory, the value of the aspect of reason in Anaxagoras is considerably diminished by the fact that its presence substantially trails off once his cosmogony is launched. These points are broached in this fragment:

> (Anaxagoras Fr. 12, Simplicius *in Phys.* 164, 24 and 156, 13): ...For it is the finest and the purest, it has all the knowledge about everything and the greatest power; and Mind controls all things, both the greater and the smaller that have life. Mind controlled also the whole rotation so that it began to rotate in the beginning... *And this rotation caused the separating off*.... [emphasis added]

Anaxagoras' cosmogony is such that, although Mind is responsible for the initiation of the separating off of the portions of everything, in practice it is the momentum of that initial burst that virtually takes over. The following fragments speak to this:

> (Anaxagoras' Fr. 13, Simplicius *in Phys.* 300, 31): ...and as things moved and were divided off, *the rotation* greatly increased the process of dividing.

[emphasis added]

> (Anaxagoras' Fr. 13, Simplicius *in Phys.* 300, 31): ...as these things rotated thus and were separated off by the force and speed (of their rotation). *And the speed creates the force.* Their speed is like the speed of nothing that now exists among men, but is altogether many times as fast. [emphasis added]

Here, it becomes more clear that Mind ebbs in Anaxagoras' system. The significance of the invocation of reason then subsides. Furthermore, in deferring to the force of the speed of the rotation to partially separate off the portions that are in everything, the unlimited dynamism that Mind as a motive force would potentially infuse into a system is also compromised. As Kirk, Raven, and Schofield put it: "Not only is like continuing to be attracted by like, but also, evidently, the pressure at the centre of the rotation (the "force" [in Fr. 13]) is compressing the 'seeds' into ever more solid bodies."[10] Though Kirk, Raven, and Schofield do betray an ambiguous vision of the notion of seeds here, their underlying premise is still salient: simply put, change in Anaxagoras' system, after Mind diminishes in importance and relents to momentum, essentially becomes unidirectional. This is unsatisfying, particularly when contrasted with Empedocles' system, which comprises two opposing forces, Love and Strife. For all intents and purposes, Anaxagoras' system can *de facto* only claim the presence of half of the motive force that Empedocles' can. Empedocles' system, while satisfying the condition that what is cannot come to be from what is not, can thus account for more dynamic change than Anaxagoras can with (a tempered) Mind as a motive force.

Still, Empedocles, by not ascribing motive force to Mind or any such intentionality-infusing force, must defer to an extensive presence of chance in his system (which irked Aristotle), an illustration of which occurs in this passage: (Plutarch DK31A30) "...The start of motion is due to the accident that there was a concentration in one region because fire pressed heavily there..." It seems, however, that Anaxagoras does no better in that sense, yet must contend with a more static range of change. Furthermore, while chance in a system of cosmogony is intuitively bothersome, Empedocles' biology, in delineating his perception of the homologous functions that are present in apparently dissimilar parts, provides a scenario whereby chance, on a 'survival of the fittest' model, is indeed satisfying and plausible, *contra* Aristotle.

As both Anaxagoras and Empedocles posit explicit and external motive forces, which takes them a step beyond the Pre-Eleatics (which Kirk, Raven, and Schofield deem to be a sign that they are not taking for granted, on the Eleatics' suggestion, any fact of motion[11]), and as each of their systems require motion, they clearly support it, in contrast to the Eleatics. Still, neither explicitly addresses the matter in response to Eleatic charges against motion. There is a feature in Anaxagoras' system, however, which, in contrast to Empedocles', does go some way towards responding to Eleatic

concerns about motion, particularly Melissus'. That feature is co-extension.

According to Melissus: (Fr. 7, Simplicius *in Phys.* 112, 6) "And nothing of it is empty. For what is empty is nothing. Well, what is nothing could not very well exist. Nor does it move. For it cannot give way at any point, but is full. For if there were such a thing as empty, it would give way into what is empty; but since there is no such thing as empty, it has no where to give way..." With this fragment, Melissus presents his argument that:

> There is no motion without void.
> There is no void.
>
> ---
>
> Therefore, there is no motion.

With the first premise, Melissus tacitly denies that there is any alternative to void that can allow for motion. In so doing, he neglects any version of the world in which a body may not have the property of solidity. Anaxagoras, with "everything is in everything," does not deny that the world is full — that there is no void. With this principle, however, he is able to take aim at Melissus' first premise. Everything is in everything entails complete co-extension as, if the parts of being, i.e., Anaxagoras' everythings, were not completely coextensive with each other then, on some level of analysis, however small, there would be a spot in which everything was not in everything. We know that Anaxagoras denies that this is possible as he subscribes to a notion of the impossibility of leasts (minima):

> (Fr. 3, Simplicius *in Phys.* 164, 17): Neither is there a smallest part of what is small, but there is always a smaller (for it is impossible that what is should cease to be). Likewise there is always something larger than what is large. And it is equal in respect of number to what is small, each thing, in relation to itself, being both large and small.

With this feature — co-extension — Anaxagoras counters Melissus' 'no motion without void' with an alternative to void. Melissus contends, in the above passage ([Fr. 3, Simplicius *in Phys.* 164, 17]: "Nor does it move. For it cannot give way at any point, but is full") that being cannot give way — or, more precisely, that it cannot give way without void. With co-extension as a tool, Anaxagoras' being *can* give way without void as it is not necessary that there be a particular "point" at which it can give way (as this is only necessary with non-coextensive objects) because it can give way into itself. Thus, Anaxagoras gets around (or passes through!) Melissus' argument against motion, based on the assumption that being cannot give way because there is nowhere to give way to, by obviating the need for a point at which being could give way (which would

necessitate void). In positing an alternative to void, Anaxagoras dismisses Melissus' first premise and so may dismiss Melissus' argument as unsound.

There is a problem for Anaxagoras and motion, however, which is rooted in his acceptance of the existence of individual organisms *via* his Doctrine of Seeds. Were Anaxagoras only to accept the existence of portions, then there would be but one level at which motion would be necessary. Due to his acceptance of the existence of individual organisms, however, Anaxagoras tacitly accepts the property of solidity that individual organisms *qua* individual organisms evidently have. This entails, for our purposes here, two levels of analysis — that of the portions which exhibit co-extensiveness, and that of the individual organisms which do not. While the solidity of individual organisms does allow for their existence writ large, Anaxagoras compromises the tool that co-extension gives him to account for motion among portions. Where Anaxagoras needs to accept the solidity of individual organisms in order to save appearances (individual organisms do not appear to be able to pass through walls at whim, for instance), he is unable to account for the locomotion of individual organisms (beyond perhaps a wanting explanation based on the existence of a motive force [Mind]). Co-extension at the level of analysis of the individual organism that grows from each seed, in contrast to the level of nourishment and homoeomers, would be unsatisfying as it would contradict the primary advantage/goal of his system wherein it confirms our ontologies without downgrading our existence, as the other Eleatic pluralists must. In order for Anaxagoras to retain the existence of individual organisms in his system as well as account for motion on the 'co-extension-so-no-void-necessary' model of motion, he would have to allow for co-extension of, for instance, the air through which we appear to move (which Anaxagoras explicitly denies to be void[12]) with our bodies as individual organisms. For Anaxagoras, this denigrates the fact of their existence beyond their parts, *contra* the appearance that we, as non-homoeomers/individual organisms exist. Given the limited scope of things that exhibit co-extension for Anaxagoras (only those things on the level of the portions, which are not the only things that exist), Anaxagoras' implicit claims against motionlessness are not a panacea. Yet, they do counter the Eleatic (here, Melissean) denial of motion on a front where Empedocles (who, we know, did not posit co-extension because of his pigment model for apparent coming to be[13]) is silent.

In sum, there is a real sense in which Anaxagoras' and Empedocles' responses to Eleaticism are similar, particularly where that '-ism' designates monism. Both set out to save appearances, re-establishing for the senses some of the validity that was eschewed by Eleaticism. While validating appearances to a certain extent, each thinker dedicates himself to respecting the Eleatic tenet that what is can never come to be from what is not by explaining plurality through a mixture approach in which mixtures are derived from a plurality of eternal principles. In addition, in heeding the Eleatic advice, each accepts elemental changelessness by positing external motive forces.

Notwithstanding these broad similarities in goals and approaches, which evidently follow from an attempt to reconcile two preceding branches of Greek thought, the particulars of the thinkers' systems differ. The most salient differences between the thinkers involve the number of existing things for which each is able to account. While Empedocles can explain the apparent coming to be of all things *via* a pigment analogy for the ability of the mixture of his four elements to alter their appearance at the mixing of their properties, this yields the (somewhat unsatisfactory given his goal) conclusion that very little, in fact, exists. Anaxagoras, on the other hand, in introducing the individual organism-explaining mechanism of his Doctrine of Seeds (along with his co-extension model of 'everything is in everything' and the 'bridging nutrition' principle), provides a cogent, comprehensive system that surmounts the existence-beyond-parts difficulty thereby being able to confirm our vast ontologies. Interestingly, the model of coextensive mixture that Anaxagoras contributes is able to account for, if only partially, the motion in his system thus countering, to an extent beyond that attempted by Empedocles, Melissean assertions against motion.

Notes

[1] I will use this term to refer to the Ionians in order to put into relief the notion of continuity that I argue for here.

[2] Graham, Daniel W. "Empedocles and Anaxagoras: Responses to Parmenides." *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy.* Ed. A. A. Long. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 165.

[3] The Eleatics repeatedly warn against reliance upon the senses for any useful information about the nature of existence. For instance, Parmenides expounds (Fr. 7, Plato, *Sophist* 242A (lines 1-2); Sextus *adv.* math. vii, 114 (lines 2-6)) "For never shall this be forcibly maintained, that things that are not are, but you must hold back your thought from this way of enquiry, nor let habit, born of much experience, force you down this way, by making you use an aimless eye or an ear and a tongue full of meaningless sound: judge by reason the strife-encompassed refutation spoken by me." While Melissus attacks the senses in Fr. 8 (Simplicius *de caelo* 558, 21) by, after arguing for the changelessness of being, pointing out that we still believe based on sensory information that there is in fact change and things "born from what lives not." He thus decides here that "It is clear, then, that we did not see aright after all, nor are we right in believing that all these things are many."

[4] I use this term here to refer broadly to the fundamental first principles of Anaxagoras and Empedocles fully recognising the differences between Anaxagoras' first principles and Empedocles' "elements." While there are differences in these principles, which will be elaborated upon below, the analysis here is a broad one not meant to convolute the two through use of this term. It is merely used plausibly to demonstrate similar characteristics in the two at the broadest level of analysis.

[5] Lewis, Eric. "Anaxagoras and the Seeds of a Physical Theory." *Apeiron.* Vol. XXXIII. No. 1. March 2000, 16.

[6] This counters the position of Kirk, Raven and Schofield, 365. This is in part due to the more nuanced account of seeds given here, but also to the fact that Kirk, Raven, and Schofield's idea of dualism in Anaxagoras (a "peculiar dualism" whereby one branch of the dualism is formed of "every form of substance that the world is ultimately to contain") is itself peculiar and is, as such, seemingly an unsympathetic reading considering Anaxagoras' goal of saving appearances.

[7] This co-extension and its implications for Eleatic arguments against motion are explored below.

[8] This is from Aristotle *Phys.* A4, 187a23. It would seem that the mention of "opposites" here, where opposites (hot and cold, black and white) are essentially properties, would best be seen less as a conscious effort to give pride of place to the opposites *qua* opposites and more as an enunciation of the fact that it is not only substances that form the portions of the mixture but also properties. The reference to opposites

seems best read as a comparative nod to the Pre-Eleatic emphasis on opposites (i.e. in Anaximander and Heraclitus) which is in keeping with the notion of Pre- and Post-Eleatic continuity expressed above.

[9] This account of the nature of seeds (as homunculi) in Anaxagoras draws from the account presented in Lewis, Eric. "Anaxagoras and the Seeds of a Physical Theory" in *Apeiron*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (March 2000).

[10] Kirk, G.S., J.E. Raven, and M. Schofield. *The Presocratic Philosophers, 2nd Edition.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983, 374.

[11] *Ibid.*, 351.

[12] We can infer this from Aristotle *Phys.* _6, 213a22 "Those who try to show that the void does not exist do not disprove what people really mean by it, but argue erroneously; this is true of Anaxagoras and of those who refute the existence of the void in this way. They merely give an ingenious demonstration that air is something — by straining wine-skins and showing the resistance of the air, and by cutting it off in clepsydras."

[13] The assumption being made here is that Empedocles' use of pigment in his analogy entails a least, i.e. the 'pigment' here refers to particulate. There is another interpretation of which one should be aware — that the pigment does not refer to a particulate but to individual portions of paint. This latter interpretation would not necessarily rule out a rejection of co-extension by Empedocles but would necessitate a close look at Ancient Greek art in order to determine whether, for instance, the painting styles from which Empedocles would have drawn inspiration for his model tended to be pointillistic.

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The Synthesis of Time

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The following paper aims to give an account of the nature of temporal experience. This analysis is structured as follows: 1) The thought of Plato will be briefly examined in order to extract two main problems from his thought on time. First, that the subjective *experience* of time is not accounted for; and second, that time is abstracted to the point where its very temporal nature is leveled down; 2) The thought of St. Augustine will be closely analysed in an attempt to show that he escapes, at least in part, the first problem in Plato. However, given his triple present and the constitution of time in eternity he misses the whole point of time itself; and 3) An analysis of the Husserlian account of internal time-consciousness will be offered, with the intention of appropriating his general structure of the experience of time. While Husserl makes considerable progress on this subject he fails in one essential way. Namely, he posits a flux that is constitutive of temporal experience and constituted by double intentionality. It is not the constitutive flux that is at issue in Husserl, rather it is his double intentionality.

In order to make more clear my critique of Plato, Augustine and Husserl I have adopted a term that appears in the Stambaugh translation of Heidegger's *Being and Time*. According to Heidegger the "vulgar" understanding of time maintains that time is merely a succession of 'nows' that pass and arrive at essentially the same moment; that is, a succession of 'nows' that is not effected by the ones that passed before it or the ones that pass after it. Heidegger claims that, "The nows are cut off from these relations, so to speak, and, as thus cut off, they simply range themselves along after one another so as to constitute the succession."[1] While the critique is mostly aimed at Plato and Augustine (by both Heidegger and myself), the purpose of this paper is to show how Husserl falls prey to this critique as well. By positing a pure constitutive flux based on his theory of double intentionality, Husserl is guilty of something like a pure succession of nows as well. The Heideggerian terminology that I am adopting does not

mean that I make an essentially Heideggerian critique. Rather, I think that Husserl's treatment of the issue of time runs past what Heidegger is speaking of when he uses the word "vulgar". The terminology shall only serve to get us through Plato and Augustine and as an indication of the problem in Husserl.

1. The Vulgar Conception of Time: Plato

Plato conceives of time as being constituted in the universe itself. For Plato, the demiurge (the creator of the universe) wrought the motion of the universe out of a pre-existing chaos. By dividing the universe into circles through, which we measure time, Plato is able to encompass both an eternal element of time and a means through which time can be measured. Plato refers to the former as the circle of the Same and to the latter as the circle of the Different. The circle of the Same is the eternal element of time, a homogeneous element that allows for more discrete elements, such as actual instances of time measurement (like the timing of a race or the measurement of motion in the heavens). The circle of the Same is, according to Plato, the most basic element of time itself. But the measurement of time would not be possible without the circle of the Different. The Same provides merely a backdrop for motion to stand out against, while the motion on the circle of the Different provides the motion that is measured.

While looking out of a moving train, the objects that are closest pass so quickly that they become an indistinguishable blur, while the sun or the moon seems to remain stationary no matter how fast or far one travels. The sun or the moon can be likened to the motion of the Same, for it still passes by, but it is due to the apparent 'stationariness' of the sun and the moon that the other objects seem to move so quickly. Since — in the world soul — the Same is the constant for the motion of the Different, and therefore the means by which we measure time on the circle of the Different, the Same can be said to encompass the immutability of eternity (as much as is possible within mutability), while the Different is parallel to the change and flux of the temporal universe.

This, however, does not bring us any closer to an account of the actual experience of time. In the Platonic conception there is no effort to constitute time in subjectively, which makes it a weak account when attempting to establish the appearance of time in experience. It will doubtless be maintained that this alone is not a critique of Plato, for it is through the Same and the Different that we are able to experience the motion of the universe and, consequently, time. It is true that Plato, in his search for the constituting elements of time, engages in something that the modern mind would refer to as cosmology. But for Plato the organic whole of the universe encompasses everything, from the subject's experience of time to the constitutive planetary motions. The real problem in Plato then, is that time is constituted *qua* organic whole; that is, time

becomes something that is fully constituted in the world as something to be observed and experienced. This reduces time to a plane that can be studied and dealt with merely as another metaphysical topic.

How do we get to the point where we can begin to see time revealed in its essence? It is not revealed by way of discovering objects constitutive to, and revealed by, the experience of time, for this allows us to see only what the experience of time reveals and not the structure of experiential time itself. Before we can understand why time cannot be understood merely in terms of the objects constitutive of experience, we need to make the move of constituting time in the subject. Without the essential move of defining the role of the subject in the experience of time we run the risk of conflating the two problems that we revealed in the Platonic account: 1) that the subjective nature of the experience of time is not accounted for; and 2) that time is fully deployed and constituted, ignoring the experience of the passing of time. It is not the first problem that concerns us here, for even though it is true that the subjective experience of time is not differentiated from the objective constitution of time in planetary motion, we cannot attack Plato on these grounds because the Greeks probably did not have the concept of planetary time as distinguished from subjective temporal experience. Yet, even once this delineation is made, the second problem still persists. As we are about to see, Augustine's recognition of the problem will not be sufficient for an escape from our critique. The point of this critique of Plato is merely to lay out a preliminary definition of the two problems by showing that his account is weak when it comes to the modern issue of time and temporality.

2. The Vulgar Conception of Time: Augustine

Augustine moves closer to the kind of account we are looking for, but since he is still caught up with the idea of a God as the eternal exemplar of time which somehow captures temporality in an infinitely long instant, his account is confined to the vulgar. The move with which Augustine brings the constitution of time into the subject can be seen in the following passage:

> Let no man tell me, then, that movements of the heavenly bodies constitute periods of time. When at the prayer of a certain man, the sun stood still until he could achieve victory in battle, the sun indeed stood still, but time went on. That battle was waged and brought to an end during it's own tract of time, which was sufficient for it. Therefore, I see that time is a kind of distention. Yet do I see this, or do I only seem to myself to see it? You, O Light, will show this to me.[2]

While the Platonic theory postulates that the demiurge wrought the motion of the universe into the motion of the Same and the motion of the Different, thereby creating a gauge by which to measure time, Augustine moves further claiming that time is not merely measured through the motion of celestial bodies, but also through the motion measured by the subject. While, like Plato, Augustine claims that time is measured through motion in the temporal universe, he develops the theory further, claiming that it is not only the motion of celestial bodies — although these can be used[3] — but the motion perceived by the subject that constitutes time. It is in this distinction that we see Augustine move closer to constituting the actual experience of time. In the following argument Augustine develops a theory of time based on experience.

> 1) time is the past, present and future.
> 2) the past does not exist — anymore.
> 3) the future does not exist — yet.
> 4a) the present does not exist —
> because it would be eternity, and no part of time.
> 4b) eternity and time are separate concepts —
> eternity is not thse same as endless time.
> Inferred from 4a & 4b:
> 4c) the present does not last any time at all.
> Inferred from 2-4c:
> 5) therefore, time does not exist.[4]

Augustine's argument against the existence of time is not meant to abolish it altogether. Instead, he introduces three presents, the purpose of which is to bring time into the human soul: 1) the present of things past, existing in memory; 2) the present of things present, existing in attention; and 3) the present of things future, existing in expectation. It is important distinguish between the time that Augustine asserts does not exist and the time that is constituted in the triple present.

It is the time existing in the world, the organic whole that we see in Plato, which does not exist for Augustine. As we see from Augustine's reference to the book of Joshua (above), the fact that time can stand still without altering the experience of the world shows us that the experience of time cannot be thought of as an experience of a whole existing in the universe, but must be thought of as having its generation in the subject. Hence, to say that time does not exist is not to refuse the existence of a temporal element of experience, in fact it is quite the contrary. The argument that time does not exist paired with the revisions that come later are an attempt to remove the objective constitution of time in the world. Augustine, after showing that there is no organic whole of time, must then account for our temporal experience; this is done by positing the triple present. For Augustine, it is in the present that all experience occurs, and if the past and the future cannot be an element of the constitution of the present, then it is impossible to account for the experience of past and future at all. If they do not figure into the present then they will not be experienced.

This is the vital move, of interest to phenomenology, that distinguishes Augustine from Plato. Plato constitutes the source of time in the motion of the planets and, while there is nothing inherently wrong with this conception as such, it still does not define time as a constituted by subjective experience. Plato's entire meditation on time is concentrated on the structure of time in the heavens. For Plato, it seems, there does not need to be a subjective element present to extract time and temporal relations from the motion of the planets. This is essentially the first problem we identified in Plato's conception of time and I think we have shown in what sense Augustine escapes this problem. The second problem though is a little more difficult to delineate. The problem with Plato's conception is that it attempts to bring the concepts of past and future *into the world*; that is, he attempts to constitute time as independent of a subject. Augustine also falls victim to this error, but in a different way. It is not that Augustine attempts to deploy time fully into the world, rather, it is that time is fully deployed in the subject over a completed triple present (the present of things past, existing in memory; the present of things future existing in expectation; and the present of things present, existing in attention). This is where Heidegger's critique of the vulgar becomes clear. Time defined in the Augustinian fashion is sufficiently subjective, but the fact that the present extends to encompass both the past and the future posits an element of totality into time, a totality that results in time being interpreted as a series of completed 'nows'. This conception fails to account for time *qua* temporal occurence by defining its entire constitution. Defining time as a constituted whole does not account for the nature of human temporal experience because it is not that case that we can examine time *qua* whole at all. Time is something that is in flux and by its very nature never completed.

Despite Augustine's shortcomings he has been credited by Husserl as making great strides in the constitution of the experience of time:

> The first thinker to be deeply sensitive to the immense difficulties to be found here was Augustine ... For no one in this knowledge-proud modern generation has made more masterful or significant progress in these matters than this great thinker who struggled so earnestly with the problem.[5]

As we will see, Husserl develops a description of time that relies on the unity of individual parts, like the unity of three presents, to develop something like the experience of a whole.

3. Husserl's Phenomenological account of the Experience of Time

The Augustinian gesture of unifying time in the subject is important to Husserl because the entire project of Husserl's phenomenology is to show the internal conscious structures at work in the constitution of any experience. Husserl's method is

borrowed from Descartes' method of pre-emptive skepticism, the goal of which is not to assume any sort of knowledge in order to discover what is most elemental in experience. As the element of internal conscious experience, which seems to be the most primordial, time occupies an important place in Husserl's thought.

In *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl investigates what is most elemental in experience (through what he calls the phenomenological reduction). Husserl arrives at a flux of temporal experience in which he thinks the experience of time can be identified:

> ... we also find a connecting form, in as much as, for all, not merely does the law of transformation of the now into the no longer and, on the other side, the not yet into the now function separately, but also something akin to the common form of the now exists, a likeness generally in the mode of the flux.[6]

This flux is difficult to identify in itself because it seems that whenever one tries to identify what is elemental of the flux, the very experience of the search for the constitutive component is unified into the flux of conscious experience as well. He considers the problem in *Cartesian Meditations* and in *Ideas*, and fails to give a satisfactory answer in either. It seems, at first glance, that all that is approachable is the subjective experience of the flux, or rather, the conscious processes in flux. But approaching this is itself a process unified within the subjective conscious flux of experience. The discovery that any conscious process is unified by time results in an infinite regress to the ideal point of generation of the flux of time itself, an infinite regress involving: 1) the first sensation; 2) temporal experience of the first sensation in time; 3) temporal experience of the first sensation in time in time; 4) and so on *ad infinitum*. This infinite regress is problematic for Husserl because he wants to grant some objective status to time. Merely claiming that the subjective process of internal time is constitutive of the flux of time, but not describing the flux of time itself, does not provide a sufficient an answer to the problematic of the constitution of experienced time. Husserl needs to show *why* such an infinite regress is arrived at and why it is only a problem if internal time itself cannot be described in its totality; that is, Husserl needs to show us how the infinite regress is itself a product of the flux of consciousness. He needs to show us why the flux of temporal experience cannot be "bracketed" for investigation like other elements of internal conscious process. In this sense, the infinite regress is helpful to Husserl because it reveals that all experience is unified by the flux.

Husserl's search for a universal structure of the experience of time leads him to talk of the unity of experience. With reference to the temporality of the appearing object, Husserl says:

> This appearing flows away with all its temporal extents and phases ... Their unity is a unity of synthesis: not merely a continuous connectedness of cog-

> itations[7] (as it were, a being stuck to one another externally), but a *connectedness that makes the unity of one consciousness*, in which the unity of an intentional objectivity, as 'the same' objectivity/belonging to multiple modes of appearance, becomes '*constituted*'.[8]

He then states that there is a certain *objective sense* in which this appearing to consciousness takes place:

> This being-in-consciousness is a *being-in of a completely unique kind*: not a being-in-consciousness as a really intrinsic component part, but rather a being-in-it 'ideally' as something *intentional*[9], something appearing — or, equivalently stated, a being-in-it as its immanent '*objective sense*'.[10]

It is not difficult to grant Husserl a certain universal structure of the consciousness of time: If we have learned anything from Kant on the subject of time, it is that the appearance of any object is conditioned by the universal structures of intuition.[11] It remains for Husserl to show us, through experience, how we are pointed towards a universal structure of time. He undertakes this task in *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* and it is to this text that we now turn our attention.

Husserl's major contribution to the problematic of time is in his distinction between primal retention/protention and memory/anticipation. Retention and protention for Husserl are something like immediate memory and anticipation. It is through primal retention and protention that something like a melody can be experienced as a unity. Without an immediate memory of the following tones and immediate anticipation of the tones to come, the experience of a melody would not be the experience of a whole, but rather, of a single new tone at each instant. A melody has the character of unity with itself, and is distinguished from a melody to follow by the respective unities of the melodies themselves. In the flux of conscious experience an 'all at once' of the melody is established through this unity of tones; that is, the melodic 'now' is formed by a group of primal sensations which, through the unity of retention of the past tones and the anticipation of future tones, are unified together to form a melody made up of a series of tonal instants. The primal sensations themselves are not simultaneous. Rather, they form a unified experience that is constituted as the all at once. The primal sensations form no unity on their own and it is for this reason that "We can no longer speak of a time of the final constitutive consciousness."[12] We cannot distinguish between primal sensations based solely on the time of their occurrence because primal sensations are only ever experienced in the context of retentions of the past and anticipations of the future. As a result, the time of occurrence of any primal sensation can only be abstractly estimated and not objectively established:

> In a group of primal sensations, one is distinguished from the other through the content. Only the now is the same. According to its form, consciousness as consciousness of primal sensation is identical.[13]

But is it enough to simply point out the role that time must play in the formation of an object like a melody? We have seen that any process (including the process of approaching internal time) must be unified by universal time. Consequently, Husserl needs to establish the self-appearance of the flux constituted in itself; that is, Husserl must establish the constitution of the melody as well as the fact that a melody appears *qua* unity of primal sensations within a context of other experiences of unified primal sensation. This move is made by exposing the role of retention in both the unity of a melodic 'now' and the element that is constitutive of that unity. For it is not only that retention is needed to constitute the unity of the melody. Rather, the melody *as a whole* must be retained when the melody passes in order for it to enter into the modification of the primal sensations to follow:

> If we now let the flux flow away, we then have the flux-continuum as running-off, which allows the continuity just described to be retentionally modified, and thereby every new continuity of phases momentarily existing all-at-once is retention with a reference to the total continuity of what is all-at-once in the preceding phase.[14]

There is a sort of unity of the flux through the phenomenon of retention that conditions and modifies the proceeding phase. There are two intentionalities of the same composition, one which unifies primal sensations into phases of the flux and the other within which the phases of the flux occur; this is what Husserl calls "double intentionality". First, we can take an intentional stance towards a unified now like a melody or to the total flux within which the unity is constituted. Second, we can concentrate on the context of experience within which the constituted unity appears. But the question remains: what allows us to talk about a constitutive flux at all?

The unity of a tone could be conceptualized in the following fashion[15]: a, b and c are separate primal sensations respectively, a.1, a.2 and b.1 are retentions of the primal sensations of a and b. This diagram makes clear that through its connection with a.1, b cannot have the same entry point of primal sensation that a did. Likewise, the entry point of c undergoes a retentional modification through a.2 and b.1. The entry point of each primal sensation is therefore modified by all that have come before it. The effect is that when a person hears a melody, the melody can form a unity through the action of retention and protention. A melody can be sad, for example, because of the context of retentions and protentions, within which the primal sensation of the 'now' occurs. Likewise, the same primal sensation of the 'now' can take place in the context of another set of retentions and protentions to form a melody that suggests happiness.

It is here that we begin to see the constitutive flux of consciousness revealed. A retention of a primal sensation not only makes us conscious of the primal sensation itself, but also of the fact that it is a retention; that is, the primal sensation is situated in the context of the unity of the melody (established by simultaneity) and the melody is situated in the continuing alternation of intentional objects (established by succession). However, we have yet to reveal Husserl's complete answer to the problem of the self-constitution of the flux. Husserl's account of the double intentionality of retention in simultaneity and succession gives us a clue as to how it is possible to have any knowledge of the constitutive flux of consciousness when the only pointers are the primal sensations forming immanent objects which arrive and pass in flux.

Since we can look back on a complete flux as a unity (like a tonal succession) the flux of consciousness is also *constituted in consciousness as a unity*. For without the constituted unity of primal sensations in consciousness there would be no unity of the duration of something like a melody. It is said then that the flux of consciousness is constitutive of two things: 1) the immanent temporal unity of the now; and 2) the unity of the flux of consciousness itself. We see here the base of Husserl's double intentionality. We must now explain the curious fashion by which the constitutive flux is constitutive of itself.

Here too the structure of retention plays a key role:

> Accordingly, we believe that these retentions, constituted in the flux of consciousness by means of the continuity of the retentional modifications and conditions, are continuous retentions of the continuously preceding ones; they are the unity of the flux itself as a one-dimensional, quasi-temporal order.[16]

For example, when experiencing a sound, we are experiencing the unity of primal sensations, so that when we are in an attentive stance towards the sound itself we are aware of, in unity, the retentional modifications of primal sensations and the primal sensation that is at hand 'all-at-once'. But, according to Husserl, there is another stance we can take with regards to the flux of consciousness. We can pay attention to the constituted sound *qua* unity of primal sensations and flowing away with the appearance of a new unity of primal sensations. Primal sensations are not distinguishable based on time alone, but solely on content; for if we can measure the duration of a sound from a beginning point to an end point, then the primal sensation in unity immediately preceding and proceeding the unified sound must have some difference in content, since it is a primal sensation identical to all the rest. Content of primal sensation is important here because it is obvious that the content of each respective primal sensation is different. But there must be a strong enough difference in content in order for the unity of something like a melody to appear against the background of other primal

sensations. The unity must be placed in the context of a constantly flowing flux that would situate the melody in between two other temporal events, e.g., my friend was talking to me, I heard the melody and then my friend began to talk to me again.

The unity of the constantly flowing flux and the unity of things like melodies are not two separate and distinct unities in the flux of conscious experience, for Husserl says: "The self-appearance of the flux does not require a second flux, but *qua* phenomenon it is constituted in itself."[17] They are, claims Husserl, two different stances towards the same thing. It is not possible, to have one without the other — there cannot be a constant flowing sound, nor can there be a flux without any constituted unities. They are necessarily intertwined with one another. By means of these two modes of the flux of consciousness, two different things are constituted: 1) the duration of that which endures (the sound for example); and 2) the flux within which that which endures occurs, the flux of the always identical 'now' which contains no unity like that of duration, but rather, is the constitutive series of enduring unities. Each is so unmistakably assumed in the other that the self-constitution of the flux becomes a necessary conclusion, for if there is to be a flux at all then it must be constituted in these two modes of appearance.

The development of primal retention and protention as distinguished from memory and anticipation is, as we have remarked before, Husserl's major contribution to the problematic of time. If we are going to hear something like a melody then there must be some sort of unity between the individual parts of that melody as well as a context of other unities within which the melody can occur. But is this double intentionality sufficient to explain the nature of the constitutive flux? That is, does double intentionality do justice to the nature of our temporal experience? And further, does Husserl's formulation of double intentionality based on primal sensations, retention and protention, escape the Heideggerian critique we posited at the beginning of this paper?

4. Husserl's Vulgarity and the Unfolding of Temporality

In order to answer these questions we must ask ourselves whether or not the individual components of the unity of the melody that Husserl calls primal sensations (in places, primal impressions) can be thought of as the building blocks of the experience of melody. It seems that primal sensations are only abstracted out post-experientially. While it is true that we can separate the tones out of the melody and listen to them individually, these tones have a unity of experience unto themselves. Talk of something like primal sensation would suggest something like a certain threshold of consistency for the content of the primal sensation. In order for the primal sensation to be considered at all as a single whole it must be present in consciousness long enough for us to distinguish it from other primal sensations; that is, it must, in itself, form something

like a unity. If Husserl maintains that all experience is filtered through the structures of retention and protention, then the experience of primal sensations in themselves would not be possible because they would need to be unified in order to be experienced. Therefore, primal sensations must reach a certain threshold of consistency (that is, they must remain the same for long enough) in order for them to be experienced. Since they must endure, they must be unified.

Is this what Husserl means when he peaks of primal sensation? If it is the case that Husserl means nothing more then the type of primal sensation described above — that which produces the unifying force of the constitutive flux — then he is stuck with an infinite regress to the ideal point of pure primal sensation. A passage from Husserl seems to suggest that when he speaks of primal sensation he is speaking of the pure points which require no unity at all: "The 'source point' with which the 'generation' of the enduring Object begins is a primal impression [primal sensation]."[18] If the enduring object is generated by primal sensations that act as a source point then this source point cannot itself be considered an enduring object, for this would require yet another definition of the source point.

In what way then is primal sensation left in experience? Our previous mention of a threshold of consistency suggests that the experiential primal sensation would require a consistency of content over a certain amount of time, but this is very different from what Husserl speaks of. What then can this threshold of consistency of primal sensation be?

In their empirical theory of mind[19], as presented in the article "Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness of the Brain" Dennett and Kinsbourne address a similar issue. Talk of a threshold arises when speaking of something like the phi phenomenon, the temporal anomaly that provides us with the illusion of motion when two points are flashed quickly enough at a small enough visual angle. It is this phenomena that makes the viewing of a motion picture possible. If I were to flash a dot before your eyes and then flash another like it at a quick enough rate, the first dot would appear to move to the point of where the second flashed. If the dots were a different size the first dot would undergo the same movement but would grow or shrink at the same time. The colour phi phenomenon is a variation of the same experiment where the colour of the dots changes. When a dot of one colour is flashed and followed by another of different colour, (separated by 4 degrees or less), the first dot begins a path of movement towards the second and suddenly changes colour before finishing its journey.[20] Of course the actual account of this phenomenon is not at issue for us here, but merely serves as an example to show what we mean by a threshold of consistency of content. If the first coloured dot in the colour phi phenomenon lasted for a longer period of time then it would be distinguished from the second as a separate unity. But given the speed and the spatial immediacy of the two dots in the colour phi phenomena the two are blended together to create the perception of motion.

David M. Rosenthal gives an interesting and convincing account of the colour phi phenomenon in his response to Dennett and Kinsbourne's "Time and The Observer". There is, Rosenthal insists, a distinction between a mental state and the transitive consciousness of that mental state.[21] Since there is a difference between the two, that is, since a mental state is not intrinsically conscious, there is nothing about the way my mental perceptions represent a temporal succession that fixes my transitive consciousness of that state. According to Rosenthal, the appearance of a dot of a certain colour is taken as a mental event, as is a second dot of another colour. Because my transitive consciousness of mental events is distinct from the events themselves, there is no conscious representation of two dots as two dots. The conscious temporal succession of dot A moving and suddenly changing colour to constitute dot B occurs as a result of the transitive conscious state that is settled upon based on the information taken in the mental events. Mental states (as distinguished from the transitive consciousness of the mental states), according to Rosenthal's definition, do not seem to be anything at all without the transitive consciousness of them. They seem only to be determined post-experientially. So how does this relate to the problem that we see in Husserl?

It seems that the mental states of which Rosenthal are similar to Husserl's primal sensations. Indeed, the unity of primal sensations that we experience merely are our transitive consciousness. It seems that this parallel is laudable and may point us to the problem in Husserl.

We have already admitted that we can grant Husserl the appearance of a flux of consciousness inasmuch as the experience of anything at all rests on our ability to create temporal relations. However, Husserl's double intentionality (the method by which he was able to uncover the constitutive flux) is such that it rests on the existence of primal sensations. Are primal sensations anything more than the abstract component parts of the unity of the experience of something like a melody? Husserl seems to err by reducing experience to primal sensation. While his double intentionality is supposed to afford him an escape from such an error, it appears that it does quite the opposite. Husserl's double intentionality reveals how strongly empiricism is working in his thought.[22] Merleau-Ponty's critique of classical empiricism seems to apply to Husserl on this point:

> Let us imagine a white patch on a homogeneous background. All the points in the patch have a certain function in common, that of forming into a shape. The colour of the shape is more intense and as it were more resistant than that of the background; the edges of the white patch belong to it, and are not part of the background although they adjoin it: the patch appears to be placed on the background and does not break it up. Each part arouses the expectation of more than it contains, and this elementary perception is therefore already charged with a meaning ... The perceptual

> something is always in the middle of something else, it always forms part of a field. A really homogeneous area offering nothing to be cannot be given to any perception. The structure of the actual perception alone can teach us what perception is. The pure impression is, therefore, not only undiscoverable, but also imperceptible and so inconceivable as an instant of perception.[23]

Husserl attempts to break down experience into pure impressions so that the experience (or the perception) of time ends up being constituted by imperceptible and inconceivable parts. If we go back to the diagram illustrated earlier, we can now see how it does not really tell us anything about the real experience of time. While it does capture the dynamic nature of time, by showing how the past must function on the 'now'[24], it only does so by binding us to the ideal constructs of primal sensations. It is not Husserl's constitutive flux that is the problem as such, for it is true that " ... I should be incapable of perceiving any point in time without a before and an after, and that, in order to be aware of the relationship between the three terms, I must not be absorbed into any one of them: that time, in short, needs a synthesis."[25] But through the endeavour of establishing the constitutive elements of time, Husserl leads himself towards the full constitution of time rather then to a descriptive account of how time is experienced The result of Husserl's constitutive flux then is just as abstract as the primal sensations upon which he bases it. Merleau-Ponty continues:

> ... it is equally true that synthesis must always be undertaken afresh, and that any supposition that it can be anywhere brought to completion involves the negation of time ... a thetic consciousness of time which stands above it and embraces it merely destroys the phenomenon of time.[26]

So it does not seem that the constitutive flux is constitutive of any kind of synthesis at all, for it seems only to be an abstract form of synthesis of abstract building blocks. The constitutive flux is arrived at only because there is something for it to be constitutive of; the unity of primal sensations is precisely that something but it is not arrived at through experience. It is only through the endeavour to find the constitutive flux (the goal that led Husserl to primal sensations in the first place) that primal sensations are posited. It seems then that the constitutive flux cannot tell us anything new about the experience of time. Rather, it is merely the unifying force of the abstract building blocks of primal sensation. Here we can see how Husserl falls prey to the second error we identified in the thought of Plato and traced through to Augustine. By talking about primal sensations (which are impossible to experience) as the component parts of the very *experience* of the passing of time, Husserl has ceased to give us a descriptive account of what it is to *live through* time. Instead, Husserl has given us an empirical account of the abstract constitutive components of time itself.

We learn from Leibniz that because we have no experience of space or time without the objects in space or time, the abstract Newtonian space/time as an empty bucket that objects or events can be thrown into is inconceivable. Time cannot be experienced without the events that make it up. Leibniz, I think, had a more fertile theory than he was aware of, for it is here that we can see a connection to our critique of Plato, Augustine and Husserl. Fully constituting time (in the circles of the Different and the Same in Plato, the triple present in Augustine, and the constitutive flux based on primal sensation in Husserl), creates a Newtonian bucket that is unthinkable, and certainly impossible to experience, without the events — melodies for example — that make up the existence of that bucket. Because of the fatal fault of abstraction and the attempt to capture time *qua* whole, Husserl's theory of time ends up being less of a description of the experience of time than an abstract construction of temporal experience. Now the Heideggerian critique that we posited at the outset becomes more clear in its application to Husserl. It is not that Husserl's account of time-consciousness cuts primal sensation off from the relations of before and after; in fact it is here that he constitutes these relations. The problem is that he also reduces time to primal sensations that are not distinguishable in experience. In this sense, Husserl has posited a pure succession that is open to the Heideggerian critique, and it is in this sense that Husserl remains "vulgar".

Notes

[1] Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. Trans. Joan Stambaugh.. NY: SUNY Press, 1996, 387.
[2] Augustine. "The Confessions". Eds. Arthur Hyman & James J. Walsh. *Philosophy in the Middle Ages*. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., 1973, 85. This quote from Augustine refers to the book of Joshua where time was ordered to stand still so that victory in battle could be achieved.
[3] If Augustine claims that the motion of human bodies engaged in battle can constitute the passing of time, then we can also be safe to posit the fact that Augustine saw the motion of any temporal body as a suitable measure of the passing of time.
[4] This argument was formulated from Chapters 15-16 in: Augustine, "The Confessions," 80-81.
[5] Husserl, Edmund. *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*. Ed. Martin Heidegger. Trans. James, S. Churchill. London: Indiana University Press, 1964, 21.
[6] *Ibid.*, 102.
[7] This is a bit of Husserl's vast technical terminology. A cogtatione is merely an individual cognition, an autonomous element as it were, of the constitution of the flux of experience.
[8] Husserl, Edmund. *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*. Trans. Dorion Cairns. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991, 41-42.
[9] This is another piece of Husserl's technical terminology. An intentional object is an object like any other, but in phenomenology, to be in an intentional stance towards an object signifies the subject's participation in the creation of the object. Hence, in this quote the word "intentional" signifies the fact that time appears as something created by the subject.
[10] *Ibid.*, 42.
[11] I refer here, of course, to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, specifically the "Transcendental Aesthetic", where the nature of sensation and intuition is revealed.
[12] Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 104.
[13] *Ibid.*, 103.
[14] *Ibid.*, 107.
[15] Merleau-Ponty, M. *Phenomenology of Perception*. Trans. Colin Smith. London: Routledge, 1962, 417. A similar diagram is cited here from Husserl (Zeitbewusstsein, p. 22). Merleau-Ponty notes quite rightly that the diagram should properly be mirrored on the other side in order to represent protentions.
[16] Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 108.
[17] *Ibid.*, 109.
[18] *Ibid.*, 50.
[19] I refer here to their Multiple Drafts Theory, which is a refusal of what they call the Cartesian Theatre stance. This paper is not the platform for a discussion of the Multiple Drafts Theory, it is enough to say here that it refuses the central processor model of the brain in favour of a theory of mind that does not posit some one place in the brain where consciousness "happens".

[20] Taken from an account of the phenomenon in: Dennett, Daniel & Kinsbourne, M. "Time and the Observer: The Where and the When of Consciousness in the Brain." *Behavioural and Brain Sciences*. vol. 15:2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 186.
[21] The transitive consciousness of a mental state is, for Rosenthal, what is actually experienced by the subject. The experimenter knows that there are actually two dots of different colors flashed before the subject's eyes, but the subject has a "transitive consciousness" of the dot moving from one position to another. In effect, transitive consciousness is merely the conscious state settled upon by the brain when two experiences are too temporally and/or spatially immediate to be distinguished on their own. For more on Rosenthal's distinction please see: Rosenthal, D. "Time and Consciousness," *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 220.
[22] This mention of empiricism in Husserl's thought requires some qualification. Husserl's indebtedness to Augustine's triple present is via Brentano. It was Brentano who first used the Augustinian conception to arrive at the unity of a "now" based on retention/protention structures of primal sensations (primordial associations in Brentano's language). Husserl, in his turn, critiques Brentano of much the same thing that we are accusing Husserl of: of reducing experience to mere primary content.
[23] Merleau-Ponty, M. *Phenomenology of Perception*, 4.
[24] And indeed the future too, as Merleau-Ponty points out, for our diagram is not complete without the mirrored image on the other side of c.
[25] Merleau-Ponty, M. *Phenomenology of Perception*, 415.
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Drag's Subversive Potential: Performativity and the Possibility of Resistance

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With respect to gender and sexuality, there are narratives and 'ways of being' that are perceived as the 'right' kinds of stories and ways of existing, which are in turn oppressive for those who fail to live up to them. What can be done to alter this state of affairs? How can change be brought about in areas of perceived social injustice? In this essay I will argue that we do indeed have the resources for subverting the dominant heterosexual norms that structure our lives as men and women in western society. To this end, I believe it is important to have a theoretical framework through which we can make sense of our gendered lives. The framework that I will examine and elaborate upon is that offered by Judith Butler, specifically her notion of performativity. I am primarily concerned with answering two questions. The first is: What exactly is performativity? I will focus on two issues in my explication of Butler's account of this notion: a) The relation of the 'actor' to the performance, and b) How it is, given that gender can be conceived and performed in different ways, that certain performances come to be construed as 'natural'. My second, and more important, question is: Given a willingness to accept Butler's account of the performative, what possibilities for subversion will be available to us? Butler addresses the idea of subversion, but not in an adequate manner. Thus, I will add some arguments of my own by focusing on the practice of drag. Some would argue that drag is the kind of practice that inherently challenges traditional gender roles; Jack Babuscio, in his essay on camp and the gay sensibility, says, "camp is subversive of commonly received standards: it challenges the status quo."[1] There are others, however, who would deny this resistant function to camp (and thus to drag as one of its specific incarnations).

Butler's performative account of gender is, I believe, an especially powerful tool for understanding our gendered lives. With this understanding comes a particular way of conceptualizing resistance to oppressive norms, one that is played out in the example of drag. I will argue for an understanding of drag as a subversive practice. This is

not to say that every drag performance is subversive, but that it offers that possibility. This will involve both a direct engagement with the critics of this position and an elaboration of the context and conditions necessary for a subversive performance to take place.

1. Gender as Performative

It will be useful to sketch out the view that Butler is looking to replace when she offers a performative account of subject formation. Her object of critique might be called essentialist narratives of gender construction. On these accounts there is something, an essence, which determines our gendered existences. A biological essentialism would go something like this: there is a biological fact of male and female sexed bodies; gender is such that it is caused by the sex of the body. Thus, male sexed bodies will produce masculine genders, while female sexed bodies will produce feminine genders. A supporter of this kind of story might even want to go further and use genetics as the starting point of their causal chain. XX and XY chromosomes, they might assert, are the reason we have differently sexed bodies and are differently gendered individuals. Butler directly refutes this form of determinism. She goes as far as to suggest that we should not simply assume that sex is a pre-social, pre-linguistic fact about individuals.[2] Thus, it may be the case that it is not only gender that is constructed socially, but sex as well. The existence of intersexed individuals might be seen as a possible counterexample to the hegemonic belief in the 'natural' dichotomy of male and female sexed bodies.

Butler asks us to "Consider gender… as a corporeal style, an 'act,' as it were, which is both intentional and performative, where 'performative' suggests a dramatic and contingent construction of meaning."[3] Instead of understanding gender as determined, by biology for example, we are to see it as a contingent construction; indeed, she might even have us understand biology itself as something contingent and constructed. It is not the case that XX chromosomes necessarily entail a feminine gender. For Butler, gender formation is contingent. Furthermore, she asks us to entertain the possibility that gender (what it means to be a man, or a woman) is something that is constituted by an act, or a performance. Thus, for example, women have certain norms of dress and conduct that must be performed in order to be read as a 'real' or 'authentic' subject. The woman whose performance goes against compulsory norms will be seen as inauthentic; those with whom she interacts will show resistance and confusion when forced to make sense of her. This is evident in our reading of some women as 'butch'; in other words, they are more like men and less like 'real' women. Butler also uses the word "intentional" when referring to gender in this quote, which raises the question of agency. If gender is something that is performed, what is the role of the performer's wishes and intentions?

Butler is quite explicit that her theory is not a kind of voluntarism, though she has been misread in exactly this way. On a voluntarist account we have radical freedom in the choices we make. Gender, accordingly, will be a performance over which we can have absolute control. Thus, when I wake up in the morning, according to the voluntarist, I can decide which gender I will be that day and perform accordingly. This is not what Butler has in mind when she speaks of gender performativity. In her essay, "Critically Queer," she makes the following claim: "Femininity is thus not the product of a choice, but the forcible citation of a norm, one whose complex historicity is indissociable from relations of discipline, regulation, punishment."[4] One does not choose to become a certain gender. But rather, from the time of the foundational interpellation, "It's a boy," or "It's a girl," the individual is compelled into a particular performance. This performance will be intimately tied with dominant narratives about gender and the positive and negative apparatuses of reinforcement that accompany them.

In addition to this institutional factor, there is also an account of the subject behind Butler's rejection of voluntarism. This is expressed in another essay, "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution," where she says: "The act that one does, the act that one performs, is, in a sense, an act that has been going on before one arrived on the scene… Actors are always already on the stage, within the terms of the performance."[5] The voluntarist framework seems to assume that a subject exists prior to the acquisition of a gender and thus, that this subject is free to choose the gender that will be performed. Butler holds, on the contrary, that the subject is created in the performance, as its effect. And furthermore, she believes that this performance has a particular history that shapes its enactment. The terms under which it is possible to perform as a woman, for example, are already determined historically. When a new "actor" arrives there will already be a script, so to speak, in use. We cannot sit back passively as the "production" goes on; we cannot step outside of our gendered existences and join in as it suits us. Instead, we find ourselves already a part of this "production," in a field of action that we did not create. Thus, the performances we participate in, rather than being chosen by some pre-performative subject, will instead constitute those very subjects. The word participate is perhaps the wrong one to use, because there is nothing optional about our participation. From the moment of birth, when we first "step on to the stage," we are forced into a performance that has a particular historicity. The "I" does not choose to perform; rather, the "I" is retroactively constituted as an effect of the performance.[6] Why is it the case, given the adoption of this notion of performativity, that certain ways of being in our social lives come to be understood as the 'right' kind of performance? Why is it that there is a right way and a wrong way to be a man or a woman?

The main mechanisms of naturalization, for Butler, are repetition and citation. In her discussion of the latter, Butler invokes the image of the judge who acts in the name

of the law: "Hence, the judge who authorizes and installs the situation he names... invariably *cites* the law that he applies, and it is the power of this citation that gives the performative its binding or conferring power."[7] It is not the case that the law, on this account, has a power in and of itself, which the judge simply invokes. Rather, it is the judge who creates the power of the law through his citation, indeed, "it is through the invocation of convention that the speech act of the judge derives its binding power; that binding power is to be found... in the citational legacy by which a contemporary 'act' emerges in the context of a chain of binding conventions."[8] Again, we see that there is no sense in which the law has any absolute power. It is through convention, and the power of a "citational legacy," that the injunction of the law gains its force.

This notion of convention moves us to the idea of repetition. Convention seems to involve the idea that "this is something we do, perhaps something we have always done." It is in, and through, the repetition or citation that the performative gains its force, that it comes to be seen as conventional. Butler claims, "If a performative provisionally succeeds [it is because] that action echoes a prior action, and accumulates the force of authority through the repetition or citation of a prior, authoritative set of practices."[9] It is through a process of repetition and citation that the performatives involved in heterosexuality will gain authority and present that position as the 'real'. Likewise with the conventions of masculine and feminine behavior: 'Authentic' men and women will repeat the performatives that reinforce a particular "chain of binding conventions," while those who are 'inauthentic' will fail to cite, or to repeat, in the appropriate manner. Butler also uses the notion of sedimentation to convey this idea; "From a feminist point of view, one might try to reconceive the gendered body as the legacy of sedimented acts rather than a predetermined or foreclosed structure, essence or fact, whether natural, cultural, or linguistic."[10] It is a particular repetition in history and time that causes certain performances to become "sedimented"; they become the types of performances that are enacted by 'true' subjects.

2. Resistant Repetition

What does Butler have to say about subversion and resistance in the face of what many might perceive as oppressive kinds of performativities? On the face of the discussion thus far, it might seem that Butler is foreclosing resistance by asserting that it is the performance that constitutes the subject, and not the other way around. One might worry that what Butler has given us is an account of how our identities are over-determined by the social practices in which we participate, thereby excluding the possibility of a transformative agency. There is a sense in which Butler has told a story of subject determination. Some might claim that due to institutional, historical, and linguistic circumstances, we are destined to become certain kinds of subjects. I would not deny this nor, do I think, would Butler. But this is not to say that a particular determination of the subject is necessary or immutable; it is not an absolute over-determination. There is still a very real role for agency to play within the framework that Butler supplies.

Butler locates the possibility of agency within the performative and its repetition. Even though individuals are, to some extent, determined by their performances, she does not believe that a performative can strictly over-determine our identities. As such the possibility of subversion is found in the necessity of repetition:

> The subject is not determined by the rules through which it is generated because signification is not a founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition that both conceals itself and enforces its rules precisely through the production of substantializing effects.[11]

The rules of signification, or, in other words, the rules of our performances, are not totalizing in nature, they do not completely and fully seal the individual. Instead, Butler sees them as "regulated processes of repetition" that attempt to conceal their contingent nature and instantiate themselves as the 'real'. Thus, agency "is to be located within the possibility of a variation on that repetition."[12] We are not radically free to construct our identities as we see fit because we are compelled into a particular performance at the moment of birth. This performance, however, is a "regulated process" that attempts to compel each individual into a repetition of acts that reinforce dominant discourses and cultural forms. Our agency, then, is to be found in the possibility of repeating differently, of acting in discord with hegemonic norms. Indeed, Butler claims, "it is only *within* the practices of repetitive signifying that a subversion of identity becomes possible."[13] We cannot step out of our identities, or performances, in order to subvert what are perceived as oppressive norms of repetition; it can only be done from within.

In her book, *The Psychic Life of Power*, Butler articulates a slightly different notion of resistance, but one that still unfolds along the same lines as the view presented above. On this account the terms that are used to name particular identities become the sites of resistance. This is possible because of a gap between uses of a term, and the fact that no one user can be said to properly own a term. This gap is a temporal one and points to the fact that the words we use have a particular history. Definitions and references will not be static, but will alter over time. A word that had a particular use a hundred years ago may have a completely different function today. The notion that no one can own a particular term highlights the fact that language is 'public property', so to speak. Words, when used for a particular purpose, are put into a social realm where they can be picked up and used by others; no one person, or group, is capable of permanently laying claim to a term and dictating what meaning it will have. I am thinking here of the more general, social use of particular terms, words like 'gay' and

'queer'.

In a discussion of Nietzsche, Butler says, "This temporal gap between usages produces the possibility of a reversal of signification, but also opens the way for an inauguration of signifying possibilities that exceed those to which the term has previously been bound."[14] The example of how the term 'queer' has been used illustrates Butler's point. In its inaugural uses this term had a derogatory and punitive function. It was used as a tool to mark and bring shame to those who were perceived to exist outside the status quo; in other words, anybody who failed to embody the norms of a compulsory heterosexuality. Over time, however, that term came to be re-appropriated by the very subjects that it named. Now the term 'queer' is used in a much more positive manner, though its old use can certainly resurface.

The user and the context seem to be very important in determining the meaning a term will come to acquire. Butler calls this process of sign transformation, using one of Foucault's terms, "reverse discourse:" "The term which not only names, but forms and frames the subject... mobilizes a reverse discourse against the very regime of normalization by which it is spawned."[15] Thus a term like 'queer', or 'faggot', can be used to call a particular subject into existence, on the one hand, but on the other, through a process of reverse discourse, that same term can be re-appropriated by those subjects, and thus come to have a new meaning that fights against the use for which it was originally intended.

On both of these accounts, re-signification claims an important role in the possibility of resistance to oppressive norms. On the first account, our agency is expressed in the possibility of performing differently. In the spaces between repetitions, the possibility exists for the subject to re-signify, or to repeat in a different manner. Likewise, on the second account, we find the possibility of subversion in the re-appropriation of the terms that are used to name subjects. Again, it is the gaps between uses where the possibility of re-signification appears. In a sense — *contra* Audre Lorde's famous assertion — we can use the master's own tools against him.[16] We can use the structures that facilitate oppression and exclusion to enable a reverse discourse. Instead of allowing repetition to conceal the contingent nature of gender and sexuality performances, we can repeat in such a fashion as to highlight that very contingency. In the same vein, we can use terms of shame and negativity in a new way, so that the negative use is resisted. This account of resistance, as subversive repetition and re-signification, raises an important objection.

Butler's position on resistance and subversion may appear simply to reintroduce voluntarism in another guise. It seems as though one can choose to subvert norms by performing one's gender differently and using certain terms in new ways. If I put on a dress and call myself queer, will I automatically be resisting oppressive norms in my society? This is certainly not the case. Resistance is a much more complicated matter, not something that can be enacted through the will of a single individual. As Naomi Scheman, invoking Wittgenstein, points out, "meaning cannot be a private matter: A word means what it does not because I have joined it in my mind to an idea or an image... but because there exists a set of social practices in which I participate, in terms of which I can get the meaning right or wrong."[17] Thus, issues such as context, community, and intersubjectivity are important in determining the subversive possibilities of a particular performance or the re-appropriation of a term. All of these issues, and the larger one of subversion, can be best understood through a discussion of drag.

3. The Drag Problem

It is obvious that we should be cautious in naming certain kinds of performances as subversive. Butler herself notes that the "failure to approximate the norm...is not the same as the subversion of the norm."[18] Not every failure to repeat the norm faithfully should be understood as somehow resisting that norm. The example of drag highlights this point well. From a political point of view there are two main ways to characterize this practice. The first sees drag as a politically progressive action that calls oppressive norms into question, while the second reading, usually done from a feminist perspective, presents drag as conservative. On this account, drag reinforces oppressive stereotypes of the feminine, and does so with a hateful attitude towards women. I will critically examine these positions at greater length, drawing on particular supporters of each.

Some might want to hold that the performance of drag is an obvious example of a subversive performance. Gender norms in our society dictate that male sexed bodies must perform a masculine gender, while female sexed bodies must perform a feminine gender. The drag performer will defy this norm and enact that gender which they are forbidden to embody. A man in drag will present himself as a woman, while the woman will become a man. They have repeated differently, therefore, subversively. As Erika Munk puts it in her essay, "Drag: 1. Men", "theatrical drag [is] liberating because it reveals the artificiality of sexual roles, the arbitrary quality of those gestures, attitudes, costumes, forms of language, and psychological stances which we usually place as either male or female."[19] Drag is seen as a way to "imagine other possibilities, other ways to play our roles or to smash them."[20]

Butler provides a similar reading of drag, but one that offers greater complexity. She believes that the performance of drag points to the fact that the enactment of any gender is exactly that, namely, a performance. In other words, there is a sense in which all gender performances are drag performances: "Drag constitutes the mundane way in which genders are appropriated, theatricalized, worn, and done; it implies that all gendering is a kind of impersonation and approximation."[21] Drag highlights the socially constructed nature of gender by making a spectacle of particular gender styles; it exposes dominant cultural norms as illusory, as not in any way essential or natural.

Obviously, these norms structure our lives in very real and significant ways, but they are in no way necessary or unchangeable: "parodic proliferation deprives hegemonic culture and its critics of the claim to naturalized or essentialist gender identities."[22] The practice of drag might be understood as one of the forms that this "parodic proliferation" could take, but it is not intended to be *the* form. Butler explicitly states that it "would be a mistake to take [drag] as the paradigm of subversive action."[23] Drag, on her account, is intended to suggest new possibilities for gendered existence. It is not simply that boys can be girls, and girls can be boys; this presupposes that there are 'real' boys and girls who can perform what they are not. Butler invokes drag as a means to prompt the "occasion in which we come to understand that what we take to be 'real', what we invoke as the naturalized knowledge of gender is, in fact, a changeable and revisable reality."[24] New options are to be suggested and explored. Drag is a 'making fun of' that in the end serves a specific political goal, namely, that of denying the status of the hegemonic, heterosexual norms, and opening the door for new possibilities. On this account, drag seems to be an important tool for resistance and subversion.

Babuscio is another theorist of camp who shares a view comparable, though slightly less sophisticated, to that of Butler: "Camp, by focusing on the outward appearances of role, implies that roles, and, in particular, sex roles, are superficial — a matter of style. Indeed, life itself is role and theatre, appearance and impersonation."[25] Gender might be a "matter of style," but, following Butler, it is not a style over which one can have absolute control. The "role" as well, is already, to a certain extent, determined for the performer. In general, however, Babuscio, like Butler, sees drag as a practice that highlights the performative character of all gender. Babuscio also believes that camp has subversive potential; it is "a means of illustrating those cultural ambiguities and contradictions that oppress us all, gay and non-gay, and, in particular, women."[26] Here he advocates a plurality of subversive uses; it is not the case that drag is only useful for gay men, but for everybody, including women and those who identify themselves as straight. Babuscio argues, and I agree, that drag has the potential to free us all from the rigid confines of the two-gender/sex system that prevails in our cultural consciousness. It can force us to think in novel ways.

The majority of the criticism directed at this way of understanding drag has come from a radical feminist perspective. This critic claims that in their performance the person in drag has actually reinforced, or repeated, oppressive gender norms. In her essay, "Boys Will Be Girls: The Politics of Gay Drag", Carole-Anne Tyler characterizes this criticism in the following way: "For many feminists, the gay man in drag is just another example of the gynephobic/misogynist representations of woman which predominate in our culture."[27] They will point out the drag queen's high heels, his fancy dress, long nails, and make up, and then claim that this performance has simply reiterated all of the factors that create a 'real' woman in our society, without calling them into question. Two instances of this criticism are found in the work of Janice Raymond and Marilyn Frye.

In the introduction to the 1994 edition of her book, *The Transsexual Empire*, Raymond explicitly deals with the issue of drag. She subsumes drag under the term 'transgender', which she claims applies to all those individuals "who exhibit any kind of dress and/or behavior interpreted as 'transgressing' gender roles."[28] She goes on to claim, assuming that most 'transgenderists' are men, that "rather than transcending...gender roles" most simply "seek to combine aspects of traditional femininity with aspects of traditional masculinity."[29] Raymond then invokes RuPaul as the image of the drag queen, primarily in an attempt to deny the claim that this individual is a 'de facto social activist' simply in virtue of being a man in woman's clothing. She points out that RuPaul's performance involves an appropriation of miniskirts, blond wigs, and platform heels, which leads her to lament the fact that in this performance, RuPaul "looks and acts so much like the woman of man-made femininity."[30] Ultimately, Raymond's critique comes down to an asymmetry of power. Men can 'put on' femininity and 'gender bend' for a moment, but they can also take it off and continue to participate in the privilege that living in a patriarchal society offers them. Women, on the other hand, have no such option. Dressing up as men will not grant them access to male privilege, it will simply allow another avenue of oppression from those who will perceive them as 'butches' or 'lesbians'. Raymond says, "That some men may find gender relief, sexual pleasure, and/or stardom and financial profit in this mimicry does nothing to challenge the political power of the normative, dominant, powerful class of men that the male gender bender still belongs to."[31] Thus, Raymond denies that drag offers a real possibility for the resistance of dominant gender norms.

Frye offers a similar criticism of drag, but from a slightly different point of view. Discussing the relationship between lesbian feminism and gay rights, in her book *The Politics of Reality*, Frye questions the belief that the woman's movement and the gay men's movement have much in common. She does not believe that there is a necessary affinity between feminists and gay men, as some hold; in fact, she argues for a position that sees gay men and their political goals as commensurate with a patriarchal, phallocentric social arrangement. Frye believes that drag is one expression of contempt for women; it is a principle that reinforces the oppressive state of affairs with which women are confronted. Instead of understanding drag as a way to expose oppressive norms, Frye thinks that the "donning of feminine apparel displays no love or identification with women or the womanly."[32] She continues her criticism by saying: "It is a casual and cynical mockery of women, for whom femininity is the trappings of oppression... It is a naughtiness indulged in, I suspect, more by those who believe in their immunity to contamination than by those with any doubts or fears."[33] Parallels can be seen here with Raymond's argument. Drag is just a form of play by a social group, namely men, who have nothing to lose. It is a little risky and dangerous, but at the first sign of trouble these "cocky lads" (Frye's words) can simply take off the women's

clothes and resume their lives as 'real' men with all of the privilege that that entails.

What is interesting about Frye's position, as compared to Raymond's, is that on the very next page she seems to go on and acknowledge the subversive possibilities of drag. In a bracketed paragraph, she says:

> There is a gentler politic which lies behind some gay men's affectation of the feminine. It can be a kind of fun which involves mockery not of women or of straight men but of the whole institution of gender — a deliberately irreverent fooling around with one of the most sacred foolishnesses of phallocratic culture.[34]

It appears as though, within Frye's argument, we have found both Butler and Raymond. On the one hand, she sees drag as the expression of a conservative, woman-hating patriarchal principle, but on the other hand, she acknowledges that drag can bring the whole institution of gender into question. What are we to make of this apparent contradiction? I think it points in the direction of making a distinction between particular instances of drag, and the concept of drag itself. Frye seems to think, as I believe Butler does, and I agree with both, that although not every instance of drag constitutes a subversive gender performance, it still nonetheless offers the possibility of that subversion.

Although Raymond only deals with the male who performs in drag, and Frye only mentions the gay man in her discussion, I think it is wrong to assume that only men, especially only gay men, participate in drag performances. The fact that there are also drag king performances highlights this fact. Women also perform as men, and I am sure that not all of these women are necessarily lesbians. This said, I do not wish to conflate the practices of male and female drag (there are important similarities and disjunctions between the two), nor do I seek to deny the historical connection that drag performances have with gay and lesbian communities. I simply wish to point out that drag is not necessarily connected only with homosexual men.

My response to critics like Raymond and Frye's (in her more skeptical moments), would be to say that drag is still a performance that inherently re-signifies in its enactment. Men are performing as women, and women as men. These performances highlight the contingent nature of the performatives that we are involved in. It need not be the case that male sexed bodies conform to masculine norms of dress and behavior; that norm is contingent. If the performance of femininity by the drag queen does involve a reiteration of stereotypical feminine traits, then I am tempted to believe that this is because we have not progressed far enough in the production of new signs, norms, and narratives, as far as gender performances are concerned. The historical progression of the meaning and use of a particular term or practice may not have evolved enough for radically different possibilities to have been imagined or enacted. It is in

virtue of a particular historical situation that the male drag performer finds "himself in a cultural context which offers him the duality masculine/feminine to box himself into."[35] The signs available for the performance of femininity are historically entrenched, and these are what the drag performer has at his disposal. This is not to say that this must remain a static situation; the drag performance might be understood as opening "the way for an inauguration of signifying possibilities that exceed those to which the term has been previously bound,"[36] where the "term" can be understood as the performance of the feminine. Thus, through the process of re-signification, in time, the terms that we use, or the performances we enact, will acquire new meanings and functions. Even if drag does not always subvert dominant norms, I think we must still understand it as the type of re-signifying practice that will be essential for this resistance. As Munk says about the conservative enactment of drag in mid-eighties New York theater, "It doesn't have to be so — the radical possibilities remain — but it is."[37] However, even after acknowledging the possibilities inherent in the practice of drag, we are still left with the problem of determining whether or not subversion has taken place in a particular situation: What will be the ground for a drag that resists and subverts dominant, oppressive norms? This leads us back to questions of intersubjectivity and community alluded to earlier.

4. Drag's Possibilities

Tyler reiterates Butler's worries about the subversion of norms, in a drag specific context, when she says, "Sometimes, however, one is ironic without having intended it, and sometimes, despite one's best intentions, no one gets the joke."[38] It appears we have the problem of perhaps not resisting when we explicitly intend to, and doing exactly that when we have no such intentions. I think by examining a number of examples we can come to appreciate the contextual, and intersubjective, character of the possibilities of resistance that drag offers to those who wish to use it.

Recall that Butler and Babuscio both argue that drag makes the performative nature of all gender explicit. Given this, we seem to be confronted with a problem. If drag and the everyday performing of genders are essentially the same, then how will we distinguish a subversive performance, one that seeks to unmask the performative in all gender styles, from a performance that is a reiteration of a norm? Tyler addresses this problem: "What makes the one credible and the other incredible when both are fictions? The answer, it seems, are the author's intentions: parody is legible in the drama of gender performance if someone meant to script it, intending it to be there."[39] While I think the "author's" intentions will play a role in subversive performances, those intentions should not be regarded as the most important determinate. Consider the radically self-making "genderfucker," to use June Reich's term.[40]

Imagine an individual who decides that they want to challenge hegemonic gender

norms. Let's say that this is a male sexed person who has until now presented himself as masculine with all of the dress, mannerisms and style that this requires. After reading some Butler, or Babuscio, this person decides they want to work at changing the status quo, so they put on a feminine style, intending to go out into the world and show everybody the contingent nature of gender construction. Now, there are a number of possible consequences to this person's action. They might go out into the world and effectively 'pass' for a woman; nobody will read this subject as a man in women's clothing. In this case, no subversion will have taken place because this performance has been read as being a standard feminine one. No one's dichotomous conceptualization of gender has been challenged. A second possibility is that this person will in fact be read, by those he interacts with, as a man in women's clothing. We can imagine the reaction to this as being something as small as a sideways glance, to something as serious as assault, or even murder (one need only remember the fate of Brandon Teena). I think it is reasonable to assume that in the general population such a radical gender performance will not be received as a critique of oppressive norms; rather, I think it will set those norms into action, causing a backlash of social sanction and damnation. It is important to note, however, that I do not believe the outcome of such a reaction must be necessarily negative or inconsequential. An act of violence, directed at the individual who performs their gender out of line with dominant norms, can have a positive political outcome. Coverage in the media, for example, might lead to a heightened awareness of the situation in the mind of the general public, thereby increasing support for those who are subjected to this hostility. An action that is performed with conservative intent, which is done to punish a gender transgression, can fail to achieve its goal. In a similar fashion to linguistic re-signification, somewhat analogous to what has happened with the term 'queer', an act of violence can become the catalyst for a more positive political organization.

These possible outcomes gesture towards two points that we should keep in mind. First, the actor's intentions will not be enough for resistance. One could have all the subversive will in the world and still fail when going out into a particular situation of social interaction; there is the possibility that no one will get the "joke." Secondly, the audience will be an essential component for any performance. Without the right kind of audience, intentions could fall on deaf ears and a potentially dangerous backlash could be directed toward the performing agent.

Before moving on to a discussion of the type of audience that will be conducive to subversive political goals, I would like to discuss another incarnation of drag that fails to challenge the status quo. It is important not to discount the criticisms of drag that we see in Raymond and Frye, especially when one considers two contemporary forms of men dressing in women's clothing. I am thinking here of the bachelor party and the fraternity initiation. In both cases, when this particular ritual is invoked, either the groom to be, or the initiate, is dressed in women's clothing. I would argue that neither of these is a subversive way of performing. In fact, I think both of these cases are tailor-made to fall into the woman-hating objection that Frye raises against drag. Rather then using a disjunctive gender performance to throw gender itself into question, with the bachelor party, for example, the women's clothing is used as a way to punish and shame the man who is "betraying" his fellow men; it is perhaps a kind of symbolic castration, to put it in psychoanalytic terms. This is surely a case of laughing *at*, and not *with* the object of mockery. As Babuscio says, "Though camp mocks the solemnities of our culture, it never totally discards the seriousness of a thing or individual. [Quoting a Christopher Isherwood novel]: 'You can't camp about something if you don't take it seriously; you're not making fun *of* it; you're making fun *out* of it…'"[41] Thus, the drag of the bachelor party violates this principle of camp. It fails to take the feminine seriously and, in doing so, makes fun of it in a rather malicious, woman-hating fashion. Drag is certainly being used for conservative ends on this account. It seems to be saying, in a highly pejorative voice, "you had better be careful, or else you will cease to be a man and reemerge as a woman." This performance is not calling anything into question; rather, it is policing the borders of oppressive norms.

It would appear as though the right kind of audience is needed in order for a particular gender performance to be read in a resistant fashion. What kind of audience is this? One of the most important traits its members need to posses, I believe, is an awareness of gender issues in a more or less conscious way. This could be one reason that theatrical drag performances have been embraced predominantly by the gay and lesbian community. A kind of epistemological point is being made here, based on the standpoint of the audience. Due to the fact that the members of the gay and lesbian community are marginalized in relation to the dominant heterosexual norm, they occupy a privileged position for observing the ways that gender and sexuality are constructed and policed. If one has never been the object of a homophobic reaction, then presumably one is not in a position to appreciate the importance that one's sexual orientation has for social interaction. It is important to note that a great deal of complexity surrounds these various claims. For instance, it is neither entirely clear what it would mean to occupy the standpoint that would grant access to this knowledge, nor is it clear who exactly is a member of the gay and lesbian community. It would certainly prove difficult to find a common thread that ran through all the experiences of those who identify themselves as either gay or lesbian, thereby making it equally difficult to define the particular epistemological position that they might occupy. If the experience of homophobia is a condition for realizing the importance of gender in social existence, then, it might be argued, that the fraternity initiate or the groom-to-be will also have access to this understanding. In these particular rites of passage, both individuals experience the homophobic, women-hating reactions of their peers. Will these experiences promote a certain standpoint dependent realization? It is entirely possible, but I do not think it is as likely as it would be in a genuine instance of homo-

phobia. On the one hand, the frat boy and the groom, analogously to Frye's "cocky lads," can be comforted in the fact that they will be able to remove the costume in the end; they can go on being real men. On the other hand, the gay man who experiences true fear, as he is harassed on the street, will have no such recourse; his experience of homophobia is qualitatively distinct. The product of this event is a very different knowledge of the importance of conforming to accepted gender performances. It is this more acute awareness of oppressive norms, by a particular audience, which can lend itself to an appreciation of the new possibilities that drag performances point toward.

Consider Judith Halberstam's interpretation of a drag king performance at "New York's premier Drag King club, Club Casanova."[42] Halberstam identifies herself as a 'trans-butch', who takes her "masculinity very seriously and [finds] it nourished and cultivated by immersions in these queer arenas of Drag King theater."[43] The performances she examines involve an interpretation of Elvis at three different stages in his career. After discussing the specifics of the show, she steps back to take a more philosophical position, and in words that sound a lot like Butler, she says: "the Drag King takes what is so-called natural about masculinity and reveals its mechanisms — the tricks and poses, the speech patterns and attitudes that have been seamlessly assimilated into a performance of realness."[44] First of all, as more of an aside, I think this quote implicitly encourages a distinction between drag king and drag queen performances. The performance of masculinity and femininity seem to offer different political potential; the two must not be conflated. Halberstam is intimating that the drag king performance reveals something that is usually invisible, namely, the performative mechanisms of masculinity. This ties in with the belief that a position of privilege carries with it the possibility of remaining unmarked. With regards to our heteropatriarchal society the masculine remains an invisible subject position; its mechanisms are not blatantly obvious. A possible drag king project then, is to work at making the conventions of that subjectivity visible. With the drag queen we find a different situation. Since the feminine is a marked existence, its performative nature is already apparent in the cultural consciousness. Feminine dress and makeup, for example, are more easily identified as a kind of performance already. This makes a political representation of femininity more difficult, and a reiteration of stereotypes more likely. Therefore, it appears that a subversive performance on the part of the drag queen requires a more subtle engagement with certain aspects of the feminine; a hyper-performance is insufficient.

Secondly, returning to the issue of the audience, we see in Halberstam how a specific drag performance can lead to a more serious engagement with the issue of gender performance in general. The particular audience, Halberstam in this case, was apparently the right kind to receive and interpret a subversive gender performance. As far as content is concerned, Halberstam seems to realize here what Butler and Babuscio have already noted, namely, that drag can expose the naturalized mechanisms of gender.

Another important point to realize is that the "author's" intentions do not really come into play on this account. The Elvis impersonators may have simply been having fun, they may have had no subversive aspirations, but the resistant nature of those performances is brought out through the audience's reading.

I think this point marks an important realization for understanding drag. It appears as though the audience plays a fundamental role in determining whether or not a subversive performance has taken place. As argued above, meaning cannot be a private matter; one can have the intent to subvert oppressive gender norms, but that is insufficient because those intentions can be ignored or misunderstood in a context of social interaction. On the other hand, if a particular audience is prepared to read a drag performance as placing dominant gender norms in question, then the performers intentions are not important. The actors' intentions may meet with the audience's, but they may not, in which case it is still possible for one to be "ironic without having intended it."[45] The other possibility is that neither the audience nor actor, are seeking to create or locate evidence of resistance. This may be a good characterization of the state of affairs in society in general. People unselfconsciously perform their genders every day, and those confronted with these performances unconsciously accept them. Drag offers up the possibility of a critical awareness of the mechanisms that are at work in our gendered lives. It asks us to become a different kind of audience, one that questions the realness of those performances that we witness. Once this questioning has begun the process of changing negative cultural norms and forms take place. We can perform differently, reiterate and re-signify in order to challenge the status of the 'real' that is endowed upon particular ways of being.

Two possible objections must be anticipated in regards to my presentation of drag thus far. The first might be called the 'preaching to the converted' objection. This objection maintains that an audience must already accept the notion that gender is performative in order to see drag as a subversive practice. If one has not adopted this framework (perhaps one is an essentialist), then drag performances can still be coherently subsumed into one's understanding of gender. Drag might be interpreted as something weird, but there is still a real man or woman underneath all of the costume; in other words, one's worldview will not be radically altered. Thus, drag offers no possibility of resistance, because the only people who will understand it in that way are those who are already predisposed to do so. A different way of interpreting the world, facilitated by reading Butler perhaps, will allow one to see drag as a challenge to the status quo, not the other way around. Drag, in and of itself, cannot cause a change in a person's understanding. My response to this objection is simply to deny that this is the case. Although, I agree that a familiarity with *Gender Trouble*, and other works in this vein, will make it easier to see drag as a subversive practice, I do not think that this is a necessary, step-wise progression for arriving at this particular way of perceiving. It seems perfectly plausible that the reverse could be true; that a drag performance could

cause certain questions to be raised, which are in turn answered by a discovery of the relevant theoretical literature. This is a possibility that is suggested by Butler:

> And sometimes this shift [the realization that real genders are fictions] comes as a result of certain kinds of practices that precede their explicit theorization, and which prompt a rethinking of our basic categories: what is gender, how is it produced and reproduced, what are its possibilities?[46]

I do not see why drag could not be one of these practices. There seems to be no reason that drag must be foreclosed as a possible instrument of conversion, even though it does not necessarily play this role.

The second objection that might be raised against my position is concerned with the issue of authenticity. What is to be made of the phenomenological experience of an authentic gender identity? In other words, it seems plausible that one could accept a performative account of gender formation, but still feel very strongly that one is really a man or a woman. Gender is a part of identity that can be deeply entrenched in a person's self-conception, and the acceptance of a politics of the performative may not do much in the way of changing this. This leads us then, with regards to drag, to the same problem seen above. Drag may be risky, taboo, and a little weird, but it is not subversive, because the performers, as well as the audience, experience themselves as real men and women underneath. Therefore, drag will be ineffective as political strategy due to the fact that it does nothing to alter an embedded feature of the individual's psyche. First of all, I think it is important to note that one of the intentions of Butler's theory is to call into question the notion that gender is an internal feature of individuals:

> The view that gender is performative sought to show that what we take to be an internal essence of gender is manufactured through a sustained set of acts, posited through the gendered stylization of the body.[47]

Thus, it is wrong to think that there is a 'real' gender core that every subject possesses. The example of drag is intended to highlight this "gendered stylization of the body." The critic, however, might still respond: "So what? I still *feel* as though I am 'really' a man, for example, and being told that I am mistaken will not change this fact." My response would be to say that perhaps we should begin to understand performativity as a kind of philosophical therapy. Performativity is a theory that can be used to destabilize the inherited views of a dichotomous gender system. This need not be some kind of instantaneous transformation, whereby I now experience myself as free of the confines of gender; Butler shows that a radical voluntarism is not plausible. I certainly still experience myself as having a gender in virtue of the fact that I was born onto a particular 'stage', at a particular time, but the promise of the performative is that we can

be encouraged to think in new ways and imagine new possibilities. I believe drag is one manifestation of this therapy. It is a practice that encourages a re-conceptualization of gender itself, and enacts these new 'ways of being'.

5. Conclusion

Butler's account of performativity provides us with a way of understanding gender in a non-essentialist fashion. We can see gender as something contingent, as an area of our lives that can be changed. Over time, through the repetition and sedimentation of certain norms and ways of being, some practices, or types of performance, come to achieve the status of the 'real' or the 'essential'. It is within this process of repetition that the possibility of resistance and change can be found. If one can repeat in a different way, one can expose the contingency of our gendered lives and begin the process of re-signification. In doing so, we expand the possibilities for living a human life and begin altering a social consciousness that excludes, and harms, so many. Again, we find a similarity in Frye's thinking about the gay man who wants to resist patriarchal privilege. She says that this person must "invent:" "He has to move off, as [lesbian feminists] have, in previously indescribable directions. He has to invent what maleness is when it is not shaped and hardened into straight masculinity, gay hypermasculinity or effeminacy."[48]

Notes

[1] Babuscio, Jack. "The Cinema of Camp (aka Camp and the Gay Sensibility)." *Camp: Queer Aesthetics and the Performing Subject.* Ed. Fabio Cleto. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999, 120.
[2] Butler, Judith. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity.* New York: Routledge, 2nd Ed. 1999 with new preface [1990], 10.
[3] *Ibid.*, 177.
[4] Butler, Judith. "Critically Queer," *GLQ* 1:1 (1993): 23.
[5] Butler, Judith. "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory." *Performing Feminisms: Feminist Critical Theory and Theatre.* Ed. Sue-Ellen Case. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990, 277.
[6] Butler, Judith. "Imitation and Gender Insubordination." *Inside/Out: Lesbian Theories, Gay Theories.* Ed. Diana Fuss. New York: Routledge, 1991, 18.
[7] Butler, "Critically Queer," 17.
[8] *Ibid.*, 17-18.
[9] *Ibid.*, 19.
[10] Butler, "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory," 274.
[11] Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity,* 185.
[12] *Ibid.*, 185.
[13] *Ibid.*, 185.
[14] Butler, Judith. *Psychic Life of Power.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997, 94.
[15] *Ibid.*, 93.
[16] Lorde, Audre. "Age, Race, Sex, and Class: Women Redefining Difference." *Sister/Outsider.* Boston: The Crossing Press, 1984, 123.
[17] Naomi Scheman, "Queering the Center by Centering the Queer: Reflections on Transsexuals and Secular Jews." *Feminists Rethink the Self*. Ed. Diana Meyers. Boulder: Westview, 1997, 139.
[18] Butler, "Critically Queer," 22.
[19] Munk, Erik. "Drag: 1. Men," *Village Voice*, 5th Feb (1985): 89
[20] *Ibid.*, 89.
[21] Butler, "Imitation and Gender Insubordination," 21.
[22] Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity,* 176.
[23] *Ibid.*, xxii.
[24] *Ibid.*, xxiii.
[25] Babuscio, "The Cinema of Camp (aka Camp and the Gay Sensibility)," 123.
[26] *Ibid.*, 128.
[27] Tyler, Carole-Anne. "Boys Will Be Girls: The Politics of Gay Drag." *Inside/Out: Lesbian Theories, Gay Theories.* Ed. Diana Fuss. New York: Routledge, 1991, 41.
[28] Raymond, Janice G. "Introduction to the 1994 Edition." *The Transsexual Empire: The Making of the She-Male.* New York: Teachers College, 2nd ed. 1994 with new preface [1979], xxv.
[29] *Ibid.*, xxv.
[30] *Ibid.*, xxvii.
[31] *Ibid.*, xxviii.
[32] Frye, Marilyn. "Lesbian Feminism and the Gay Rights Movement: Another View of Male Supremacy, Another Separatism." *The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory.* New York: The Crossing Press, 1983, 137.
[33] *Ibid.*, 137.
[34] *Ibid.*, 138.
[35] *Ibid..*, 146.
[36] Butler, *Psychic Life of Power,* 94.
[37] Munk, "Drag: 1. Men," 91.
[38] Tyler, "Boys Will Be Girls: The Politics of Gay Drag," 54.
[39] Ibid, 54.
[40] Reich, June L. "Genderfuck: The Law of the Dildo." *Camp: Queer Aesthetics and the Performing Subject.* Ed. Fabio Cleto. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999, 254-55.
[41] Babuscio, "The Cinema of Camp (aka Camp and the Gay Sensibility)," 128.
[42] Halberstam, Judith "Jack", Volcano, Del Lagrace. *The Drag King Book.* London: Serpent's Tail, 1999, 59.
[43] *Ibid.*, 1.
[44] *Ibid.*, 62.
[45] Tyler, "Boys Will Be Girls: The Politics of Gay Drag," 54.
[46] Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*, xxiii.
[47] *Ibid.*, xv.
[48] Frye, "Lesbian Feminism and the Gay Rights Movement: Another View of Male Supremacy, Another Separatism," 146.

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