



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
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
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
Du Grand **M** Séminaire

DE VILLE-MARIE.

A la Montagne.







Edward Richard

EDOUARD RICHARD

ACADIA

MISSING LINKS OF A LOST CHAPTER

IN AMERICAN HISTORY

BY
AN ACADIAN
EX-MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS OF CANADA


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
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Entered according to Act of Parliament, in the year one thousand eight hundred and ninety-five, by EDOUARD RICHARD, in the office of the Minister of Agriculture and Statistics, at Ottawa.



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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

THE work I am now undertaking has never been done before. This sweeping assertion may astonish the reader; but there is this very good reason for making it: the archives of the most important part of this history have been either carried off, or destroyed, or simply lost. Which of these alternatives is the most likely will appear later on.

An American writer, Philip H. Smith, treating of the same subject, gave his book this title: "Acadia—A Lost Chapter in American History." Though he had not the documents needed for a complete reconstruction, yet, with his sound judgment and great impartiality, by making good use of what he had in hand, he has managed to hit upon a line of development that affords a glimpse of what was hidden in the missing documents.

That lost chapter I believe I have reconstructed in its essential parts. The reader will judge if the title I have chosen suits the work I lay before him. Have I, then, found the missing portion of the archives? Yes and no. A considerable part of them will, probably, never be found; but good luck has put in my way fragments of them, which are amply sufficient to throw light, if not upon the secret details of this history, at

least upon its main outlines. Close and continued thought has done the rest.

It is easy to understand what lively interest these events excite in a great grandson of the transported Acadians. That which for others was only a matter of curiosity became for me an intense attraction, urging me to undertake researches and meditations that seem to have disheartened those who have hitherto approached the question. The very mystery that enshrouds it has drawn to it many writers ; but labor that is continually running against all sorts of difficulties soon becomes wearisome, and so it has happened that all these writers have ended either by leaving a blank here or by copying the shadowy sketch found in authors who had opened the way.

All the importance of this history of Acadia, from the English conquest in 1710 until 1763, was centered in the events that brought about the transportation, in the transportation itself and in its consequences ; that, is to say, in the period that extends from 1743 to 1763, or even to 1766. Before that, there is nothing but unimportant facts. No one will tarry to describe a river peacefully flowing through a valley where the landscape on all sides is monotonous in its sameness ; but, once this tiresome monotony is past, if we reach mighty and fantastic cliffs, overhanging rocks, foaming surges dashing from chasm to chasm, we stop, we are thrilled with wonder at the wild wreck wrought by the ceaseless buffeting of the waters. This is the aspect of the story I am about to tell. It is the only part of Acadian history that presents a real and varied interest, it ought therefore to have been related in detail ; and yet, all we have of it so far is

a rough sketch that leaves out the palpitating pity of it all.

How comes it that the documents of so important a period have disappeared? Was this the result of accident or design? Many writers have asked this question before. Those who have answered it have all done so in the same way. Others have ignored it, giving the reader no hint of this strange disappearance. Granting that these latter did not share the suspicions of the former, it seems evident that they ought at least to have combated those suspicions, or at all events to have mentioned the disappearance of the documents, were it only to let the reader know why they were so brief in their treatment of so important an epoch. Did they think that obvious inferences unpalatable to them were easy to draw? Perhaps.

However this may be, few writers have bestowed on this "Lost Chapter" as much as one-sixth of the space I am giving to it. Now, unless I be despairingly prolix, this fact suffices to show that I must have undergone serious labor and have found much information that is new. On this score I may assure the reader that he will not be disappointed. What opinion soever he may form of my work, he will not be able to deny that he has been interested by a mass of unedited documents, by novel views, and by inferences from which it is hard to escape. Most of my readers, I am sure, will readily admit that this book is quite a revelation, that it solves a problem over which the world has been puzzling for more than a century.

Every one knows how deep are the impressions produced on a child by the tales he has heard at the fireside, especially when their very character is full of dra-

matic interest; and, if these events are personal to the authors of our being, then they take on portentous proportions and become ineradicably riveted in our minds. So it has been for me with the events that preceded, accompanied and followed the deportation. Sitting on my mother's knee, I have heard them repeated a hundred times, and the tears they often drew from me would alone suffice to perpetuate the remembrance of them. The whole of my childhood was spent in the midst of an Acadian settlement. Then were still alive the sons of those who had been deported, facts were still fresh in their memories, and each family could reconstruct the series of its misfortunes from the time it left Grand Pré, Beaubassin or Port Royal till its final settlement in Canada.*

Since that time the generation that was dying out has made way for a new one. I have myself long left my childhood's home, and those memories, persistent though they be, have lost the precision that was needed to give them the weight of carefully collected traditions. Besides, as my recollections bear only on the purely material facts of the deportation and of the misfortunes that followed in its train, they would afford but slender interest to my readers. This only will I say, that the invariable answer of all whom I questioned as to the cause of this deportation was: the refusal to take the oath of allegiance unless it were stipulated that they should not bear arms against the French.

"But," I used often to reply, "that cannot be; your fathers must have been guilty of some act of hostility,

* I still have by me an aged uncle—Raphael Richard—who remembers very distinctly having heard his grandfather relate the incidents of the deportation, of which he had been himself a victim at the age of eleven.

in one way or another, which forced the Government to act with rigor; the punishment was too severe, and yet the choice of means alone seems blameworthy." And there came back always the precise and formal answer—that never, at any time, did the people dwelling in the peninsula on English territory, take up or even threaten to take up arms.

In spite of their affirmations I had always thought that they were mistaken; and, strange as it may seem, my only wish had been to convince myself that they were wrong. Thus at least would the bitterness evoked by these memories have been lessened by the certainty that the cause of all this woe was to some extent a righteous one. I would then have likened, or, at any rate, tried to liken these sad events to so many other calamities that have, in bygone ages, befallen all other nations indiscriminately. Whatever may be the cruelty of a chastisement, it is some consolation to know with certainty that it was partly deserved; forgiveness and oblivion become possible, nay, perhaps a duty.

No such consolation has issued from my conscientious researches. I am convinced, beyond all doubt, that tradition faithfully reproduced historic truth; but—eagerly do I proclaim it, incredible though it may seem—the Home Government had nothing to do with either the resolving upon or the carrying out of this act of barbarity that has left upon the civilized world an impression of ineradicable and unassuageable pain.

There are events and men that fill a large place in the eyes of their contemporaries. They bid fair to be long held in remembrance and perhaps to be immortalized in history; yet, hardly have they disappeared, when every trace of them is forgotten. Others again there

are, apparently less important, less noticed at the time, which never seem to lose the interest that clings to them. Finally, there are other events and men that may be said to grow in magnitude with the very growth of the distance that separates us from them. To this last category belong, in ancient history, the siege of Troy, the battle of Thermopylæ; men like Homer, Plato, Socrates; and, in modern history, the signing of the Magna Charta, the massacre of St. Bartholemew, Columbus, Shakespeare, Washington. So will it be, I venture to think, with the deportation of the Acadians. This unique fact of the dispersion of a people will grow as time grows. The very effort made to blot out all trace of it, by suppressing both the documents and the names that should engrave it on the memory, will contribute more than anything else to make the recollection of it lasting. Where the historian cannot penetrate the poet enters. These mutilated or lost chapters of history then become a field from which the poet gleans the golden grain that has escaped destruction, and gives to grateful humanity those touching poems for which he is repaid by immortality. And, indeed, what field can offer him a richer harvest than this one? A happy and prosperous people rudely snatched from its home, dispersed on every shore; families rent asunder, so that scattered members seek each other during many long years; the melancholy monotony of lives consecrated to sorrow and suffering,—all this is so charged with “the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune” as to produce in him who ponders it all, after more than a century, an indefinable feeling of sadness. The victims of this dismal drama still tug at your heart strings like the wailings of some hero of ancient trag-

edy. The consequences of this dispersion cannot be measured; they have reached out into every family and to each member of every family; each heart has felt the torture, each nerve the cruel twinge.

If I have not been able to find in these events that comfort which the certitude of a merited chastisement might have afforded me, I must admit that the non-participation of the Home Government has been a great relief from the sinister thoughts that haunted my brain. No; the English Government never ordered this deportation, nor ever did anything that might imply it; quite the contrary. This work will give indisputable proof that, at the very moment when Governor Lawrence, falsely taking His Majesty's name, was executing the project he had long entertained, orders were addressed to him condemning, in energetic terms, the mitigated project he had submitted to the Lords of Trade. It is a strange thing—which shows how superficially history is sometimes written—that not one of the documents establishing so important a fact has been cited by any English historian. For some, the motive of their silence will appear in the course of this narrative. For others, it was a question of following the beaten path rather than facing the labor of cutting through a jungle.

It is not my intention to indicate even briefly, in these preliminary remarks, the important data on which this book rests. That would cause unnecessary delay. Suffice it to assure those who take a deep interest in matters of history, that they will find in this volume ample satisfaction for their curiosity, and, probably, the solution of the riddle that has long teased them. Perhaps they will be still better pleased to follow gradually, without further explanations, the connected series of

facts brought to light by many hitherto unpublished documents to be found here.

I am fully aware of the prejudices that may arise in the minds of my readers, prejudices whose name very likely is legion; but I am also aware that they will disappear one by one, till the last of them, I hope, will evaporate long before the reading of my last chapter. Far from wondering at these prejudices, I should be liable to them myself, were I in the reader's place; I could not, at first blush, shake off the impression that he who relates events with which his ancestors have been so painfully connected, cannot view them with that calm impartiality which is a requisite of history. I unhesitatingly confess that these events have produced on me the keenest of impressions, that my heart has bled at the recital of the woe that crushed my forefathers. Still, despite all this, I hope to convince the reader that I have not been biassed. No doubt education has a mighty influence in giving, from childhood, a fixedness to the opinions of one's whole life. For most men early education is everything, they are its slaves from the cradle to the grave; it has equipped them with spectacles, green or blue, through which they look at and pronounce without appeal on the most varied colors. But, there are others who, thanks to a more elastic temperament, are able to make a clean sweep of whatever is cumbrous in their past, to begin to examine anew whatever is not certain, and thus to break through the narrow horizon that shut them in. For better or for worse, this is, in a very marked degree, my own disposition.

This work was first intended for my French compatriots; but, on second thoughts, I decided to present it also to my English-speaking fellow-countrymen.

Albeit historians are not wont to dilate on their own personality, I will, nevertheless, make bold to say that, as far as I may judge, my chief characteristic is kindness. Wherever I could, without too greatly jeopardizing the truth, I have been delighted to lean to the side of indulgence. When I might have called in question the sincerity of several historians, I refrained from doing so; nay, I have sometimes been so indulgent as to suppose, against my plain convictions, honorable intentions, on the principle that it was better to sin by excess of silence and mercy rather than by too great severity. But, when brought face to face with systematic attempts, unmistakable and continually renewed, to falsify history, I have thought that silence became a fault, and that the finger of scorn must be laid on these dishonest practices, and on those who perpetrated them with malice prepense.

The exception I have just hinted at bears on the compiler of the volume of Archives of Nova Scotia and on Mr. Parkman. Regretfully do I say this; but the evidence leaves no possibility of doubt.

As I advance nothing without proof, the public will be in a position to judge whether or not my motives are solidly grounded. I know that I am laying myself open to reprisals; but I believe that I can successfully face them, and that I can defend my position still more strongly than I have done here. However, despite my efforts to master the question, I may have made some mistakes; some secondary or even important facts may have escaped my knowledge; this would not be surprising, since I am engaged in reconstructing, in a lost chapter, the fragments that have not been destroyed. If there are mistakes, I will willingly acknowledge them; but it is one thing to be ignorant of unpublished

facts, and quite another to distort or suppress what one cannot but know.

However, my conclusions agree in the main with those of most historians. During more than a hundred years all that was written on the subject was pretty much from the same standpoint. First, comes Raynal, who wrote about 1780, shortly after the deportation. His work might possess some value, if he had lived in the country, or if, at least, he had visited it and collected information on the spot. Being a contemporary of the events—he was born in 1713—he might have written a work of much weight. Unfortunately he did not avail himself of his opportunities. So, without questioning his sincerity, I attach so little value to his sayings and his opinions that I do not quote him even once. His views have no importance except as a reflection of the ideas and sentiments that then were current in France. Besides, Raynal does not strike me as a serious writer; at best, he is a superfine story-teller in the pompous and turgid style of the epoch. The flattering picture he draws of Acadian manners is, I admit, too ideal not to have been somewhat embellished by his imagination. And yet we have numerous proofs that, in Halifax itself, a goodly portion of the citizens did not think him very unreal. Haliburton, who wrote forty years later, quotes Raynal's appreciations, and points out that he was not so far from the truth as people might imagine.

After Raynal comes Haliburton himself (Thomas Chandler Haliburton). Here we have no longer a foreigner, nor a superfine story-teller, but a son of the soil, whose grandfather, a Loyalist, had immigrated to the country after the American war of Independence; a

man, moreover, who rose to the Supreme Court Bench of his province, a remarkable author, who enjoyed the respect of his fellow-countrymen, and was honored by his Sovereign. His position, his character, his judicial mind, his great and varied talents mark him out as the noblest representative of the eminent men this highly favored province has produced.

His History of Nova Scotia does not give us the full measure of his literary ability; but it does of his noble character, of his rectitude, and of the efforts he made to acquire a mastery of his subject, so as to guide the public along the path his conscience showed him. He founded the history of his province, for which he received a vote of thanks from the Legislature. To this day his work is continually consulted as an authority, and is a foundation for most of those who treat of local history. This book was published in 1829. As it was in preparation for many years previous to that date, and as he was then a middle-aged man, he may be said to have been a contemporary of some of the men who figured at the time of the deportation. Thus, besides his researches in historical documents, he could take advantage of much oral information on matters that were still fresh in men's memories. The sequel will show that his conclusions do not differ materially from mine.

Thirty years later (1859), Rameau published "La France aux Colonies" and, in 1889, "Une Colonie Féodale en Amérique." In 1865 appeared the "History of Nova Scotia" by Beamish Murdoch. The volume of "Nova Scotia Archives," begun in 1857, was completed in 1869. Campbell's "History of Nova Scotia" came out in 1873, which year also gave us Moreau's "Histoire de l'Acadie." Hannay's "History of Acadia" is dated 1879; Philip

H. Smith's "Acadia—A Lost Chapter in American History," 1884; Casgrain's "Pèlerinage au Pays d'Évangéline," 1888; and Parkman's "Montcalm and Wolfe," which contains a good deal about Acadia, 1884.

With the exception of Hannay and Parkman, and perhaps of Murdoch, who, however, hardly expresses any opinion on the events he describes, all the other writers named above hold nearly the same view as Haliburton.

Of late years history has been enriched by an exceedingly precious collection of documents, which throw a flood of light on the very darkest part of the period. It is really unfortunate that men like Murdoch and Hannay, who seem to have been sincere, had not access to this collection. As to Parkman, I have the positive proof that he knew of it but chose to ignore it.

This voluminous collection is due to the Rev. Andrew Brown, Presbyterian minister, who died at Edinburgh, when he was Professor of Rhetoric in the university. While living at Halifax, from 1787 to 1795, he collected materials with the intention of writing a history of Nova Scotia. This history, incomplete and in manuscript, was found with all the original and other documents that accompanied it, in a grocer's shop, and bought, Nov. 13th, 1852, by Mr. Grosart, who sold it to the British Museum in London. Some years ago it was copied, in whole or in part, by the Historical Society of Halifax, in whose archives it is now. I am particularly indebted to this collection, from which numerous extracts have been published in "Le Canada Français," if I am in a position to recompose, almost entirely, this lost chapter. The importance of this MS. is obvious. An historian was needed who should be a closer contemporary

of the obscure period than Haliburton. This want is now supplied, and all the more effectually because Brown's position and character would satisfy the most fastidious critic.

The volume of Archives, published in 1869 by order of the Legislature, was edited by Thomas B. Akins, Commissioner of the Public Archives of the Province. I do not hesitate to affirm that the documents have been selected with the greatest partiality, and with the purpose, poorly disguised in the very preface, of getting together such papers as might justify the deportation of the Acadians. This accusation I have not deliberately striven to support by hunting up examples, and yet the proofs of it have incidentally accumulated in such profusion as to open the eyes of those who are not wilfully blind. It is easy to see that this compiler aimed at starting a reaction against the opinions and sentiments that had been current for more than a century. His intention, evidently, was to make this volume an arsenal for all who wanted weapons, for he was fully aware that few writers would give themselves the trouble to go behind his compilation.

A mere summary of documents will not do duty for the history of this period. He who should accomplish no more than this would have written nothing that even remotely resembled history; first, because of the scarcity of materials, and then because, up to 1758, we are face to face with the omnipotent authority of the governor and of a soldier at that. Inured to military discipline, these governors knew only how to command and imperiously to enforce passive obedience. Will any one pretend that, under such conditions, history can be written solely with the orders of this potentate, and his letters

to the Secretary of State, whose representatives in this case were the Lords of Trade? Such a pretension were absurd. Clearly, these letters exhibit one side only of the question, the governor's; they are sure to contain nothing that is unfavorable to him, nothing that could militate against him and in favor of those who, most of the time, silently obeyed his unjust orders, or whose recriminations are not recorded, had they plucked up enough courage to contradict him or to utter a murmur. And yet these are the only documents we possess for this period; nay, even these one-sided statements have, in great part, disappeared. The only thing a man can do who undertakes to give the public a somewhat faithful picture of the reality is—for the satisfaction of his readers as well as his own—to make the best use of these wretched remnants, to piece them together, to try to penetrate their hidden meaning, the motives by which this despot may have been actuated; in a word, to get hold of some evidence from which an opinion may be formed of his character and his acts. If, in the teeth of these difficulties, the historian succeeds in explaining the governor's acts by means of the latter's own documents, in which he has said only what he chose to say; if, moreover, the historian detects the motives which he had every reason to hide with every facility for hiding them, so as to convict him of this or that evil design against those who have left nothing in their own defence; such a result is indeed surprising.

Yet that is what I have done, and more particularly for Lawrence and his accomplices. All, or almost all previous writers seemed to have perceived that the conduct of the Acadians, even as represented by Lawrence himself, had not justified their deportation. For a hun-

dred years there has been scarcely a dissentient voice on this point. Such being the case, if it is true that the English Government never ordered the deportation, Lawrence must have had some motive for acting as he did. This motive I had some inkling of directly I began to study the question. Soon I understood clearly what it was. That was not the difficulty. The great, the immense difficulty, lay altogether in proving the motive, when all helpful documents had disappeared. It has been said, with more wit than truth, that, if you want to ferret out a crime, you must "find the woman in the case." Though this may sometimes hold for a crime in the singular, it cannot be true of a crime in the plural, as this one is. Here I should say: "Find what profit the criminal got." This profit I have found and the proof thereof, clear enough to satisfy any court of justice, though it were absurd to require the evidence of law courts for events that took place almost 140 years ago.

It is comparatively easy to write the history of a country enjoying representative institutions, or of a long-settled nation like France or England. The State papers are confirmed or contradicted by so many other documents that there is not much need of commentary in quoting authorities. But, in this case, nothing like history can be written without meditating, weighing probabilities, and drawing legitimate inferences. I should have found it much easier to be a mere compiler; but then, I might as well have done like so many others and copied right and left, or, better still, have written nothing at all. Others, possibly, may have examined more documents; but perhaps no one has brought to bear on the question so much of the deep consideration needed for grasping the dominant purpose of the interested parties,

the intentions and feelings lurking between the lines of official or other documents.

Addressing myself to the subject with all the impartiality at my command, I thought I should find at least a partial justification of the deportation, and that thus I should free my soul from a burden that weighed heavily upon it. This justification I did not discover ; I reached a contrary conclusion ; but I have at all events the consolation of knowing that the guilt does not bear directly upon a nation, but upon individuals whom history has not yet properly branded. This book will, in my judgment, effectually clear England's Home Government's honor of the deepest historic stain ever attached to it. Let the stigma be obliterated which England has hitherto borne ; burn it into the foreheads of Lawrence, Belcher, Wilmot, Morris, and their accomplices.

If it is true, on the one hand, that the policy of England has always been one of self-interest, rather than of sentiment, it may be held that, as far as the Home Government is concerned, its policy has been in general honorable and compares favorably with that of any other nation. England owes its high standing to the wisdom and large-mindedness of its statesmen. Ministries rose and fell ; but the main lines of its policy were unchanged. Impervious alike to sudden enthusiasm, to gradual apathy, and to unexpected reversals, England pursued its ends with unvarying resolution and changeless tenacity of purpose. Obstacles seemed only to whet its ambition, and to strengthen its determination.

The policy of France, on the other hand, may be described in nearly opposite terms. Colonies were founded with enthusiasm, only to be left to themselves a few years later. This is precisely what took place in

Acadia. About a hundred families were settled there, and then left without adequate assistance to carry on heroic struggles against a much more powerful enemy. When this handful of colonists became a happy and prosperous embryo nation, when it was seen what store England set by keeping its hold on them, France began again to covet what she had neglected or forsaken.

Instead of founding colonies by multiplying the colonists, she thought she could found them with fortresses. One single million out of the thirty millions spent on the rock of Louisburg would have peopled Acadia in a way to insure its permanent possession by France. Whilst Canada, with its sixty thousand souls, was check-mating New England's twelve hundred thousand, France, the prey of courtiers, was making merry. Voltaire, leader of the high court of wittings, declared that Canada was only "a few acres of snow;" and Canada was lost.

These colonies had duties towards France, and they fulfilled them nobly. Can she in her turn say as much? Has the father of a family no duties beyond the begetting of children? Does he not owe them also education and protection?

After more than a century of forgetfulness, that same France has recollected that that child, conceived in a burst of love and carelessly cast off, is now grown up and keeps a fond remembrance of his mother. She has likewise perceived that those acres of snow are an empire, the possession of which enriches her rival. Vain regrets! England has long since appropriated all the desirable lands of our planet. Its tongue, its institutions, its capital accumulated through the colonies themselves, now encircle the entire globe. In these are

its might and its wealth. While France was making merry, England was attending to business; which was surely worth Voltaire's witty saying, which people laughed at one day, and would have forgotten the next, had not France been mourning over it ever since.

Poor France! In order ever to retain a firm hold of your sceptre, you had invented the Salic law. You would not be governed by queens, and you have been ruled by harlots. You were rich and honored; those women squandered your coins and your honor. What havoc has wrought in you the wit of your madcaps? You are now striving to retain the privilege of drying your fish on a corner of this continent that once belonged to you, or at least might have been entirely yours; it would still be yours, with all the wealth hidden under its acres of snow, if you had had less of the wit that evaporates and more of the wit that bears fruit.

You are getting wiser; you tardily acknowledge the folly of your wit; you perceive that England has become strong and wealthy just because of a wiser appreciation of what you despised. But it is too late! A few acres of sand in the Sahara, where your people cannot live, a few thousand negroes in Senegal, Dahomey or Congo, will never make up for the loss to you of those French hearts that would have throbbed in the vast and healthy plains of this marvellous continent.

O France! Forgive to a son of those unfortunate Acadians the recalling of these cruel memories . . . our sufferings have been so bitter.

Forsaken, forgotten, the Canadians have always kept their love for France. They changed their allegiance,

but only to become ere long the masters of their own destiny. Their fate, except inasmuch as they were forgotten by France, was not otherwise a cruel one. Not so with the Acadians. Can they forget the woes wrought by that abandonment?

However, though we cannot forget the incalculable wrongs inflicted on us, we now can, with a juster appreciation of facts, forgive the English Government the share it may have had in them. But we cannot acquit the true culprits; we cannot absolve those who, without any cause, without orders or against the orders of the Home Government, impelled solely by sordid motives, despoiled us and cast us on foreign shores. No; such injustices, such wrongs cannot be forgotten. So long as our children shall be able to retrace their origin, they will recall and bemoan the sufferings of their fathers. It is not in our power to blot out from our hearts these poignant recollections. We may still cherish and bless the flag that floats above our heads; we may excuse and condone whatever share England may have had in these events; but we cry enough! to those who throw dirt at us in order to whitewash a dozen miscreants whom all the waters of Niagara could not cleanse. Let honest men join in restoring the historic truth which certain historians of most recent date have done their best to pervert. British fellow-countrymen! show us that British fair play is not an empty word. Brand the culprits with the stigma they deserve. Then, will Acadians forgive, bless, nay, perhaps forget . . . provided that be possible after so many misfortunes.

A very natural curiosity impelled me to study this period of history; deep convictions led me on to write. I regret this curiosity; it has flung upon my life a

cloud of sadness which nothing can remove. I have doomed myself to climb again unceasingly this Calvary of suffering, humiliation and ignominy, to which my forefathers were condemned. My mind has fastened itself upon this mournful epic as Pygmalion, of ancient fable, riveted his soul upon the statue he had made; with this essential difference that he fell in love with the work of his hands, whereas I am haunted by a ceaseless and merciless nightmare. I have wished to see; I have seen; I recoiled with horror, but the die was cast. Like the lover who could not resist his longing to behold once more the dead face of her who had charmed away his heart, I drew back horrified; and yet I must needs bear the pangs my rashness has provoked.

A thoughtful writer—Thucydides—has said, “Happy the people whose annals are vacant.” This saying has a paradoxical sound to us who behold on all sides nations, whether mighty or feeble, whether lowly or haughty, glorying in their past, viewing it over and over again with complacency, as if to renew in themselves the joy they taste in contemplating the features of their ancestors magnified by the enchanting distance and by the illusions of love. But can this be the case for Acadians? To recall the contentment and the virtues of their fathers, the joys of the century that preceded their deportation, is to recall the deportation itself and the century that followed. Their evil fortune is inseparable from their good fortune; to look at the one is to look at the other; to magnify the one is to magnify the other. Their history is a Janus with two faces, of which the more recent, the fresher to their memory, the hideous one, is ever staring at them. Gladly would they turn him round to view his other face, on which their eyes would rest

with delight. But, whenever they conjure up the past, the sad, the hideous face will always eclipse the sweet and agreeable one; the nearer will absorb the farther. Woe will ever be a mightier reality than weal; the former is the positive element, the latter is merely, so to speak, a negative quantity. For Acadians the paradox, "Happy the people whose annals are vacant," will bear repeating.

ACADIA:

MISSING LINKS OF A LOST CHAPTER IN AMERICAN HISTORY.

CHAPTER I.

Discovery of Acadia (1604).—Foundation of Port Royal (1605).—
Brief Summary of the Colony's History under the French
Régime until its Cession to England in 1710.

WITH the discovery of a new continent a new era had begun for the civilized world. Columbus had been that providential man who, braving prejudices, breaking through obstacles, had dowered the Old World with these unknown lands.

The horizon opened out by this discovery to the eyes of wondering Europe was too immense, too dazzling in its novelty to be clearly pictured in the mind. Great must have been the sensation produced; but it were difficult to realize how far the consequences that should flow therefrom were understood. It is possible that the enthusiasm of the moment gave a glimpse of the prodigious development we are witnessing to day. That enthusiasm, which suddenly bursts forth from a great discovery, is often the best guide to the grasping of the remote consequences it implies. All at once, under its influence, the mind is illumined like the horizon aflame with the lightning flash that cleaves the clouds of a summer's night. In that brief moment, swifter than

thought, the eye has followed the line of light tearing through space: it has seen clouds heaped up, strange forms, contours vividly outlined; yet, the mind has retained scarcely anything of this magnificent panorama, for the view was too sudden and too rapid to engrave on the retina the multitudinous details. The background alone of this dazzling scene was visible for a moment; all the foreground was overlooked. Such, likely, was the case with Columbus's discovery. The enthusiasm of the moment afforded a glimpse of the far-off scene which the new Continent was to lay before Europe. It was a scene of treasures heaped up, of numberless ships ploughing the main to bring to Europe the wealth of this unknown world, of new gatherings of men, of cities springing up in the wilderness. Kings foresaw empires to found, men of wealth and station domains to acquire, the poor man a plot of land to live on.

That was, perhaps, the background of the picture; but the eye had caught nothing of the vague space between. That space must soon be crossed by whoever longed to reach what was promised by the iridescent vision of the transient scene. Then were to arise difficulties unnumbered and ever-recurring, unforeseen obstacles which would cast doubts on the reality of that vision. Nevertheless, the eye had not deceived, enthusiasm had not warped the judgment. Only, four centuries will barely suffice to reach the brilliant future of which that scene had afforded a glimpse.

We marvel to-day that more than a century was needed to take final possession of the beautiful continent we inhabit. To understand this fact, we must take into account the numberless difficulties encoun-

tered by the first explorers. Not less than sixteen regular expeditions were organized by England, France and Portugal in the course of a century, either to discover a northwest passage to China, or to explore the North American continent itself, or for purposes of immediate settlement. Not one of these attempts had any practical result. Some of them, rather more fortunate than the others, first gave rise to great hopes; but they were invariably followed by some other expeditions so disastrous as to remove, for several years, from the nation that had suffered, all idea of founding a colony. Then, again, a little later, some other nation had its turn. One, two, and sometimes even three expeditions followed in quick succession, to end in a new disaster, and the game was given up. Disgust took the place of enthusiasm; but as often also, enthusiasm, sharpened by greed, ambition or jealousy, was rekindled only to issue in disheartening results. Each nation hoped to do better than its rival, each expedition hoped to avoid the faults of its predecessors; and the sum total of them all was uniform failure. Tempting, indeed, must have been the prize, since men were not utterly repelled by the danger and sterility of so many efforts.

Of these numerous expeditions four were lost in the depths of the ocean, some others were scattered by storms and partly destroyed, and almost all were decimated by disease and destitution, so that any fresh attempt was discouraged for a time.

The expedition which came nearest to lasting success was undertaken in 1541 by Roberval, whom Francis I. had appointed Viceroy of New France, with Jacques Cartier as Captain General of the fleet. The enterprise was on a larger scale than any of those which had pre-

ceded it; but it failed because the ships did not start together and because of misunderstandings. Roberval was to perish with his entire fleet in a fresh attempt; and thus success was delayed for sixty-three years more.

It would be a mistake, however, to imagine that, besides these official expeditions, America was not at all, or was not often visited. As early as 1504 its coasts were frequented by Basque, Breton and Norman fishermen very regularly. "Sometimes," says Hackluyt, "there were not less than a hundred boats fishing there." Lescarbot mentions a man called Savalet who had made forty-two voyages to the coasts of the Gulf of St. Lawrence,

These annual and regular voyages, repeated during a whole century, had made the public of the maritime towns both in France and England familiar with this part of America. France was the first to resume, in the beginning of the seventeenth century, the projects of colonization formed and so often abandoned in the preceding century. This time, if the success was not yet equal to the hopes entertained, the founding of a colony was to be definitive; and the example was soon to be followed by England and other nations.

De Monts, a nobleman of Henry IV.'s court, organized this expedition. He set out from Hâvre de Grâce March 7, 1604, accompanied by de Pontgravé, the Baron de Poutrincourt, de Champlain, d'Orville, Champdore, and others. Their destination was the peninsula of Nova Scotia, then called *la Cadie* or *l'Acadie*, and the place definitively chosen for the colony was Port Royal, of which, with the adjacent territory, de Monts made a grant to his friend Poutrincourt. In the course of the following summer a few dwelling-houses, a store, and a

palisade enclosing the whole, were put up. Thus was Port Royal founded on the very site now occupied by the city of Annapolis. This was the first permanent settlement by Europeans in these northern climes.

As I have undertaken that epoch only which begins in 1710, when Port Royal was taken and Acadia was definitively ceded to England by the treaty of Utrecht, I have no intention of dwelling at any length on the events that marked the stormy beginnings of Acadia's history. I will merely sum up in a few pages a whole century of facts, so as to make it easier to understand what followed the cession of the country to England. Not that the earlier history is uninteresting,—far from it; it were impossible to find on this continent any other spot so interesting, at that very time, as Acadia was. The most thrilling dramas of America in the seventeenth century were played in the waters of the Bay of Fundy (Baie Française).

Exposed as was this feeble colony, separated from Canada by vast distances and impenetrable forests, left to its own resources, without immigration, without assistance proportionate to the dangers of its situation, it was the theatre of perhaps greater vicissitudes of war than have fallen to the lot of any other country in the world. While, on the one hand, it was, or might have been, highly useful to France; on the other, it was a constant menace to the commerce and tranquillity of the English colonies. It is there that expeditions of adventurers were organized against the New England colonies; there, too, attacks were made upon the French. If it was a fine field for organizing, it was equally open to attack. Whether the two nations were at war or in peace, it was often war anyhow in these parts. A

grievance or a mere pretext was enough to determine disastrous hostilities. Boston and Acadia sometimes waged war on each other on their own account, in spite of temporary peace and amity between the two crowns; and, what is more, on certain occasions, Acadia was the scene of prolonged hostilities between Frenchmen who claimed the right to govern the country.

Nothing, to my mind, is more captivating than the story of this province from 1604 to 1710. It is to America what Greece once was to Europe, and the Bay of Fundy evokes almost as many memories as the Ægean Sea. The scenes there enacted have been so various and so dramatic, the actors thereof give one such an impression of heroism and of half-savage grandeur, that one can hardly refrain from treating them as legendary, as if they belonged to an epoch that is lost in the mists of antiquity. Biencourt, d'Aulnay, the two de la Tours, Saint-Castin, Denys, Subercase, Mompain, are so many legendary heroes whose names are still re-echoed by forest and rock from New Hampshire to the inmost recesses of the Bay of Fundy.

To the many difficulties which Poutrincourt and his son Biencourt experienced in solidly founding their colony of Port Royal, there was added another of a far more serious kind. During the whole of the sixteenth century, inexperience, stress of weather and disease had been the principal causes of the failure of colonization in the New World; now came the turn of human passions, ambition, jealousy, cupidity. This continent was not vast enough to satisfy the covetousness of many nations. To Samuel Argall, whose record in Virginia was so bad, belongs the honor of having begun the conflict for this immense territory, if, indeed, the acts of

piracy which he committed can be ranked as warfare. His first attempt was the destruction of the colony of Saint-Sauveur in Mount Desert Island, on the coast of Maine; the pretext of this outrage was Cabot's voyage, one hundred and sixteen years before, and priority of discovery on that account. Emboldened by this easy victory, he made another attempt and this time destroyed Port Royal.

By this one fell stroke was annihilated all Poutrincourt's outlay of time and money; and France must have been strangely careless of her colony, to say nothing of her honor, since she made no move to demand reparation for the outrage committed by Argall. And, indeed, for twenty years afterwards, Acadia is hardly mentioned at all, so little, in fact, that, in 1621, it was ceded by the King of England to Sir William Alexander, Earl of Stirling. And yet the colonists whom Poutrincourt had brought with him were still in the country; some of them contrived to till the soil of the upper reaches of the river, a few miles from the old fort; others had sought employment from Biencourt and de la Tour.

Seeing their hopes ruined by the destruction of Port Royal, Biencourt and his companions, taking advantage of the friendship of the Indians, had become wood-rangers (*coureurs de bois*), hunters, trappers. This state of things continued till the treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye in 1632, by which Acadia was restored to France. Of the Scotch colony founded by Sir William at Port Royal, there remained only three or four families which were soon merged in the French population: for instance, the Colsons, the Paisleys, and the Mellanson family, which became very numerous and important

in the Acadian colony under the French form of Melançon.

After this retrocession, France once more turned her attention to Acadia. A company was formed having at its head Isaac de Razilly, his kinsman d'Aulnay de Charnisay, and Nicolas Denys de la Ronde. As their object was trade rather than colonization, they settled with their immigrants at La Hève, which was considered more suitable for traffic than Port Royal. As Governor, Razilly bestowed upon Denys in fief all the Gulf coast from the Bay des Chaleurs to Canso, and upon La Tour the old post of Cape Sable and the river St. John. In this latter place, at a spot called Jemsek, La Tour built a fort to which he gave his own name. Thanks to his long experience and his activity, thanks also to the sense of security then pervading the country, he made this a most important trading post.

De Razilly died in 1636 without having been able to accomplish all the great projects he had in view. D'Aulnay and de la Tour were both named Lieutenant-Governors; but the limits of their respective territories and jurisdiction were so badly defined as to lead to hostilities that long paralyzed the development of the colony. Whatever may have been d'Aulnay's faults, it seems certain that he projected a great agricultural establishment and the progress of the colony. With this object he abandoned La Hève to settle at Port Royal, which was much better suited for a colonial settlement. After gathering about him the people that had first settled at La Hève, he went to France, whence he returned with a score of colonists. It was he also who inaugurated that system of dikes which was afterwards to become so widespread. Unfortunately, the



CESSION

DE TOUTES LES

*Indulgences et Œuvres satisfactoires
en faveur des Saintes Ames du
Purgatoire.*

§ I.

Cet acte consiste à faire, en faveur des saintes âmes du Purgatoire une *offrande* ou *Donation* complète, non-seulement de toutes les *Indulgences* que nous pourrons gagner et de la valeur *satisfactoires* de toutes les bonnes œuvres que nous ferons pendant notre vie, mais encore des suffrages, indulgences et messes que l'on offrira pour nous après notre mort.

Nous déposons ce petit trésor entre les mains de la Très-Sainte Vierge, laissant à cette sage et tendre Mère le soin de les appliquer selon son gré aux saintes âmes qui gémissent dans les flammes du Purgatoire.

Pour lever tout embarras et toute objection, il suffira de remarquer : 1. Que nous conservons la valeur *méritoire* de nos bonnes œuvres, laquelle est

essentiellement personnelle et incommunicable ; 2. Que nous nous réservons aussi la valeur *impétra-toire* de nos œuvres, afin d'en disposer avec une pleine liberté, soit pour nous-mêmes, soit pour les besoins des âmes qui vivent sur la terre ; 3. Que cette offrande étant faite pour l'amour et la gloire de Dieu, ne peut préjudicier en rien aux obligations de *justice* et de *charité* que Dieu commande ou désire que nous accomplissions.

3. Ainsi, les Prêtres peuvent appliquer le fruit du St. Sacrifice aux personnes pour lesquelles ils veulent dire la messe. Ainsi, nous pouvons prier spécialement pour les défunts qui nous sont chers, subordonnant toutefois nos intentions à celle de la Très-Sainte Vierge, et la conjurant d'appliquer à ces âmes bien-aimées une large part du petit trésor que nous lui avons confié, ou plutôt de faire pour elles cent fois, mille fois plus que nous n'aurions fait nous-mêmes, si nous avions conservé le droit de disposer de nos indulgences et de nos satisfactions.

4. Cette Cession n'oblige point sous peine de péché : aucune formule n'est prescrite, de sorte qu'une simple offrande intérieure serait suffisante. Il est utile de la renouveler fréquemment, spécialement le lundi de chaque semaine, et plus solennellement encore au jour de la Commémoration des Morts.

§ II.

Cette donation, pratiquée par plusieurs personnages d'une héroïque sainteté, fut expressément approuvée et enrichie de précieuses indulgences par le Pape Benoît XIII Pie IX a confirmé et

augmenté ces faveurs spirituelles, dont voici l'indication sommaire :

1. Tout Prêtre qui a fait cette Cession jouit du *privilege personnel de l'autel* tous les jours de l'année.

2. Les simples fidèles gagnent une indulgence plénière *chaque fois qu'ils communient* pourvu qu'ils prient quelques instants dans une église ou un oratoire public aux intentions du Souverain Pontife, et de plus, *chaque lundi de l'année (ou le Dimanche s'ils sont empêchés le lundi,)* pourvu qu'ils entendent la sainte messe et prient suivant les intentions du Souverain Pontife ; la communion n'est pas requise.

3. De plus, toutes les indulgences, sans aucune exception, deviennent, pour ceux qui ont fait cette Cession, applicables aux âmes du Purgatoire.

§ III.

Brisons donc les entraves d'un égoïsme aveugle et mesquin, et versons dans les brûlants abîmes du Purgatoire toutes nos indulgences et nos satisfactions. Nous le devons, 1. à nos frères prédestinés qui languissent dans les flammes et implorent notre secours ; 2. à Notre-Seigneur, dont le Cœur Adorable chérit si tendrement ces saintes âmes ; 3. à Dieu dont nous procurons la gloire en introduisant plus promptement dans son Royaume céleste les enfants bien-aimés qu'il ne punit qu'à regret ; 4. à nous-mêmes, car non-seulement nous posséderons éternellement le mérite et la récompense de notre charité, mais encore les saintes âmes que nous aurons soulagées, prieront avec ferveur et reconnaissance pour leurs bienfaiteurs : et de plus

si nous exerçons la miséricorde d'une manière si excellente pendant notre vie mortelle, nous obtiendrons miséricorde après notre mort: *Beati misericordes, quoniam ipsi misericordiam consequentur.* Impossible de supposer que nous restions un seul instant de plus en Purgatoire pour avoir pratiqué la charité avec trop d'héroïsme.

§ IV.

FORMULE QUE L'ON PEUT EMPLOYER POUR
FAIRE ET RENOUVELER LA CESSION.

Moi,

je fais don et cession, en faveur des saintes âmes du Purgatoire, de toutes les indulgences que je pourrai gagner, et du fruit satisfactoire de toutes les bonnes œuvres que je pourrai accomplir désormais, et je prie la Très-Sainte Vierge Marie de leur en faire à son gré l'application.

Nous, soussigné, Evêque de Montréal, recommandons l'Acte de Cession ci-dessus mentionné comme souverainement avantageux aux fidèles, qui le feront, et comme pouvant procurer un grand soulagement aux saintes âmes du Purgatoire.

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† IG. EV. DE MONTRÉAL.

A. M. D. G.

incessant quarrels provoked by his pugnacious humor made his efforts well-nigh fruitless.

When France made no protest against the destruction of Port Royal, when she refrained from putting a stop to the armed contentions of La Tour and d'Aulnay, of La Tour and Le Borgne, of Le Borgne and Denys, all fighting for the possession of the country, she showed so little care for her honor that Cromwell, in spite of the peaceful relations between the two kingdoms, conceived the idea of seizing Acadia. As war was then waging between England and Holland, he gave instructions for the capture of New Holland, and, the fleet being in these waters, for the subsequent capture of Acadia. Peace was signed before New Holland could be taken; but Acadia, unable to offer serious resistance, was seized (1654).

In 1667, it was again returned to France by the treaty of Breda, and in 1670 M. de Grandfontaine came to assume official possession.

As may be supposed, these dissensions, these repeated attacks, the indifference of France, all this put together scarcely favored the establishment of a colony on a firm basis; and so the census of the following year, under M. de Grandfontaine, tells a sad tale. After so many sacrifices of time and money, the population showed only about 400 souls, more than three-fourths of whom were at Port Royal. There must have been, in various places, a nomadic population proportionately pretty numerous, which does not enter into this census; but it was made up chiefly of a few half-breed families settled on the coast, especially at La Hève, and of those families which, having intermarried with the Indians, had adopted their mode of life. This census, as well

as the following ones, is confined to the population of purely French origin ; and it is chiefly from this little group of 47 families that the Acadians spring. Here are the names : *Bourgeois, Gaudet, Kessy, de Forêt, Hébert, Babin, Daigle, Blanchard, Aucoin, Dupeux, Terriau, Savoie, Corporon, Martin, Pellerin, Morin, Brun, Gauterot, Trahan, Cyr, Thibaudeau, Petitpas, Bourg, Boudreau, Guilbaut, Granger, Landry, Doucet, Girouard, Vincent, Bréau, Le Blanc, Poirier, Comeau, Pitre, Belliveau, Cormier, Rimbaut, Dugas, Richard, Melançon, Robichau, Lanoue, d' Entremont, de la Tour, Bertrand, de Bellisle.* These are the main heads of branches, and several of these families were already divided into two or more branches, as was the case for those whose names are subjoined : *Boudrot, Girouard, Gaudet, Hébert, Bourg, Martin, Terriau, Blanchard, Aucoin, Brun, Commeaux, de la Tour.* Each family averaged six children, and the descendants of each of them now run up into the thousands.

The census of 1686 exhibits a population of about 800 souls, of whom 461 were at Port Royal, 164 at Mines, 78 at Beaubassin, 90 in other places mentioned, and the remainder scattered here and there on the coast ; thus the population had about doubled in 15 years. In 1671 60 persons, 5 of whom were women, had arrived ; but, as the census of 1686 registers only 36 new names, some of these persons may have either gone to Canada or taken service in the garrison and gone back to France afterwards. These are the new names : *Le Prince, Brassard, Douaron, Levron, Lort, Arsenaut, Bergeron, Bellefontaine, Tourangeau, Barillot, Godin dit Chatillon, Benoit, Préjean, Bastarache, Fardel, Henry, Gareau, Laperrière, Michel, Gourdeau, La Bauwe, La Pierre dit*

Laroche, Pinet, Rivet, Mirande, La Barre, Aubin-Mignault, Cochu, Cottard, Mercier, Lavallée, Lagassé, Blou, Desorcis, Martel, Dubreuil. The three last named, I think, must have gone to Canada, and Cochu, Cottard and Fardel to France; at any rate their names do not appear in any subsequent census. From 1686 to 1710, 85 new colonists, at most, came, and these were, to a great extent, soldiers disbanded from the small garrison which the Government maintained at Port Royal. *

From 1671 the agricultural population confined itself more and more to its land; every immigrant, every disbanded soldier became a farmer. When, after a few years' growth, families found themselves pinched for room at Port Royal, they sought settlements elsewhere for their children. Thus it is that, one after the other, Beaubassin (Amherst), les Mines (Horton, Wolfeville, Windsor, etc.), Cobequid (Truro), Chipody, Peticodiac, Memramcook sprang up. Frequently, whole families migrated to these new settlements, which had the double advantage of being freer from the vexations of a government that was often too troublesome, and safer from the oft-repeated attacks of the English.

From the treaty of Breda till 1710, a space of 40 years, Port Royal was besieged no less than five times,

* The last general list of names, dated 1714, shows 77 new names: Le Basque, Moyse, Ollivier, Parisien, Dubois, Bernard, Thibeau, Rossette, Le Breton, Lyonnais, Lafont, Allard, Le Marquis, Emmanuel, Dupuis, Denis, Barnabé, Beaumont, Le Maistre, Allain, Cadet, Lessolle, Raymond, Donat, Maillard, Vilatte, Surette, Savary, Dumont, Lavergne, Lalande, Simon, Babineau, Paris, Cosse, Saint-Scène, l'Espérance, Manceau, Pothier, Dambouc, Laliberté, Laurier, Yvon, Samson, Blondin, Bideau, Gentil, Gousille, Langlois, Vigneau dit Maurice, Champagne, Clémenceau, La Montagne, Mouton, Jasmin, Voyer, Toussaint, Boutin, Roy, Chauvert, Boucher, Darois, De Saulniers, Boisseau, Herpin, Guérin, Longuépée, Haché, Lambert, Chiasson, Maisonnat, Carré, De Vaux, Ondy, Nuirat, Véco, Leger.

whereas, barring a raid on Beaubassin and Mines by Church in 1696, the settlers in these latter places were fairly sheltered from the perils that beset Port Royal.

All the names that figure at Beaubassin and Mines (Grand Pré, Rivière aux Canards, Pigiguit, etc.) are the same as at Port Royal. So it was, somewhat later, at Cobequid, Peticodiac, Chipody and Memramcook to the north of the Bay of Fundy.

As the census was taken many times during the French period, it is easy to follow up the development of these different groups, and to get a pretty fair idea of the number of new colonists that came to swell the original stock. These were, for by far the most part, unmarried men who were obliged by force of circumstances to marry the daughters of the oldest settlers, of the 47 heads of families that had settled in the country before 1671. Thus we see that there were only five women among the 60 immigrants that arrived at Port Royal in 1671. Whence we conclude that, 30 or 40 years later, the entire population was linked together in bonds of kinship that must have powerfully contributed to remove dissensions and to produce that social condition with which we are familiar.

Some modern writers have treated the picture of Acadian manners as a creation of the fervid fancy. It has been held that the imagination was author of much of it, that this ideal society was incompatible with what we know of human nature. I am willing to grant, indeed, I have no doubt, that the conventional picture has been embellished by fancy; yet I hold that a close study of the circumstances of this people makes one understand better how a state of things clearly proven to have existed was possible. The defects common to

all Frenchmen, particularly those which spring from their too great sociability, such as jealousy, backbiting, idle gossip, existed there as everywhere else, but toned down by the exceptional status of the people. Nor was their condition always enviable; it certainly was not so in the early days of the colony, when these families were strangers to each other, and probably also during the greater part of the French occupation.

The destruction of Port Royal by Argall, France's neglect, the frequent raids of Anglo-Americans had forced a certain number of the first colonists to become adventurers, forest rangers (*coureurs de bois*), fishermen in the train of Biencourt, Denys, La Tour. This roving element could not be expected to show as high morality as the first followers of Poutrincourt, or as the society that was afterward formed when all these separate units coalesced. But here, as in all other lands, given the time to form new habits of order and economy, given a sedentary life in the midst of a sober and hard-working people, given a comfortable competence drawn from a most fertile soil, a gradual purification of morals was sure to result. At the same time, an adventurous life had steeled many men for the ceaseless struggles they had to face before the final conquest of the country. On the other hand, the abandonment in which France had so long left them, the habit of living beyond the sphere of action and the regulations of a government jealous of its authority, bred in the Acadians a spirit of independence that would ill consort with the restrictions put upon them in after years by the French governors. In fact, when, after the treaty of Breda, France took firm hold of the administration in Acadia, there arose much grumbling and murmuring against a government

that took pleasure in throwing around the people the complicated net-work of Old World formalism. Of this we find proofs in the correspondence of the governors: M. de Brouillan, in one of his letters, calls the Acadians half-republicans. However, these difficulties were very rare among them, and were as nothing compared to the troubles that arose among the sharers of authority.

Necessity had taught the people to govern themselves, to hold meetings, to consult together, to settle their differences amicably or according to simple rules quite sufficient for their local needs. They had thus acquired a habit of liberty and a taste therefor. They knew by experience that they could dispense with an authority that was only irksome, that did not improve their condition, that ensured them no additional security in their relations with one another. Hence it was that, under English rule, they got rid, as much as possible, of official regulations and ruled themselves.

Certain it is that, in their special situation, better results could be hoped for from this method, from the *laissez faire*, than from the vexatious interference of an uncontrolled authority. Matters of public interest were decided at public meetings; men worked all together at works of public utility, as when they completed a vast system of dikes, which were built in so short a time as to point to unusual harmony and good-will among the workers. Their reward came in an abundance of all that could meet their needs and their simple tastes, beyond which they had no ambition and were therefore easily satisfied. Nor had they any anxiety about the future of their children: the custom had been early established that the community was to provide them with all things neces-

sary for a homestead, and a few years sufficed to make them as well off as their parents. The good understanding must, surely, have been remarkable, since, even under English rule, there is not on record a single case in which the people disagreed in their decisions upon matters of general interest; whatever the decision might be, it was always, as far as can be gathered, unanimous.

When all these exceptional circumstances are understood and taken into account, the familiar picture of their simplicity of life, morality, abundance, harmony, and social happiness has nothing, it seems, that should provoke wonder; the same circumstances would, I believe, have brought about elsewhere somewhat similar results. For a century they were strangers to France and Canada; they had formed habits and built up traditions that made them a separate people. They were Acadians. And, if the increase by immigration was almost nil, quite otherwise was it with the multiplication of families, since, eighty years later, this small nation counted 18,000 souls.*

From 1690 to 1710 was one uninterrupted series of hostilities between New England on the one hand and Canada and Acadia on the other, the object being either to capture vessels fishing in French waters, or to destroy some fort on the badly defined frontier between Acadia and Maine. In 1690 Port Royal was taken and sacked by Admiral Phips; M. de Menneval, Governor of Acadia, was carried off a prisoner to Boston, together with his garrison; but Phips, too much engrossed with

* The census of 1714 gives	2,100
" " " 1737 "	7,598
" " " 1747 "	12,500 or thereabouts.

the expedition he was preparing against Quebec, neglected to establish himself solidly in Port Royal, which was, accordingly, soon reoccupied by the French.

This period, from 1690 to 1710, was probably the darkest in the annals of these colonies, and the most disastrous for British colonization. For twenty years, without truce or respite, on sea as well as on land, there was, in these parts of America, nothing but devastation, pillage, ambushes and surprises. Sometimes a fort was attacked by France's Indian allies, and, if it was taken, the inmates were massacred; most frequently, some defenceless settlement was raided by night, and, if any were made prisoners, they were held for exchange or ransom. By seductive advantages offered to fillibusters and alluring bounties on Indian scalps, the greed of gain was so keenly excited that organizations sprang up in the bordering settlements of New England for the sole purpose of marauding, plundering and butchery. It was a life of danger, often ending in terrible reprisals; still, bold men were never wanting to replace those who disappeared. In such conditions, civilized man often surpasses in cruelty the most cruel savages; there were acts of base treachery and barbarity that have never been exceeded nor perhaps equalled by any savage tribe in America. Very great, no doubt, must have been the provocation for the English colonists: all the Indians in these parts were allied to the French, so that retaliation, if any, had to come from the colonists themselves. A violent impulse born of anger, grief, pecuniary loss and insecurity, may have shaped itself, with many, into the misconceived idea that adopting the cruel methods of those barbarians would inspire such terror, such fear of annihilation, that they would relent from their bloody raids. At

the same time it was hard not to make those answerable who urged them to their bloody raids; nevertheless, though these barbarous allies were acknowledged to be necessary in the struggle between the two nations, both of whom made use of them when they could, yet nothing could justify the use of their cruel methods and the infringement of all the laws of honor.

This state of affairs could not last long. Acadia was too weak to be thus left as a perpetual menace to the trade and the security of the New England settlements. Driven to extremities by the disasters inflicted on their commerce, the Anglo-Americans resolved upon the greatest efforts to emerge from a situation that was daily becoming intolerable. The final issue was not doubtful. The disparity in the numbers was enormous; France was too careless or too busy elsewhere to succor her colony; yet, the conflict was longer and more desperate, successes and reverses more evenly balanced than might have been expected. No less than four expeditions were required before Port Royal was taken, and there the intrepid Subercase, powerfully seconded by the Baron de Saint-Castin and by other Captains at the head of Indian troops, wrought prodigies of valor. The first of these expeditions was undertaken by Church, the famous "Squaw-killer;" but, moved by the desire of plunder and of easy exploits, he made no serious attack on Port Royal, and was satisfied with invading Mines and Beaubassin, where he carried off all the cattle he could seize, after opening the dikes, burning houses and doing all the damage he could.

A second expedition under Colonel March was much more serious. Rhode Island and New Hampshire had united with Massachusetts for this decisive onslaught;

but, after a seige of eleven days, March, repulsed at every point, had to re-embark, and, instead of returning to Boston, where he dreaded censure, he took refuge at Casco. Thence he wrote of his failure to Governor Dudley, attributing it to his officers and soldiers, who, he said, had refused to second him. Immense was the chagrin of Boston ; so little was this result anticipated that preparations had actually been made for a pompous celebration of the taking of Port Royal.

Humbled but not discouraged, Governor Dudley, who could not resign himself to disband the troops he had organized with such fine hopes, sent orders to March to keep on board the ships his soldiers, willing or unwilling, and to return immediately to Port Royal with the reinforcement now setting sail. At the same time Dudley appointed three commissioners to superintend the operations of the siege. March, unable to overcome the sadness and dejection to which he was a prey, declined the honor of commanding this new expedition. Wainwright, second in command, had to take charge of it ; but, after another siege and a long one, he also re-embarked without effecting anything. This was in August, 1707.

Thus far, at least, Port Royal had been revictualled and assisted by France, though inadequately. Subercase had been able to satisfy the Indians by some gifts and still more by promises. His kindness to all had sufficed to inspire the courage and ardor that were absolutely necessary in the situation of inferiority in which he was left. All the Captains of Indians, d'Amours d'Echauffours, Saint Aubin, Bellefontaine, de Saillan, Denys de la Ronde, de Saint Castin, de la Tour ; the French corsairs, Francis Guyon, Pierre Maisonnat, de

Morpain, had gathered under him and had helped him with a will. With these and the inhabitants he had enough men to manœuvre outside, to harass the enemy without weakening his garrison, which numbered only about 160 soldiers, three fourths of whom were undisciplined young men picked up on the quays of Paris.

Having heard that a fresh attack was preparing, still more formidable than the preceding ones, Subercase repeatedly urged the Home Government to send reinforcements; but nothing could rouse the apathy of France's rulers. For three long years the colony, destitute of everything, subsisted almost entirely on the booty of the corsairs. As a crowning misfortune, in 1710 the harvest failed, and the corsairs, so numerous the preceding year, were driven from Acadia by an epidemic; so, when in September a large fleet with 3,400 landing forces appeared before Port Royal, there was but one voice in the garrison and colony in favor of immediate surrender.

Though fully aware of his weakness and feeling that he could not come out once more victorious from a conflict in which all the odds were against him, Subercase resolved to tempt fortune, and, without hearkening to the proposals of General Nicholson, commander of the fleet, he prepared to withstand the enemy. The English, on their part, taught circumspection by the unexpected and repeated defeats of past years, set to work with extreme prudence. Several times they were repulsed or had to desist from their investing operations; but Subercase no longer had a body of troops to sally forth from the fortifications and worry the besiegers. The fleet had arrived before Port Royal September 24th, and it

was not till October 12th that the capitulation was signed on quite honorable terms, so honorable indeed, that Nicholson expressed his regret at having accepted them, when he beheld the destitution of the garrison. Provisions were so scarce that Nicholson had to provide the French soldiers with rations before they embarked for France.

Port Royal had become, and this time for good and all, an English town; the destiny of the whole of Acadia was soon to be the same. In the course of a century Port Royal had gone through more vicissitudes than any other American town, more even, than any other from its foundation to our own day. It had been taken, sacked, destroyed, abandoned, retaken; and meanwhile France, seemingly unaware of its importance, untaught by the lessons of experience, unmoved by its hazardous position or by the unjust and cruel fate of its faithful subjects, never thought of ensuring its permanent possession by making such efforts as were called for by the risks and advantages of this stronghold.

Such criminal neglect might seem astounding, were it not repeated elsewhere, and everywhere. This bit of exposed territory had only 2,000 inhabitants when the provinces of New England alone had 150,000. Was it because the sovereigns that governed France, the governors that represented them in Canada or Acadia, did not realize the importance of the colonies they owned? Was it because, as has been said, Frenchmen are not colonizers? No; this is not the true answer. We have plenty of documents proving that the governors of these provinces generally realized, with great perspicacity, the value of these colonies and the way to make them prosperous, powerful and useful to the Home Govern-

ment. We have also some proof, though rarer, that the sovereigns or their ministers saw things in the same light. We have likewise proofs that the spirit of enterprise, boldness and activity were not at all lacking in the French colonist. We know that, in spite of the way in which he was forsaken by France, his activity had familiarized him with the whole interior of the continent, at a time when the English had not yet lost sight of the Atlantic coast. But the colonists needed backing, at least by numbers; they needed a helping hand from the mother country. In an absolute government, which claims all powers and all initiative, which rules and regulates everything, even the peopling of its colonies must be initiated by authority. The expression of a wish or instructions from the throne would have been enough to create an unflagging movement of emigration that would have compared favorably with the emigration from the British Isles. The entire blame lies, I believe, with the throne; not so much because it did not understand the importance of colonizing this country, as because of forgetfulness and neglect begotten of that thoughtlessness and inconstancy that marked all its acts.

“When I compare the result of European wars in the last fifty years,” wrote M. d’Avaugour in 1663, “and the progress that may be made in ten years here, not only does my duty oblige me, but it urges me to speak out boldly. . . . France can, in ten years and with less outlay, secure more real power in America than all its European wars could win for it.”

“Who can undertake,” said Vauban, “anything greater and more useful than a colony? Is it not by this means, rather than by any other, that one can ob-

tain, with all possible justice, aggrandizement and increase?"

And Louis XIV. himself, who for a time seemed to take a serious interest in his colonies, entirely concurred in this view, when he so wisely wrote in 1676 to M. de Champigny, "Intendant" of Canada: "Be thoroughly convinced of this maxim, that it is better to occupy less territory and to people it entirely, than to spread out indefinitely and to have weak colonies at the mercy of the slightest accident."

That was, perhaps, for the great monarch, only a passing thought between two pleasures. Successfully to carry out these fine projects, France was in need of calm and peace; but, ever carried away by the pride, ambition or caprice of her sovereigns, she always lacked the restfulness that alone would have enabled her to give to these designs the sustained attention they demanded. She must dazzle, she must have glory, and, assuredly, not in those lowly hamlets lost in the forests of America could Louis XIV. attain this end. And yet there, more than in aught else, was the future of France. True, it was slow, plodding work, the fruits of which were far distant; but in return what a rich harvest, what solid glory, what lasting greatness was thus cheaply to be earned by France!

There is no more striking proof of her carelessness than the way in which she deserted Acadia. In the course of an entire century this province received barely two hundred colonists, whereas its dangerous situation and its importance would have called for fifty times as many. This was less immigration in a century than the smallest English colony received in one year. In the single summer of 1620 the colony of Virginia wel-

comed 1261 colonists, and it already had 600. In 1625 there came another thousand, and as early as 1646 it had a population of 20,000 souls. Before 1640, 298 ships crowded with immigrants had cast anchor in the port of Boston. On the other hand, it is clear that, unassisted and unencouraged, immigration must have been a negative quantity in a country so helplessly exposed as was Acadia. That it possessed natural advantages was not enough; over and above this there was needed, at the outset, vigorous encouragement to a body of colonists immigrating all together in sufficient numbers to ensure their being able to protect themselves, and thus make up by their multitude for the insecurity of their position. This province, which would thus have been a source of strength to France, really became, on the contrary, a cause of weakness, an ever menacing danger. Very different, indeed, was the reality from the wise maxims which Louis XIV. recommended to his Intendant in Canada.

But what is more inconceivable still, is that, at the very time when Acadia was fighting heroic battles decisive of its fate, Louis XIV., easily seduced by great projects, was seized with a new infatuation for Louisiana and the inland regions leading up to the Great Lakes and to Canada: a great and noble project in truth, which his habitual inconstancy was to reduce to a costly chimera, furnishing fuel for jealousy and hastening the ruin of his colonial empire.

If France can find in the study of her history, as she undoubtedly can, matter for self-glorification, it is surely not in her colonial policy. The wonder is, not that her colonies ended in misfortune, but that they held out so long against such fearful odds. Courage,

energy and well-directed efforts were not lacking in the colonists themselves; this is proved to evidence by their struggles, both in the direction of self-development and extension of French power, and in the way of resistance for so long a time and with such marked success against an enemy that outnumbered them sixteen to one. Here is cause for naught but glorification and astonishment. The shame of failure falls entirely upon that unskilful administration, that witty incapacity, that proud impotence which stamped the policy of France.

The national character, in its good qualities as well as in its defects, had already become well-nigh fixed, and Louis XIV. was its most brilliant expression. Generally speaking, the character of a nation is the result of apparently insignificant circumstances, scarcely noticed when first they appear. Later on, however, and sometimes much later, they make themselves felt. For a long time, and especially during all the middle ages, the most salient points of divergence in the respective characteristics of the nations of Western Europe were, after all, only shades of difference. England differed little from France, France from Spain; all three had acquired the germs of liberty, and it was the expansion or contraction of that liberty which was to have a dominant influence in fixing the special character of each nation, and in stamping each with its essential differentiation. These distinctive qualities were also to influence the future destiny of each nation.

At that remote period France and England were like two streamlets lazily meandering on the same table-land, coming near to each other, then winding further apart, then winding in again; their general trend seems the same; are they going to unite? Perhaps; but, at any

rate, when they have grown by the tribute of many affluents into mighty rivers, they will surely empty into the same ocean. Yet facts belie this forecast: a very slight rise in the land will be enough to change their course and make them flow in opposite directions; one to the east, the other to the west; this one toward one ocean, that one toward another. One was to keep on majestically and peacefully flowing through rich meadows; the other was to leap wildly through narrow gorges, then spread out into a lake, then again narrow into a torrent, crossing now enchanting scenery, now desolate burning deserts. A little bit of a hill had been the insurmountable wall that had decided their respective fates and the flow of their waters. The expansion of the liberties of England, the contraction of those of France was that little hill that sent them in opposite directions through experiences so dissimilar. Had it not been for a seeming trifle, the course followed by the one might have been followed by the other with reversed results.

While the English nobility shut themselves up in their demesnes, thus preserving a certain independence in respect of the sovereign, and some interest in consorting with the people for the conservation and increase of their common liberties, in France all the nobles rushed to court, drawn thither by royal favor and the fascination of pleasure. However insignificant this slender historic detail may seem, it prepared France for the abandonment of the germs of liberty it then possessed; this was the little hill that altered its course and its destiny.

These men, who had become courtiers in quest of honors and favors, athirst for pleasure, held their peace before the encroachments of the king. Deprived of its

defenders, the people could not withstand the clipping of their hard-won privileges. Thus it was that, one after another, the conquests of liberty, both for nobles and commoners, disappeared. When Louis XIV. decided to be his own prime minister; when, waited upon, after the death of Cardinal Mazarin, by the functionaries of state, and asked to whom they must in future apply on questions of public business, he replied, much to their astonishment, "To myself," then was liberty undone. There remained only the precarious splendor of the throne and the doubtful prestige of the past, until the day should come when the state would be the Pompadour or any other favorite courtesan, until, sinking still lower, Louis XV. should be shameless enough to say, "After me the deluge." Nor was this deluge long delayed; a deluge of blood, the prelude of frequent fruitless efforts and violent reactions, of scenes of anger and hatred, glory and humiliation.

England alone escaped the wreck of her liberties. If she was saved from disaster, it was probably not because she had acquired, in that seventeenth century, more wisdom and maturity than other nations, but because of her insular position, because of some insignificant details resulting rather from an apparently fortuitous combination of circumstances than from her own foresight. "England," says Macaulay, "escaped from absolutism, but she escaped very narrowly." It is well for mankind that this exception arose. Those liberties, preserved and increased, constitute England's greatness; her example has set her up as a beacon light to guide the nations in the proper channel.

Viewing the results, men have ascended to the cause thereof and traced out the methods that produced them.

They have imitated England ; they have also imitated the nation that sprang from England, built up by her on this continent out of suitable elements, conditions, tastes and tendencies, in a new land freed from Old World ties. Instead of one model now there are two. With regard to England, the evolution was the work of seeming chance, in answer to the necessities of the moment, in order to escape from the ruinous caprice of a despot, to satisfy that desire of liberty which we all feel more or less ; but by little and little the mists were lifted, the consequences, if not of the future, at least of the past and the present, were better and better understood. It soon became evident that the growth of liberty must be accompanied by the growth of education, that the one was the reason of the other, and that the two, working together, were the fountain-head of all the material progress which our century enjoys.

To study the effects of liberty one must not stop at abstract theory, but must go on to examine methods and facts. Excellent as liberty is in itself, it may be the source of many evils. The study of actual methods teaches that solid results are obtained only by agitation, *i. e.*, by a continual, thoughtful, calm effort leaning on public opinion which it first creates, advancing methodically step by step, by legitimate means on what we might call an easy upward gradient. One reform, one new franchise, becomes a solid and permanent acquisition, as well as a step to other reforms. It is a process of building up and consolidating rather than of destruction.

This method, more even than the liberty it won, is what gives to British institutions that progressive stability which all the world admires. The most important

effect of this method is the moulding of the nation's character. It is this "broadening from precedent to precedent" that has imparted to the English character that calmness, moderation, firmness and dignity which insure its superiority in great undertakings and in its differences with other nations. It is this, too, that has made respect for law and authority almost an instinct with Englishmen. What has been acquired by dint of patient effort is loved and revered; nor are such conquests any longer open to attack. Rulers themselves will respect what is only one step more, one slight sacrifice to the will of the nation freely expressed by its legitimate representatives.

However tardy was sometimes the advent of long-looked-for reforms, no one ever dreamt of imposing them by force against the will of the majority, when experience showed that constitutional agitation and argument gave the best chance of success and the most solid guarantees, provided one were on the side of right and justice. Under these circumstances it was to be expected that the debates of contending parties would necessarily be stamped with calmness and dignity, which were, besides, conducive to success.

One of the results of this well-ordered march from liberty to liberty, from reform to reform, was that parties were generally separated only by shades of difference; essential harmony was rarely marred. When a scarcely perceptible line of demarcation parts us from an adversary, it is possible to come to an understanding with him. The separation was, so to speak, a movable fence that might be shoved back and forth. Instead of living in two distinct camps, quite estranged from one another, there was a certain amount of intercourse, proposals and con-

cessions were in order. Self-possession, moderation, peaceful and courteous discussion were obviously called for in order to husband or to increase one's strength. The distance between one party and the other was sometimes so slight that a little cautious diplomacy was often enough to secure either consent or a majority.

Because she was deprived of these liberties and thrown violently backward, France rushed into revolution. Not being allowed legitimate freedom of evolution, she went into revolution, and overthrew law and order. Perhaps it was her only way out of the chaos and ruin that threatened her. When Louis XIV. confiscated the liberties of France and thus threw her back, he little dreamt that he was preparing the ruin of his dynasty and the death of his second successor. He had himself charged the mine that was to blow up his throne. He was called great because he knew how to dazzle; but, if greatness be measured by the solidity of one's structures and the clear view of consequences, he was very small and very fatal to his country.

This confiscation of the liberties of France is responsible for the momentous events of which she has since been the scene, and these events in their turn have intensified both her own native defects and those which she shared with other nations governed as she was. Had she slowly developed along the lines of freedom, she would, by the very force of circumstances, have not only kept her own good qualities, but also acquired most of those which have accrued to England. For want of this wisdom, she has rushed into a series of revolutions of which the end is probably not yet. Freedom forced upon people by bloodshed cannot be true freedom; it will always be odious to many and therefore of uncertain tenure. If

imposed by revolution, the same means will be employed to destroy it; hence contempt of law and of one's adversaries, rancor, injustices, conspiracies; hence a special tendency of the national character that stiffens into a fixed habit of mind. Between the man that desires a republic and the man that desires a return to the old order of things yawns a gulf that is very hard to bridge. They have no points of contact; even socially, they are strangers, and if they have any knowledge of each other, it will be mostly founded on slander. Their natural weapons will be violence and insult.

Thus the slight divergences of three or four centuries ago have become strong contrasts through the choice of different methods. This we realize to-day; but our forefathers did not. It was not in view of an ideal dream or according to a preconceived plan that liberty gradually was introduced into England. Men acted merely according to the exigencies of the moment in order to supply fresh wants. Yet experience has set great store by these liberties thus acquired. People were gradually educated up to an intelligent comprehension of what is called the theory of social evolution, a theory which, in France, has recently been styled opportunism. Thus it is that we are ever advancing toward new horizons that should be studied and, if possible, foreseen; thus it is that events are ever occurring the tendency and ultimate significance of which we cannot so much as conjecture.

Whilst England, by her steady progress in the widening field of liberty, grew greater and greater, France, tending towards absolutism, was, amidst bursts of dazzling glory, gradually losing as much as her rival gained. The time came when the latter sought not only to re-

cover what she had lost, what it had cost England three hundred years to maintain and develop, but also to take a forward leap of several centuries. Then a useful experience proved that the social edifice has no stability unless it be built up slowly, stone upon stone, with plumb-line and cement carefully applied to each. When, however, the edifice has been raised without these precautions, and consequently threatens to fall, it may be necessary to pull it down.

All the teachings of the past lead to the belief that England followed the true, the better course. But, in such matters, error is always possible, because, to the immediate and visible results, must be added others that are invisible and distant, and sometimes very different from those which seem startlingly clear. We are witnesses, on the one hand, of the first consequences of evolution; on the other, of revolution; or rather of slow evolution and rapid evolution. For this century, at least, the advantage is clearly on the side of slow evolution. But who can foretell with certainty the remote consequences in future ages? It is the secret of Providence. In all social questions this principle holds: immediate or proximate results may be very different from remote consequences. The human mind is, after all, despairingly limited. It often happens that what is practical wisdom in the long run comes from reputed fools. Statues are erected in honor of those who have foreseen immediate or proximate effects. Those who have had intuitions of more distant results are sometimes locked up.

It may be for the interest of mankind at large that nations work out their destinies in various ways. Human progress is a congeries of acquired experiences.

The doings of one people are noted by another, matured, weighed, accepted or rejected entirely or partially; the residuum of good becomes the property of the civilized world.

One thing seems quite certain: England has won the first game. Her methods of success have been studied; they have been and still are useful to all nations. Shall she lose the next innings? It is the secret of the future, the secret which statesmen are striving to discover. All nations may have special hopes and consoling forecasts; but, at any rate, it is undeniable that England, by opening up the path, has got a start that she may very well be proud of. Some may question if her advance has not been too slow, if the habits thus formed may not be some day a source of danger. For her that slowness was a necessity; she was feeling her way from the known to the unknown. Now that the territory is mostly mapped out, it is easy for other nations to take a short cut and suppress some of the old, painful, round-about tramping. But England's traditional wisdom gives us every reason to trust she will always be willing to move on in time to avoid any dangers that may threaten her.

Highly as I value the good points which liberty and the struggle therefor have brought out in the institutions and character of England, I am far from admiring everything English or blaming everything French. The scope of this work does not admit of insisting on the defects of the picture. Else I might point to a series of shameful acts very often far worse than the worst deeds of France. Taking all in all, not only was England's seventeenth century no better than the same period in France; but, in many respects, it was worse than the

eighteenth in France. Nevertheless, in the midst of her deepest humiliations England was collecting materials for future greatness. If deeds of shame were, in a sense, an outcome of the struggle for liberty, it was the stubbornness and encroachments of the crown that provoked them; they were the offspring of absolutism and of those who sacrificed to it the interests of the nation, nor can they be fathered on the valiant defenders of liberty. Courage and disinterestedness were needed to expose one's self to the royal displeasure, to persecutions, to ruin, to decapitation. No wonder most of the high functionaries sacrificed, when the sacrifice was an essential condition, honor, principles and humanity in order to preserve or obtain royal favors. Those men, who seem to us bereft of all honorable feeling, might have been, under other circumstances, the ornament of their race; in fact their only fault, perhaps, was rating ambition above virtue.

In this world of ours there is no such thing as un-mixed good. The purest joys are the reward of suffering. This is true of liberty, and still more true of the struggle to obtain and preserve it. This struggle was necessary, and the defections, treachery and crime were unavoidable. Would liberty have given to England such favorable results, had it been acquired without resistance? Would it be as highly valued? Would it have taken on that stability which has hitherto secured it from all vicissitudes? Probably not.

So long as England was in the painful period of incubation, so long as the nations of Europe could see only the evils accompanying those conflicts for liberty, it was perhaps impossible for them to grasp the good result that was to follow. The very bitterness of the

contest for freedom must necessarily have produced special crimes from which the undisputed absolutism of the French monarchy was exempt. The fruits of liberty could not be tasted and appreciated until the conflict had cooled down by the final triumph of Parliamentary supremacy. No wonder, then, that Louis XIV., or even the French nobility, seeing contemporary facts, judged that the absolute rule of the sovereign was the only means of ensuring unity of action, stability, order, harmony and the elements of greatness. What they witnessed in their own day must have convinced them that they were right. Very likely they saw, in those intestine struggles, only the attempt of a few to gratify their passions or further their own interests at the expense of the nation's weal. Could they then descry the far-off effects of this liberty on the national character, effects that were only as yet dimly outlined in a maze of striking disadvantages? So long as France was in the hands of a sovereign like Louis XIV., who dazzled her by his greatness, she could delude herself with the fancy that things would remain ever thus. It needed the follies of the Regency and of Louis XV.; it needed ruin and humiliation to rouse her from her torpor, to make her realize that she was at the mercy of the infrequent virtues and very frequent vices of her kings.

France has had many severe lessons. Will she profit by them? We must hope so. Will she get back what she has lost? This again we may hope for: one or two centuries are of small account in the life of a nation. We may hope that she will at length reach a state of equilibrium, and, having secured that, will advance with constant and measured steps. She will always be, we hope, great in her genius, in her activity of mind, in

noble and generous ideas, in science, in the love of the beautiful. But, what she will never regain is the high place she has lost, the part she once played in the civilizing and peopling of the globe. If France has declined somewhat, or rather if she has not advanced as much as was to be expected; if she be destined to decline still more, she can trace this decline to her want of expansion, to her lack of colonies. When France and England were contending for the possession of North America, the latter had only thirteen millions of inhabitants, whereas the former had twenty-seven millions. Look at the situation to-day. The United Kingdom has thirty-seven millions, France only thirty-eight millions, while in North America alone there are almost seventy millions of men that speak the language and are impregnated with the ideas and special characteristics of Britain. How shall it be in one, two or three centuries, when England will have developed mighty empires in the vast colonies under her sway? It matters little that these colonies should become independent of the mother country; even when her daughters leave her, their influence and prestige is none the less traceable to their fruitful parent.

Yet, not to the unfruitfulness of the French race is this contrast to be attributed. Any doubt on this question would be set aside by the prodigious expansion of the Canadians and Acadians, an expansion the only equal of which perhaps is that of the Boers.

When European governments, in the last two centuries, strove to found colonies, they did not, as far as we can judge, reckon with this increase and spread of population. They were naturally inclined to think their colonizing movements would weaken the mother

country. They simply yielded to the pressure of commercial interest. But experience has since proved that the increase of population was largely due to increased space and to the elbow-room thus afforded. Here, again, is one of those far-off consequences, invisible to one generation and yet visible to another, to which I alluded a moment ago.

It is highly probable that British statesmen did not foresee, any better than those of France, the future of their colonies. Neither did they create and develop these colonies according to a set plan and on fixed principles, foreseeing, arranging and maturing everything. The contrary of all this would be nearer the truth. In this respect the English government was not more active, nor more provident than the French. True, British immigration was considerable from the outset; but it was mostly all due to private initiative. As for the Puritans and the Quakers, it was an asylum from intolerance. They wanted and hoped to govern themselves, or at least to be free from hindrances to freedom of conscience. France never held out similar hopes to the Huguenots. All other immigrants were either traders or colonists pure and simple.

While the pernicious influence of the French court was weakening the nobility, in England the gentry and the rich merchants were eager for distant enterprises. In this latter country it was enough to let that private initiative have its way which in France was excluded and paralyzed by the habit of waiting in all things for the orders and regulations of royalty. Had the Huguenots been allowed the same freedom of action as the Puritans, they would have been only too glad to set up for themselves outside of France in her colonies; so

would the religious orders ; but, for the latter as well as for the former, it was feared that they might acquire too much independence and power. Thus, between inaction on the one hand and obstacles on the other, the colonies were left to struggle on in their impotent way. I am not aware that the English Government made more efforts at the outset for the peopling of her colonies than France did. The obstacles the latter opposed to the Huguenots the former also opposed to the Puritans ; but—here comes in an important difference, on which perhaps depended the fate of the English colonies—England yielded to entreaties, and less than a century later that flourishing colony of the Puritans numbered 75,000 souls, four times the entire population of New France. So true is it that the fate of empires frequently turns on apparently insignificant events.

Nor did England govern her colonies much better than France did hers. Like France, England granted ridiculous charters which handed over and confiscated vast domains, ill-defined charters which annulled each other or which were annulled according to caprice. Nor, again, were the British immigrants any better than the French. Quite the contrary : when France undertook to send colonists, she was too fastidious, while England was perhaps not sufficiently painstaking in her choice.

Here the Puritans are not included : they were not *sent* to the colonies ; having left England, they had taken refuge in Holland, and they succeeded in effecting a colonial settlement in America only by dint of begging for permission to do so. Their motives were of the most exalted kind. Most praiseworthy were the morals of those families seeking an asylum where they might live

according to their convictions. They sought neither riches nor pleasure, nor the satisfactions of vanity and ambition; yet they found, together with the asylum they had desired, all that frugality, orderliness, economy and intelligence could procure. It was this undesired emigration that turned out best for the strength of England.

Not so with the colony of Virginia. At first picked families were sent thither; but soon recruits came from all quarters, and immigration, lapsing into a commercial venture, gradually deteriorated till it became altogether bad. High bounties made the recruiting of clerks and servants for the great colonizing companies a matter of money grabbing. Boys of 14 and 15 and even sickly youths, says Rameau,* were kidnapped from sea-ports; agents embarked all the vagabonds and jail-birds that felt the need of going far away from places where they were too well known. A still more revolting spectacle on the shores of the New World was the sale of contracts which were often wholly fictitious. In truth this was the organizing of a white slave trade with slavery for a term of years; from that to the negro slave trade with indefinite slavery was only a step, and that step was soon taken.

“As early as 1619,” says Hildreth, “1,200 immigrants came to Virginia; among them were 100 vagabonds or old offenders, who were sold like the rest, and also 20 negroes, who were brought thither and sold by a certain Dutch captain; these were the first.”

The British Government, taking the hint thus given, saw its way to getting rid of all its prisoners: transportation, in fact, saved the expenses of their mainte-

* Quoting Carlier and Bancroft.

nance at home, while the sale of their services actually brought in money. These living consignments became frequent; nor was the transportation confined to criminals; it was soon extended to political prisoners, and thus the civil dissensions of England became a fruitful source of English emigration to Virginia, and afterward gradually to the other colonies, even to New England.

“This traffic in men of British race became so common * that not only the Scotch who had been made prisoners at the battle of Dunbar, were shipped to America to be there made slaves, but also the royalists that fell into the power of the Parliamentary party at the battle of Worcester, as well as the leaders of the revolt of Penruddor were embarked for the colonies. In Ireland the transportations of Irish Catholics were numerous and frequent, and accompanied with such cruel treatment as to be scarcely better than the atrocities of the African slave trade. In 1685 nearly a thousand prisoners, compromised in the rebellion of Monmouth, were condemned to deportation, and forthwith many of the men that were influential at Court wrangled over this prey as over a most profitable merchandise.”

Thus the British Government had but a small share in the peopling of the colonies, and this share is perhaps not very creditable. However, for one reason or another, the blunders of England were not so grave as those of France, with this further difference that the very blunders of England became ultimately profitable. Perhaps it was better to be less exacting in the choice of emigrants and to fill up the colonies than to remain inactive and especially to hinder emigration. **Those**

* Rameau quoting Carlier and Bancroft.

criminals must live somewhere, and it may have been preferable to suffer them to settle in a new country, where, finding more numerous and varied advantages, they might become moral and prosperous subjects. The original population was moral and numerous enough to absorb without too much harm to itself those outcasts of society. Nevertheless, if the facts themselves are excusable, the method of operation was not so: nothing can excuse the British Government for having, not only tolerated, but originated that hateful white slave trade which was soon to issue in the regular negro slave trade and to taint in their very fountain-head the really excellent qualities of an infant nation.

France made another mistake in not colonizing, as she might have done, the Atlantic coast from Virginia northward, or at least a considerable portion of that coast, so as to secure a greater variety of climate. Trade was, of course, the motive power at the time the colonies were founded. France made the first choice, and, as regards the fur trade and the fisheries, that choice must have been considered, at least for the first half century, the best. Similarly, it was the gold craze that first led multitudes to California in 1849; yet, in the long run, the soil and the climate were found to be greater sources of prosperity than the richest mines. This climatic blunder may have contributed more than anything else to keep France in a state of great numerical inferiority in America. People did not care to emigrate to Acadia because it was too much exposed to attacks, nor to Canada because the climate was too severe or not sufficiently varied. Probably it was to repair this mistake that Louis XIV. had conceived the project of colonizing the Illinois country and the Upper Mississippi; but it

was then too late. Voltaire gave expression to this idea, when, with his witty flippancy, he said that, after all, France was giving up "only a few acres of snow."

It has become the fashion to say that the Frenchman is no colonizer. No doubt he has now no great reputation in that line; but the reason is that France has no longer a single colony favorably situated as a home for the white race. The Frenchman is no longer a colonizer, because, amid the turmoil of revolutions and counter-revolutions, amid constant struggles with his European neighbors, he never has had leisure to take a serious interest in his colonies. But I cannot admit that the Frenchman, in the seventeenth or eighteenth century, was not quite as good at colonizing as the Englishman, the Spaniard or the Dutchman. The only things that handicapped the Frenchman were his paternalism in government and the disadvantages of his position in Europe. As to Frenchmen themselves, what they achieved here on American soil seems utterly to contradict the assertion that they did not know how to colonize.

Having explained their numerical inferiority by causes that do not imply an absence of the colonizing spirit, I find that those who settled in Canada gave proofs of physical aptitude, of energy, of skill, of courage, which, in many respects, seem superior to anything of the sort the British colonists could show. Else, how could the French have held their own during a century and a half against an enemy that outnumbered them sixteen to one? What wonderful achievements would have been theirs, had they been, I will not say sixteen times as numerous as the English, but fairly matched in point of numbers? Were they not singularly gifted, those men who penetrated into the interior of the continent and

founded settlements and outposts in countries that were as yet unknown to the American colonist? The settlements of Frontenac, Detroit, Green Bay, Vincennes, and other colonies in Illinois date back as far as 1680. So great was the activity and boldness of the inhabitants of Detroit that they offered to throw three thousand colonists into the adjoining territory, so as to command the whole interior of the continent, provided the French Government would fill up the void by encouraging a strong emigration to Canada.

Forsaken by the mother country, without direction or assistance, the colonists faced the difficulties of their position with a courage and an intelligence that were seldom at fault. By the superiority of their methods and by their wise forecasts they acquired a great ascendancy over the minds of the Indians. It is remarkable that the French never had to fight the Indians of the countries they occupied, nay, that they made them their faithful allies even in the most critical junctures. Everybody knows that it fared quite otherwise with the British colonies. Whether through acts of injustice, or haughty and arbitrary measures, or for some other cause, they did not know how to make friends of the Indians: hence terrible deeds of vengeance provoking the British settlers to exterminate the savage in self-defence against dangers that they had not the wisdom to avert.

"In fine," says Rameau, "the point in which the intelligence of the French colonists shone forth with especial brilliancy was their keen appreciation of topography and of their local environment, of which they unflinchingly made an excellent use. This it was that enabled them to maintain the defensive and to succeed in attack. Their quickness and sureness in seizing the

main point, their skill in planning, their promptness in deciding, their energy in acting were no whit inferior to their robustness of constitution, suppleness of body, sobriety and austerity of habit."

When finally they succumbed, it was only because they seemed exhausted by their victories after having for a long time and repeatedly gained advantages that made the ultimate result doubtful. When Port Royal fell, it had twice resisted an army that was more numerous than the entire population of Acadia. And, when Canada in its turn was forced to yield to the invader, it had only five or six thousand soldiers left to withstand the sixty thousand of the enemy. Canada had then but sixty thousand souls, whereas the British provinces had more than a million.

I have not the slightest wish to depreciate the English colonists, nor to extol unduly the French, nor even to institute comparisons; both had their good qualities and their defects, rather difficult to estimate satisfactorily; but, to any one who will put away from him the glamour of success and view the question on its merits, it will appear evident that, minor differences apart, the Frenchman was, at that time, as good a colonizer as any other European. The failure of French colonization is traceable entirely to the faults I have pointed out, all of which are to be imputed to the Home Government and to an untoward combination of events.

CHAPTER II.

Surrender of Port Royal, Oct. 13th, 1710—Articles of the capitulation—Cession of Port Royal with the territory "within cannon-shot"—Vetch named governor of the place—Five inhabitants of Port Royal made prisoners—The garrison decimated by sickness—Saint Castin comes with 42 Abenakis to direct operations against the fort—Battle of "Bloody Creek"—Port Royal besieged—The Acadians of the ceded territory withdraw—The garrison is reinforced and the projected siege is abandoned.

THE surrender of Port Royal to Nicholson by de Subercase was signed Oct. 13th, 1710. He had resisted most heroically for nineteen days, and merited no less honor by his surrender than he had done in the two preceding sieges by repelling the enemy. The struggle was hopeless and surrounded with circumstances which would induce even the bravest to withhold making any effort. Alone with a few chosen officers, he withstood the general call for an immediate surrender. It was difficult to impose his will and to revive men's courage when there was no hope of success; when to want, to privation, to the superior strength of the enemy, to the uselessness of his repeated efforts, was added a still graver circumstance, complete abandonment by the Home Government. There was room for no feeling but discouragement, when Subercase displayed such energy and skill that he restored their drooping spirits. His constancy won for him the admiration of his enemies

together with most honorable conditions of surrender, which were carried out by the English General with great fidelity.

The articles of the capitulation referred only to Port Royal and the dependent territory within cannon-shot thereof. To be brief I omit the articles of the capitulation which relate to the garrison, and restrict my attention to what concerned the inhabitants of the ceded territory, for there is no question at all of the rest of Acadia.

ARTICLE V. "That the inhabitants within cannon-shot of Port Royal shall remain upon their estates, with their corn, cattle and furniture, during two years, in case they are not desirous to go before, they taking the oath of allegiance and fidelity to Her Sacred Majesty of Great Britain."

In a memorandum accompanying the articles of the capitulation, Gen. Nicholson declares that "within cannon-shot" ought to be understood to be "three English miles around this fort." The number of persons comprised within this space according to a list presented to the General was 481.

To have a correct view of the situation we should not lose sight of the fact that this capitulation was limited only to Port Royal and the country comprised within a radius of three miles from the fort. The inhabitants of this district had two years at most allowed them to pass over to the French territory with all their movable goods; but, pending their decision thereupon, they were to take the oath of allegiance and fealty; which they did. We find nowhere the terms of this oath, but we suppose it must have been very carefully worded, in order to make sure that, in the meantime, they would

do nothing against the peace and the interest of the English government, until their final decision to remain or depart within two years. The circumstances themselves preclude any other interpretation. We should not forget that whatever was outside this three-mile radius remained meanwhile French territory; it is well also to remark that the war between the two nations continued for nearly three years until the treaty of Utrecht. A clear view of these facts is necessary for the better understanding of what follows, and for avoiding the confusion into which so many historians have heretofore fallen.

After the departure of the French garrison, Nicholson reembarked with his troops on the 28th of October, leaving in the fort, as Lieutenant-governor, Colonel Vetch, with about 450 soldiers. From Boston Nicholson set out for London, where he succeeded in organizing an expedition for the conquest of Canada by land and sea; he himself had the command of the troops who were to operate on Montreal through Lake Champlain; but, owing to the unskilfulness of Admiral Walker, the fleet suffered grievous disaster opposite the Ile aux Œufs, and so the expedition was abandoned.

During this time, desertions, but, still more, sickness, reduced so greatly the Annapolis (Port Royal) garrison that, according to an eye-witness, there remained only a hundred able-bodied soldiers at the end of the following June.

With the enemy in such a plight, it became easy enough, for the Acadians who were outside the limits comprised in the capitulation, to engage in hostilities and even to seize upon the fort. Here was an excellent and easy opportunity for retaliation. This they signified to

de St. Castin who had previously been named Lieutenant of the King of France in this district. The movement was sufficiently apparent to make the governor of the garrison anxious, and often detachments of his troops ventured abroad in order to watch the manœuvres of the people both within and without the bounding circle. In one of these excursions two deserters of the garrison, one being a certain Abraham Gaudet of Beaubassin, and three half-breeds, strangers to the place, captured the commissary of the garrison whom, however, they released, for a small ransom. The governor, thinking that there had been connivance between these men and some inhabitants of Annapolis, arrested Wm. Bourgeois, Peter Leblanc and John Comeau of Annapolis as well as Germain Bourgeois of Beaubassin and Francis Brassard of Chipody, who were passing through Annapolis. We have no account of what may have been the result of their trial.*

Saint Castin, whose warlike humor was never at rest so long as there were blows to be given or received, was easily prevailed upon to come and take part in the struggle which the Acadians up the river were preparing to have with the English. With forty-two Abenakis of the Penobscot river he succeeded in crossing the Bay of Fundy and by his stealthy march escaped even the suspicion of the garrison. In one of their usual sallies,

* Haliburton gives quite a different version from that of Murdoch. According to the former these arrests were intended to keep these men as hostages, and by means of threats to prevent those who were not included in the capitulation from committing any hostile act. "This hostile disposition of the French settlers," says he, "induced the officer commanding at Port Royal to apprehend the priest and five of the most respectable inhabitants of the district as hostages for the good behaviour of their countrymen, who were informed that, upon similar attempt, these prisoners should suffer military execution."

eighty men of the garrison under the command of Captain Pigeon advanced as far as twelve miles from the fort, intending to surprise some Indian warriors who, by their threats, were preventing the inhabitants of Annapolis from furnishing the wood necessary to the fortifications. Saint Castin, who was watching the movements of this troop, surprised them in a place ever since called Bloody Creek. Thirty soldiers and officers were killed and the rest made prisoners.

The position of the garrison was becoming critical, if it be true, which, however, leaves room for doubt, that, before this encounter, there remained only a hundred soldiers able to bear arms. This event was unfortunate as are all those that result from war; but it cannot be judged otherwise than as legitimate warfare, since the action took place twelve miles from Annapolis and nine miles outside the territory ceded by the capitulation. The successful combatants were French subjects on French territory; it was in time of war and moreover an act of self-defence against their assailants. Some writers, forgetting the terms of the capitulation, speak of this affair as if at that time the whole of Acadia had been ceded, and as if these men had been guilty of treachery. This is clearly a mistake.

During this time Abbé Gaulin, parish priest of Mines, tried to organize an expedition against Annapolis. He succeeded in getting together two hundred men, whom he intrusted to Saint Castin. Annapolis was invested for the purpose of attacking the fort, when the ammunition and cannons, which they expected from Newfoundland, should arrive; but, as this help did not come, and as, on other hand, the garrison received a reinforcement, they gave up their project and dispersed.

Before investing Annapolis, writes Murdoch, "All the inhabitants withdrew out of cannon-shot from the fort, and they also transported their cattle up the river. Those of the *banlieue* (within cannon-shot) intimated to the governor that he had violated the articles of the capitulation to their prejudice, and that they were thereby freed from the oaths they had taken not to bear arms; after which they joined their compatriots in blockading the Fort."

I have much respect for this author, whom I look upon as a sure guide in all questions of fact: yet I must say I have nowhere found the confirmation of the last part of this citation. Was it simply an inference from the declaration that precedes it? I think so. Though not a strictly logical inference, it might be justifiable. In what did the governor violate the articles of the capitulation? I do not know, and strong reasons would be required to justify such conduct. The time was likewise badly chosen to take advantage of any violation whatever, and the circumstances give rise to a serious suspicion about the fairness of these reasons.

Nevertheless, for want of precise information on the nature and gravity of these reasons, we can perhaps supply more or less what is wanting by a document which has an intimate connection with the question, and which makes us see, as far as we can judge by the account of one side only, what was the fate reserved for the Acadians by Governor Vetch. Some months before this incident the inhabitants residing within the limits of the territory comprised in the capitulation sent to the Governor of Canada, M. de Vaudreuil, by M. de Clignancourt, the following letter:

"As Your goodness extends over all those who, being subjects of

His Majesty, have recourse to you to relieve them in their misery, we pray you will vouchsafe us your assistance to *withdraw ourselves from this country*. . . . M. de Clignancourt will tell you better than we can do by a letter, *the harsh manner in which Governor Vetch treats us, keeping us like negroes*, and wishing to persuade us that we are under great obligation to him for not treating us much worse, being able, he says, to do so with justice, and without having room to complain of it. We have given to M. de Clignancourt copies of *three ordinances* which M. Vetch has issued. We pray you, sir, to have regard to our misery, and to honor us with your letter for our consolation, expecting that you may furnish the necessary assistance *for our retiring from this unhappy country.*"

CHAPTER III.

Treaty of Utrecht—Cession of Acadia—Clauses of the treaty and letter of Queen Anne—Lieutenant-Governor Vetch opposes the departure of the Acadians—Arrival of Governor Nicholson—MM. de la Ronde and Pinsens at Port Royal to remove obstacles to their departure—Referred to the Queen—Subterfuges—Character of Nicholson and of Vetch—Compilation of the archives of Nova Scotia—Artifices of the Compiler, his partiality, etc., etc.

THE war between France and England was at last terminated, and, April 13, 1713, at Utrecht, was signed the treaty of peace which definitively ceded Acadia to England. Nothing in this treaty defined the extent and limits of the country which France ceded, but these were to be determined, later on, by a commission to be appointed by the two Crowns. Pending this decision, France, by the terms of the treaty, ceded: "All of Nova Scotia or Acadia comprised in its ancient limits, as also the city of Port Royal." It was, as may be seen, difficult to make such a badly worded declaration the basis of a mutual understanding. What Acadia was, what Nova Scotia had been or then was, had never been defined with precision; but the question, already so knotty, was still more stupidly complicated by this additional clause, "as also the city of Port Royal," as if Acadia or Nova Scotia composed only one part of the peninsula to which the treaty, by extension, added on Port Royal. This could not be the intention of the

parties, since Port Royal was essentially a part of Acadia, since it had been its cradle and the seat of government for a whole century. It was a gross error, so gross that it could not be invoked or maintained as far as Port Royal was concerned ; but the insertion of this additional clause still left in the mind the vague idea that Acadia or Nova Scotia could at most be understood only of the peninsula. These difficulties were to be resolved fifty years later by force of arms.

Article XIV. of the treaty of Utrecht, which defined the situation of the Acadians is couched in these terms :

“ It is expressly provided that in all the said places and colonies to be yielded and restored by the Most Christian King in pursuance of this treaty, the subjects of the said King *may have liberty to remove themselves within a year to any other place, as they shall think fit, with all their movable effects.* But those who are willing to remain here, and to be subjects to the kingdom of Great Britain, are to enjoy the free exercise of their religion according to the usage of the Church of Rome as far as the laws of Great Britain do allow the same.”

The better to define this situation, but still more to please the king of France, in return for some of the latter's acts of kindness to his Protestant subjects, Queen Anne agreed to relieve the Acadians from the rigor of the terms of the treaty. The new terms are contained in her letter to Governor Nicholson, dated June 23, 1713 :

“ To our trusty and well-beloved Francis Nicholson, Governor of our Province of Nova Scotia or Acadia, etc., etc.

“ Whereas our good brother, the Most Christian King, hath, at our desire, released from imprisonment on board his galleys, such of his subjects as were detained there on account of their professing the Protestant religion ; We, being willing to show by some mark of our favor towards his subjects, how kind we take his compliance there-

in, have therefore thought fit hereby to signify our will and pleasure to you, that you permit such of them as have any lands or tenements in the places under our Government in Acadia and Newfoundland, that have been or are to be yielded to us by virtue of the late treaty of peace, and are willing to continue our subjects, *to retain and enjoy their said lands and tenements without any molestation*, as fully and freely as other our subjects do or may possess their lands or estates, *or to sell the same, if they shall rather choose to remove elsewhere*. And for so doing, this shall be your warrant.

“ By Her Majesty’s command,

“ DARTMOUTH.”

The situation of the Acadians was thus established by Art. XIV. of the treaty and by this letter. In its essential points this situation was very clear. They had, besides the free exercise of their religion, the choice either to remain in the country, keeping the ownership of all they possessed, *or to leave the country, bringing away with them all their movable goods and also the proceeds of the sale of their immovable property*. This letter did not specify any time for their departure. This omission, if it were one, might throw some doubt on this point. The treaty, which was three months previous, fixed the delay to a year. Was it then to be understood that the time fixed by this treaty continued to be what the treaty had made it, or did it become unlimited? The remark that the compiler of the archives of Nova Scotia adds at the foot of the document might make us believe that he adopts the second interpretation. Such, however, could not be his intention, for, when we have better understood the motives which always animated this compiler, we shall understand better that he could not accept an interpretation which would have been so favorable to the Acadians. I am inclined to believe and I deem it my duty to say so, that,

strictly speaking, the delay fixed by the treaty was not modified by the letter of Queen Anne.

This distinction is after all of little importance, because, from that time forth the Acadians had decided to leave the province, and even then they were actively preparing to do so. This departure would have been accomplished in the autumn of 1713, had it not been for the obstacles opposed thereto by Governor Vetch, and repeated under different forms by Nicholson, Cauldfield, Doucette, Phillips, Armstrong, and later still by Cornwallis. During seventeen years (1713-1730) all the events of Acadia are connected with the artifices used to prevent this departure and rivet the Acadians to the soil by an oath of allegiance. To suppress these facts is to render the history of this period unintelligible and altogether false. For some reason or other, whether it be for not having had access to the documents which we possess or for other less avowable reasons, these facts have not come to light or even been touched either by historians or by the compiler of the archives of Nova Scotia.

As to this gentleman, I have declared in my preface, without hesitation and without reticence, that the volume which he compiled has been put together with great partiality and with the intention of prejudicing the public against the Acadians. This grave accusation I have uttered deliberately after mature reflection and without laying aside for a single moment the benevolence and charity that animates me; but to judge it well, it will be necessary to peruse this work, since my reasons are based upon the facts and developed from them as they present themselves in the course of the narrative. To explain the circumstances of this

publication let me say at the outset that the Legislative Assembly of Nova Scotia on April 30, 1857, on motion of Honorable Joseph Howe, adopted the following resolution :

“That His Excellency the Governor be respectfully requested to cause the ancient records and documents illustrative of the history and progress of society in this Province, to be examined, preserved and arranged, either for reference or publication, as the Legislature may hereafter determine.”

What precedes, as also what follows, is extracted from the very preface of the volume of the Archives, compiled by Thomas B. Akins in virtue of this resolution and of those which followed.

“In the following year the Lieut.-Governor was authorized by the Assembly to procure from *the State Paper Office, in England*, copies of any dispatches or documents that may be found *necessary to complete our files*.

“In 1859, by another vote of the House, he was empowered to procure from the Government of Canada, *copies of such papers in the Archives of Quebec* as related to the early history of Acadia.”

The compiler afterwards adds his personal reflections in the following manner :

“The expulsion of the Acadians from Nova Scotia is an important event in the history of British America, and has lately derived peculiar interest from the frequent reference made to it by modern writers. Although much has been written on the subject, yet, *until lately*, it has undergone little actual investigation, and, *in consequence*, the necessity for their removal has not been clearly perceived and the motives which led to its enforcement have been often *mis-understood*. I have, therefore, carefully selected all documents in possession of the Government of this Province, that could in any way *throw light on the history and conduct of the Acadians*.”

In this preface two distinct parts are to be kept in view, (1) that which relates to the end the Legislature had in view, namely: to unite in one volume the most

important documents that might serve for the general history of the Province, and to procure in London and Quebec those which should be judged useful to fill up the deficiencies of the Archives of Nova Scotia; and (2) that which relates to the compiler's own private ends. Even without reading between the lines, it is easy to see that the end of Mr. Akins was not exactly the same as that of the Legislature.

The special purpose he had in view was to comprise in this volume all the documents that could throw some light on the causes that furnished motives for the expulsion of the Acadians. In substance he says, *up to the present time these motives have not been understood*. Precisely so; during a century historians had been astray, and he, Mr. Akins, was going to set all future historians once more on the right path; he was going to group together all that might be injurious to the Acadians, and to make his volume a convenient and easy arsenal where writers might come to seek weapons against those poor Acadians, to whom all this would be a mystery, and who would suffer in silence whatever insults these writers would be pleased to heap upon them.

In matters of history, any plausible opinion, whether it be or not the result of the aberrations of the mind or of the heart, is to be respected, and Mr. Akins could very well entertain the opinions which he expresses in his preface; but I am surely justified in finding him presumptuous when he ventures to condemn the writers of a whole century, including those who were contemporaries of these events; and in branding as unbecoming and injudicious his inserting in a preface his own opinions on events which were narrated in the compilation he was charged to make. This compilation had to be

impartial, or it would deviate from the end which the Legislature had in view ; and, if the fitness of things did not move Mr. Akins, his shrewdness should have made him hold his tongue lest his work should seem biassed. And to show how great indeed was his want of tact, I may say that his preface itself made me believe that he must be partial and prejudiced, and, starting therefrom, I studied him closely, compared, meditated, and finally arrived at this clear and plain conclusion, that his partiality was outdone only by his bad faith.

For the moment, let it be sufficient to say that this volume is in reality not, as the Legislature wished it to be, a collection of the most important documents relating to the general history of the province, but a collection of all that could appear to justify the deportation of the Acadians ; that it omits all or nearly all the explanations that might be favorable to them, and systematically excludes all that was unfavorable to the governors. And, let not the reader imagine that I have purposely hunted up the omissions I charge him with in order to introduce them into this work ; the very importance of those which I point out by the way, shows that I have not stopped at the trifles which abound, but that, on the contrary, I have kept silence on many grave facts in order not to encumber my work.

The first documents, introduced into the volume of the archives, are dated November, 1714. It seems to me clear that the intention of the legislature must have been to comprise therein all the documents since the taking of Port Royal in 1710, or at least since April, 1713, the date of the treaty of peace. The documents between this date and November, 1714, were particularly important, in order to determine in a precise manner what had

been done both by the governors and by the Acadians in respect of those clauses of the treaty that referred to the departure. The Acadians had the space of a year to withdraw with their effects, their cattle and the outcome of the sale of their immovable goods: we know by the sequel that very few of them left their country at that time; but did they wish to leave? were they prevented from doing so? that is what we might expect to see in the volume of the archives. To find light on this obscure point, I had to search elsewhere, and, as will be seen, the result of my researches is of great importance and diametrically opposed to the pretensions of the Compiler.

By leaving out all the documents between 1710 and the end of 1714 he has led into error nearly all the writers that have written the history of Nova Scotia. They begin where the Compiler begins; they finish where he finishes; they omit what he has omitted, they skip what he has skipped. I suppose all this is done in very good faith, and if I mention this, it is rather to show that the Compiler has attained his end, that he will continue to do so just so long as his motives are not understood, so long as it is not known that there is beyond his volume a vast unexplored field, which explains what he did not wish to disclose, which makes us take the proper measure of the man and his work. In the part which claims our attention at present, unless we search elsewhere for the means to fill up this serious void, he obliges us to enter on the scene in the second act of the drama; which may leave many things unexplained and inexplicable.*

*To be brief and to avoid all confusion, I will hereafter use the term 'The Compiler' to designate Thomas B. Akins, compiler of the archives of Nova Scotia.

At the taking of Port Royal, Colonel Vetch, as I have said, had been appointed lieutenant-governor of the place. The following year he went to rejoin Nicholson in his projected expedition against Montreal, leaving in his place, as administrator, Sir Charles Hobby; when this undertaking was abandoned, he returned to his post, where he reassumed his office and exercised it till the summer of 1714. October 20, 1712, Nicholson had been appointed governor, but, during his absence, Vetch fulfilled his functions with the title of lieutenant-governor of the garrison, in which office he was replaced in 1714 by Major Caulfield and later by Captain Doucette, while Nicholson remained titular governor until 1717.

I have said that since the signing of the treaty the Acadians had almost decided to leave the country, but that they were prevented by all imaginable means and artifices. In fact in August, or perhaps even in July 1713, they sent delegates to Louisburg to come to an understanding with the French governor on the conditions to be held out to them if they were transported over to the French territory. These delegates sent in their report, and the answer of the Acadian people dated September 23, 1713, implies a refusal. They do not wish to accept an establishment at Ile Royale (Cape Breton) without effectual assistance, since the soil there is of an inferior quality, woody, and without natural meadowland to pasture their cattle. If, however, they are obliged to take the oath, they will depart anyhow:—

“ Besides,” says their report, “ we do not know yet in what manner the English will use us. If they burthen us in respect to our religion, or cut up our settlement to divide the lands with people of our nation we will abandon them absolutely.”

The governor of Louisburg, M. de Costabelle, was sorely vexed at this reply, and still more so at a letter from Father Gaulin, whom he had hoped to enlist as an ally in his dealings with the Acadians. The latter had replied "that he could not lend himself to his manœuvres, as he did not see any sufficient guarantees for the assistance which he, M. de Costabelle, promised, and that it did not become him to employ missionaries in an affair, the purpose of which appeared to be to warp his judgment in order to deceive others; that, if he could not offer any better guarantees for his good intentions, he preferred to see the Acadians remain on their lands with the English, who are doing all in their power to prevent them from departing." *

The more the French government desired, as will be explained further on, that the Acadians should take advantage of the treaty to go over into French territory, the more were the authorities of Port Royal opposed thereto. Negotiations were resumed between the Acadians and the governor of Louisburg; lands were offered on Prince Edward Island (l'Île Saint-Jean), and divers advantages which were considered acceptable by the Acadians. They wished to leave; Colonel Vetch opposed this under the pretext that he was only lieutenant-governor, and that they had to wait for the arrival of Governor Nicholson. He arrived only the following summer, when the year stipulated by the treaty had just expired. The following letters, both from Major l'Hermite who replaced de Costabelle at Louisburg, refer to these events. The first is dated July 11, 1714, and is addressed to Nicholson himself:—

* *Costabelle au Ministre*, Nov. 1713—*Murdoch*, vol. i. p. 338.

"Having learnt, sir, from several inhabitants of Port Royal, of Mines and Beaubassin, that he who commands in your absence at Port Royal (Col. Vetch), has forbidden them to leave, and even refused the permission to those who asked him for it, which event makes most of the Acadians now established on the lands of the King of England unable to withdraw this year. . . .

"That is what has determined me, according to the order given me by the King, to send thither M. de la Ronde Denys, into whose hands I have remitted the orders of Queen Anne; he will confer with you about the reasons why they are detained. I hope, sir, you will render all due justice, and that you will have no other view than to obey the behests of the Queen."

The other letter is from the same to the Minister and dated August 29, 1714: "He who commands Port Royal has forbidden the Acadians to leave the country before the arrival of Mr. Nicholson, so that all those who have come here had escaped. They represented to me that it was necessary to send an officer there in order to uphold their rights, the English having forbidden the missionaries to meddle with the affairs of the Acadians."—(Archives de la Marine et des Colonies.)

This is clear enough. The year had just expired, and the prohibitions of Governor Vetch were of sufficiently distant date to have given the Governor of Louisburg time to be informed of them, to communicate this information to the King of France; and the latter had had time to obtain an order from the Queen of England, to transmit all documents to the Governor of Louisburg, to appoint M. de la Ronde and to write to Nicholson under date of July 11, 1714.

And what were these orders of Queen Anne to Nicholson? Evidently, to let the Acadians depart, since they were within the limits of the year when the complaints were made, and since Major l'Hermite summoned Nicholson to execute the behests of the Queen. We shall see how he respected them, or rather what measures he took to elude them.

Messrs. de la Ronde and Pinsens, bearers of the orders

of Queen Anne, arrived at Port Royal about July 20, at the same time as Nicholson himself. He gave them a superb reception, took cognizance of the orders which they bore, and promised to let the Acadians depart within the lapse of another year, should they decide to do so. He permitted them to hold assemblies in order to make sure of the intentions of the Acadians. All reiterated the determination to abandon the country.* Nicholson seemed to agree to everything; but, under the pretext of referring the matter to the Queen, he finished by refusing everything. It required a more than ordinary dose of bad faith to refuse to obey the formal orders of his sovereign: that is, however, what he did, and we have the proof of it in the following official document, which is an account of the negotiations of Messrs. de la Ronde and Pinsens with Nicholson:

"In 1714 Messrs. de la Ronde and Pinsens, captains, were sent to Acadia to obtain from Mr. Nicholson freedom for the Acadians to withdraw with their cattle and grain to Ile Royale."

"Mr. Nicholson permitted these officers to assemble the inhabitants in order to know their intentions. They all declared that they wanted to return to their lawful sovereign.

"Mr. Nicholson was asked to allow these inhabitants, conformably to Art. XIV. of the treaty of peace, the space of a year to remain on their land unmolested;

"That they might be allowed, during this time, to transport their grain and cattle, to construct ships for the transportation of their goods, and to receive from France the rigging and complete outfit for those which would be built at Port Royal or elsewhere.

"*These two articles were sent back for the decision of the Queen.*

* The Governor of Acadia, Mascarene, writing to Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts, April 6, 1748, said: "M. Nicholson came over as Governor, and proposed to the Acadians the terms agreed on for them at the treaty, which were to keep their possessions, etc., etc., or to dispose of them, if they chose to withdraw within the space of a twelvemonth. They, to a man, chose the last."

“ They asked also that they might be allowed to sell their property or to leave therefor letters of attorney.

“ This article was answered : ‘ Remitted to the Queen,’ moreover referred to her letter which is to be a sure guarantee therefor.

“ Mr. Nicholson promised, besides, a prompt dispatch of all these articles, but since that time there has been no reply about this matter.”—(Conseil de Marine, March 28th, 1716.)

This official document is confirmed by several others ; but I will give only the following, because it contains other important facts. It is addressed by the commander of Louisburg to the minister, and dated August 29, 1714, that is, immediately after the return of Messrs. de la Ronde and Pinsens :

“ June 13th I had Mr. de la Ronde leave for Port Royal. I send your Highness the copy of the letter that I wrote to Mr. Nicholson and of the instructions that I gave to Mr. de la Ronde. *I confided to him the orders of the Queen in English and French.*

“ Your Highness tells me that you are procuring for them the rigging that I had requested ; but it will come late : before they receive it, the season will be already advanced. *The Acadians had written to Boston to have some; Mr. Nicholson forbade it, and even seized the ships and boats that they had built.*

“ They appeared decided *not to leave their country before having received Mr. Nicholson's decision.* It is known he will do all in his power to retain them ; *they have even already twice held a council with the view of leaving Port Royal.*”

Nicholson, who had just arrived, had probably not had time to realize the dreadful consequences resulting to the country from the departure of the Acadians. That is why, at first, when he took cognizance of the orders of the Queen, he promised to obey them and not to oppose the departure of the Acadians ; but, when he was informed by his officers of the disastrous consequences of this departure, he bethought himself, in order to gain time, to refer the question to the Queen, to

refer to her what she ordered him to do, to remit to her decision the clear and formal clauses of a treaty. The subterfuge was a gross one, but he had no others at command just then.

Unfortunately for the Acadians the Queen died a few days after August 1st, 1714; else it is probable that, in spite of the consequences, she would have made it a point of honor to have her decisions respected. Numerous communications were successively addressed to the Lords of Trade to represent to them in sombre colors the many inconveniences resulting from the departure of the Acadians, if it were not prevented; and that is why the questions referred to the Queen by Nicholson were never settled in either sense; that is why for a long time the Acadians were kept under the impression that the questions submitted were still being considered by the authorities, when, in reality, these latter were perfectly determined to put all possible obstacles in the way of their departure. In their child-like belief that justice gave rights, that treaties were sacred, that honor was the basis and support of governments, the Acadians waited long for this reply, which they were always told was under consideration; but they waited in vain. They felt so certain that justice would be shown them, and that their departure could be effected in the course of the following summer (1715), that many did not even sow their lands in the spring.

M. de Costabelle, in a letter to the minister, dated Sept. 9th, 1715, informs him, "that the Acadians of Mines had not sown their lands that year, that they had grain to live upon for two years, and had kept themselves ready to abandon the country." *

* "Father Dominic on his return presented him (M. de Costabelle) a

It is clearly apparent by the documents which I have produced, all of an official nature, and by some others also which I have seen, that, in the autumn of 1713, only a few months after the signing of the treaty of peace, the Acadians announced to Lieutenant-Governor Vetch their intention to leave the country; that from that moment they prepared for their departure, but were prevented by Vetch under the pretext that they had to await the arrival of Governor Nicholson; that the latter, without regard for the conditions of the treaty and the formal orders of the Queen transmitted to him by M. de la Ronde, and without any other motive but to gain time and deprive the Acadians of the rights granted to them by the treaty, referred their request to the Queen; that, subsequently, after having refused to transport the Acadians in English vessels, he also refused to French vessels entry into the ports of Acadia; that their determination to leave the country was such that they built vessels themselves; that, wishing to procure at Louisburg rigging to equip them, they were re-

memoir, from which it appears that the Acadians were determined to abandon all in order to leave the country; that most of them did not wish to sow their lands in hopes of retiring in the spring. That several had built ships for the transport of their families and their effects." (Conseil de la Marine, 28 mars, 1716).

"The English are doing all they can to retain the Acadians, not only by avoiding useless unpleasantness, but also by refusing them the things necessary for their passage, and by making them understand that they will not permit them to dispose of their immovable goods nor of their cattle, that nothing but a few provisions would be left to them." (Letter of Intendant Bégou, Quebec, Sept. 25, 1715.)

"In his letter of Nov. 6th, 1715, he (M. de Costabelle) says that he spoke to Mr. Capon, sent by the governor of Port Royal, of the hard and unjust way in which Mr. Nicholson had treated the Acadians, altogether contrary to the orders of Queen Anne and to the word he had given to Messrs. de la Ronde and Pinsens.

"Mr. Capon agreed that Nicholson's conduct had not been approved by any officer of his nation, but that Vetch, the lieutenant-governor, could change nothing without new orders from the king of England; and thus all further movements for the free departure of the Acadians are suspended until more ample decision be given thereon by the two crowns."

fused permission ; that, having applied to Boston for the same object, they again met with a refusal, and moreover their vessels were seized.

Nothing of what precedes is found in the volume of the archives ; it is possible the Compiler was unacquainted with some of these facts, and that, in spite of their importance, he may thus escape censure. His mission, as imposed upon him by the legislature, was restricted to the duty of collecting materials in Halifax and London and those of the *Archives de la Marine* that were likely to be found in Quebec. But, among the documents I have cited are : (1) a letter of Costabelle to Nicholson, (2) the orders of Queen Anne, of which Mr. de la Ronde was bearer, transmitted to Nicholson, (3) the account of their proceedings, all of which must have been in the archives of Halifax ; and, nevertheless, in spite of their extreme importance, they are not in the volume of the archives. However, the number of important documents omitted, all having the same general drift, is so considerable that I am perhaps wrong in directing attention to such a comparative trifle as the non-appearance of three documents. He was not, however, ignorant of this question of the obstacles put to the departure of the Acadians : for, as it will be seen, there are many other documents of the same kind with which he was acquainted. The question seems to have made him somewhat uneasy ; for on page 265 of his volume, when the events he was then considering referred to the transportation of 1755, he has the following note, relying on a declaration of Governor Mascarene :

* Governor Nicholson came to Annapolis in 1714, and then proposed to the Acadians the terms agreed on for them, which were, to

keep their lands on their becoming subjects of the British Crown, or to dispose of their property and withdraw from the country, if they chose, within one year. They all chose the latter, and prepared to leave the country; *but the vessels promised them from Cape Breton for the purpose of their removal not being sent, they were compelled to remain.*"

In the foregoing very little is exact, but the Compiler offers us a new proof of an outrage which the documents already cited point out. Thus the Acadians, according to the Compiler, if we understand him rightly, would not have had the privilege that the treaty clearly gave them; namely: to transport their goods, their cattle, etc., etc.; but only to dispose of them before their departure. Now, as they were the only inhabitants of the country, the reducing of their right to transport their cattle and effects to a mere permission to dispose of them would have been illusory and a new imposture. But, says he, they were not able to depart, because the vessels promised from the island of Cape Breton did not come.

There is not a word anywhere to sustain the Compiler's assertion. Can it be supposed that the French, who had so much interest in this transmigration, would have neglected to send them vessels for that object? Such a supposition is absurd. But, then, why were the Acadians prevented from setting out in their own ships and procuring their equipment at Louisburg and even at Boston? Clearly, this building of boats to quit the country was but the outcome of a prohibition to leave it in French or English ships.

The absurdity of the Compiler's pretension would be alone sufficient to justify us in rejecting it with contempt. This strange pretension having never been given out in 1714 or 1715 or even afterwards, one cannot expect to

find it contradicted or disputed; however, we have it incidentally contradicted in a very explicit manner in two documents; here is one of them:

“The absolute refusal which the English governors have always made, to permit even the King’s vessels to come to Acadia in order to transport those who desired to depart, or to lend rigging for the ships which the Acadians had built and which they were obliged to sell to the English; the prohibition imposed on them of transporting with them any live stock or provisions of grain; the grief of abandoning the hereditary estates of their fathers, their own work and their children’s, without any reimbursement or compensation; all these infringements are the principal reasons of the inaction in which they have remained.”—(Conseil de la Marine, year 1719, vol. iv. folio 96).

The other document is from Mr. de Brouillan, governor of Louisburg, and is not less explicit.* (Archives de la Marine, vol. III., fol. 180).

Moreover, as we have seen elsewhere, Nicholson had referred the question of the departure of the Acadians to the Queen, and this never-to-be-settled reference is most likely the pretext afterwards used by the Governors to prevent the Acadians from departing in any kind of ships, English or French, or of their own make. This is strengthened by the fact that, on the 7th of November following said reference (1714), Mr. de Pontchartrain, Minister of Marine, sent the French Minister at London a copy of the report of Messrs. de la Ronde and Pinsens, with instructions to hasten the solution of the questions referred by Nicholson. The only action ever taken upon it was the submitting of the question to the Lords of Trade by the Secretary of State, Lord Townshend.

* “The Acadians, says Haliburton, alleged that they had been detained contrary to their desire, that they had been refused leave to depart in English-built vessels, and that, upon making application to embark on board of French ships, they were informed that such vessels could not, consistently with the navigation laws, be allowed to enter a colonial harbor.”

The Compiler has not a word about this reference to the Queen, but if he can reasonably pretend that it was not possible for him to know most of the documents I have cited, because they were not found in the archives of Halifax, London or Quebec, this cannot be the case for those which I am here about to offer to the reader :—

COLONEL VETCH TO THE BOARD OF TRADE.

“ Mar. 9th, 1715.

“ MY LORDS:—“ I could not but judge it my duty out of a trew concern for the publick good : to put Your Lordships in mind of the circumstances of the country, the Acadians being in a manner obliged to leave the country *by the treatment they received from Mr. Nicholson while Governor there* ; as will be made appear to Your Lordships by the affidavits of some persons lately come from thence * : to which I humbly pray Your Lordships to be refered : what I am now to intimate to Your Lordships is, that as the season of the year now advances, *unless some speedy orders are sent to prevent the Acadians' removal with their cattle and effects to Cape Brittoun as it will wholly strip and Ruine Nova Scotia, so it will attonce make Cape Brittoun a populous and well stocked Colony, which many years and great expense could not have done directly from France as I already observed in a former paper.*”

It has been seen that, according to the Compiler, Nicholson, at the end of July, 1714, had given a year to the Acadians to retire. The above letter is dated March 9th, 1715, eight months after this promise. If such were the case, what became of the promise, when Vetch thus begged for prompt orders to prevent their departure—“ *speedy orders to prevent their removal?*” And Vetch only repeated what he had already said in a letter of November 24th preceding.

The following letters throw more light on the situa-

* Vetch had then been in London since the preceding September or October.

tion. We reproduce them, like the foregoing letter, in their original spelling :

COLONEL VETCH TO BOARD OF TRADE.

“ LONDON, Sept. 2d, 1715.

“ M. Nicholson's discouraging, or rather discharging all Trade there to the Acadians, and causing keep the gates of the Fort shutt against them night and day, that they may have no manner of commerce with the Garrison, and having by Proclamation discharged their harbouring or resetting any of the natives, with whom they used to have a considerable Trade for Peltry, hath so discouraged them from staying *that they had built abundance of small vessels to carry themselves and effects to Cape Brittoun, which was what the French officers so much solicited.*”

Vetch carefully abstains from mentioning the reason that prevented the Acadians from leaving in the numerous ships that they had built, but one would easily guess it, if one did not know it already through many other channels.

COLONEL VETCH TO BOARD OF TRADE.

“ LONDON, February 21st, 1716.

“ As to the Acadians, by what I can learn, there is not many of them removed notwithstanding the discouragements they mett withal some time ago, and will, no doubt, gladly remain upon their plantations—some of which are considerable—providing they may be protected by the Crown, and, as no country is of value without inhabitants, so, *the removal of them and their cattle to Cape Brittoun would be a great addition to that new colony, so it would wholly ruine Nova Scotia unless supplied by a British Colony, which could not be done in several years, so that the Acadians with their stocks of cattle remaining there is very much for the advantage of the Crown.*”

LIEUT.-GOVERNOR CAULFIELD TO COL. VETCH.

“ ANNAPOLIS ROYAL, 2d Nov., 1715.

“ I am but too senceable of Colonel Nickolson's unrepresented malice, and, had his designs taken their desired effect, I am perswaded there had not been att this time an inhabitant of any kind in the country, nor, indeed, a garrison: when I recollect his declaration to the Acadians and afterwards to the soldiers, wherein he told

the latter that the french were all rebels, and would certainly cut their throats if they went into their houses, telling of us that we must have no manner of correspondance with them, and ordered the gates of the garrison to be shut, tho' att the same time he was senciabile that we could not subsist the ensueing winter, but by their mains, there beeing no other prospects left to us . . . If the whole seine of his administration here was plainly laid downe, itt would be very difficult to find one instance of all his proceedings, whereby the garrison or colony could receive the least benefit."

ADAMS TO CAPTAIN STEELE.

" 24th *January*, 1715.

. . . . "We were in hopes here upon General Nicholson's arrival, he would settle the place on a good footing, but on the contrary, put us in the greatest confusion, pull'd down the fforts, Drove away the Acadians, and carried away all the English he cou'd, that the place is now desolate. In short, if his commission had been to destroy the country, he could not have discharg'd his trust to better purpose than he did, he employed all his time here in pursuing his implacable malice against Governor Vetch, when in truth he did the English interest in this country more damage in the two months he was here than Govr Vetch cou'd have done in all his life, if he had been as bad as he would fain make the world believe he was, he used to curse and damm Gov. Vetch and all his friends. There is not one soul in the place, french or english—save 2—but hate and abhor his name."

We have likewise, with the same import, a letter of Captain Armstrong who became later on Lieutenant-Governor of the Province.

In our first chapter we reproduced a letter of the Acadians to Mr. de Vaudreuil, in which they complained of being treated as negroes by Governor Vetch. If such were the case, and it is difficult to doubt it, one must not be astonished at the efforts they made to leave the country, nor at the subterfuges invented to deter them from doing so.

There was, evidently, great animosity between Nicholson and Vetch, and, what is almost as evident, it had its source in covetousness. It seems that Vetch, who

was then in London, sought to supplant Nicholson, by alleging the testimonies of the principal officers of Annapolis, testimonies which he transmitted to the Lords of Trade. At the same time, he sought to prove to them that he understood better than Nicholson the interests of the country, and that he was the man needed in the circumstances. It would be curious to know the counter-accusations of Nicholson; for he could not tolerate such an attack without a rejoinder most injurious to Vetch's reputation, and solid reasons were not wanting to him, for Vetch underwent a trial in 1706 before the legislature of Massachusetts, with the result that he was condemned to pay £200 "*for having supplied the French with ammunition and stores of war.*" Judging the quarrel by its results, we have reason to think that both succumbed in one common defeat, because for both the career of honors seems to have terminated there; Vetch obtained nothing, and Nicholson lost his position two years later. As it often happens on these occasions, both succeeded in proving that they were equally unworthy.

We are better acquainted with the accusations laid against Nicholson, and, even should allowance be made for exaggeration, this allowance cannot be considerable, since the accusations rest on the testimony of three persons who were regularly appointed lieutenant-governors of Nova Scotia, namely: Vetch, Caulfield, Armstrong, and on the testimony of Adams, who, in 1739, was for some time administrator of the province. Without this quarrel, without this rivalry we should know nothing of the character and conduct of Nicholson and Vetch; were we to trust the Compiler, we should think ourselves in the presence of irreproachable men to whose memory posterity should raise statues.

What is to be thought of the Compiler who has omitted these documents? Were they unimportant or too inconveniently important? Was he, or could he be ignorant of them? Certainly not, since they are all in the Colonial Records in London (Nova Scotia section), where the Compiler was charged to procure copies of all the documents that interested the province. They are to be found in volumes I. and II., alongside of those very documents which he procured and which we find in his own compilation. What could be more interesting for history than documents such as these, which, apart from their importance arising from the publicity of the facts they contain, offer us a rare opportunity of judging the character, the temperament and the motives of the persons who figure in them so conspicuously? Mr. Akins is not only a compiler, he is at the same time a biographer. He has inserted in his volume numerous notes, in which he gives us his appreciation of the personages who played any part in these events; but, invariably, when there is question of a governor or any man that had relations with the Acadians, he is stave and eulogistic with regard to them. Yet here was an excellent opportunity to give his judgment on Nicholson, in which the virtues he might have would be judiciously coupled with his faults, so as to show forth the most salient traits of his character. This study was easy, thanks to the well-grounded opinions of four lieutenant-governors; performed with intelligence and impartiality, it would have powerfully assisted the reader to pass an enlightened judgment on the whole course of events.

The letters quoted above are important from another and not less striking point of view. They explain the deep interest the governors had in preventing the emi-

gration of the Acadians. As Vetch says, this departure would ruin the country; and, though eight months had not yet elapsed since Nicholson had decided in presence of Messrs. de la Ronde and Pinsens to refer this question of the departure to the Queen, he does not hesitate to ask the Lords of Trade for permission to prevent their departure: "*Unless some speedy orders are sent to prevent the Acadians' removal with their cattle and effects to Cape Breton, as it will wholly strip and ruin Nova Scotia, so it will at once make Cape Breton a popular and well-stocked colony.*" And, as he says elsewhere, "*They had built abundance of small vessels to carry themselves and effects to Cape Breton.*" He is careful not to say that he had prevented them from leaving in those same vessels; but the conclusion is self-evident. It is easy to see that fraud and force had much more weight in his mind than justice and right. In a man who a few years before had, through greed of gain, "*supplied the French with ammunition and stores of war,*" and had been condemned for this act, this is not surprising. Besides, it was not otherwise with his successors.

Another not less grave reason against the departure of the Acadians is, that the Indians of Acadia and of all that forms to-day Maine and the maritime provinces were, from time immemorial, sworn enemies of the English. This departure would have left Nova Scotia without an inhabitant, and in the impossibility of peopling it with colonists, who would have been daily exposed to be massacred by these Indians. Possession of the country would have become useless; and, if the English had persisted in keeping a fort and garrison there, this latter would have been provisioned only at great expense. Such was the perplexing situation of

the governors and of the Home Government. All the communications exchanged between these two make us clearly see that the situation was thus understood, and all the obstacles accumulated to hinder the departure of the Acadians have never had any other motives than the various interests which have been brought to light in the preceding documents. Anent this last motive—fear of the Indians—I will cite one letter from Lieutenant-Governor Caulfield to the Lords of Trade, not because it stands alone, but on account of its being more explicit than others :

“ I have always observed, since my coming here, the forwardness of the Acadians to serve us when occasion offered.” [This is astonishing, after their harsh treatment and the trickery resorted to by Nicholson and Vetch]. “ And if some English inhabitants were sent over, especially industrious laborers, tar and pitch makers, carpenters and smiths, it would be of great advantage to this colony ; *but in case ye Acadians quit us, we shall never be able to maintain or protect our English family's from ye insults of ye Indians, ye worst enemies, wch ye Acadians by their staying will in a great measure ward off for their own sakes.* Your Lordships will see by ye stock of cattell they have at this time that in two or three years, with due encouragement, we may be furnished with everything within ourselves.” *

And elsewhere, in the correspondence of the governors : “ As the accession of such a number of Acadians to Cape Breton, will make it at once a very populous Colony ; so it is to be considered, one hundred of the Acadians, who were born upon that continent, and are perfectly known in the woods ; can march upon snow-shoes, and understand the use of birch canoes, are of more value and service than five times their number of raw men newly come from Europe. So their skill in the fishery, as well as the cultivating of the soil, must make at once of Cape Breton the most powerful Colony the French have in America, and of the greatest danger and damage to all the British Colonies as well as the universal trade of Great Britain.”

* Stated by Vetch to be about 5,000 black cattle, besides a great number of sheep and hogs.

With what we know of human nature, with the teachings of history in general, and particularly of this history, no one, taking into account the grave interests that the departure of the Acadians compromised, will doubt the obstacles of every kind opposed to this departure. Even without proofs the presumptions would be of great weight; but, when the fact is sustained, without contradiction, at least without explicit contradiction, by a mass of official documents, it becomes a certainty of the first order, which remains fixed in history as a question withdrawn from debate, in spite of the compiler, in spite of those who, like Parkman, have accepted without further investigation his biassed and ill-matured assertions.

CHAPTER IV.

Lieutenant-Governor Caulfield—He sends Peter Capoon and Thomas Button to have the Acadians take the oath of allegiance—Answers of the Acadians—Omissions of the Compiler—Lieutenant-Governor John Doucette—New injunction to take the oath—They consent to remain in the country on certain conditions with regard to the oath—Other omissions.

WITH this chapter we enter at last into the volume of the Archives.

It will be admitted that the two chapters immediately preceding are not wanting in significance. The sequel will show that the events of these five years have in themselves alone more real importance than those of the fifteen succeeding years. In fact, subsequent events are so connected with those we have just sketched, that, without them, they become unintelligible or assume a different significance.

While waiting till the course of our narrative has made the learned methods of the Compiler familiar, I will leave the reader to his own reflections upon the possible motives of these strange omissions. And, if now and then indignation suggests expressions that may seem severe, I beg pardon for the moment, until this pardon I now solicit shall become complete and shall be spontaneously offered by whosoever bears with me to the end.

The Compiler makes us begin at the second act of the drama. As the curtain rises, we perceive Lieutenant-Governor Caulfield, successor to Vetch, Hobby, and

SAMUEL JOHNSON

Nicholson, the fourth on the list, in the year 1715, ordering Messrs. Peter Capoon and Thomas Button, officers of the garrison, to betake themselves to Mines, to Beaubassin, to Penobscot, to River St. John and to other places :

“ Directing that His Most Sacred Majesty, George, King of Great Britain, *France* and Ireland, be proclaimed in all parts of his Government. You are likewise to tender the oaths of allegiance to ye Acadians in ye form prescribed.”

On the 15th of the following May, Caulfield acquaints the Lords of Trade with the result of the mission of Peter Capoon and Thomas Button.

“ *Here inclosed are the transactions of M. M. Button and Capoon, by which you will find that ye inhabitants, beeing most of them French, refused the oath, having, as I am informed, refused to quit the collonny intirely and to settle under ye french government, and I humblie desire to be informed how I shall behave to them The Acadians who always maintained this garrison with corn, are most of them quitting the collonny, specially at Mines.*

“ How is this ? ” must the intelligent reader of the compiler’s extracts say, he who knows nothing of what happened between 1710 and 1715: “ It is now five years since the taking of Port Royal and two years since the treaty of peace, and those Acadians are still in the country, they refuse to take the oath of allegiance and even to go away ? Why, the governors must have been very good and very paternal not to have constrained them by force to either alternative ? ”

That is indeed what the reader must have said to himself in good faith, since historians, who have written since the compilation of this volume, have said substantially the same thing. The Compiler knew well that he was constructing there by an arsenal where men

TOLEDO-THAS

would come for arms without taking the trouble to look any farther. He knew well that most of those who write history, even when they have aptitude for it, which sometimes they have not, have seldom the patience to meditate, compare, observe and penetrate. He knew well that many of them follow one another in a row to fall into the same rut. There were, however, very simple questions to be asked here, such as these: "What had happened since 1710? Why does the Compiler begin his volume with the year 1715? Why are not the proposed formula for the oath, the replies of the Acadians and the report of Capoon and Button in the volume of the Archives? Why does Caulfield seem to desire and to have ordered the departure of the Acadians, though in a subsequent letter he says that their departure would be the ruin of the country? Why does the Compiler almost always omit the replies of the Acadians? The documents from them are rare enough to have made it a bounden duty for him eagerly to grant them a place in his volume as well in justice to them as in order to permit us to pass an enlightened judgment on the events that depend thereon. He was not unaware of these replies, since the very letter of Caulfield to the Lords of Trade, which we have just quoted, refers to it: "*Herein enclosed are the transactions of Messrs. Button and Capoon.*"

I am going to supply in part the omissions of the Compiler. In the Colonial Records, N. S., Vol I., we find, just alongside the documents produced in the archives, the formula of the oath proposed by Caulfield and the replies of the Acadians.

"I, A. B., sincerely promise and swear that I will be faithful and maintain a true allegiance with His Majesty, King George."

Reply of the Acadians of Mines to Messrs. Capoon and Button :

“ To answer what you have done us the honor publicly to announce to us last Wednesday, and for replying to which we begged you give us till last Sunday, in which time we have not been able to accomplish what we had promised, seeing that several learn nothing from writings but only *viva voce*, and, not even knowing exactly of what there was question, returned home without giving any answer.

“ We have the honor to signify to you, that no one can be more thankful than we are for the kindness that King George, whom we recognize as the lawful sovereign of Great Britain, so graciously shows us, under whose rule it will be for us a real joy to remain, as he is such a good prince, if we had not *since last summer, made engagements to return under the rule of the King of France, having even given our signatures to the officer sent in his name (M. de la Ronde), contrary to which we cannot act, until Their two Majesties of France and England have disposed of us otherwise.* However, we bind ourselves with pleasure and gratefulness, while we remain here in Acadia, to do or undertake nothing against His Britannic Majesty, King George, of whose proclamation to the crown we are witnesses, which was made by you, sirs, in presence of the inhabitants of the said places, at Mines, this 12th of March 1715, we, the undersigned, acting and being authorized by all the inhabitants to act according to the power of attorney which they have given us.

(Signed) Jacques Le Blanc, Antoine Le Blanc, Charles Babin, Jassemin, Philippe Melançon, Claude Landry, Pierre Terriot, René Le Blanc, Pierre Richard, Jacques Le Blanc, François Rimbaut, Germain Terriau, Jean Le Blanc, Martin Aucoin, etc., etc.”

We have also the reply of the Acadians of Beaubassin ; its purport is exactly the same ; it is signed by Michel Poirier, Martin Richard, Michel Bourg, Charles Bourgeois, François Doucet, Jean Cyr, Alexis Cormier, as arbiters for the whole population.

Those of Port Royal seem to have acted otherwise. Instead of refusing the oath presented to them, they proposed another formula as follows :—

“ I sincerely promise and swear that I will be faithful and maintain a true allegiance to His Majesty, King George, as long as I shall

be in Acadia or Nova Scotia: and [I stipulate] that I shall be permitted to withdraw wheresoever I shall think fit with all my movable goods and effects, when I shall think fit, without any one being able to hinder me."

It is signed by thirty-six names, twenty of which are marked with crosses, and appears to have been accepted by Caulfield.

Without being very explicit, these documents hint at many things. One sees clearly that French delegates had some months previous conferred with Governor Nicholson; that the question of the departure of the Acadians had been referred to the Queen, and that the oath offered them could not be taken into consideration before this decision. The publishing of these documents would have been a key to guide the reader in researches which would have revealed what we have set forth elsewhere, and what the volume of the archives concealed from view.

Thus, these documents confirm anew on certain points those which I have produced, and overthrow the vague insinuation of Caulfield, when he says: "having, *as I am informed*, refused to quit this colony entirely and to settle under the French government." He seems to wish to insinuate thereby that he gave orders to the Acadians to take the oath or to leave, and thus he misrepresents their situation to the Lords of Trade. His instructions to Capoon and Button show nothing of the kind; the replies of the inhabitants prove the contrary; and a subsequent letter to the Lords of Trade shows that he considered the departure of the Acadians as a calamity. It is therefore ridiculous to suppose that he gave such orders and received such replies. Moreover, we have seen by several documents that the greater

number of the Acadians, in this year 1715, did not even sow their lands, so truly did they expect to leave in the course of the summer. And, if he had given such orders, he would be so much the more culpable, since he knew that, a few months before, this question of the departure had been referred by Nicholson to the decision of the Queen, and that the reply had not yet been given.

The only means of reconciling his insinuation with possible facts would be to attribute such a reply, I mean the refusal to depart, to some inhabitants of Penobscot or of the St. John River, where the Messrs. Capoon and Button likewise betook themselves to have the oath taken. These were upon a territory that France claimed; whence their declaration that they would not leave the country. This is the only possible interpretation that I see, otherwise his assertion, "that *most of them are quitting the collony*" would be contradictory and absurd.

In May of the following year Caulfield writes to the Lords of Trade: "I received a letter from ye Acadians of Mines of their resolution to continue in this government, and are making all preparations for improvements as formerly, and they seem impatient to hear what is determined on their behalf."*

This letter might seem contradictory; but as the last part shows us that the Acadians were impatient to know the decision respecting the questions submitted to the Queen by Nicholson, it must be inferred that they were always determined to depart as soon as this reply would be known and the means afforded them for departing; else, why would they have been impatient for a reply which was to decide their departure, if their intention

* This letter is omitted in the volume of the Archives.

was to remain in any case? The first part, then, means that they agreed to prolong their sojourn till after the harvest (they had not sown the preceding year).

In the ensuing October (1716), writing to the Lords of Trade, he informs them that he has proposed the oath to the Acadians and sends them their replies.* We infer therefrom that they reiterated their determination to leave the country, for he adds: "at the same time I am persuaded it will be with reluctance they leave the country."

Caulfield was replaced as Lieutenant-Governor by John Doucette (1717). Addressing first the inhabitants of Annapolis, the latter severely enjoined them to take the oath according to the formula which he communicated to them. Tired of waiting in vain for a response to the questions submitted to the Queen by Nicholson, despairing of ever obtaining the facilities necessary to their transmigration, they answered that they all desired to come to a common decision, and for that purpose it was advisable to have all the inhabitants of the other localities assembled at the same time:

"For the present we can only answer, that we shall be ready to carry into effect the demand proposed to us, as soon as His Majesty shall have done us the favor of providing some means of sheltering us from the Indians, who are always ready to do all kinds of mischief, proofs of which have been afforded on many occasions since the peace.

"That unless we are protected from them, we cannot take the oath demanded without exposing ourselves to have our throats cut in our houses at any time, which they have already threatened to do.

"In case other means cannot be found, we are ready to take an oath that we will take up arms neither against His Britannic Majesty nor against France, nor against any of their subjects or allies."

Up to that time the Acadians had refused to accept any oath that tied them to the country; they wished to

* Documents omitted in the volume of the Archives.

depart and had been waiting to be enabled to do so. From that moment they no longer refused this oath, provided a clause were inserted exempting them from bearing arms against the French or Indians, their allies.

The situation presents no difficulties. Either they must be allowed to leave with their goods and cattle, as signified by the treaty and the letter of the Queen, and obstacles must be removed and the assistance requisite for their transmigration granted them, or the conditions they imposed on their sojourn in the country must be accepted. It might have been disagreeable to have conditions imposed by poor peasants; but either this must be endured or the inconveniences which their departure entailed, at least if justice should regulate the relations between the high and the low, between the weak and the strong. Their conditions were certainly not frivolous. The only enemy that England had to combat in these places was France. Without the acceptance of this condition they could be obliged to take up arms against their compatriots and still worse against their brethren, their relations who resided on the north side of the Bay of Fundy at River St. John, Chipody, Peticodiac, Memramcook and even at Beaubassin on a territory which, it is true, was disputed, but which might eventually be adjudged to France by the commission appointed to decide thereon.

Nothing was more reasonable than the exemption which they claimed, especially when they were deprived of the right of going away; and those who treat their claim as frivolous have evidently never sounded their inmost hearts to see what would be their sentiments in a similar situation. Later on we shall find that the American colonists, who established themselves in 1760 on the

lands of the Acadians, were exempted from bearing arms against their brethren of New England at the time of the war of independence; but in that case it was deemed quite natural to grant them this exemption. Not without heart-rending grief had the Acadians resolved to leave their country, their property, these abodes of their childhood bedewed by the sweat of several generations. Oh! assuredly, they would have preferred by far to remain; but in those days of prejudice, intolerance and absolutism, they feared the caprice of their governors, they feared that, sooner or later, obstacles would be raised to the free exercise of their religion. Will it be said that their fears were not reasonable, seeing that for three years they had been retained by force in violation of a treaty, at a time when England had not yet emerged from the most intolerant period of her history? They might perhaps run these risks, but, at least, they did not wish to have to combat their fellow-countrymen and their brethren; they wished to put themselves in a position to be able at any time to quit the country, if the conditions imposed by them should be violated. Upon sufficient reflection we shall find that the sentiments that actuated them arose from the noblest of motives. This persistency in refusing during forty years any oath that exposed them to be obliged to combat their compatriots, does an honor to them of which their descendants may rightly be proud. Parkman could carelessly assert that they were "weak of purpose;" but when there was question of contravening the elementary dictates of human nature, or of conscience, then this firmness energetically faced consequences from which men of our civilized time and probably Parkman himself would shrink.

It was still easier for England to grant their demands, as was done in 1730, than for the Acadians not to make them. In their simplicity, they thought perhaps that in these proposals they had found a very acceptable middle term, which, while allaying their apprehensions, would permit them to preserve their property and their fatherland. It was a proposal that could be considered, discussed and met by another proposal. Could not the local authorities effect a compromise? could they not make allowance for such justifiable repugnance, for the obstacles opposed to the execution of a right so evident as was that of their departure? could they not, I ask, limit this exemption of bearing arms to a definite length of time? But no; no concession! "We are the authority, and we do not treat with private individuals. You shall not depart, and you must take the oath without reserve, you must depend on our good pleasure."

Moreover, if they felt no such natural repugnance to fighting the Indians as they felt to fighting their own countrymen, their own safety led them to shun all hostility to the savage. We have seen that Vetch and Caulfield were of opinion that there would be no security for English colonists to settle in the country on account of the hostility of the Indians. Would it have been otherwise with the Acadians, if they had been forced to take up arms against the Indians? There were certainly between them friendly ties which dated far back; but what would these ties have availed under these new circumstances? Does not our friend or ally of to-day become our enemy to-morrow, if he fights against us? And in that event, what greater security could they have enjoyed than the English colonists? In view of their security the objection to bear arms against the Indians

was much more serious than the objection to bear them against the French. What did they really demand, when answering the summons to take the oath? Nothing more than this reasonable agreement: "Find some means to protect us against the Indians, and we ask no exemption with regard to them, in spite of the threats which they use against us every day. In default of this means, we will agree to remain in the country and take the oath of allegiance, provided we be exempt from any obligation to bear arms against the French and the Indians."

Certain historians speak of the efforts made by French authorities to prevail on the Acadians to emigrate, as if, by doing so, they had been guilty of reprehensible intrigues, unworthy of a great nation. It may be accounted ingenious to get quit of one accusation by another; there are always some people who let themselves be duped by any subterfuge, however gross it be. That the French made efforts to engage the Acadians to take advantage of the clauses of the treaty, is a fact not to be doubted. That was their right and their interest, as it was their duty; the Acadians having decided to urge the English authorities to grant all the facilities requisite for their departure, France was a party to the treaty, and, in virtue of this, she had the obligation to protect her former subjects against any violation of those clauses which were profitable to them; and, if France is to be blamed, it is for not having urged the matter with sufficient energy, when the Acadians so earnestly claimed her support, and when her own interests were all in favor of it. It has been pretended that France, under the idea that Acadia might return to her, gradually fought shy of the departure of the Acadians.

That was quite possible; although her indifference to this departure could only be partial, since, besides the uncertainty of such an issue as the return to French dominion, and the fact that the departure of the Acadians would be the ruin of Nova Scotia, there still remained a not less urgent interest for France to people her colony of Cape Breton and Prince Edward Island and to gain strength for future conflicts.

But, we have not here to consider the interests of France and England otherwise than as they explain facts. For the moment, I am examining only the question of right, and I assert that, for both France and England, the lawfulness of their efforts to decide the Acadians to depart or not to depart, was limited to persuasive influence, and that, while France, perhaps on account of circumstances, employed only this expedient, the English authorities used every unlawful means that ruse and force could suggest. Such is the difference, and it is really enormous. And yet, we might view all this with a certain indulgence, if only the English had taken into account their own unlawful conduct in their subsequent proceedings with regard to the Acadians.

As a question of fact, the idea of departure was or appears to have been spontaneous on the part of the Acadians. Port Royal had been in the hands of the English for only three months, when they averred, in an address to the Governor of Canada, that Governor Vetch was treating them as negro slaves, and that they desired to move into French territory. Immediately after the treaty of Utrecht, it was still, as far as we can judge, by a spontaneous movement, that they sent delegates to Louisburg to treat this same question.

After having given the above response of the Aca-

dians to the summons of Governor Doucette, the Compiler plunges us again into darkness by letting us remain ignorant of what ensued.

We can here clearly perceive an omission of five letters, three of which are from the Governor himself and two replies, one from Abbé Pain, curé des Mines, the other from Mr. de Brouillan, governor of Cape Breton.* By the former's reply we may judge what was the drift of the latter's answer.

MINES, 29 March, 1718.

"I have received the letter, with which you honored me, under date of Dec. 5, 1717. I have the honor to signify to you, sir, that these Acadians must be sufficiently acquainted with their duties and obligations *without needing my help for what you desire me to do with regard to them.* . . . Allow me to declare to you, so that you may have nothing to say against my behavior in this matter, that I am resolved to give no advice for or against the measure: thus you will recognize their natural intentions," etc., etc.

FELIX PAIN.

From this reply it appears evident that the Governor solicited the concurrence of this priest to influence the Acadians in the direction of an unconditional oath. In justice we must say that he declares himself satisfied with this reply, and with the priest's intention not to meddle with temporal affairs. We have likewise the reply of the governor of Cape Breton, and it confirms all that I have previously said respecting the obstacles opposed to the departure of the Acadians.

Louisburg, 21 July, 1718.

"Concerning your complaints that the inhabitants of Acadia had not departed as agreed upon, and that this delay has caused loss to His Britannic Majesty, you must have known, sir, the impossibility in which Mr. Nicholson and other rulers of Acadia have put them of executing what had been agreed upon; some not wishing to let them carry away their effects, and the others not wishing us to send them

* Colonial Records, N. S., Vol. II.

the rigging to equip the little ships they had built, and which in consequence they were obliged to sell almost for nothing to English merchants. I will not fail to inform the King my master of all you remark to me thereon, so that he may give the orders that he will judge proper."

CHAPTER V.

Administration of Philipps (1720-1722)—Taking the required oath of allegiance or departure within four months without carrying away anything—Decision to depart—Disappointment of Philipps—New omissions of the Compiler—The Acadians undertake to open a road in order to effectuate their departure—Philipps orders the suspension of the works—Prolongation of the delay—Cajoleries to keep back the Acadians—Important letter of the Secretary of State Craggs—Parkman.

IN 1720 General Philipps, who in reality had already been for almost three years Governor of Nova Scotia, came to Annapolis to take charge of his province. He was invested with more ample jurisdiction than his predecessors, and his high position in the army added weight and importance to his authority. At first he dealt very haughtily with the Acadians. Hardly had he arrived when he issued a proclamation ordering them to take the oath without reserve or to leave the country within four months, without being able either to dispose of their goods or to transport them. "It is expressly prohibited to those who will choose to leave the country to sell, dispose or bring with them any of their effects." These conditions were excessively hard. Is that the reason why the Compiler omits this important document, this proclamation?

Thus the temporizing plan invented by Vetch, and continued by Nicholson and his successors, attained the desired result. The only fault of the Acadians was

their having let themselves be duped and their having so meekly awaited a reply, which the rulers took good care not to give them.

Philipps's intention was evident. He well knew that, without means of transport, the Acadians could not depart, especially on such short notice. He believed that they were so attached to their property that his prohibition to carry away anything with them would force them to accept his terms of the oath without reserve, and even all the conditions that he would be pleased to exact. He was, however, deceived. Nevertheless, such severe orders spread consternation all around; the agitation was most violent; a prompt decision was imperative. They replied in substance as follows: * "We cannot take the oath which you demand of us, and the question is still more difficult with regard to the Indians than to the French, because the former daily threaten us with revenge if our reservation do not extend to them. Since you cannot grant us this reservation, there only remains to us the alternative of retiring from the country even on the hard conditions you impose, life being dearer to us than all our goods. As the sowing season has just elapsed, and there remains hardly any more grain to nourish our families, the only favor we beg of you is to prolong the delay a little, so as to give us time to gather in our grain and permission to carry it away with us, and also to make use of the vehicles that we own or of those we might make or otherwise procure, hoping that Your Excellency will permit us to send to Cape Breton Island to ask help for our departure."

I have in hand, relating to these facts, six documents or letters, all most important and absolutely indis-

* Col. Records, N. S., vol. 3.

pensible for the clear understanding of these events. They consist of a reply of Father Justinian to Philipps, 30th April, 1720; two memorials of the Acadians of Annapolis and Mines to Philipps, both presented May 26th, 1720; a letter of the Governor of Louisburg to Philipps, June 8th, 1720; a letter of the Acadians to the Governor of Louisburg and the latter's reply. None of these documents are found in the volume of the Archives, and yet the first four are found in the Colonial Records in London, just alongside those which the Compiler produces; his volume contains all the letters of Philipps to the persons mentioned above, but not a single one of the replies. Oh! I am wrong; there is one, not here mentioned, and it is the one that is the worst drawn up, the least explicit. Is that the reason why it is there? Is that also the reason why we find in his volume a letter of the Acadians to the Governor of Louisburg, when there was another far superior to it as a statement of the situation. The Compiler renders his case more complicated by the insertion of this document, for this letter of the Acadians to the Governor of Louisburg, it will be understood, could not reasonably be found in the archives either of Halifax or of London; it could be had only in the archives of the Marine in Paris. Did he go there to ferret it out? If so, then, he studied those archives, and why in the world did he go out of his way, while he was passing over so many important documents in London, which should have been brought to Halifax? However, not to run the risk of being unjust to him, I will not hold him responsible for any other omissions than those relative to the archives of these two last places.

In spite of my desire to fill up the void that the Com-

pier has left, in spite of the importance of the documents omitted, I shall present only short extracts. The letter addressed by the Acadians to the Governor of Louisburg contains among other things the following :

“ You are, sir, aware of the difficulties opposed to our departure when we petitioned for it, and the impossibility in which we were, to accomplish what was demanded of us. And yet now they wish to constrain us to take this oath, or to abandon the country, and it is impossible to do either. . . We are resolved not to take this oath imposed upon us, but we cannot quit the country without suitable facilities, such as were promised to us by the Court of France and refused by the Court of England. Our situation is painful and perplexing, and we beseech you to assist us.”

In his reply to Philipps, Mr. de Brouillan, governor of Louisburg, says :

“ Allow me to state, that the inaction of the Acadians neither can nor should be imputed to them, both on account of their want of the assistance essentially requisite for their transmigration, and on account of the obstacles which the Governors, general or local, who preceded you, have put in their way.

“ I cannot, moreover, refrain from representing to you that the clauses of your proclamation that refer to the term and the circumstances of their departure seem to me but little in keeping with ordinary kindness, especially after a treaty and an agreement of mutual good faith between Queen Anne and King Louis XIV., a treaty that has been executed in its entirety by France and partially by England.

“ You are aware, sir, that by this agreement the lot of the inhabitants of Acadia was to be the same as that of the inhabitants of Plaisance. It were impossible to add to the kindness and sincerity with which this evacuation of Plaisance was accomplished, and I have the honor to represent to you, that nothing could be harsher than the extremity or rather the impossibility to which these poor people would be reduced, should you not consent to be less severe for the time and the manner in which you exact their departure.”

To prove the obstacles opposed to the departure of the Acadians, I have quoted, so far, more than twenty

documents, all of which are omitted in the volume of the Archives. What is there in this volume against these clear and precise affirmations? Nothing. Nowhere do we find that these affirmations have been contradicted in reply to those who made them. Neither Nicholson nor Doucette replied to the affirmations of Costabelle and de Brouillan. The only passage that looks like a formal contradiction of these affirmations is found in a letter of Philipps to the Lords of Trade, in which he says :

“At the time of the surrender of the country, it was stipulated in behalf of the Acadians, to have their choice, either to remain in the Province if they would transfer their allegiance, or, in case of the alternative, to *dispose* of their estate *and effects* to the best advantage ; to determine which, one year's time was allowed them ; but, at the expiration thereof, finding their new masters in no condition to oblige them to the observance of one or the other, they have remained.”

Philipps himself knew nothing of the obstacles we have mentioned ; he could, doubtless, be informed by Vetch, Caulfield, Doucette, and other officers of the garrison ; but it is clear that they were not eager to accuse themselves of their own trickery. We may judge of the credit we should give to the declaration of Philipps by the trouble he takes to disfigure the treaty he had under his eyes. Clearly, the treaty gave the Acadians the right to carry away their movable effects, their cattle, etc. Philipps converted this clause into a right to sell or dispose of them, and nothing more. If he erred so grossly as to the terms of a treaty, what are we to think of his second-hand assertions picked up from persons interested in deceiving him ? This prohibition to carry anything away with them was not only inhuman, it was

also a fraud. He well knew that, since they were the only inhabitants of the country, they would have no one to whom they might sell their goods in case they departed, and that is why he chose this means of attaining his end, and preventing their departure. He was soon to be convinced that the people about him had deceived him respecting the reasons that had prevented their departure, and that he deceived himself, if he fancied his barbarous orders were going to produce the result he expected.

As the Acadians no longer hoped to work upon the Governor's determination, as they no longer hoped either for timely help or for a prolongation of the appointed delay, they set to work to devise ways and means to effect their departure. Unable to withdraw in ships, they had no other alternative than the land route; but, for that, they would be obliged to open new roads where there were none.

The Beaubassin people could easily withdraw by Bay Verte, but the case was otherwise with those of Mines, and especially of Annapolis. Between these two places there was a space of from twenty to thirty miles which had never yet been opened to vehicles.

To this point the Acadians of Mines first directed their efforts, and thus came to the assistance of their Annapolis brethren. All the able-bodied population set resolutely to work, and the road-making was rapidly advancing. In presence of this determination to leave the country, which was shown in so unmistakable a way, Philipps was alarmed; but what could be done? Could he reasonably oppose these works, indispensable as they were to the transmigration? Certainly not, since it was the only means left them to depart and to

conform to the alternative of his proclamation!
And, nevertheless, they must not be allowed to depart!

His conduct would be incredible, had I not before me the official documents that establish indisputably the means which Philipps used to balk the Acadians once more, as had previously done Vetch, Nicholson and Caulfield. There was only one means; it was to forbid the continuation of these works; he did so.

“ At a Council held, &c., &c.

“ Present :

“ His Honor Lieut.-Governor Armstrong, &c., &c., &c.

“ The Honorable Lieut.-Governor acquainted the Board, that His Excellency, General Philipps, having advice that the Acadians of this river are cutting a road from here to Mines, which gives him suspicion that they design by it either to molest this place, or to drive off their cattle and carry their effects from hence by that way, in order to settle in a body, either there or at Beaubassin, and stand in defiance of the Government, Advised and agreed :

“ That His Excellency be desired to send his special orders to the Acadians of this river and Mines not to cut any such road without having His Excellency's leave in writing.”

We have also the proclamation drawn up conformably to the above order-in-council. In this proclamation he adds : “ *And I do further forbid any persons to quit their habitations clandestinely and without my leave.*”

Naturally, as might be expected, the order was drawn up as if he supposed other designs than that of quitting the country, but one's perceptions would have to be very dull indeed not to understand the true sense of what was meant by this order, “ not to cut a road nor quit their habitations without leave.”

Philipps and his council were well aware that their object could not have been to molest anybody, but merely to leave the country. When writing to the Lords of

Trade, he does not feel constrained to disguise his purpose under false pretexs ; hence, in rendering an account of these events, he does not make a mystery of their intention, which, he says, was, or must have been, to leave the country by way of Bay Verte: " Being joined in a body, *they can march off at their leisure, by the way of the Bay Verte* with their effects, and destroy what they leave behind, without danger of being molested by the garrison." So, as is clearly shown, in this opening of a road, Philipps did not see anything but the means and the design of leaving the country. His fear was not that his garrison might be molested by them, but, on the contrary, that his garrison might not be able to molest them and prevent their marching off. The case is widely different.

It reminds us somewhat of the fable of the crocodile and the child:—" Why do you shed tears at the lamentations of this child? Have you of late become so tender-hearted?" was remarked to him.—" I weep," retorted the crocodile, " because I could not reach him and swallow him up."

It was the settled fate of the Acadians that they should not leave the country except by deportation. Once more were they detained against their will. An alternative had been offered them, but eventually they had none. At first, they had thought they could leave in English vessels; these were refused. They had asked that French ships might be allowed to enter the ports of Acadia; this was opposed. Having constructed small vessels, they wished to procure the necessary equipment at Louisburg; this was forbidden; at Boston, forbidden again. This time the order to take away nothing extended even to vehicles, and, as that did not

suffice to deter them, the route by land was likewise forbidden. There still remained the air route; but the manageable balloons of the twentieth century, nay, even the primitive fire-balloons had not yet been invented. The letter of Queen Anne extended their right to the selling of their immovable property, but, with obstacle on obstacle, restriction on restriction, ruse on ruse, the result was this much simplified statement: "If you go away, you shall not take even your effects with you." And to strike the lowest note of the scale: "Go away, if you like, but you shall not take away even your bodies; your bones will have to remain here. When the time for your departure shall come, we ourselves will see to your transportation, and we will scatter you upon all the shores of the new world." Considered in all its naked reality, such was the situation.

Only peaceable persons, as they were, could have submitted to so many unjust impositions. They could put on foot six times more fighting men than were numbered in the garrison of Annapolis. The decision of the Acadians had rendered Philipps's situation very perplexing. In the same letter to the Lords of Trade he writes:

"For the sake of gaining time, and keeping all things quiet till I have the honor of your further commands in what manner to act, I have thought it most for His Majesty's service to send home the Acadian deputies with smooth words and promises of enlargement of time."

He ends his letter as follows:

"They say they will oblige themselves to be good subjects in every respect, excepting that of taking up arms against the French and Indians. . . . And I would humbly propose that if an oath were formed for them to take, whereby they should oblige themselves to take up arms against the Indians, if required, etc., etc., how far this may be thought to bind them."

It is easy to see, while following this correspondence of Philipps with the Secretary of State and the Lords of Trade, that he was profoundly humiliated by his want of success. He had flattered himself that his high position in the army, the renown of his name, would overthrow all the obstacles that a little simple and ignorant population might oppose to him. Arriving with the air of a conqueror, he had issued a pompous and severe proclamation which admitted of no reply; then he had encountered difficulties which he could have smoothed away, but which he had only increased by his demeanor. He would have liked to retrace his steps and to resort to conciliation, but he had sown mistrust and was reaping alarm. He had thought that these Acadians were so attached to their goods that the short delay granted them to leave the country and the prohibition to take away their effects would infallibly determine them to accept the proposed oath. As to that, he had fallen into the same error as Nicholson, and, like him, he found himself obliged to prevent at any price the departure of the Acadians, with this difference, that Nicholson could use subterfuges, while he had not even this resource. His own order, which forbade the inhabitants to open a road leading out of the country, while his proclamation to evacuate it was still fresh, must have jarred his sense of consistency. And, what a humiliation here for a man that deserved, I believe, on other occasions, the reputation of being able, affable and conciliating.

The more meek and amiable he became towards the Acadians, the greater was his bitterness and the more malevolent his insinuations with regard to them in his correspondence. He had suffered failure. To justify or attenuate it, he did what has always been done, what

is still done: he laid the blame on others. In order to do so, he had to represent the Acadians as headstrong, ungovernable, directed by "bigoted priests;" this he did to the best of his ability.

"They will never, said he, in substance, make good subjects. They cannot be let go now at least: their departure, if they went to swell the colony of Cape Breton, would render our neighbors too powerful; we need them to erect our fortifications and to provision our forts, *till the English are powerful enough of themselves to go on, and they must not withdraw before a considerable number of British subjects be settled in their stead.* On the other hand, *if they withdraw in spite of us, a great many fine possessions will become vacant. I believe it will not be difficult to draw as many people almost from New England as would supply their room, if it were not robbing a neighboring colony without gaining much by the exchange; therefore, hope there are schemes forming at Home, to settle the country with British subjects in the spring, before which time these inhabitants do not think of moving, having the benefit of enlargement of time I granted, until I shall receive your further commands. What is to be apprehended in the resettling these farms is disturbance from the Indians, who do not like of the Acadians going off, and will not want prompting to mischief.*"

In his vexation Philipps had shown only the dark side, and had painted it so vividly as to affect the Lords of Trade, who wrote under date of December 20th, 1720:

. "As to the Acadians of Nova Scotia, who appear *so wavering* in their inclinations, we are apprehensive they will never become good subjects to His Majesty. . . . *We are of opinion they ought to be removed as soon as the forces which we have proposed to be sent to you shall arrive in your Province; but as you are not to attempt their removal without His Majesty's positive order for that purpose, you will do well in the meanwhile, to continue the same prudent and cautious conduct towards them, to endeavor to undeceive them concerning the exercise of their religion which will doubtless be allowed them if it should be thought proper to let them stay where they are.*"*

* Parkman had this document before him. For an historian of *fifty years standing* he should have eagerly seized a letter that threw so much light on history; it was a real tit-bit . . . but it was not of the right kind.

On reading this one feels as though a leaden cloak were falling on his shoulders, and as though there was not enough air to breathe freely. The sinister project of the deportation has just been hatched. A cold shiver runs down one's spine. One fancies he hears the first blasts of the trumpet that was to order the embarkation.

I append, by way of elucidation, a version of the same letter in familiar style:

“MY DEAR PHILIPPS:

“I see you do not get the better of the Acadians as you expected before your departure. It is singular all the same that these people should have preferred to lose their goods rather than be exposed to fight against their brethren. This sentimentality is stupid. These people are evidently too much attached to their fellow-countrymen and to their religion ever to make true Englishmen. It must be avowed your position was deucedly critical; it was very difficult to prevent them from departing, after having left the bargain to their choice. However, you did well to act thus, it was your only resource. The treaty be hanged! Don't bother about justice and other baubles any more than Nicholson and Vetch did; those things will not advance our interests. Their departure will, doubtless, increase the power of France; it must not be so; they must eventually be transported to some place, where, mingling with our subjects, they will soon lose their language, their religion and the remembrance of the past, to become true Englishmen. For the moment, we are too weak to undertake this deportation; but we purpose effecting it in the spring time, when we shall have sent to you the required troops. Do nothing of your own accord before we have given you orders. Meanwhile, my dear friend, lay aside your high and mighty airs, show yourself affable and kind towards them. Encourage them with any hopes you choose, say what you like; provided you obtain the desired end, which is none other than to prevent their departure, you will merit our gratitude.

“Yours,

“CRAGGS,
“Secretary of State.

“N. B.—Make them believe that we shall leave them the free exer-

cise of their religion ; we shall see later on what we shall do on this score, if it be decided to leave them in the country. In this case it is probable we shall allow them the free exercise of their religion.

“ P. S.—There is a great storm brewing against Aislabie, Stanhope and myself relatively to the South Sea Co. . . . I am all of a tremble at it. . . . Must I. . . .

“CRAGGS.*

The reader will find the document I have just paraphrased hardly agrees with the declaration of my introductory remarks, exonerating the home government from all complicity in this iniquitous deportation. It was, indeed, a Secretary of State who had resolved to execute it, but a man of the stamp of Craggs is rarely met with in history. There was certainly no question here of a government project, but of the scheme of a single individual, who had begun his career by a fraud that brought him to the Tower, and ended it by another which ought to have sent him back thither. Thus, the deportation was conceived by a barber who became Secretary of State, and it was executed thirty-five years later by a house-painter who became Provincial Governor. It was conceived by a plunderer and executed for the sake of plunder. One man died as he was planning it, the other as he was realizing it. The one had been shut up in the Tower, and avoided a return thither by an opportune death ; the other escaped the same fate in the same manner. Under such exceptional circumstances I think it would be unjust to throw the

* Craggs had begun life as a barber. He then became a footman, and, later on, an army clothier. His dealings as such being investigated, he refused to produce his books and was sent to the Tower. Twenty-two years later he was Secretary of State, with Aislabie as leader of the House of Commons. When the *South Sea Bubble* exploded, Aislabie was expelled from the House for his shameful conduct in connection with the famous *Bubble*. Craggs escaped the same fate by a timely death. Green, in his history, says that he died of terror at the punishment he expected to meet.

responsibility of this document on the home government in virtue of the ministerial responsibility. It was none the less an unfortunate deed; for Lawrence, who knew of it, took pattern from it; he saw or thought he saw therein his justification.

The good-natured souls who have pitied the deportation and sad fate of the Acadians, says Rameau, have no need, by way of explaining the fact, to credit them with imaginary crimes. After this document, it may be said that the proscription was not a deed improvised in anger: it was premeditated as early as 1720. Lawrence, upon whom this crime is charged, was acquainted with this document.

It cannot be said that the Acadians had been rebellious, nor even that they had had recourse to violence, since their submission embraced even obedience to the order to depart without taking away anything, and to the still more unjust order that put a stop to their departure, and this, when they were powerful enough to snap their fingers at authority. Examples of such peaceable dispositions are very rare in history. Their extreme peaceableness was their misfortune. Had they not been so meek, they would have had to be let go.

This document, Rameau says again, would suffice, in default of others, to show what nervous apprehension the Board of Trade in Europe and the Governor of Annapolis in America felt lest the Acadians escape from their control. They wish at all costs to avoid this misfortune; so, in spite of the bitter anger which Philipps's disappointment caused him, see how he lavishes kind words upon them, with what insinuating sweetness, while praising the tenderness of King George, he slips in those perfidious assurances of liberty, of

peacefulness, of religious freedom, in order to protract their present condition and make them accept a provisional tolerance that should not be binding for the future, until the favorable hour should strike when they might be deported without risk.

Philipps perfectly understood his instructions; he, who had made his fortune amid the intrigues of the court, was now altogether on his own ground: he put away his great sabre and the high-flown phrases of his first appearance on the scene, and continued the policy he had just inaugurated: wheedle the Acadians so as to make them remain on their lands, exact allegiance if the occasion presents itself, if not, then lavish fine words without promising anything definite; keep a way open for retreat, so as to prove no promises had ever been made, but only attempts at agreement. Thus was obtained from the Acadians the desired amount of usefulness, by freely granting them tolerance without ever affording them any certainty.

Philipps made this situation last two years more without allowing their departure, but also without accepting or refusing the restricted oath which the Acadians claimed; he still kept them on their lands by protracting their uncertainty. He thus reached the year 1722, when he returned to Europe, leaving in his place Captain Doucette as lieutenant-governor.

In his work entitled "Wolfe and Montcalm" Parkman, falling in with the Compiler, affirmed that the Acadians had remained in the country of their own free will. Since writing what precedes I have noticed in his new work, "A Half Century of Conflict," that he has modified his first opinions on this subject. It was indeed difficult not to yield to evidence that was supported by

such a considerable mass of documents as that collected by Casgrain in the "Canada Français." Howbeit, it is with pleasure I give Parkman credit for this implied concession. I cannot reasonably expect him to do as much with respect to all his other errors, for then it would be necessary to destroy almost all that he has written on the history of Acadia.

"Governor Nicholson," says he, "like his predecessor, was resolved to keep the Acadians in the Province if he could. This personage, able, energetic, headstrong, perverse, unscrupulous, conducted himself even towards the English officers and soldiers in a manner that seems unaccountable and that kindled their utmost indignation. Towards the Acadians his behavior was still worse. . . The Acadians built small vessels and the French authorities at Louisburg sent them the necessary rigging. *Nicholson ordered it back*, forbade the sale of their lands and houses *and would not even let them sell their personal effects*; coolly setting at naught both the treaty of Utrecht and the letter of the Queen. Caulfield and Doucette, his deputies, both in one degree or another, followed his example in preventing, so far as they could, the emigration of the Acadians."

All that this citation contains is, in a general way, true; but, as a question of fact, it is not strictly accurate; thus, Nicholson did not order the Acadians to send back the rigging to Louisburg, but forbade them to procure any, nor did he forbid them to sell their effects, but only to take them away with them. Though these variations would be unimportant in an ordinary chronicler without such pretensions as Parkman has to historic accuracy and fairness, still, it would have been better to be absolutely precise, when it was so easy for him to be so.

After having made this concession, apparently so frank and candid, let us see how he sets to work to nullify it:

"If they had wished to emigrate, the English Governor had no power to stop them. . . They were armed and far outnumbered the English garrison. To say that they wished to leave Acadia, but were prevented from so doing by a petty garrison at the other end of the Province, so feeble that it could hardly hold Annapolis itself, is an unjust reproach upon a people who, though ignorant and *weak of purpose*, were not wanting in physical courage. The truth is, that *from this time* to their forced expatriation, all the Acadians, *except those of Annapolis*, were free to go or stay at will."

It is perfectly true, as Parkman says, that the Acadians, *except those of Annapolis*, had the numerical strength to enforce their departure from the country; nor, as is most probable, were they wanting in physical courage, and they undoubtedly had the right to act thus; but we must not judge their actions according to our own ideas. Parkman, as all this history clearly proves, should have understood that these people, these ignorant peasants, as he never fails to call them, had, far otherwise than we, the love of peace, respect for and submission to authority. Instead of overthrowing by force the iniquitous obstacles opposed to their departure, they applied to the French authorities to put an end to them. In their naïve ignorance the stipulations of a treaty seemed sacred, and, thought they, eventually justice would prevail; they did not suspect, so well as we should, the perverseness of their rulers. It is this spirit of submission that later on enabled Lawrence to deport them. Would Parkman have it imputed to them as a crime? And, because they might have effected their departure in spite of the authorities, does this fact relieve the authorities from all blame for their unjust proceedings? Did that iniquitous detention oblige the Acadians to take the oath exacted of them? Is Mr. Parkman's indulgence and commiseration invariably for

the oppressor as against the oppressed? To depart without having the requisite facilities for deportation meant to leave behind them their effects and their cattle, all which was very painful, especially when the right to take them away was guaranteed by a treaty.

There are still other very important considerations to which Mr. Parkman, from the snugness of his easy chair, did not even take the trouble to advert. Thus, if it be true that the Acadians of Beaubassin and Mines had sufficient strength to effectuate their departure, and they would, I believe, have succeeded therein, it was not so for those of Annapolis, as he admits. By withdrawing, the former would leave these latter behind them; they would leave a large number of their compatriots, their relations and brethren at the mercy of a power that held out no hopes of equitable treatment. Not being able to depart in English, French or even Acadian vessels, it was expressly to permit those of Annapolis to effect a union with themselves that the Acadians of Mines had set to work to open a road between the two places, in which attempt they were frustrated by an order from Philipps. To withdraw thus and leave their relations behind would mean a lifelong separation, unless they should chance to meet as adversaries upon the field of battle, in case a war should break out between France and England. Parkman makes no account of this separation, or more probably he did not even think of it; these ignorant people, who were guided in their actions by the humane feelings inherent in our nature, bore most heavily this separation with all its dreadful consequences; they had weighed and pondered it; they had felt the delicacy of their situation; they had seen

farther and more correctly than Parkman with all his learning.

Pursuing the same idea Parkman adds :

“ The year had long ago expired, and most of them were still in Acadia, unwilling to leave it, yet, refusing to own King George.”

Thus does Parkman endeavor to nullify all the merit of his former admission. He had admitted that Vetch, Nicholson, Caulfield and Doucette, in one way or another, did all in their power to render the departure of the Acadians impossible, and yet these Acadians, in spite of all these efforts, “ were unwilling to go.” It is very hard to reconcile these two conflicting statements, but we must be prepared to see Parkman contradict himself on one and the same page ; * the public has so eagerly bolted his first ten volumes that he ceased to be on his guard in the eleventh. After he had said in a general way that the Acadians “ were unwilling to leave,” I find, thirteen lines further on, the following, relative to the proclamation of Philipps :

“ They protested to M. de Brouillan *that they would abandon all rather than renounce their religion and their King ; at the same time they prepared for a general emigration by way of the isthmus and Bay Verte, when it would have been impossible to stop them.*”

The contradiction is flagrant enough, but it would be still more so, if Parkman, by a trick that is familiar to him, had not, as it were, cut his sentence in two, so as not to let us know what, this time, had prevented the departure of the Acadians. We have only to add, in order to complete the unfinished sentence, the following words : “ but they were stopped in their preparations by

* *A Half Century of Conflict*, p. 198.

an order of Governor Philipps, forbidding their cutting a road between Annapolis and Mines and forbidding their leaving their habitations." This addition is not long, and these few words supply the reader with information of great importance. By cutting his sentence in two, Parkman stopped, so to speak, on the brink of a precipice, for I am merely yielding to evidence in saying, that the avowal, which the completion of his sentence entailed, would have been extremely painful to him. Should the reader doubt it, I can assure him that his hesitation will be dispelled long before reaching the end of this work.

And, when Mr. Parkman added: "*Yet, refusing to own King George,*" had he absolutely persisted in introducing these incorrect terms into his account, he might have explained in a few words that the Acadians, when they saw how their departure was made impossible, unanimously offered to Governor Doucette to take the oath of allegiance with a clause exempting them from bearing arms against the French and the Indians their allies; or simply against the French, if means were afforded to protect them against the Indians; and that, from that time up to their deportation, they never refused such an oath. Many of Mr. Parkman's readers might have found this detail very instructive and very important in order to judge of the spirit that animated the Acadians. Leaving the public under a contrary impression, through omission and misconstruction, was allowing unjust prejudices against them to circulate; which is equivalent to falsifying history.

CHAPTER VI.

Departure of Philipps (1722)—Doucette reassumes his functions as lieutenant-governor, which he exercises till 1725—Total absence in the volume of the Archives of documents for this period—Armstrong succeeds him—His character—Taking of the oath at Annapolis—Captain Bennett and Philipps make the tour of the province for the same purpose—Their failure—Armstrong confides the same mission to Officer Worth—Incomplete success—His report.

Philipps returned to England altogether disgusted with everything: with the ungrateful task that had fallen to his lot, with the state of the fortifications, with the weakness of the garrison, with the indifference of the authorities in regard to his projects, with his own inability to enforce obedience. He felt himself humbled by his failure. Moreover, this life in an out of the way garrison, far from comfort and civilization, coincided so little with his tastes of a great lord and courtier that, regardless of the general opening of hostilities with the Indians, he embarked for England in the course of the summer of 1722. He nevertheless remained titular governor of the province with all the emoluments of his office till the foundation of Halifax in 1749, at which time he had nearly attained the age of ninety years.

John Doucette, who had been lieutenant-governor some time before the arrival of Philipps, resumed his functions, which he exercised till 1725. Oddly enough,

the volume of the archives does not contain a single document of the period extending from 1722 to 1725. Given the partiality of the Compiler and his efforts to combine in this volume all that could be prejudicial to the Acadians and justify their deportation, here is the explanation that seems to me most probable. Philipps, for fear of seeing the Acadians escape, had shown himself meek and amiable toward them, and up to his departure the burning question of the oath had been kept prudently in the shade. The proper thing to do was to let several years glide by, to await the favorable moment, and, until then, to treat the Acadians with the greatest regard. This policy was all the more commendable because the Indians of Maine were in open war and those of Nova Scotia threatened to follow their example, and in fact were already committing depredations. Under such circumstances Philipps could not have failed to recommend strongly to Doucette maintenance with regard to the Acadians of that same prudence and forbearance which he himself had inaugurated. The interposition of the governor in the affairs of the Acadians became almost null, and that is why his correspondence contained nothing or almost nothing relative to them, and especially nothing that could be turned against them. But, some will say, this volume was to have been a compilation to serve for the general history of the province. That is very true; but the Compiler thought otherwise. For him, as I have said, and the thing is evident, this volume was the combination of all the documents that could throw some light on the reasons that might have called for the deportation; and, whatever did not tend to confirm this proof, or whatever tended to overthrow it, was extraneous matter.

So true is this that, up to the foundation of Halifax, this volume contains nothing but what relates to the Acadians and to their priests; and, when a letter mentions something that does not relate to them, or something that throws discredit on the governor or some other important official, this part is systematically suppressed, and this is done even when the omitted part explains or exhibits in a different light the inserted part. In this period, from 1722 to 1725, the Acadians, conformably to the orders of Philipps, had been left to themselves, and the Compiler, finding nothing in Doucette's correspondence to support his proofs, found nothing worth reproducing. Yet it is certain that Doucette must have had regular correspondence with the Board of Trade and with Philipps. If we suppose the small number of four dispatches a year to the Lords of Trade, as many to Philipps and the replies thereto, we should have forty-eight documents, of which some, though they contained nothing for or against the Acadians, might at least be useful for the general history of the province. Such had been the intention of the legislature. I have seen some of these documents, which in fact contained nothing of importance to the Acadians.

In striking contrast with Philipps, Armstrong, who succeeded Doucette in 1725, was a man of violent temper, of a rough and disorderly cast of mind, altogether unfit for the functions of a governor, even under the most favorable circumstances, and still less suited to the task of smoothing out difficulties such as then faced him. The most salient feature of his character was, however, the capriciousness of his humor. Sometimes affable and obliging, he was most often so harsh

and brutal as to provoke officers and soldiers to insult him publicly.

The new governor was that same Captain Armstrong concerning whom, ten years before, Lieutenant-Governor Caulfield addressed complaints to the Lords of Trade in the following terms :

“ I must own 'tis *with ye greatest reluctancy imaginable* that I am obliged to acquaint Your Lordships of *ye frequent misbehaviour* of Captain Armstrong of this garrison *towards several inhabitants here*, and by my next shall transmit to Your Lordships the several complaints in behalf of ye said inhabitants.”

Invested with absolute power over all the Province, he could hardly be expected to do aught else than vex and worry it. And, in point of fact, he was continually at logger-heads with everybody : with the priests, with his officers, with his soldiers, with his council, with each member of his council, even more than with the Acadians. The volume of the archives, as might be guessed, indicates only his quarrels with the priests and the Acadians, according to the above-mentioned policy of excluding whatever might discredit Armstrong and weaken the effect of his sayings and doings in regard to them. Fortunately, the hostilities of the Indians had ended before his arrival at Annapolis ; else he would perhaps have plunged the Province into a most deplorable situation. At first, he seemed to wish to make Canso the seat of his government and assembled there a quorum of his councillors ; but, the following year, he established himself at Annapolis.

His nomination to the post of lieutenant-governor had alarmed the Acadians. From the moment of his arrival at Canso, he spoke of nothing less than crossing Nova Scotia in battle array and thus cutting the Gordian

knot, if only the necessary troops were furnished him. Writing to the Secretary of State, he said :

“ I have written to the Government of New England to send me sixty Indians of that country, with twelve whale-boats, which, joined with so many of our troops and forty men from Commodore St. Lo, I intend to take a tour through the Province to humble the villainous french inhabitants. . . I hope we shall do our duty and give a good account of ourselves.”

All this had no other foundation than the taking of the oath, and he relied on terror to exact it. However, he did nothing of the sort; but the Acadians long since knew what they might expect from him. In the course of the following summer they prepared for a general emigration, fully resolved, should circumstances so permit, not to take any account of the prohibitions that might be opposed thereto. Some families withdrew that very year to settle in Prince Edward Island, where the French government were preparing to receive them. In July of that same year Armstrong wrote :

“ They are resolved to quit the Province rather than take the oath, and as I am informed, have transported several of their cattle and other effects.”

Yielding to his irrepressible temper, he had hoped violently to break down all opposition by spreading terror around him, and the only result he was obtaining was the hatred and contempt of his officers and the departure of the Acadians. The threatened exodus must be stopped, or he would incur a severe reprimand and ruin his dearest hopes.

Was he going to let France strengthen her colony with so many useful subjects? Was he going to let his Province be deprived of the only inhabitants that he

had to govern? What would people say of him? What would become of the government with which he was charged, what would become of his own position? All this filled him with fear; his manner and tactics were suddenly changed; he inveigled the Acadians to well-prepared meetings, where he spoke feelingly of the great advantages they would secure by accepting the oath and cordially becoming the loyal subjects of King George. Then, as soon as he thought that the favorable moment had come, he proposed to them the taking of the oath:

“He hoped they had come with a full resolution to take the oath of fidelity like good subjects, induced with sincere honest principles of submission and loyalty to so good and gracious a King, who, upon their so doing, due and faithful observation of their sacred oaths, had promised them, not only the free exercise of their religion, but, even the enjoyment of their estates and other immunities of his own free born subjects of Great Britain; and that for his part, while he had the honor to command, his endeavors should always be to maintain to them what His Majesty had so graciously vouchsafed to grant.

“Whereupon, at the request of some of the inhabitants, a french translation of the oath required to be taken was read unto them.

“Upon which, some of them desiring that a clause whereby they may not be obliged to carry arms might be inserted,

“I told them that they had no reason to fear any such thing as that, *it being contrary to the laws of Great Britain, that a Roman Catholic should serve in the army, His Majesty having so many faithful Protestant subjects first to provide for, that all His Majesty required of them was to be faithful subjects.*

“But they, upon the motion made as aforesaid, still refusing and desiring the same clause to be inserted, the Governor, with the advice of the Council, granted the same *to be written upon the margin of the french translation, in order to get them over by degrees.* Whereupon, they took and subscribed the same *both in french and english.* . . . And having drank His Majesty's, the royal family, and several other loyal healths, *I bid them good night.*”

Such is the report drawn up by Armstrong himself.

When a man of his position has the effrontery thus to parade his knavery in a public document of this kind, we naturally infer that his honor is not worth much. This document is curious, it throws a strong light on the kind of diplomacy that was used toward the Acadians. Rameau, from whom I draw, has analyzed it with much skill. The dramatic get-up of the whole affair, says this historian, the feigned good-nature and honeyed speeches of the man, the "flowing bowl" that wins consent, and the cordial "good-night" that sends everybody to bed "mellow": all this shows the consummate craft of an artful dodger. A master-stroke is that marginal note which he makes believe to accept in order "to get them over by degrees," and which he carelessly inserts in only one of the reports read by no one and never seen again. An admirable fabrication is that subterfuge about military service.

What! says Armstrong, you fear to be enrolled by force? Know that, as you are Catholics, you would not even have the right to enlist of your own free will. His Majesty reserves this honor for his Protestant subjects only. Assuredly this is one of the daintiest hoaxes ever invented in the realm of knavery. It belongs to high comedy, not to history. A pity it is that Molière never heard of this adventure! "What!" would Scapin have exclaimed, "Are you afraid I will take your purse? Why, my dear fellow, I wouldn't have it, even though you begged me to take it."

Scarcely had he finished with the taking of the oath by the inhabitants of Port Royal, when he arrested Father Gaulin, their parish priest, "that old mischievous incendiary Gaulin" as he calls him, on the plea that he had meddled with affairs that did not concern his ministry.

The offence, if it should be really considered one, and if the accusation were well grounded, was certainly trivial: at any rate this arrest might be impolitic under the circumstances. There still remained for him to cause the oath to be taken by the inhabitants of Grand Pré, Pigiguit, Cobequid, Beaubassin, etc., that is by more than three-fourths of the entire population; but such was the irrepressible violence of his character that he could not control himself. His efforts to induce the people of these places to take the oath were ineffectual. Capt. Bennett and Ensign Philipps, whom he had sent for this purpose, returned without having accomplished anything. However, he does not attribute the cause of it to the arrest of Father Gaulin, if we judge by his letter of April 30, 1727, to the Secretary of State.

The public will be surprised to learn that he imputes his defeat to the instigations of some merchants of Boston and to Major Cosby, afterward lieutenant-governor of Annapolis :

“ Since my last I have the mortification to tell Your Grace that there arrived here from Boston one M. Gambell, a lieutenant in the army, who, I am told, came from England with Major Cosby to Boston, where the Major still continues, tho’ I have ordered him to his post at Canso, and in defiance and disobedience to my orders, stays in New England to know the result of the said Gambell’s false complaints against me. After his arrival here from England, he associated himself with some *Boston antimonarchical traders*, who, together with some evil intended french inhabitants, . . . incited them to sign such complaints as he had formed against me, telling them, that I had no power nor authority to administer them such oaths, and also that Major Cosby would be with them this spring with full power to govern the Province. . . . And all this occasioned by the incitements and ill conduct of the aforesaid Gambell, and three or four New England traders.”

Mr. Parkman, it seems to me, ought not to have

deprived his readers of this document and of the other still more important one that precedes it. They would be interested to know the true inwardness of the wrangle to which Armstrong alludes. He must have had a special gift for making enemies, since we have here leagued against him a major of his own regiment, a lieutenant from some other regiment, and three or four merchants who had come from Boston to dissuade the Acadians from taking the oath that he proposed to them. We can understand his having enemies in Acadia, but his having enemies as far as Boston is beyond us. That there should be Frenchmen or priests to dissuade the Acadians from taking the oath is only natural ; but that English officers and English merchants should do so is most astounding. And if his yoke was hateful even as far as Boston, what must it have been at Annapolis and in Acadia ?

Undejected by the failure of Bennett and Philipps, Armstrong despatched to the Acadians of the district of Mines and Beaubassin a young officer of the garrison named Robert Wroth. He gave him some very detailed instructions on the way he was to proceed. First, he was to proclaim the accession to the throne of His Majesty George II, and to celebrate the event by public festivities, after which he would make them sign the proclamation of this event, and then, in the nick of time, he was dexterously to slip in the oath of allegiance :

“ You are to behave *seemingly with an air of indifference*, and you are to represent to them *how Divine Providence by ways unforeseen* . . . You are not to depart from my instructions *unless where circumstances and place may so require.*”

In reality Wroth had great latitude as to the oath

he was to accept. The instructions of Armstrong to Wroth, the report of the latter, the text of the oath and of the conventions concluded between him and the Acadians are found in the Colonial Records. When one reads these documents, it is easy to understand why they were suppressed at Halifax, and still easier to realize the fraud and duplicity with which Armstrong presided at the taking of the oath.

“Copy of the oath of fealty which I left to the inhabitants of Beaubassin and its dependencies:

“I do sincerely Promise and swear that I will be faithful and bear True Allegiance to His Majesty King George the Second, so help me God.

“Original of the articles that I granted to the inhabitants of Beaubassin :

“I, Robert Wroth, etc., etc., promise and grant in the name of the king etc., etc. . . to the inhabitants of Beaubassin, etc., etc. . . the articles here below that they have requested of me, namely:

“1. That they shall be exempt from taking up arms against anyone, so long as they shall be under the rule of the king of England.

“2. That they shall be free to withdraw whithersoever they will think fit, and that they shall be discharged from this signed agreement, as soon as they shall be outside the domination of the King of England.

“3. That they shall have full and entire liberty to practise their religion and to have Catholic, Apostolic and Roman Priests.

“ROBERT WROTH.”

This oath did not differ perceptibly from that accepted by Armstrong from the inhabitants of Annapolis, since he himself had agreed to their exemption from military service and the other articles had been provided for by the treaty of Utrecht.

The report of Wroth to the governor is very long and detailed. It is very interesting reading: step by step, says Rameau, we can trace his method, which does

not differ from Armstrong's as far as fraud goes ; but, while the latter is imperious and passionate, the former is an amiable blackguard who attends to his affairs while enjoying himself and who enjoys himself so as to attend to them better. Wherever he shows himself, he opens proceedings by banquets : a banquet the first day, a banquet the second ; there is eating and drinking. The first day no special topic is introduced ; next day, the king's death is announced and the accession of his successor, who is greatly interested in the welfare of the Acadians. They drink in memory of the death of the former and for the health of the latter ; they drink in honor of His Gracious Majesty, they drink the health of the Queen regnant, of the other Queen ; they drink to all the other royal and loyal toasts ; then this amiable blackguard winds up by drinking with feelings of compunction to *Divine Providence which by ways unforeseen. . . .*

"After which," resumes Wroth, "I judged the moment favorable to introduce my little discourse as follows :

"I doubt not, my friends, you know what brings me here, how that by the death of the King, my master, of glorious memory, *Divine Providence has miraculously* afforded you the occasion."

Here, he extols the king and his bounty, but makes no mention yet of the oath, which was the object of his mission ; only, he convokes them to another banquet, during which they were to proceed to the proclaiming of the king, and Wroth improves the occasion by exhorting them to bring as many friends as possible, for that they were to acclaim and sign the Proclamation of the king.

The way was thus skilfully prepared ; but in spite of orchestral symphonies, bonfires, discharges of musketry,

hurrals, enthusiastic toasts, yea even the fumes of liquor, these Acadians had not quite lost their wits, and, when he finally presented the written oath to have it signed, they respectfully reminded him that he had forgotten to complete it, and requested him to insert the restrictions they had always demanded in such an emergency. He flew into a rage, cooled down, returned to the attack on the morrow ; but, with their simple good-nature, he found them still inexorable.

“ They still insisted upon the same demands, and after having seriously weighed them, and not judging them repugnant to Treaties, Acts of Parliament and Trade, I granted them as an indulgence, and by reason of their diffidence of my authority, *I was obliged to certify the same in the body of the oath.*”

It was the same at Mines : the same manœuvres, the same results. There, objections were made with reference to the word “obéirai,”

“ . . . *which gave me no concern, the english being what I had to govern myself by ; and finding by advice, the same might be translated in a manner more agreeable to them, and, at the same time, as conformable to the english and as binding ; I thought proper to alter the same, as appears by the oath they took.*”

So, here we have, says Rameau, a man who does not scruple, in a treaty of which two copies were extant, to alter one of them so as to render the agreement more acceptable, and who is, meanwhile, fully aware that the French will understand the text in one way, while he, the Englishman, will understand it in quite a different way. After all, says he, I will sign whatever they wish ; for me, only the English text will count.

Wroth was very badly received by Armstrong, and yet he had not swerved from his instructions ; he had,

substantially, followed the same line of conduct as Armstrong himself. By a decision of the council the oath obtained by Wroth was declared null and void; but, most strange to relate—for these negotiations are a series of surprises—it was declared in the same resolution that, since the inhabitants had signed these acts and proclaimed His Majesty, they had become his subjects and would enjoy all the privileges attached to that quality, which no doubt also implies all the obligations resulting therefrom.

CHAPTER VII.

Return of Philipps—All the Acadians of the peninsula take the oath—Nature of this oath—It was entitled "*Oath of fealty*," ("Serment de Fidélité"), and the Acadians were called "*French Neutrals*"—What the Compiler thinks of this—Parkman.

WHOEVER confronts Armstrong's reports on the question of the oath with his letters to the Lords of Trade after his operations at Annapolis, the other letter that followed the failure of Captain Bennett, his instructions to Wroth and the latter's report, can easily account for the indignation the Lords of Trade must have felt in presence of this series of administrative tomfooleries and tricks, worthy, at best, of a horse-jockey or a street mountebank. The exploits of Wroth had filled up the measure; all this nonsense must now be stopped; the Government's dignity gravely compromised by Armstrong must be restored; a final and fairly reasonable settlement must be made of this eternal Acadian question.

The Lords of Trade had recourse to Philipps, who always retained the title of Governor of Nova Scotia. It was not without regret that he quitted London where he led so pleasant a life of leisure on his large salary. He himself, in his first attempt, it is true, had not been more fortunate than Armstrong; but he was able at least to command attention by his high position, his courtly manners, his urbanity; and, at all events, the dignity of

the crown would be safe in his hands. Moreover, knowing by his own experience the inflexible determination of the Acadians with regard to military exemption, he brought with him or was expected to have brought a solution to the difficulty, a middle term, which, he trusted, would give them satisfaction. We know not the tenor of his instructions, but his subsequent acts permit us to form a very correct estimate thereof.

Hardly had Philipps landed at Annapolis when he set to work, and three weeks later, he wrote to the Lords of Trade that he had administered the oath to all the inhabitants of Annapolis, and that at the opening of navigation he would do the same for the inhabitants of Mines, Cobequid and Beaubassin, who, it was said, were all disposed to take it resolutely, "as they are pleased to express that the good likeing they have to my Government, *in comparison of what they experienced afterwards*, did not a little contribute, and therefore, reserved this honor for me; indeed, *I have had no occasion to make use of threats and compulsion.*"

Philipps had arrived in December, 1729. On September 2nd following, he informed the Lords of Trade that he had completed the tendering of the oath to all the Acadians of the province. "A work," says he, "which became daily more necessary in regard to the great increase of those people, who are this day a formidable body and, like Noah's progeny, spreading themselves over the face of the Province. You are not unacquainted that for twenty years past they have continued stubborn and refractory upon all summons of this kind, *but having essayed the difference of Government in my absence*, they signified their readiness to comply . . . Thus far the peace of the country is settled."

How had Philipps been able to obtain, and apparently with so much ease, what he himself and others had hitherto failed to obtain? Was this, as he boasted, due to the superiority of his methods, to the mildness of his government? What had really happened? What was the nature of the oath obtained? Was there a clause exempting the Acadians from bearing arms against the French and their allies? And if so, was it written or verbal?

The answer is easy. Philipps, it is true, did not explain that to the Lords of Trade, he merely says that he took care not to imitate Wroth's shameful surrender. Any further statement was unnecessary, since he had but just come from England, his instructions were quite fresh, and the question must have been discussed in all its different aspects before his departure. Philipps well knew by his own sad experience that he could not hope for an unrestricted oath; he must therefore have come with a solution all prepared, and this solution was—to agree *by word of mouth* with the Acadians that they should be exempt from bearing arms. A written promise annexed to the oath was the difficulty that the authorities could not surmount; it was, thought they, a shameful capitulation, a derogation from the dignity of the crown. It was not so for an oral promise, and that was, I have no doubt, the concession which Philipps was instructed to grant; for, in England at least, it was very well understood that the Acadians could not be obliged to take up arms against their fellow-countrymen. For the Acadians, the objection to an oral promise was the lack of security; but this obstacle was not insurmountable. With a man of Philipps's high position, newly arrived from England, who vouched for the word of his sovereign, the

guarantee seemed sufficient, and diffidence ceased. Such was, I firmly believe, the compromise proposed, discussed and accepted; it readily explains the prompt success of the negotiations.

When Haliburton wrote his history of Nova Scotia, he had not access to the documents we now possess. He does not even seem to have seriously tried to penetrate the problem; but, with his knowledge of this people, his great talent of observation, developed by his experience as a lawyer and a judge, he immediately perceived that the Acadians could not have accepted an unrestricted oath; but he supposes treachery; he recalls Armstrong's impostures, and supposes that some artifice of the kind had been practised. He cannot have convinced these men, he must have deceived them, says he. He was right in the sense that the Acadians did not indeed take an unrestricted oath. But I do not think they were deceived. The promise was only verbal, but was accepted as a solemn promise. Haliburton, judging according to previous events, cannot believe the Acadians accepted simple oral promises. His mistake arises from his not adverting to the wide distinction they drew between a man of Armstrong's character, so violent, so crafty, so fickle, so little respected by the people about him, a man whose position was after all only secondary, and Philipps with his imposing dignity, his high position and the authorization which he had brought with him from England.

Contrary, then, to several historians, who have supposed a written restrictive clause annexed to the body of the oath and afterwards suppressed as was the oath itself, which is not in the archives of Halifax, I assert that, in all likelihood, the Acadians were not deceived by

Philipps, that the restrictive clause about not bearing arms was only verbal, and was accepted as such.

I would not undertake to establish the proof of this restriction, had not the Compiler objected to it, and Parkman accepted his objection. According to them the oath of fidelity was taken by all the Acadians voluntarily and without any written or verbal condition.

In support of my contention, I shall first cite Governor Lawrence, the very man who deported the Acadians. In his circular to the governors of New England, which accompanied the transports laden with exiled Acadians, I find the following: "The Acadians ever refused to take the oath of Allegiance, *without having at the same time from the Governor an assurance in writing that they should not be called upon to bear arms in the defence of the Province, and with this General Philipps did comply*, of which His Majesty disapproved."

This would seem to prove clearly that there was a *written* promise; but Lawrence, I have every reason to believe, was mistaken in that detail. The point on which he wished to throw light was the restriction in the oath, and that alone is well founded; the details, which were only incidental to the principal fact, are false; and it is equally false that His Majesty disapproved this restriction, for not the slightest trace of such disapprobation appears in the public documents. All we see there is a small discussion between the Lords of Trade and Philipps on the construction of a sentence in the oath, a mere matter of grammar. Lawrence, who was not very particular, has construed this simple question of syntax into a formal disapprobation of the oath.

In another letter of Lawrence to Sir Thomas Robin-

son, of November 30, 1755, we find the following, relative to the Acadians of Beaubassin :

“They were the descendants of those French who had taken the oath of allegiance to His Majesty in the time of *General Philipps's Government*, with the reserve of not taking arms.”

Another letter from Lawrence, in the Archives of Nova Scotia, page 259, contains this passage :

“As the Acadians of this Province have never yet *at any time* taken the oath of allegiance *unqualified*.”

Governor Cornwallis, in his letter, dated September 11, 1749, to the duke of Bedford, writes :

“I cannot help saying that General Philipps deserved the highest punishment for what he did here, *his allowing a reserve to the oath of allegiance*.”

The same Governor, addressing the Acadian deputies, said :

“You have *always refused* to take this oath without an *expressed reservation*.” *

Governor Hopson, writing to the Lords of Trade, December 10, 1752, said :

“Lord Cornwallis can likewise acquaint you that the inhabitants of Beaubassin who had taken the oath with General Philipps's *condition*. . . .”

Governor Mascarene, in a letter to Shirley in April 1748, said with reference to the oath obtained by Philipps :

“The Acadians intending to have a clause not to be obliged to take up arms against the French, though not inserted, they have always

*N. S. Archives, p. 174.

stood was promised to them ; and *I have heard it owned by those who were at Mines when the oath was administered at that place, that such a promise was given.* Their plea with the French, who pressed them to take up arms, *was their oath."*

In 1744, when war was raging between France and England, an attempt was made to oblige the Acadians to serve as pilots and guides ; but the Acadians, believing that their oath exempted them from a service that appeared contrary to their neutrality, addressed a petition to the governor to ask him his opinion on this point. Governor Mascarene replied :

" If in taking this oath of allegiance, the Government was kind enough to say to you, that *it would not compel you to take up arms*, it was out of pure deference. That they were not thereby exempted from serving as pilots and guides. . . . Whereupon, they withdrew their petition.

There are other proofs of the same kind in twenty different places in the volume of the Archives, and particularly on pages 204, 233, 234.

It was not without some apprehension that the Acadians consented to waive their claim to a written proof ; so, in order to provide for emergencies, they, immediately after the taking of the oath, drew up a certificate, which was signed and attested, and addressed to the minister of foreign affairs in Paris, to be, in case of necessity, appealed to by the French Government.

" We, Charles de la Goudalie, priest, missionary of the parish of Mines, (Grand Pré and River aux Canards) and Noel Alexandre Noirville, priest bachelor of the faculty of theologians of la Sarbonne, missionary and parish priest of the Assumption and of the Holy Family of Piguit, certify to whom this may concern, that His Excellency Richard Philipps, etc., etc., has promised to the inhabitants of Mines and other rivers dependent thereon, that he exempts them from bearing arms and fighting in war against the French and the Indians, and

that the said inhabitants have only accepted allegiance and promised never to take up arms in the event of a war against the Kingdom of England and its government.

"The present certificate made, given and signed by us here named, this April 25, 1730, to be put into the hands of the inhabitants, to be available and useful to them wherever there shall be need or reason for it.

"Signed : de la Goudalie, parish priest; Noel Noirville, priest and missionary.

"Collated by Alexander Bourg Belle-Humeur, this 25th April, 1730."

It would be difficult not to admit the force of the proof I have just given. I might add the very significant fact that, since 1730, the Acadians were universally known by the name of "*French Neutrals*." Thus are they very often designated by the official documents emanating from the governors of the province and from the Lords of Trade. To pretend, as the Compiler does, that their oath contained no restriction, would be to destroy all the significance of this appellation, and to suppose an absurdity.

In spite of all this evidence the Compiler says : "Governor Philipps, on his return to Annapolis in 1730, brought the people, at last, to *take an unconditional oath willingly*." The reader will be curious to know what grounds the Compiler had to establish a pretension that was never alleged at this epoch, and which is expressly and repeatedly contradicted by all the governors of the Province, who succeeded Philipps, namely : by Mascarene, Cornwallis, Hopson, and Lawrence. The reply is very simple : his pretension is utterly groundless. In the entire volume, which he himself compiled, there is not one sentence, not one word that supports his pretension or implies it, whether directly or indirectly. This may appear strange, but it is not so for me who am accus-

tomed to the artifices of the Compiler. It would be difficult to express in fit language the conduct of a man who dares to uphold such views not only without any proof, but against a mass of documents that destroy them.

“In April, 1730,” says the Compiler, “Governor Phillips announced to the council the *unqualified* submission of the inhabitants.” No such thing occurred. Neither to his council, nor to the Lords of Trade did Phillips ever use the expression “*unqualified*,” nor any other equivalent one; at least there is not a trace thereof in the Compiler’s volume, and there can be no doubt that any document that contained such an expression would not have been omitted, as he omits such documents only as are unsuited to his purpose.

Until now I have had to attack only his bad faith, and that was bad enough; but it is, if such a thing be possible, outdone by his presumption. Listen to him:

“The term “Neutral French” having been so frequently applied to the Acadians in public documents, their constant denial of an unqualified oath ever having been taken by them, the reiterated assertions of their priests. . . led the governors at Halifax, in 1749, and at subsequent periods, *erroneously to suppose* that no unconditional oath of allegiance had ever been taken by the people of Acadia to the British Crown.”

This is really ridiculous. A man must fancy himself endowed with intuitive cognition and born with infused science, before he thus ventures to substitute his own groundless view for the wisely formed opinions of all his predecessors, and to set himself against them all. He is ludicrously in earnest when he proclaims to the world that the term “French Neutral” never had any foundation in fact. The contemporaries of these events, the

governors and Lords of Trade, when they made use of it in public documents, knew not what they were saying. Mascarene, who had been present at the taking of Port Royal in 1710, who in 1730 was counsellor to Philipps, and in 1740 governor himself, knew nothing. The officers of the garrison who had been, some of them, witnesses of this tendering of the oath, and who had reported it to Mascarene, Cornwallis, Hopson and Lawrence, knew nothing. All these governors had a thousand ways of ascertaining the true state of the case; yet, they knew nothing. The facts that they so positively affirm were contrary to their interests and desires, and, nevertheless, they let themselves be imposed upon by the affirmations of the Acadians. What a fraud history is, if this be the case! But, considering that this attempt to overthrow one of the best established historical facts is supported only by the *ipse dixit* of a man living in a different century, even though he be a compiler of archives, I prefer to say: What monumental audacity!

“ *Their constant denial led the governors to believe*”, as if there had then been a great controversy on this subject between the Acadians and the governors; whereas, I repeat, there is not one sentence, not one word in the whole volume of the archives, compiled by himself, that shows it was so. It is a pure fabrication. And, if in reality this question had been the object of a controversy, it would be necessary to believe that the Acadians were able to satisfy these governors that their pretensions were well founded, and then it would be rash for a *fin-de-siècle* compiler of the nineteenth century to dispute the validity of facts a century and a half old, already pondered, matured and

accepted by contemporaries whose interest it was not to admit them. "Their *constant denial* of an unqualified oath, and the *reiterated assertions* of their priests . . . led the governors erroneously to believe" . . . According to this ineffable compiler, the testimony, the constant affirmations of the Acadians and their priests, all count for nothing, are not worth the least verbal report of the vilest soldier of the garrison; that is no doubt the reason why he has systematically omitted the few documents coming from the Acadians. In this spirit has all this volume been compiled.

Haliburton, it is easy to see, cannot have known the opinion on this subject of the four governors I have just named; however, his powers of observation and his legal instinct, aided by his impartiality, had guided him securely in this search for truth. He had not been able to believe in an oath without restriction; the subsequent discoveries showed he was right. Thus is true history written; one must possess these qualities to write it; otherwise it is only a lie.

Parkman, on this point, as on many others, has endorsed the opinion of the Compiler. It is so convenient to find opinions ready-made. But, there is this difference between them: while the Compiler had absolutely no ground for his opinion, Parkman had at least the excuse of resting on the Compiler's authority. Slender as this is, let him have the benefit of it.*

*Since the foregoing was written, Mr. Parkman in his new work, "A Half Century of Conflict" has rectified in these terms what he had formerly said:

"Recently, however, evidence has appeared that, so far at least as regards the Acadians on and near the Mines Basin, the effect of the oath was qualified by a promise on the part of Philipps that they should not be required to take up arms either against French or Indians."

Mr. Parkman had accepted the opinion of the Compiler without verifying it. I must do him the justice of admitting that he likes to found his

statements *on something* ; but he is wrong in saying: "*recently* evidence has appeared," for with the exception of the affidavit of Messrs. de la Goudalie, Noirville and Bourg, the entire proof I have produced is drawn from the volume of the Archives itself, which he quotes frequently in his former work, "Wolfe and Montcalm;" however, some labor is needed to combine the factors of this proof. Besides, his correction is incomplete, as he applies to the Acadians of Mines what should apply to all.

CHAPTER VIII.

Philipps returns to England 1731—Armstrong resumes the administration of the province—His character, his difficulties with Major Cosby, Blinn, Winniett, etc.—His relations with Maugeant—The Compiler, his omissions, his artifices—Suicide of Armstrong, Dec. 6th, 1739.

AT last, this question of the oath, so long an occasion of strife, vexation and uncertainty, was, apparently at least, settled for good. There was no more question of it for twenty years till the foundation of Halifax in 1749. Until then, the Acadians had been held captive in the country by the orders and hindrances of the governors, who had refused to accept in good faith the treaty and conventions of Queen Anne.

Wearied of a bootless struggle, the Acadians had accepted the oath of fealty which granted them the exemption which they clung to so earnestly. They were becoming English subjects, and were finally giving up the ever-entertained idea of a departure. Their agricultural holdings, which had suffered from this uncertainty, were about to make rapid progress. Peace and contentment were about to take the place of distrust, and prosperity was going to spring up anew.

This period of twenty years was the most tranquil, the happiest and most prosperous in the history of Acadia. The Acadians had still to suffer from Armstrong, who, for nine years after the departure, of

Philipps, once more filled the office of lieutenant-governor; but as much might be said of the garrison, the officers and the council, all of whom suffered perhaps even more than the Acadians, because the daily contact they had with him exposed them still more to his whims and bursts of anger. On the whole the Acadians did not feel the yoke too severely; in fact, those of Mines and Beaubassin were almost left to themselves. For a long time there was almost no other garrison in the Province than that of Annapolis. Outside this place the authority of the government was in no way represented, except perhaps by the notary, who was at the same time receiver of the rents and revenues of the Crown, which were very little. These notaries, moreover, were themselves Acadians,* and, during six months of the year, all communications between these places and Annapolis were interrupted. Disagreements between Acadians were rare, and were usually settled by arbiters, except those arising from the limits of their lands, which were referred to the Council of Annapolis. These latter seem to have been frequent after 1730. These properties had never been regularly surveyed, and, as the population rapidly increased and the government refused or delayed to make new concessions, the result was repeated subdivisions of the land and frequent conflicts, which were submitted to the decision of the council. I shall return to this subject.

I would like to speak as seldom as possible of the Compiler, but, in spite of myself, I am forced to return to him, because he puts me in the impossibility of passing

*Jean Duon was notary at Annapolis, Pierre Bergeron at Beaubassin, Alexandre Bourg at Mines. Saint Cenne was physician at Annapolis, Bugeaud and Mouton at Mines.

an enlightened judgment on many a phase of this history. His volume, which, in the intention of the Legislature, was to serve for the general history of the province, is, as I have already said, only a compilation of complaints against the Acadians and the clergy. Insignificant as they sometimes are, they take up the whole of his space during Armstrong's administration, from 1725 to 1740. There is not in the volume of the Archives a single document emanating from the Acadians or their priests during these fifteen years; it was not, however, because they were completely wanting, since in several of Armstrong's letters to the Lords of Trade he makes mention of copies of such documents which he communicates to them.

Not only does the volume of the Archives contain nothing but letters setting forth complaints against the Acadians and the clergy, but these letters are mutilated in such a way as to exclude all that does not relate thereto. It is easy to understand that Armstrong in his letters to the Lords of Trade must have most carefully avoided whatever might damage him; but his other letters, treating of his endless difficulties with his officers, his council and all his attendants, are quite sufficient to give us a clear insight into his character, and these were omitted by the Compiler, who, I have no hesitation in saying it, has carefully eliminated all that might direct suspicion to Armstrong. And, if Armstrong's own letters are a sufficient portrait of himself, how much more life-like that portrait would be, if in each case the letters of others about him were also shown? Did the Compiler imagine that writers who like to get to the bottom of a question were going to accept as proved and indisputable every accusation brought by Arm-

strong, even were this man what the Compiler has endeavored to make him? With some people, doubtless, he has succeeded; but all this deception will come to an end: for, not to speak of the researches of painstaking writers on this subject, the Government of Nova Scotia will, I trust, understand how it is its bounden duty to have the Archives overhauled and that compilation completed and corrected, which has issued so incomplete and so one-sided from the hands of Thomas B. Akins.

Through the fault of this Compiler, I am unable to satisfy myself and the public fully as to Armstrong's administration, which occupies, in the period of history I am engaged on, fifteen years, that is, nearly one-third of the whole. Though the Compiler's handling of the other two-thirds is not much better, I have at least had, in certain parts, the advantage of receiving more complete information from documents outside the volume of the Archives.

I will, however, try to make up, as best I can, for the Compiler's omissions, and to show, what he hides, the character of Armstrong; for that purpose I shall in certain cases receive help from the curtailed portion of the documents that he delivers to us, in others, from new documents coming mostly from Armstrong himself. Thus, to a great extent, which is certainly a rare privilege, Armstrong shall be judged by himself.

We have already seen what Lieutenant-Governor Caulfield said of him to the Lords of Trade, when Armstrong was as yet only captain in the regiment garrisoned at Annapolis in 1715. We have seen how he had made himself enemies at Boston among the merchants of the place. We have seen, besides, by another letter dated October 24, 1735, not cited in the volume of

the Archives, that, as soon as he arrived at Canso from London with his commission as lieutenant-governor, he wrote to the Lords of Trade, that he had asked to have from Boston sixty Indians and twelve whalers, that he had from Commodore St. Lo the promise of sixty marines, that, with all of these joined to the soldiers of his garrison, he intended to traverse the province for the purpose of forcing the Acadians to take the oath. He ended his letter thus: "I hope we shall do our duty, and give a good account of ourselves." True, he did nothing of the kind; but perhaps he could not help himself. At all events this letter speaks volumes for his character.

At the same time he complained of Captain John Eliot, Captain Franklin, Captain Kenwood and several others. On September 23, 1726, he accused his servant, John Nichols, of an assault on his person. In the month of July following, Mr. Shirreff, secretary of the council, resigned his position after some difficulties he had with Armstrong. A month later, as Murdoch writes: "A discord arose between Armstrong and M. M. Winniett, James Blinn and Bissell, merchants, connected with the supplies for the garrison." August 23d, Armstrong informed the council: "of M. Blinn's insolent behaviour to him on Monday last, upon the public parade, before most of the officers and soldiers of the garrison, where, after a great deal of disrespectful language and unmannerly gestures, he, at length, told him that he would not give him two pence for his commission."

In September of the same year he notified the inhabitants of Annapolis to take the oath. They refused unless he would insert the restriction. He imprisoned the three delegates they sent him, Landry, Bourgeois and

Richard: "It was ordered that they should be sent to prison and laid in irons." Landry's wife applied to Armstrong, in consequence of her husband being dangerously ill, to grant his liberty on surety for his return when recovered. Her prayer was rejected.

July 12, 1728, Armstrong wrote to Mr. Stanion, of the office of the Secretary of State: "Several complaints being sent against me by two or three malicious leaders in this Province, although not exhibited, but lodged in the hands of Governor Philipps, who, I am sure, only wants a proper opportunity of making his own use of them to my prejudice." Murdoch, the estimable author of a history of Nova Scotia, to whom I owe some of my quotations, says, that Armstrong had, in 1711 and afterwards, undergone some losses, and that in consequence he became "*unhappy, irritable, and jealous*. He suspected Philipps and Cosby of being his enemies," the last named gentleman because he had married the daughter of Winniett, with whom Armstrong had had some difficulties. "Mr. Winniett," continues Murdoch, "seems to have been married to an Acadian lady and to have had great personal influence among the Acadians, but I believe it was never used for any improper purpose, and that he was upright, loyal and kindly disposed."¹

June 23, 1729, Armstrong wrote again to the Lords

¹Winniett, who was a merchant at Annapolis and counsellor of the governor, had married in 1711 Marie Madeleine Maisonnat, second daughter of Pierre Maisonnat and Marguerite Bourgeois. This Pierre Maisonnat, in the wars that preceded the capture of Port Royal, was, together with Pierre Morpain and Francis Guyon, the terror of Boston commerce. He was known throughout all New England by the name of "*Baptiste*." Toward 1706 his vessel was taken and he himself brought prisoner to Boston. In 1707 he was exchanged for Rev. John Williams, the unfortunate victim of the massacre of Deerfield. Major Cosby, lieutenant-governor of the garrison of Annapolis, married Anne, the eldest daughter of Winniett. Pierre Maisonnat settled about 1712 at Beaubassin with his wife's relatives.

of Trade. In this letter, which is very long, he complains of everybody, of Major Cosby in particular, of Father Breslay, of the French papists, of the collector of customs, etc., etc.

On the arrival of Philipps, in 1730, Armstrong went back to England, whence he returned the following year. Here is what Philipps wrote to the Secretary of State a few weeks after his arrival at Annapolis: "I found at my coming a *general dissatisfaction in all parts*, and disagreement between the two lieutenant-governors (Cosby and Armstrong) about the right of power and command, which drew the inferior officers into parties; but I assure Your Grace it is now the reverse. *Joy and satisfaction appear in every countenance among the people*, and in the garrison tranquillity."

This letter is in the volume of the archives, but the part I quote is omitted. Doubtless it is by mistake the Compiler dates this letter January 3, 1729, for in reality it should be January 3, 1730.

The following fact is a revelation of Armstrong's character. In 1726, there arrived at Annapolis a Frenchman by the name of Maugeant, who, when examined by the council, admitted that he was fleeing from French justice for a murder he had committed at Quebec. He pleaded as an excuse self-defence. Armstrong made him his man of business, his instrument, and, as far as we can judge, his intimate counsellor. With Armstrong's confidence and protection, Maugeant incurred the detestation of everybody: officers, soldiers, and Acadians. His infatuation for Maugeant was so great that he took him with him to England, on the arrival of Philipps. Here is what Philipps wrote of him, September, 2, 1730:

“Lieut.-Col. Armstrong who is gone for England, carried with him one Maugeant, a french papist, who fled lately from Canada into this Province for a barbarous murder. The Lieut.-Governor took him into his protection and admitted him to take the oath, after which he rendered himself exceedingly odious to the inhabitants, both English and French, they, believing that the Lieut.-Governor acted toward them by his council and advice. At my arrival, he, finding many complaints were ready to be exhibited against him, petitioned for leave to retire, which, being granted, with a defense never to return, gave a general satisfaction, and proved a great inducement towards their submission to the Crown of Great Britain. The fellow's character is very bad, but is allowed to have a genius, and would make an excellent minister to an arbitrary prince.”

This letter is also in the volume of the archives, except, however, this citation; and nevertheless this short extract says more as to the character of Armstrong and is more useful to the general history of the Province than many other documents found therein.

Philipps sang his own praises rather loud when he attributed his prompt success to the good remembrance every one had preserved of him, and to the difference between his administration and Armstrong's. He cannot be judged exactly by his own valuation; for, though he undoubtedly possessed great practical judgment, tact, and many of the qualities that go to make a good administrator, yet all this was favored and enhanced by circumstances; the contrast made him seem greater than he really was.

Obliged to return to England for affairs of his regiment, he was again replaced by Armstrong. At the moment of his departure, Philipps wrote to the Duke of Newcastle: “It imports me much to be very careful of delivering up the Government to Lieutenant-Governor Armstrong with the greatest exactness, who is turning up every stone and raking into every kennel, to find

some dirt to bespatter me with, in hopes that some may stick, etc., etc." He accuses him of ingratitude.

Hardly had Philipps gone home, when Armstrong's difficulties commenced again worse than before with Cosby and Winniett. Cosby did not wish to sit with Armstrong, and the council was reduced to four councillors. Twice in the course of the autumn of 1732 did Armstrong complain of both these councillors to the Lords of Trade. At that time he wished to establish a fort at Mines, but was prevented by the Indians. Murdoch says in reference to this: "Armstrong accuses and suspects everybody in his disappointment."

There is reason to believe that Armstrong's unpopularity and his ever-recurring difficulties embittered him more and more and drew upon him a severe reprimand from the Lords of Trade; for he ended by committing suicide, December 6, 1739. He had made his will a month before, and a few weeks after his death all his goods were seized in the hands of his executors, to pay for rents and government fees which he had collected for several years without rendering any account of them; in other words he was a speculator.

I ask the reader: Is the writer that does not get firm hold of these facts a person capable of forming a sound estimate of events? By silently ignoring them, does he fulfil his duty towards the public as an historian? I think not; on the contrary, I think that, when there is question of a government the power of which is centred in the hands of a single man, the first duty of the historian is to seek to penetrate the character of that man. This once found, he has the secret that will enable him to disentangle and elucidate many confused situations, to substitute light for darkness.

I might perhaps express an opinion about some of Armstrong's difficulties; I will not do so; it is not necessary. It matters little, after all, whether in this or that particular case he may have been right or wrong. The fact that he was in a continual turmoil during his whole administration, with everybody and everywhere, is ample evidence that he himself was the author of his troubles through his cross-grained and hot-tempered nature. His was an ill-balanced mind. This makes it more difficult to understand and judge him than a man whose character is firm and steadfast, whether for good or evil; however, enough is known of him to preclude all danger of a mistake. He was by turns kind and tyrannical. Amidst his fits of rage and his brutalities he sometimes gave proofs of humane feelings and of a sincere desire to promote the interests of his government. Though despotic at times, he was the first to suggest to the Lords of Trade the establishment of a representative assembly, and, when he saw that his idea was for the moment impracticable, he nevertheless granted the Acadians, and that spontaneously, the privilege to name deputies. Their functions and powers were almost null; yet this creation of his was wise and disinterested; it produced excellent results under his successor.

While passing judgment on his character and administration, we cannot forget these facts; however, they atone but very poorly for his long series of administrative buffooneries, his frauds, his unspeakable brutalities. He made enemies of all the people about him: of Major Crosby, of the secretary of the Council, of the merchants, the Acadians, the clergy, and even of Philipps, with whom it was so much his interest to be on good terms. His authority had so fallen into discredit that

he was even publicly insulted by a merchant of the place and suffered a personal assault from his servant. It would indeed be something quite unprecedented if difficulties so frequent and persistent crossed the path of one who knew how to use his authority with dignity and justice. The tree is judged by its fruits.

Nothing gives us a better insight into Armstrong's character than his relations with Maugeant. Though the latter had been expelled by Philipps on account of his criminal record, and for having made himself odious to everybody, Armstrong took him with him to England as a chosen companion, brought him back again after eighteen months' absence, and, in direct opposition to the orders of his chief, retained him near his own person even till death, as his intimate counsellor and the instrument of his caprice. In view of these facts it is not surprising that Armstrong's authority had fallen so low.

It will be readily understood that what I have alleged embraces only a very small part of Armstrong's deeds and feats, for, I have hardly touched on the last seven years of his administration, the years that immediately preceded his suicide. Very little is known of the events of that period; presumably, this suicide was brought on by the aggravation of his faults and disappointments so keenly felt by his ill-balanced mind as to throw it completely out of gear; but the Compiler cunningly saw that all this would throw too much light on Armstrong's administration and character, and defeat his purpose; so he deemed it expedient to eliminate carefully whatever might reflect upon Armstrong, in order, thereby, to animadvert with cumulative force upon the Acadians and the clergy. When the documents contain nothing against them, his occupation is

gone ; he creates a vacuum. And, so far did he carry these tactics, that he even carefully omitted all documents which would let the reader know of Armstrong's suicide.

The better to exhibit his artifice, I here give the number of the documents that the volume of the Archives contains for each year of Armstrong's administration : 1725, 3—1726, 4—1727, 11—1728, 1—1729, 1—1731, 5—1732, 9—1733, 0—1734, 0—1735, 1—1736, 2—1737, 0—1738, 0—1739, 0. Except five or six documents of the Council, this collection is wholly made up of Armstrong's own letters to the Lords of Trade. There is not a single letter from the Acadians or the priests, and yet there were such communications, since even Armstrong's letters mention several of them. Writing on June 10th, 1732, he says : " I transmit the enclosed letters ; Nos. 4, 5, 6, from priest de la Goudalie ; 7, 8, are mine ; No. 9 is from René Le Blanc." In another letter of Nov. 22nd, 1736, he writes : " No. 1 is M. St. Ovide's *first* letter, No. 2 is my answer ; No. 3 are the minutes of the Council ; No. 4 is M. St. Poncy's declaration in Council ; No. 5 are the minutes of Council ; No. 6 is the petition of the Acadians."

CHAPTER IX.

Armstrong's difficulties with the clergy—The case of Abbé de Breslay, Abbé Isidore, and Messrs Chauvreulx and de St. Poncy—Painful situation of the clergy—Their attitude.

IN the preceding chapter I have, of Armstrong's difficulties, touched only on those which he had with his officers, his council, and the English merchants of Annapolis. It may reasonably be supposed that he had some also with the priests and the Acadians. Strange to say, those he had with the Acadians are few in number and relate only to the question of the oath before it was settled by Philipps in 1730, and they are of so trivial a nature that the reader may well be spared the recital of them. All may be reduced to some complaints to the Lords of Trade concerning their refusal to take the oath in the form desired; but, if the facts are in themselves insignificant or justifiable, the expressions Armstrong uses are not wanting in force. Their conduct, in so resisting his wishes, is repeatedly termed: undutiful, insolent, contemptuous, etc., etc.

He had far more trouble with the clergy; but, just as it would be impossible in most cases to judge between Armstrong and Philipps, Armstrong and Cosby, Armstrong and Winniett, so it would be impossible for me to judge between Armstrong and the priests with whom he was at variance. After what is known of Armstrong, who would venture to accept as the exact truth all he has said of Philipps and Cosby, and to believe, upon his

simple affirmation, that he was right and they were wrong? No one, I presume, would be so rash. Similarly, I am utterly unable to decide between Armstrong and these priests. I regret it: for, I would act with the same freedom of mind as if there were question of anything else; I regret it, because, far from discouraging me, problems of this sort have a particular attraction. The reproach I should feel most would be that I let myself be influenced by prejudices, likes or dislikes, all of which it is my most sincere desire to eschew. It were, I think, a legitimate inference, after what has been said of Armstrong, that, in his difficulties with Philipps, Cosby or others, the blame was generally on his side, and, when it was not wholly so, he was guilty of having drawn the quarrel upon himself.

The first important difficulty of this kind was with M. de Breslay, parish-priest of Annapolis. All that we know of it is contained in a letter of Armstrong's to the Lords of Trade, dated June 23d, 1729. This letter, as a matter of course, is published by the Compiler, but, as he only gives *the middle of it* (the part indicated herein by italics), I transcribe it here almost in full, because the passages he has suppressed modify considerably the part he has given. Armstrong first speaks of a series of insults committed against him by divers persons of his garrison and others:

“Through the malice of some people who are abetted and encouraged by the favor and countenance of Major Cosby, the Lieut.-Governor of this garrison, who, forgetting his character and dignity, has condescended to become a party in the malicious contrivances of my enemies, who, without any regard to truth or justice, or His Majesty's service, have obstructed, vilified and misrepresented all my actions.

“*The first person I shall take notice of for his notorious inso-*

lence is M. de Breslay, the Popish priest of this river, who, having for some time past endeavoured to withdraw the people from their dependence on H. M's Government, by assuming to himself the authority of a judge in civil affairs, and employing his spiritual censures to force them to a submission. His insolence and tyranny growing at last insupportable, I sent the adjudant to him to his house, to desire to speak with him, but his intelligence proved so good, though nobody was acquainted therewith but Major Cosby, that, before the adjudant could reach his house, he was gone off, and has ever since absconded in the woods, about this river, among the Indians, pursuing his former practices of obstructing H. M's service, and exciting the savages to mischief. To prevent which, I thought proper, by an order, published at the Mass house, to command him to be gone out of the Province in a month's time.

“The Sieur Maugeant, whom I employed for to read the same to them in French, in the presence of the Fort Major, M. Wroth, and some other gentlemen, which, having done, as they were returning back to make me a report, amongst a crowd of people, they happened to meet Major Cosby, the Lieut.-Governor, on the highway, who, without any provocation, insulted and abused the said Maugeant. . . Major Cosby sent me immediately a complaint against the said Maugeant, alleging that he had affronted him, by grinning or laughing in his face. I found M. Cosby's allegations against Maugeant to be frivolous and groundless, and the true reason of the affront and insult to proceed from his resenting the services M. Maugeant had done His Majesty by reading and publishing my orders to the people against their departing the Province without leave, and against M. de Breslay, the Popish priest, whose cause he avowedly espouses merely in opposition to me.”

Such was the accusation. The obvious inference is that M. de Breslay had been chosen as arbiter; that one of the parties refused to submit to his decision, and that he had made use of ecclesiastical censures to constrain him thereto. But there was question here neither of conspiracy against the safety of the state nor of direct offence against authority. Arbitration has always been allowable in the settlement of differences, and it is devoutly to be wished that this practice were

more general. The fact that nations are adopting it in our own time is one of the healthiest signs of social progress in this nineteenth century. The censures may have been misused or inflicted for trivial motives; but such abuse bore with it its own remedy, by averting suitors from an arbiter who had so high-handed a way of enforcing his judgments. It was indeed very impolitic of the priest thus at once to ruin the popularity of his tribunal. However, Armstrong's brutality must assuredly have been most terrifying to oblige him to flee into the woods for such a peccadillo; and it is known from other sources that for more than a year he did not dare present himself at Annapolis. Very likely the case is not fully stated by Armstrong in his letter, for M. de Breslay, before returning, lodged his complaints in England and defended himself against the accusation of meddling with the affairs of the government, by producing certificates from Philipps and Cosby, attesting that on all occasions, as far as they knew, he had behaved well.* That part of Armstrong's letter which is eliminated by the Compiler shows us that Cosby had espoused the cause of M. de Breslay. This was important. It was calculated to throw some doubt on the justice of Armstrong's proceedings, and the Compiler would have acted very kindly had he not deprived the public of this information. Very little is known of Cosby. He may have been no better than Armstrong;

* Armstrong insulted M. de Breslay even in the church while he was officiating, and had some of the people flogged in order to force them to bear witness against him. He broke open his doors, plundered his house and sold his cattle, keeping the proceeds for himself; finally, he drove him by his violence to go and hide in the depths of the woods during more than fourteen months. M. de Breslay saw no other means to protect himself than to lodge his complaints in England, whither the governor had to go in person to defend himself (Casgrain, *Pèlerinage au pays d'Évangéline—Archives de la marine et des colonies*).

but it must certainly have been very disagreeable to him, lieutenant-governor of the garrison, to see himself cast into the shade, supplanted in his authority by this Maugeant. With the above remarks, I leave the de Breslay incident to the reader's judgment.

Another of Armstrong's difficulties was connected with Father Isidore, who was an interdicted priest. Armstrong wished to place him over the parish of Mines. He ought to have had sense enough to understand that a Catholic population would never consent to accept an interdicted priest. By the fact of his interdiction he had no more right than Armstrong himself to say mass, hear confessions, or administer the sacraments: in diplomatic parlance, *his usefulness was gone*. In his anger Armstrong did not understand the obstacles he was running up against, he wished to impose Father Isidore anyhow; but in this case he was powerless to accomplish his will; there ever remained to the inhabitants the privilege of not attending church, and against that Armstrong could effect nothing. That is precisely what they did, and, to use an altogether modern expression, Father Isidore was *boycotted*. *Inde irae*. Armstrong could punish the parish by refusing it another priest; he did so as long as his rage lasted.

The most serious difficulty, or at least that which is sometimes cited with accents of indignation against the insolence of the priests, particularly by Parkman, relates to Messrs. de Chauvreulx and de St Poncy. As there is here question of the actions of the Council, the case would seem to deserve special attention; but, it must not be forgotten that Armstrong alone was not far from constituting the whole force of the Council. His brutalities had disgusted the most important members and

kept them from attending it; those who still consented to attend (and the number was, at the arrival of Philipps in 1730, no longer sufficient for a quorum) had evidently to give up their independence. They had either to submit to him or to resign, or at least to absent themselves on critical occasions.

After this necessary explanation I shall reproduce in their essential parts the minutes of the Council relating to the case of Messrs. de Chauvreulx and de St. Poncey; it is the last document that the Compiler transmits to us concerning Armstrong's administration, the document nearest to the time of his suicide.

"Whereupon, M M. de St. Poncey and de Chauvreulx, the two Romish priests, were called in and informed *that it was judged necessary* before M. de St. Poncey's departure for Cobequid, that he or M. de Chauvreulx *should first go* to Pobomcoup, along with M. d'Entremont and Amherst, to use endeavors that restitution may be made of the vessel's sails and such other effects as the Indians had taken.

"They, thereunto, answered His Honor and the Board in a most insolent, audacious and disrespectful manner, saying, that absolutely they would not go, and that they would have nothing to do in the affair; and, being asked if they would not obey the just and lawful orders of H. M.'s Government, to which M. de Chauvreulx answered contemptuously with unbecoming air and unmannerly gestures, saying: 'Que je suis ici de la part du Roi de France,' and M. de St. Poncey affrontingly affirming the same also, in words to the same effect.

"His Honor therefore told them that he had a mind to send them to France.

"They replied with a laugh and a most haughty insolent air: 'with all their hearts,' then turn their backs and went out of the room, seemingly in a great passion, slamming and throwing the doors in a most rude and insolent manner, and without His Honor's leave left the Board.

"Then M. d'Entremont being called, he said he was very sorry for it, for it was his opinion that the most expedient method to bring these Indians to reason and restitution would be to send a

priest ; a priest being also much needed to baptize and administer the Sacrament.

“ It was resolved to send them out of the Province.

“ Whereupon, the two priests appearing again, their sentence was read ; they resumed their former insolence, calling for chairs to sit down, saying that they did not appear as criminals, and *that they had no business with things temporal.*”

Had the Compiler produced the declaration of M. de St. Poncy, which Armstrong communicated to the Lords of Trade with the minutes of the Council, we should probably be better able to understand the situation. After all, even according to Armstrong's own statement, it was a storm in a tea-cup. The demand was an imposition, though it might have been accepted if preferred as a polite request and not as an insulting command. How that command was intimated to them is what we should know in order to be in a position to judge ; but, even though this detail be not known, Armstrong is sufficiently known ; we know he had the knack of offending everybody, and that his difficulties were almost always the consequence of his petulance and fits of anger. It must have been so in this case ; otherwise it would be inexplicable that two persons, even though not clothed with the priestly dignity, should become, both at the same moment, on hearing an unforeseen, or apparently unforeseen injunction, so enraged as to answer and act as the minutes of the Council represent them. This is a most exceptional proceeding : a polite request is usually followed by a polite reply, and an insolence generally proceeds from a previous insolence either in the form of words, the attitude and manner, or in the matter, by uttering an imperious order when one has only the right to make a request. Armstrong prudently throws a veil over his own manner on that

occasion; but if one examine closely, he will see there was question here of an order, which was more than he had a right to use, on a point that did not regard the duties of these priests; but even this does not altogether suffice to explain the contents of the minutes of the Council; the order must have been accompanied by unbecoming conduct, or perhaps there may be some other fact which we do not know. As in the case of M. de Breslay, I am of opinion that Armstrong, here also, only makes known a part of the proceedings, and that what is omitted is the most important part.

To support my statement I have at hand a document that would warrant very different conclusions, were I not distrustful of possible rashness in deciding questions of this nature. The document bears upon this very incident. It seems that the religious persecution which Armstrong exercised upon the Acadians of Annapolis had become so intolerable that they addressed a petition to the King of France to interpose in their favor with the English government, so as to put an end to the persecution by determining more precisely the position and the duties of the French priests in Acadia.

"We beseech," say they, "Your Majesty to permit us to represent the sad situation to which we are reduced, declaring truly that in the parish of Annapolis Royal, May 29th, 1736, contrary to the treaty and to all the promises made to us when we took the oath of fealty to His Majesty George II., Governor Armstrong forbade Messrs. de St. Poncey and Chauvreulx, our two missionary priests, as worthy ones as we have ever had, forbade them, we repeat, to say mass, to enter the church, to hear our confessions, administer the sacraments to us, and discharge any of their ecclesiastical functions, arrested and obliged them to depart, though the governor, or other persons whom he had gained over to his opinion, were unable to show or prove that our above-named missionaries have any other faults than those of which they pretend to find

them guilty, namely, *not to have been willing to go far from our parish to float a brigantine*, which in no way concerns our missionaries and their functions.

» “ On the following Sunday the governor assembled the deputies and forbade them *to do anything or say any prayer in the chapel up the river*. These are the sad and deplorable conjunctures to which we are daily exposed with respect to our religion, which oblige us to implore respectfully Your Majesty, that you would deign to have determined and permanently settled the conditions by which our missionaries may hereafter abide, in order that we may not be deprived of spiritual succor, at the least whim of those who command.”

Thus, therefore, according to this document, which did not proceed *ab irato* as Armstrong's letters generally did, it was not, or it was not only, in order to make the Indians restore the effects they had carried away from a shipwrecked vessel, that Armstrong ordered M. de St. Poncey to repair to Pobomcoup, but also to oblige him to help in floating this stranded vessel. Thus Armstrong was imposing on a French subject and a missionary the compulsory labor he was wont to exact, and had the right to exact from the Acadians, as being British subjects. If such were the case, and the affirmation of the many persons that signed the petition is surely worth Armstrong's counter-affirmation, we find ourselves in presence of an act of persecution and abuse of authority that is a worthy complement to what we already know of him. This fact explains in a rational manner the insolence of which Armstrong complained, and it would be difficult to explain it otherwise than by an act of this character.

Moreover, even though his severities towards the two missionaries had been justifiable, was not his forbidding the Acadians to make use of the church to pray therein another equally tyrannical act? The author of the one

might very well be the author of the other. Can anything but a long series of arbitrary acts and persecutions, of which, in fact, the petition complains, have forced these people to implore the intervention of the King of France in their favor? *

From all that precedes it must be evident that the volume of the archives is much too fragmentary and incomplete for the purposes of history. With all my efforts to complete it by the analysis of what it contains and by my researches in other quarters, I feel that the result is unsatisfactory; but I experience at least the satisfaction of a conscientious effort to throw some light on this "Lost Chapter." The reader must have already understood what methods the Compiler follows, and also that, when I accuse him of partiality and bad faith, I assert nothing without powerful reasons therefor.

As we are just now concerned with the Acadian clergy, I shall immediately complete my view of them. The facts I have pointed out must be the most important of the individual cases, for they are almost the only ones that have found a place in the volume of the archives. Nevertheless, insinuations of a general character were not wanting against them; far from it. Often, indeed, were complaints made of their influence and the exercise of this influence over the Acadians. It was supposed that the priests did all in their power to

When I undertook this work, I intended to publish only a series of articles in rectification of what I deemed the errors of an article inserted in "The Week" of Toronto from the pen of the historian, Stevens Pierce Hamilton, who committed suicide at the beginning of this year (1893). His conclusions were to a great extent drawn from the affirmations of the self-murdered Armstrong and especially of what he said of Messrs. de Chauvreulx and de St. Poney. I thought that the intemperance of his pen was explained by his suicide, that he who wrote on the eve of his own self-destruction was not in a suitable frame of mind to form a sound estimate of history. This is the reason why I have dropped out his name and transformed my articles into the work which I now offer to the public.

preserve them in their attachment to France, to avert them from the oath and induce them to leave the country. We are at liberty to believe that these accusations were well-founded or not, or that they were so to a certain extent. The authorities knew that the priests possessed influence over them, they knew that the Acadians obstinately refused to take the oath thrust upon them; this was enough to give rise to suspicions, which sometimes probably had more or less foundation. Here there can be little else than conjecture, and the conclusions may vary according to the points of view, according to one's greater or less knowledge of the behavior of the clergy; for no doubt this influence, if it really were exercised, must have been used discreetly enough to make it almost impossible for the authorities to detect it.

Granting the morality of the Acadians which was undoubtedly great, their ignorance which was not less so, their peaceful manners, their isolation, their lively faith, the strictness of the principles of their religion, the clergy's influence over them must have been great. But, great though it was, Parkman has exaggerated beyond all measure both this influence and its exercise, with the evident object of giving a brilliant illustration to his favorite theory about the enervating action of the clergy on Catholic peoples. Unquestionably, whoever abdicates his liberty of thinking and acting in the ordinary affairs of life, loses all initiative, becomes enervated. However, I shall have to animadvert on too many greater shortcomings of Parkman's, to hold him to any severe account for what is, after all, only an exaggeration of facts in themselves partly true. I blame him only for his exaggerations, which are inexcusable.

Enough on a point that would call for very special treatment. Certain it is that the situation of the priests of Acadia at that time was extremely delicate and fraught with danger. They were French subjects and missionaries to their compatriots in an English country bordering on the French possessions, where the interests of both nations were frequently in direct conflict. Their position was awkward and difficult in many ways, and the remedy to this state of things equally difficult to find.

Armstrong thought of replacing these French priests by others of English or Irish nationality. This project could not have been realized: a move in that direction would have provoked the departure of the Acadians. The only remedy to this anomalous situation was to create among the Acadians a national clergy. The authorities could reasonably say to them: We are loyally bound to grant you the free exercise of your religion; but in our interest and yours, to save you and to save us from a delicate situation, beset with dangers, it is becoming that your priests be chosen from among your children, in order that their interests may be identical with yours. As this cannot be accomplished at short notice, we give you eight or ten years to attain this object. We shall permit two French priests, of whom one will be stationed at Mines and the other at Annapolis, to be exclusively occupied in educating young men for the priesthood. After this period has elapsed, you must provide for yourselves, and we will no longer permit any French priests to enter into the province, at least so long as France will be our neighbor.

This plan does not seem to have occurred to any one

at the time; it probably did not even enter the mind of any of the governors. Until 1730, the question of the oath and of the departure of the Acadians occupied too much place to leave room for any such design. After 1730, Armstrong, as I have just said, thought of English or Irish priests; but the only project entertained in the sequel was, either to expel the Catholic priests and replace them by French Protestant ministers, introducing at the same time among the Acadian population French Protestants or simply English ministers and English colonists, as we shall see later on. There was sometimes a tendency to adopt the first project, because it was thought more acceptable to the Acadians; but oftenest the second prevailed. The sentiments of the Acadians thereon must have been little known to those who conceived either plan, and imagined that they would submit to such a poorly disguised conspiracy. To formulate such a plan supposes that respect for treaties, for conventions, for promises and for liberty of conscience must have been greatly weakened, though, indeed, it must be said, to the honor of the Home Government, that these iniquitous projects formed at Annapolis and Boston never received, as far as I can see, the least encouragement in London.

I am considering in this chapter only the attitude of the clergy from the treaty of Utrecht till 1740. I am trying to show it in a light that will most truly and clearly set forth their share in the events of this epoch. The best way to do this is to examine the state of minds at this time and the interests on which the influence of this clergy could be exercised. It is well known that prejudices and fanaticism were never more rife. We naturally expect expressions of contempt from Protes-

tants to Catholics and from Catholics to Protestants in conversation and private documents; but, in perusing the archives of Nova Scotia, we are astounded to find that even these public documents are full of invective. Armstrong and his predecessors, in their dispatches to the Lords of Trade, invariably use such expressions as "Papists," "Popish superstition," "Mass house," etc., etc. "What better proof of their bad faith can I give?" said Armstrong, "they are papists."

So long as Catholics and Protestants struggled in each state to remain or to become the dominant element, the persecution was intense and plots frequent. When the fight for supremacy was over, this gradually abated; but there remained the settled idea that the minority were always plotting, whereas in reality, if there were still any plot, it was oftenest that of the conqueror to definitively crush the conquered. The human mind is inclined to fall into extremes on questions of this sort. Men either sleep peacefully while their enemy is working out their ruin, or they are morbidly sensitive to imaginary intrigues that have no foundation in fact. Thus were the governors of Acadia haunted by the idea that the priests were constantly conspiring against the safety of the state.

The better to comprehend the situation, let us consider the points on which the influence of the clergy could be brought to bear. First, there was the question of the oath and of the departure. Did they use their influence for either alternative? There is room for doubt, but I think it probable that some of the priests did to some extent seek to persuade or confirm the Acadians in the idea of departure or of an oath with proper restrictions.

Practically, outside the fantastical picture drawn by Parkman, here is what generally happens and what must naturally have happened at that time. Priests are not wanting whom no one dreams of consulting about worldly matters, because, devoted entirely to spiritual concerns, they hold themselves entirely aloof from purely temporal interests. Others there are who are very glad to give their opinion when asked; these are consulted by a small number of persons, and their opinion has more or less weight according to the importance of the question and the reputation for wisdom they may have earned. Finally, there are others, few in number, who seek to impose their ideas and sometimes by unduly interposing spiritual motives; but, in such cases, there is almost always agitation, murmuring, discord, religious coldness, decrease of influence. One single interposition of this kind by a priest is more remarked than the silence of twenty others, and, at a distance, the noisy exception easily passes for the rule. Thus perhaps may be explained Parkman's extravagant exaggerations. The rule, however, was not different then from what it is to-day, since, fifteen years later, Abbé Le Loutre was severely reprimanded by the Bishop of Quebec for having meddled with temporal affairs that did not concern him, contrary to the instructions the bishop had given him.

I am of opinion, however, that the majority of the priests expressed privately their opinion on this question of the oath and the departure, but that opinion was so obvious and so manifestly correct that this expression of it was not necessary and had probably but little influence on the result of the deliberations. Even were it otherwise, it would be very hard to blame a wise and

prudent influence exerted on the exercise of a right so evident as was that of the departure, and on a petition so reasonable as was that of adding the restrictive clause to the oath. It was certainly not conspiracy to repeat to the Acadians what they could not otherwise be ignorant of: that they had the right to quit the country, that obstacles to their departure were unjust, that, if they remained, they should impose the condition of not being required to bear arms against the French. What can very properly be termed conspiracy is the action of the governors from Nicholson to Armstrong, who had recourse to all imaginable artifices to prevent the Acadians from taking advantage of the treaty. Moreover, if these priests exercised so much influence, it is astonishing that the Acadians, shortly after the treaty of Utrecht, offered to remain if they were exempted from bearing arms against the French, at a time when France, by this decision, would be deprived of all the strength that this population would have added. Either the priests did only feebly interpose in these questions, or they did not, as people seem to think, busy themselves with the interests of France, or, at any rate they gave precedence to the interests of the Acadians.

Nevertheless, it need hardly be said that in those days of rampant prejudices, any interposition of the priests, however insignificant in itself, must have aroused great anger against them. If such would have been the feelings of purely civil rulers, how much greater must have been the anger of a military authority at a time when its designs could not be thwarted without peril.

Still, I believe, and all the evidence confirms this belief, that the action of the clergy was on the whole con-

ducive to the preservation of peace and the submission of the Acadians. Was there during this period of almost thirty years, from 1713 to 1740, a single insurrection, even a threat to trouble the peace, or a simple brawl? Was there as much as one act of resistance to the orders of the authority, or even one single murder? I see no trace of anything of the kind in the whole volume of the archives. During all this time there was, properly speaking, only one serious cause of dissension, always the same, the difficulty about taking the oath.

Over and over again were the Acadians ordered to meet and send delegates to Annapolis; sometimes anger got the upper hand, and these delegates, simple bearers of a general decision, were put in irons; and yet, in spite of this provocation to disobedience, did they ever refuse to obey these orders? Is it not astonishing that so many hindrances, so many base subterfuges were unable to produce a single act of prolonged insubordination, when the government, with its little garrison of one hundred to one hundred and fifty soldiers, was unable to constrain by main force a population comparatively numerous, scattered in places of difficult access, in summer difficult, in winter impossible? This is, if well pondered, the most astounding fact in the present history, and it must be well understood in order to appreciate all the rest. It may, therefore, be a mere matter of justice to give the clergy some credit for it especially if they had as much influence as is generally attributed to them. The advantages I have had for forming a correct judgment on this point and the intensity of my meditations thereon have, I make bold to say, never been equalled by any of those who have written on this subject: I know whereof I speak. This

point being understood, the reader will be convinced, in spite of appearances, that I am not indulging in special pleading, but that I am chronicling facts in all their simplicity.

In spite of the noisy and ill-sounding expressions of Philipps and Armstrong, which may be imputed to their vexation at not being able to force the Acadians to take the oath, I do not find, from 1713 to 1740, a single well-grounded, or rather well-defined complaint against them, except the following:

From 1720 to 1724 there were general hostilities of Indians on all the frontier of these English colonies and particularly in Maine. In Nova Scotia they were limited rather to depredations than to a serious open war. Eleven Indians seized a merchant vessel in Mines Basin and plundered it. Philipps was highly indignant because the Acadians of the place had not interfered to oppose the seizure of this boat, or to hunt down these Indians. The Acadians were ordered to prepare a document in which they were to express "in unequivocal terms, the enormity of their offence;" and this document, signed by all the inhabitants, must be delivered by the delegates and the parish priest of the place, and the value of the effects carried off must be paid by them. All which was faithfully done.

This happened at the beginning of the year 1721, when Philipps had just ordered the Acadians either to leave the country without carrying anything away or to take the oath, and when he had just forbidden them to open a road so as to withdraw from the province. It is probable that the Acadians preferred to sign such a document and reimburse the losses rather than to expose themselves to the vengeance of the Indians; for we

know, from other sources, that those who displayed their zeal against the Indians had to suffer disastrous vengeance from the latter, the government being powerless to protect them. Philipps acted very injudiciously in exacting such amends when he had just shown himself so unjust and cruel towards the Acadians. It was precisely in order to avoid the reprisals to which they would be exposed from the Indians, that they had stipulated for exemption from bearing arms against them, and it was on account of this same danger that, for forty years, English colonists could not be persuaded to settle in the country. It is not easy to understand why Philipps thus forced the parish-priest of Mines to take part in the delegation, if the governor was so anxious to exclude the priests from all temporal affairs. Did he think that the priest himself should have taken up arms to repulse the Indians?

The influence of the clergy, I repeat, must have been exercised to foster peace and submission to the authorities. All the history of Canada is there to prove this assertion. After the treaty of Paris, the Bishop of Quebec even went so far as to excommunicate those who would not submit to the English government, and five persons were, in virtue of this excommunication, deprived of Catholic burial. If Canada is still a British possession, England owes it to this same influence. Let the situation of Canada in 1775 be borne in mind. The country was governed in a military, that is, despotic manner, and did not contain five thousand Englishmen. France had just thrown her sword into the scales on the side of the revolted colonies. Lafayette deputed Frenchmen to Quebec and Montreal to incite the people to shake off the yoke of the Home Government. The clergy

opposed with all its might any collusion with the United States, the people took up arms to defend their soil, and the country remained English. After the victory of Trafalgar, so disastrous for France, a solemn *Te Deum* was sung in the Cathedral of Quebec. In 1837, in spite of well-founded grievances, much more serious than those which gave rise to the independence of the United States, it was still the clergy's efforts that paralyzed the rebellion and made it miscarry. Whether or not these proceedings of the religious authority be approved, they are none the less a fact, they constitute none the less, for the clergy, a point of tradition, if not of absolute doctrine. They hold that there can be no lawful revolt against legitimate authority, except when persecution becomes intolerable and when religious interests are gravely threatened in their very foundations. If Canada were ever to separate from the mother country by an act of rebellion, I do not hesitate to say that the Catholic clergy would be the last bulwark of British union, the last refuge of toryism.

It was not otherwise in Acadia. The priests might desire that the country should again become a French colony, much more through fear of religious fanaticism than through pure love of France; perhaps they may have fostered in the Acadians their love for France, they may have sometimes advised them as to their rights and the means of influencing the authorities of Annapolis, counselled them to quit the country when they had a right to do so, suggested a restriction to the oath, communicated in general terms to the French authorities their fears and their hopes. All these things may be supposed, if they cannot be proved, for they are possible and even probable. These things may be approved,

blamed, diminished or exaggerated at one's choice ; but what cannot be doubted by any one who knows that clergy—unless, of course, the fact may have occurred exceptionally or in cases of doubtful interpretation—is that the priests, whatever may be thought of them in other respects, did nothing to make the Acadians swerve from their fidelity to the oath and their lawful duties towards the English Government.

CHAPTER X.

Major Paul Mascarene succeeds Armstrong—His character—His skill—His success—(1740-1744).

WITH lively satisfaction do I now pass to the administration of Mascarene, called to replace Armstrong in the office of lieutenant-governor of the province. The death of the latter, by creating a vacancy in Philipps's regiment, promoted Major Cosby to the rank of lieutenant-colonel and Captain Mascarene to that of major; but, as first counsellor of the governor, the latter, according to custom, became lieutenant-governor of the province.

For several years Mascarene, probably through disgust for Armstrong's brutality and eccentricity, and in order to avoid the inevitable jars his presence at Annapolis might draw upon him, had passed the greatest part of his time at Boston. He was still there in the month of December, 1739, when Armstrong put an end to his life, and it was only in the following spring that he was able to enter on his office.

It would be difficult to imagine a more striking contrast than that which existed between Mascarene and his predecessor. Whereas Armstrong was impetuous, fickle and passionate, Mascarene was calm, firm and gentle. The one could not stir without getting into

trouble ; the other never gave any trouble at all, and had the gift of smoothing down whatever difficulties might occur, however complicated they might be.

Paul Mascarene was the son of a French Protestant whom the revocation of the edict of Nantes had obliged to go into voluntary exile. While still young, he followed his father first to Geneva and a few years later to England. He joined the army and gradually, by sheer merit, raised himself to the position in which we at present find him. Conciliating, clever, well-instructed, of a lofty turn of mind, he gained the esteem and confidence of everybody. All his correspondence is instinct with the same spirit, and gives the highest idea of his character and education. It would be difficult to find in his conduct a single point that could be seriously blamed ; it would be hard to note in his character one striking defect ; we behold in him nothing but good qualities of a very high order. He could be severe nay, very severe, but also as humane and kindly as he was severe. He meant to command and be respectfully obeyed, and he was obeyed. He was patient, exceedingly particular ; he pushed the love of details even to importunity, but he was loyal, just, compassionate ; and, though he did not always succeed in convincing, yet he seldom failed in securing most absolute obedience. His vigilance bore on the minutest details of his administration and extended to the remotest parts of his province. Nothing escaped him ; the least delay, the least infringement of his orders and regulations became the subject of a long correspondence, in which he paternally reprimanded and uttered warnings of danger. He punished sometimes ; but most often sent away the delinquents with kind words ; and, when he did punish,

it was only after having heard, weighed, matured his decision, and given every chance of self-defence. He united in a high degree the most commendable qualities of the French character with the sterling worth of the English; from the former he took the affability, courtesy, regard for the weak, the desire and the art to please; from the latter, calmness, determination, wise deliberateness and perseverance. Devoted to his office, to his duty and to his adopted country, he was even more the man of letters of exquisite taste than the soldier, and that is what gave him such superiority as an administrator.

His position afforded him a fine opportunity to take revenge on the Acadians and the priests for the intolerance of which his family had been the object. He, however, did nothing of the kind. We need no other proof of this than the results he obtained in the most difficult circumstances of this history; and his merit was all the greater because he had to struggle against the prejudices of the people about him and of Shirley, governor of Massachusetts, to whom the imperial government had given a voice in the administration of the province. His tact, superior to that of others round him and even to Shirley's, showed him the line of conduct he was to adopt in the difficulties incidental to the war. Without offending anybody, his skill triumphed over all opposition; and I have no hesitation in declaring that not one of the governors who preceded or followed him would have been able to overcome so many obstacles. He had that supreme ability which is the result of high breeding in a man gifted with a clear bright intellect and a noble heart.

Surrounded with counsellors who knew nothing but

the arbitrary ways and rough manners of the camp, his natural bias strikes us as having been occasionally fettered by his environment; he showed more severity than he would have wished, in order to avoid the reproach of letting himself be guided by latent sympathy; and yet in reality his great powers of observation made him understand that mildness and persuasion were the most efficacious means of securing the fidelity of the Acadians.

He was especially severe towards the clergy. Was he, whose family had suffered persecution and exile on account of their religious belief, now giving way to the prejudices he must naturally have entertained? Perhaps his family had been humiliated, crushed by this same clergy: he, in his turn had now the power they formerly had against him; he could bend them to obey his will, and even his caprices, if he so desired. It would not be astonishing if this feeling had sometimes got the upper hand in spite of his lofty intelligence and just and kindly spirit. Nevertheless, I have good reason to think this was not the case. It is true he imposed on the clergy numerous restrictions; but, he always had the condescension to discuss them point by point, and, as a general rule, he obtained assent and obedience. Moreover, in the particular circumstances in which these priests were then placed, I am of opinion that these restrictions were for the most part perfectly justifiable.

The volume of the archives contains five letters of Mascarene to the missionaries De la Goudalie and Desenclaves, in which he most courteously discusses the motives of his restrictions. The Compiler, as usual, gives none of the replies; but, here, at least, their presence is not essential, and could merely satisfy our

curiosity; besides, we can often form a sufficiently precise estimate of what these replies contained.

"Another point of your letter," said Mascarene to M. Desencaves, "is that in which you mention the temporal to be sometimes so connected with the spiritual as not to be able to be divided."

Apparently the weight of his reasons produced an understanding on this knotty point, for in another letter he said to him:

"I am glad to see from what I wrote to you, that you are sensible of the ill consequences that will follow from connecting the temporal with the spiritual."

In another he informs him of the situation in Europe and forewarns him against the dangers that a war would entail on them and on the Acadians:

"The affairs in Europe are much embroiled, and, in case they should occasion a rupture between Great Britain and France, the missionaries must expect to fall very naturally under suspicion, and therefore ought to be more circumspect in their conduct in regard to themselves and towards the inhabitants."

To Abbé de la Goudalie, vicar-general of the clergy of the province, he writes:

"I found you so well disposed since I have personally known you during your residence here to conform to those rules, that I make no doubt of your continuing in the same good intention, and that by your example and admonitions you will contribute to keep the missionaries to act in concert in maintaining the inhabitants in their obedience and duty to the government."

To the same, a year later:

"I am well satisfied with the assurances you give me on your side as well as those of the other missionaries to act in concert in

maintaining the inhabitants in peace and tranquillity and in their duty towards the Government as the oath they have taken obliges them to."

In less than two years, Mascarene, by his so remarkably skilful and just administration, had extirpated all causes of dissension. There were none left; he had only to give an order and he was eagerly obeyed in the most distant parts of the province, though the only fort he had was in ruins, and his garrison comprised only 100 able-bodied soldiers. These facts are eloquent to show what might be expected from this peaceable and submissive people, provided they were ruled with equity by humane and conciliatory governors. The keystone of all history, especially in absolute governments and more especially in small ones, is the character of the rulers; hence the care I have taken to give an accurate picture of each of the governors. Those who neglect this cannot throw light on difficult situations nor faithfully discharge the duty incumbent on him who undertakes to write history. Some one has said: "Tell me what company you keep, and I will tell you what you are." Still more appositely may we say: "Give me the character of him who rules, and I will tell you the character of the people he rules." If this man be an Armstrong, we may unhesitatingly declare that, should the population he governs be naturally unruly and turbulent, he will be continually causing trouble, and perhaps a rebellion; and that, however submissive the population may be, dissensions will unavoidably arise even when the situation would call for nothing but harmony and peace. If, on the contrary, he be a Mascarene, he will maintain order and peace in the most difficult crises. The blame, or at least most of it, lies at the door of the government.

Mascarene was hardly installed in his office when he set to work to remedy the painful situation in which former rulers had placed the Acadians by refusing to them, since the treaty of Utrecht, any new grant of lands, From 2,500 souls in 1713, the Acadian population had reached in 1740 about 9,000 souls, and, nevertheless, strange to say, this population was confined within the same extent of land as in 1713. Nov. 15, 1740, Mascarene, in a letter to the Lords of Trade, represented to them in the following terms the injustice and inconveniences of this state of things :

“ The increase of the Acadians calls for some fresh instructions how to dispose of them. *They have divided and subdivided amongst their children the lands they were in possession of. . .* They applied for new grants which the Governors Philipps and Armstrong did not think themselves authorized to favor them with, as His Majesty’s instructions on that head prescribe the grant of unappropriated lands to *Protestant subjects only*. This long delay has occasioned several of them to settle themselves on some of the skirts of this Province, pretty far distant from this place, notwithstanding Proclamations and orders to the contrary have been often repeated. . . . *If they are debarred from new possessions, they must live here miserably, and, consequently, be troublesome, or else, they will possess themselves of new tracts contrary to orders, or they must be made to withdraw to the neighboring french colony.*”

“ The French of Cape Breton will naturally watch all opportunities of disturbing the peace of this Province, specially at this juncture, in case of a war with France ; and, if occasion of disgust was given to these people here, they would soon make an advantage of it, and, by the numbers of these Acadians, they would soon distress the garrison if not taking the fort which is in a very ruinous condition.”

After this statement it is not astonishing that Armstrong should write : “ They are a litigious sort of people, and so ill-natured to one another, as daily to

encroach upon their neighbour's properties." Parkman, who has searched every nook and corner to find wherewith to besmirch the Acadians, did not fail to fasten on this sentence. What cared he for Armstrong's character, which, by the way, he was careful not to describe to the public? what cared he for the actual circumstances which he passes over in silence? He had at hand what he was looking for, and with this bit of a sentence he was able to draw his conclusions against a hundred contrary statements: "They were vexed with incessant quarrels among themselves arising from the unsettled boundaries of their lands," and much more to the same effect. Could it be otherwise, when the population was four times as large as in 1713, when their lands had been divided and subdivided so as to leave nothing but morsels, and when these lands had never been surveyed by the government? With what we know of Armstrong, of his character and his exaggeration in all things, of his violent language, are we not justified in supposing that the expressions he made use of magnified beyond measure the grain of truth that constituted the foundation of this fact?

Why does not Parkman, who busies himself so much with the character of the Acadians, and always with the evident aim of reversing the invariable verdict of history, why does he not sometimes, since he is so good a judge, make known to us what was the character of the governors? It must be easier to judge a man than a whole nation.

After having kept the Acadians in the country in spite of themselves, it was a shame to refuse them grants of land and thus drive them into indefinite subdivisions. This retarded their progress, produced discontent,

provoked disobedience, troubled harmony, weakened their loyalty, exposed the rulers to grave disappointment; such was Mascarene's view. He tells us, indeed, that, in spite of injunctions, several took up lands on the confines of the province; but what is surprising is that the greater number submitted to such unjust orders. I have serious doubts whether the colonists of New England, and in fact any other colonists, would have submitted during forty years to such a system without revolting against authority, especially if that authority had been represented by only 100 soldiers or a proportionately small number?

Mascarene tells us that the instructions of His Majesty were to bestow grants of land only on Protestant subjects. This is undoubtedly true; but it is not improbable that this order was obtained through the influence of those who had voted to themselves a grant of 100,000 acres of land at Grand Pré and Beaubassin in Armstrong's time, and among whom, besides Armstrong, Philipps and his councillors, figured King Gould, Allured Popple, Henry Popple, Andrew Robinson, Henry Daniels, Esquires, all of England. We know not the character of these gentlemen, except that of King Gould, who was financial agent for Philipps; but I have good reason to believe that one of them, *Allured Popple* was no less a personage than the Allured Popple who was then the Secretary of State. With an interested party of such position and influence it was easy to secure and maintain the decree excluding the Acadians from any new grant, in order to oblige them to buy land from these fortunate grantees. In fact, I find nowhere that the wise recommendations of Mascarene had their effect, and I have reason to believe that this iniquitous

situation continued till the time of the deportation. These lands, granted to the above Englishmen, surrounded those that were next to the Acadians' lands in the two most important centres. This must have been a speculation at their expense, like the one that provoked and followed their deportation. I have not striven to clear up this matter, but I recommend it to Mr. Parkman's notice.*

* This grant, or what was left of it, was escheated on the 21st of April, 1760, to be granted afresh to Governor Lawrence's councillors after the deportation.

CHAPTER XI.

War declared between France and England—Acadia invaded by the French under the command of Duvivier and De Ganne—Efforts to stir up the Acadians to revolt—The expedition withdraws—New expedition by Marin and later by Ramesay—Battle of Grand Pré—Fidelity of the Acadians—Testimonies of Mascarene, etc., etc.—The Compiler—Parkman.

MASCARENE'S wise and prudent conduct had produced the happiest results. Not only had he gained the esteem and confidence of all; but he had in all things established regulations and procedures, which, in his relations with the clergy and the Acadians, ensured harmony and put an end to all the misunderstandings so frequent in Armstrong's time. On June 28, 1742, he wrote to the Duke of Newcastle :

"The frequent rumors we have had of war being on the point of being declared against France, have not as yet made any alteration in the temper of the Acadians, who appear in a good disposition of keeping to their oath of fidelity, and of submitting to the orders and regulations of this government for maintaining peace."

However, he was still very anxious; he knew that, if the French invaded Nova Scotia, they would not fail to make great efforts to persuade the Acadians to join them. His fort was in ruins; he had only five companies of thirty-one men each, a third of whom were invalids. In his letter of December, 1743, to the Secretary of State, he complained bitterly of his situation :

“The inhabitants are all French Roman Catholics: in case of a rupture with France, it is as much as we can expect if we can keep them from joining with the enemy or being stirred up by them to rebel. To prevent this, I have used the best means I could by making them sensible of the advantage and ease they enjoy under the British Government, whereby to wean them from their old masters, but to do this effectually, a considerable time will be required, this Province in the meantime is in a worse condition for defence than the other American Plantations.”

War was declared on March 15th of the following year (1744). This untoward event was going to submit the fidelity of the Acadians to a hard trial. With a few more years of peace, Mascarene, by following the line of conduct which his tact and benignity dictated to him, would have been able, as he hoped, to give rise to a solid sentiment of loyalty based on ties of affection and gratitude strong enough to resist all allurements. His methods and his results would have been a safe precedent, from which his successors would not have dared to depart.

France, which had done so little to colonize and preserve Acadia, had never lost the hope of reconquering it; and it is evident, from the documents of French origin, that the authorities of Canada flattered themselves with the hope that the Acadians would seize on the opportunity about to be offered them of shaking off the English yoke. The course of events will, however, show that the fears of Mascarene and the hopes of the French had no foundation.

If Mascarene had not had time to establish the loyalty of the Acadians on the more lasting basis of affection, this loyalty was none the less really established on the grounds of interest and of respect for the oath: “Their plea with the French who pressed them to take up

arms," said Mascarene in 1748, when the war had come to an end, "was their oath; their living easy under the Government, and their having no complaint to make against it." This was the result of a few years of a just and conciliatory administration.

During four years Acadia was invaded at least four times by the French; Annapolis was besieged three times, always in the hope of taking it with the concurrence of the Acadians, for whom they had brought arms; but they were obliged just so many times to withdraw without this concurrence, and without having made any serious attempt. Every means was tried to overcome the resistance of the Acadians. From flatteries the French passed to threats, and from threats to open force, without shaking their determination, and this happened at Beaubassin as well as at Grand Pré and Annapolis.

The disappointment of the French must have been extreme to induce them to have recourse to such means, since the result could not fail to diminish the sympathy the Acadians must naturally have felt for the French.

After having exhausted all the means of persuasion, Duvivier and de Gamme, who commanded the first expedition, issued the most severe orders:

"We order you to deliver up your arms, ammunitions . . . and those who contravene these orders shall be punished and delivered into the hands of the Indians, as we cannot refuse the demands these savages make for all those who will not submit themselves."

Here is one of the replies of the Acadians:

"We, the inhabitants of Mines, Grand Pré, River Canard, Piguiguit and the surrounding rivers, beg that you will be pleased to consider that while there would be no difficulty, by virtue of the

strong force you command, in supplying yourself with the quantity of grain and meat you have ordered, it would be quite impossible for us to furnish you the quantity you demand, or even a smaller, without placing ourselves in great peril.

"We hope, gentlemen, that you will not plunge both ourselves and our families into a state of total loss; and that this consideration will cause you to withdraw your savages and troops from our districts.

"We live under a mild and tranquil Government, and we have all good reason to be faithful to it. We hope therefore, that you will have the goodness not to separate us from it, and that you will grant us the favor not to plunge us into utter misery. This we hope from your goodness, assuring you that we are with much respect.

Your very humble and obedient servants,

Acting for the communities above mentioned,

Jacques Le Blanc, Pierre Le Blanc,

Francois Le Blanc, René X Granger his mark, Claude Le Blanc, Jacques Tériau, Antoine Landry, Joseph X Granger his mark, Pierre Richard,* René Le Blanc.

Mines, 14 Oct. 1744."

"We have remaining," says Murdoch, "as many as twelve orders issued by Duvivier from the French camp, of this nature, commanding the services of individuals by name—the furnishing horses and men to lead them, the bringing in powder, horns, etc., the swearing allegiance by the deputies and elders, furnishing ladders, pickaxes, shovels, cattle, wheat—baking of bread—to forbid buying arms—the supplying of shirts, furnishing canoes, etc., etc. Disobedience to these, is usually menaced with death, sometimes with corporal punishment. . . I do not know whether we should attribute this to the pride of *noblesse*, then so predominant, to the harshness of military sentiment at that time, or to personal incapacity on the part of Duvivier; but, from whatever source, I look on it as having been fatal to his cause." †

* Brother of my ancestor René Richard, who came to Canada after the deportation.

† "Duvivier issued peremptory orders to the Acadians for supplies. . . Notwithstanding his threat, the Acadians were very unwilling to give him any assistance, and his bright hopes of a spontaneous rising of the Acadian people against British power vanished before the chilling reality. A new generation had grown up who were not disposed to welcome those who would bring war to their doors."—*Hannay*, History of Acadia.

The hasty retreat of Duvivier can be explained only by the disappointment he must have felt in not being supported by the Acadians. A French squadron was daily expected in Annapolis harbor, and nothing seemed to call for the raising of the siege. This squadron, bearing 75 guns, arrived a few days after his departure. Not finding the troops he had reckoned upon meeting there, unable with his crews alone to reduce the garrison, the commander put out to sea again without having made any attempt. This new hasty departure was as disastrous to the French as had been that of Duvivier, for there came from Boston, four days after this departure, a whole convoy laden with provisions and ammunition for the garrison, which would have unavoidably fallen into the hands of the commander of the French squadron.

Hannay, speaking of the expedition of Duvivier, says : " Duvivier, unsuccessful at Annapolis, returned to Mines, where he proposed to remain for the winter with his soldiers, but the Acadians sent in such a strongly worded remonstrance that he was constrained to withdraw. At Beaubassin he found the people equally averse to his remaining and finally returned to Louisbourg."

As soon as war was declared, Mascarene actively employed himself in putting the fort of Annapolis, the only one in the province, in fit condition to resist a siege. These works were considerable, since the walls had fallen into ruins. For the materials especially, but even for the manual labor, he could count but little on any but the Acadians. Of course in strict justice, they were bound to do this work ; nevertheless the actual doing of it was a great proof of good will. Mascarene had gained such an ascendancy over them that they

never made any objection. Writing to Shirley he said: "The Acadians showed themselves ready, not only to get the timber necessary for that kind of work, but to be employed in the repairs, when, on the 1st of July, the first party of Indians, consisting of about 300, came to interrupt us."

Later, after the departure of Duvivier, Mascarene resumed the works that had been abandoned and demanded anew the assistance of the Acadians: "I also prevailed with the deputies of the Acadians of this river," said he to Shirley, "to furnish the engineer the material requisite for our repairs, which they seemed to undertake and perform cheerfully."

The fruitless expedition of Duvivier was followed in the succeeding year by that of Captain Marin with the same results.

The moral decadence of France, commenced under Louis XIV., continued and hastened under the regency, was, under Louis XV., about to consummate its degradation and provoke the great catastrophe which would later ruin or regenerate it. This moral degeneracy had its effect on the warlike virtues of the nation, and this war was going to give the measure of the evil. Watchful England was ready to realize this, and to take upon itself, a few years later, the task of completing the humiliation of a too restless rival, by overthrowing its prestige and depriving it of what might yet re-establish its strength and its renown.

England's apprehensions were greatly relieved when it became evident that the Duke D'Anville's powerful fleet, dispersed by storms, weakened and demoralized by death, sickness and dissensions, was no longer to be dreaded.

De Ramesay, who had waited under the walls of Annapolis for the co-operation of this fleet, was obliged to withdraw upon Mines and soon after on Beaubassin.

Here comes the only glorious feat of arms for France in this part of the country, and it was accomplished by the Canadians whom de Ramesay commanded. While this officer was at Beaubassin, Mascarene, after having revictualled Annapolis, stationed in the district of Mines a detachment of 470 men commanded by Colonel Noble of Massachusetts. This armed body were billeted for the time being at the village of Grand Pré in the houses of the Acadians. De Ramesay conceived the daring project of traversing on snowshoes the long distance that separated him from Grand Pré, and of surprising during the night the troops stationed there; a raid which, though it won renown for the Canadians, produced no practical result.

We have seen, from divers extracts, what was the attitude of the Acadians during these four years of repeated invasion by the French troops; let us now listen to other testimonies gleaned from the correspondence of Governor Mascarene himself.

At different times he bears witness that, during the intervals between these successive expeditions, the Acadians came to inform him of the movements of the French and to work at putting the foundations in a fit state to withstand their attacks.

To Governor Philipps, on June 9th 1744, he writes: "I have done all in my power to keep the Acadians in their fidelity who promise fair and as yet assist us in repairing our breaches."

To the Lords of Trade on the same date: "These latter (the Acadians) have given me assurances of their resolution to keep in their fidelity to His Majesty, which they seem to justify in

having hitherto given us their assistance in the works going on for the repairs of this Fort, which according to my former representations of the nature of these inhabitants is the utmost we can expect from them."

To the Secretary of War, July 2nd 1744: "The Acadians of this river have kept hitherto in their fidelity, and *no ways joined with the enemy*, who has killed most of their cattle, and the priest residing amongst them has behaved also as an honest man, though none of them dare come to us at present. They helped in the repairing of our works *to the very day preceding the attack.*"

To Governor Shirley, July 28th 1744: "The Acadians, as soon as the Indians withdrew from us, brought us provisions and continue to testify their resolution to keep to their fidelity as long as we keep this fort. Two deputies arrived yesterday from Mines, who have brought me a paper containing *an association signed by most of the inhabitants of that place to prevent cattle being transported to the French*, according to the prohibition sent them from hence. These Acadians are certainly in a very perillous situation. Those who pretend to be their friends and old masters having let loose a parcel of banditti to plunder them, whilst on the other hand they see themselves threatened with ruin and destruction if they failed in their allegiance to the British Government."

To King Gould, on the same date: "The Acadians still keep in their fidelity and have not anyways joined with the enemy, but we have lost their assistance in the repairing of our works, they being in dread of the Indians."

To —— Dec. 1744: "To the timely succour received from the Governor of Massachusetts, *and our French inhabitants refusing to take up arms against us we owe our preservation.* If the Acadians had taken up arms they might have brought three or four thousand men against us."

To dear Ladevèse, — 1747, at the close of the war: "The great french Armada under Duke D'Anville which would have swallowed us up, was by God's Providence, weakened and shattered by sickness and storms. . . In these several struggles I used our Acadians with so much mildness, administered justice so impartially and employed all the skill I was master of in managing them to so good purpose, that, *though the enemy brought near two thousand men in arms in the midst of them, and used all the means of cajoling and threatening to make them take up arms, having brought spare ones for that end, they could not prevail upon above twenty to join them.*"

To the Duke of Bedford, June 15th 1748, after the war: "The repeated attempts of the enemy on Nova Scotia have not had the success they expected; and, notwithstanding the means they have used to entice or force into open rebellion the Acadians, who are all of french extraction and papists, they have not been able to prevail except upon a few of them; and, after having entered this province three different times, with forces far superior to what could be opposed to them, they were at last obliged to retire to Quebec."

Two months later, in August, 1748, Mascarene ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Gorham "to proceed to Mines to pay the Acadians for provisions and other necessaries, also for labor and losses incurred by them for houses burnt and fences destroyed to the value of over ten thousand pounds."

I would have the reader remark, in passing, that none of the letters quoted above are found in the volume of the archives except two, which are the least important. I would also have him remark that, from July 4, 1740 to October 27, 1745, this volume contains forty-three documents of divers kinds, while it contains not a single one from October, 1745 to April, 1748.

Why, one naturally asks, this accumulation of forty-three documents within the four years before the war and nothing within the three years during the war, that is, during the most important period? The reason is not far to seek; it is always the same: suppression is so plainly a set plan that one only need open his eyes to detect it. Before the war Mascarene entertained doubts of the fidelity of the Acadians and gave utterance to them; in the first years of his administration he had discussions by letter with the priests before inducing them to accept his regulations concerning themselves and concerning the Acadians. These documents also

contained remarks favorable to the Acadians, which the Compiler could not easily separate: he has allowed a few of them to pass. But, to include the documents of the period of the war, was to make known to the public that the Acadians had been faithful to their oath in the most perplexing of situations. Therefore, these documents must not be included. So manifest is this set purpose of his, that, in spite of this gap of three years he found means, before creating the gap, to insert in a note a letter of M. de Beauharnois to the minister at Paris, in which this gentleman expressed the hopes he entertained that the French would be supported by the Acadians. This document is, clearly, foreign to the archives, but the Compiler, however shortsighted he may sometimes be, has found means to ferret out this one somewhere. Nevertheless, this document had no real importance. Hopes! why, every one has them; M. de Beauharnois was welcome to have his; he was quite free to believe that the Acadians would take up arms against the English. But the real facts were far more important, and they were to be found in the documents of which the Compiler has deprived us just in the very place where he has created a gaping void. History is based on facts, not on the vague hopes of this or that individual.

Both the fears of the English and the hopes of the French had, therefore, no serious foundation, as the above citations abundantly prove. This war had submitted the fidelity of the Acadians to a hard trial, such as ought to give the exact measure of what might be hoped from them under equitable treatment. "When we consider these matters," says Murdoch, summing up the events of this war, "we see more clearly how it was that the little

army from Louisbourg, while it was largely reinforced by the Micmac warriors, who had always been taught to believe that the French king had not ceded their territorial rights, *received no effective aid from the Acadians*. Although there were always a portion of the inhabitants of Beaubassin positively disaffected to English rule, in the other settlements of Cobequid, Piquit, Grand Pré, River Canard, as well on the Annapolis river, *there were very few persons who were even suspected of willingly aiding the invasion*, and Duvivier received as little support from the Acadians after he crossed the Avon, as Prince Charles Stewart did in the next year after crossing the Tweed." Mascarene had notified the Acadians that their neutrality did not relieve them from the duty of instructing him with the movements of the French whenever they could; as a result, the latter never moved to another place without having previously guarded the roads, to prevent them from communicating with the English.

It is undoubtedly true, as Mascarene says, that the French had "a few sympathizers amongst them." He fixes the number at about twenty. This account seems to me exact, considering that it fairly tallies with French reports. Twelve of these sympathizers were arrested upon the denunciations of Acadians. However, it should be carefully noted that no Acadians were arrested for having taken up arms, but only for having advised and assisted the enemy, or for having neglected to give information to the authorities when they were able to do so. The names of those twelve persons are: Louis Gauthier and his two sons, Armand Bugeaud, Joseph LeBlanc dit Le Maigre, Charles and François Raymond, Charles and Philippe Leroy, Joseph Brassard,

Pierre Guedry (half-bred) and Louis Hébert, former servant to Captain Handfield. Some were condemned; others were released, their explanations having been judged satisfactory.

The wonder is, not that twenty persons thus lent assistance to the enemy, but rather that there were not more, as this war lasted four years, and the province was invaded so many times. There must necessarily have been officious persons giving information to one side or the other. To suppose the contrary would be to be totally ignorant of human nature. The French reports show us that there often came to them soldiers who had escaped from the Annapolis garrison. These deserters informed them of the situation of the English. Such isolated facts belong to all times and places, and no unfavorable conclusion can reasonably be drawn therefrom.

It is useless to insist on this point; the fact remains established, that the Acadians, in this juncture, the most difficult in their history, superabundantly proved the great esteem in which they held their oath of fidelity. "Their plea with the French who pressed them to take up arms, was their oath," said Mascarene. Besides, these facts are not disputed, except by Parkman who dissents only by implication, by making use of expressions that give quite a different impression. This writer, who, in his work "Montcalm and Wolfe," devotes only three pages to the account of the events that occurred from 1710 to 1749, sums up in three lines the events of the war of which we have just sketched the most important phases: "This," he says, "restored comparative quiet till the war of 1745, when *some* of the Acadians remained neutral, while *some* took arms

against the English, and *many others* aided the enemy with information and supplies." This sentence, apparently simple and candid, is distinctly insidious and dishonest: *latet anguis in herba*. It specifies nothing; but, through crafty insinuation, it leaves the reader under the impression that about *one third* of the Acadians remained neutral, that *another third* took up arms, and that the remaining third aided the enemy in different ways. This trick is a great favorite of his; I could quote several examples of it without even going outside this subject. A dodge of this kind might be considered, in common parlance, smart; some people might admire it in a lawyer or a politician driven into a corner; but there is question here of history, the master quality of which is impartiality. However, no Acadian, so far as I know, was ever accused of having taken up arms during this war.

In presence of this fidelity, preserved in spite of all sorts of seductions and threats, what becomes of Parkman's accusation that "the influence of the priests was always directed to alienating the Acadians from their allegiance?" an accusation which he repeats in every key and in the most positive terms. If the people remained faithful, then the priests had not the influence which he attributes to them, when he tells us that the Acadians had no will of their own, that they were the docile instruments of these priests. Either these priests, having the great influence which Parkman attributes to them, exercised it in instilling fidelity to the oath, or the Acadians had the firmness and independence necessary to resist them. Surely, the Acadians needed a strong dose of firmness to resist the solicitations and threats of the French, especially if, as Parkman avers,

they had likewise to resist those of their priests, pressing them in the same direction.

Parkman, in order to prove brilliantly his theory of the debilitating action of the clergy, had to suppose, firstly, a great influence of this clergy, secondly, a continual exercise of this influence, and, in order to draw conclusions from his theory, true in itself, if taken in the abstract, false or exaggerated in the concrete reality, he had to infer that the Acadians had lost all initiative, all will, all energy; in a word, to make of them, as he does, men who could hardly stand up alone. That was giving free rein to his fancy, and if the conclusions do logically follow from the premises, these latter rested only on one crutch, *stans pede in uno*.

Although I sometimes pass judgment on the character of individuals, I have no inclination to do so in the case of a nation; it is so easy, in such matters, to be too absolute. However, I will venture one such judgment on the Acadians, and it will bear on a defect in their character, and one directly opposed to what Parkman blames in them, namely: "that they were weak of purpose." The most characteristic fault of the Acadians is to be extremely headstrong. Even to this day, in the province of Quebec, when people wish to express in a striking phrase any one's obstinacy, they say: "He has the head of an Acadian," which is tantamount to saying: "He has the stubbornness of a mule." Firmness is a beautiful quality; but stubbornness, which is its first cousin, is a grave defect, and it is the besetting sin of the Acadians. But Parkman, who beats the air at random, without seeing anything else than his theory, has, as might have been expected, hit upon the opposite defect. Men rarely make a bull's eye when they fire

with their eyes shut. Was this defect acquired by the Acadians in their struggles on the question of the oath, or was it in them before that? I know not. If Parkman, instead of theorizing in a vacuum, had made a more careful study of their history, he would have become convinced of this fact, which is too evident to escape observation.

The efforts of the French to engage the Acadians to violate their oath of fidelity, merit, in all respects, severe condemnation, and these efforts were continual from the beginning of this war until the taking of Beau-séjour by the English. True, with the help of the Acadians, Annapolis would have been taken; but the definitive conquest of Acadia would not have been thereby decided. Even had the taking of Annapolis meant the conquest of Acadia, the French were none the less in honor bound not to urge the Acadians to swerve from duty, and not thus to expose them to the direst calamities. Their lot, till then, had been as favorable as they could have hoped it to be under a military administration, with the intense prejudices that then prevailed. France, for a whole century, had done nothing to people Acadia and to make of it a self-protecting province; she had done nothing to preserve and support it in the moment of danger. If, at the eleventh hour, she wished to repair the errors of her past, she must first reconquer the country with her own troops, and then protect her conquest effectually.

I am convinced that the conduct of France towards the Acadians during this war caused her to lose their sympathy, which she had been able to retain up till that time. If England, or rather her representatives, had understood the Acadian character, if they had trusted

them and made the most of their faithfulness, we should not have to deplore the misfortunes that ensued. At any rate, these incessant attempts to seduce them, far from being prejudicial to them, should have been an additional proof of their fidelity, a certain pledge for the future. At the same time, their conduct, interpreted with kindness, should have become for the English authorities an earnest of lasting friendship and practical gratitude; for, as Mascarene said, "without the neutrality of the Acadians, the province would have been lost;" it would likewise have been lost, if they had emigrated to the French possessions of Cape Breton, for then they would have been soldiers of France in the war. But gratitude is a *rara avis*.

CHAPTER XII.

Other events of the war (1744-1748)—Iniquitous projects of Shirley against the Acadians—Their alarms—Letter of Shirley repudiating the supposed projects—It is not judged satisfactory—Shirley procures the authorization of the Secretary of State and issues a proclamation to the Acadians—His correspondence with the Duke of Newcastle—Proclamations of the French commander to the Acadians—Firmness of the Acadians.

OTHER circumstances add a new and immense weight to the fidelity of the Acadians in this war. If Mascarene had not been obliged to endure the meddlesomeness of Shirley, governor of Massachusetts, there would probably not have been a single exception to the strictest fidelity. Mascarene, by his conduct, admirable in every respect, had gained the esteem and confidence of the Acadians to an almost incredible degree. They came to him as to a friend, as to a father. Whenever any difficulty arose respecting the extent of their obligations, they came to submit it to his decision, and his reply was invariably accepted without a murmur. The documents in hand offer several examples of this, among others the following: Some English officers obliged some Acadians to serve as guides and pilots against the French. Interpreting these orders as contrary to their neutrality, they addressed a petition to Mascarene, entreating him not to oblige them to such service. He entered into long arguments with their delegates to show them that their oath did not exempt them from this service.

Without hesitation they withdrew their petition, and afterwards no longer objected to any assistance that did not imply the bearing of arms.

Shirley, who was not animated with the same spirit, came near ruining everything, and, once more, Mascarene saved the situation. Toward the beginning of the war, Shirley, somewhat through distrust for the fidelity of the Acadians, but much more through fanaticism and contempt of right and liberty, had proposed a project in regard to them which Murdoch thus epitomizes : " He proposes to intersperse Protestant settlements among the Acadians, *taking part of the marsh lands from them for the new settlers. . . .* he recommends *granting small privileges and immunities for the encouragement of such as should come over to the Protestant communion* and send their children to learn English."

This upright historian cannot help condemning the project : " This suggestion of offering worldly advantages in exchange of profession," says he, " can hardly be commended in our days."

This plan included a further injustice, that of arbitrarily depriving the Acadians of the best part of their lands, of that which had entailed the most labor, the marshes. Would his suggestions have been adopted? Certainly, if Shirley had been master of the situation ; but, as we shall see elsewhere, the authorities in England were far from taking the same view. The Duke of Newcastle may have been a great briber, he may not have known, as Parkman says, where Acadia was situated on the map ; but, at least, he had respect for certain things. Shirley himself may have been very sagacious ; but he was laboring under a strange delu-

sion when he imagined that, with such projects, he could retain the Acadians in the province.

This design became known to the Acadians in the second year of the war, 1745, but was falsely represented to them as a plan for their expulsion. They were greatly alarmed thereat. The French took every advantage of this rumor to increase this alarm and to overcome the resistance they were meeting with. They argued that such arbitrary acts released them from their oath of fidelity; that sooner or later they would be wholly deprived of the free exercise of their religion, of their priests and their language; that their properties would be confiscated, etc., etc. In this perplexity Acadian deputies from all parts of the province went to consult Mascarene. He combated their apprehension, and promised to procure a speedy denial from Shirley, and assurances guaranteeing anew the free exercise of their religion, etc.

Shirley clung tenaciously to his project, for, at this very time, August 15, 1746, he wrote to the Duke of Newcastle: . . . "By which means, *and removing the Romish priests out of the Province, and introducing Protestant English schools and French Protestant ministers and due encouragement given to such of the Acadians as shall conform to the Protestant religion*, and send their children to English schools, in the next generation they would in a great measure become true Protestant subjects."

When the Acadians had resisted all seductions and saved the province by their neutrality and their labor in repairing the fort, at that very time did Shirley renew his infamous project.

September 16th, four weeks after the above letter,

Shirley, as representative of His Majesty, addressed to the Acadians a letter in which he affirmed: "That the apprehensions of being removed were groundless, and that they might be assured that he would use his best endeavors to obtain the continuance of the Royal favor and protection."

Three days later, September 19th, Shirley made the Duke of Newcastle acquainted with the situation. As we have seen, Shirley's plan was not expulsion, but it was none the better for that; it was equivalent to an expulsion and more odious than a mere order to depart, which would have left the Acadians free to go where they liked. It was therefore easy for him to repudiate a project, which, literally, he had not formed, and to remain vague on other matters: but the Acadians were not to be taken in by assurances that were so little defined and so unauthorized.

November 21st, Shirley wrote to the Duke of Newcastle to inform him that his letter to the Acadians had not had the effect of quieting their fears:

"They are still alarmed at the rumor of the design to remove them. New assurances should be given by His Majesty at once; if this was done it would have a great tendency to remove their present apprehensions of being sent off. . . . These measures, together with the *introducing of French protestant ministers and English schools, and some small encouragements by privileges to such as should conform to the Protestant religion; the disallowance of the public exercise of the Romish religion, at least after a short term of years, and forbidding Romish priests under severe penalties to come into the country.*

"Just as I had finished the last paragraph, a letter from Admiral Knowles was delivered to me in which he informs me that he has given his opinion to Your Grace, that it will be necessary to drive all the Acadians out of Acadia. . . I am of a contrary opinion. . . It seems *very difficult* to drive all the Acadians out of

Acadia. *This would strengthen the French considerably, and would make the reclaiming of the Indians impracticable. . . .* But, after their having remained so long in the country upon the footing of British subjects, *under the sanction of the treaty of Utrecht, and making improvements on their lands for one or two generations, and being grown up into such a number of families, to drive them all off without further enquiry seems to be liable to many objections.* Among others, *it may be doubted whether under the circumstances of these people it would clearly appear to be a just usage of them. The exemption of not bearing arms upon any account given to them by Governor Philipps, on their consenting to take an oath of allegiance, whether it was done by him with or without authority, it may perhaps be deemed too rigorous a punishment that would involve the innocent with the guilty in the loss of their estates and the expulsion out of the country ; it is not improbable but that there may be many among them who would even prefer His Majesty's Government to a French one, and have done nothing to deserve such fate. Some allowance may likewise be made for their bad situation between Canadians, Indians and English, the ravages of all which they have felt by turns in the course of the war ; during which they seem to have been continually placed between two fires, the force and menaces of the Canadians and Indians plundering them of whatever they wanted and deterring them in the strongest manner from having any communication with His Majesty's garrison on the one hand, and the resentment of the garrison for their withholding their intelligence and supplies on the other, though at the same time it was not in a condition to protect them from the enemy.* Wherefore, it seems a matter worthy of your Grace's consideration whether, under such doubtful circumstances, the driving all the Acadians off the country, *thereby greatly strengthening the enemy, is more eligible than treating them as subjects."*

Such is the man whom Parkman sets on a pedestal for the admiration of his fellow-citizens. True, he was "determined," "energetic," "resolute," and these qualities appear to be those which Parkman appreciates above all others. I am willing to make allowances for times and circumstances ; but I refuse to believe that this conduct of Shirley's was conformable to the code

of honor that then prevailed, how low soever that was ; and yet all this vile stuff was written to a duke and a secretary of state, and it was the third time he repeated his project, at the very moment when he had just assured the Acadians "of his best endeavors to obtain the continuance of the Royal favor and protection ;" when, as he himself said, "they were under the sanction of a treaty," and, when, as Mascarene said, "they had in no ways joined the enemy."

Need we be astonished, after this, that a man equally "firm and resolute," but morally much inferior to Shirley, deported the Acadians without more reason than Shirley would have had at this time ? Shirley, however, keeps within bounds ; feelings of honor stop him somewhere ; the limit is not very high, it is even very low ; but we can guess at a vague boundary line which he prefers not to overleap. This vague line is the treaty, that oath with a restriction, the difficult position of the Acadians, their resistance to the seductions and threats of the enemy. On second thoughts, he asks himself whether the Acadians should be blamed for, sometimes, not giving information to the government, when they were prevented from doing so by terrible threats, and when this government was unable to protect them.

These objections would hardly be obstacles, "*but the departure of the Acadians would greatly strengthen the enemy and would make the reclaiming of the Indians impracticable.*" This is the serious point. At bottom, the politic aspect alone interests him, and, for this reason, "*it is more eligible to consider them as subjects.*"

Between Shirley and Admiral Knowles who left such a poor reputation at Boston and elsewhere, there is at least this difference that the former is amenable to

diplomatic reasons, while the latter stops at nothing. But, had Shirley's diplomacy been anything more than skilful wire-pulling, he must have understood that not an Acadian would remain in the country, if they were deprived of their religion. It is truly remarkable that not one of these governors, except Mascarene and Hopson, realized this, though the proofs of it stared them in the face. Evidently they judged others by their own feelings.

Let us pass to the reply of the Duke of Newcastle on May 30th following (1747) :

“As you and Mr. Warren have represented that an opinion prevailed amongst the Acadians, that it was intended to remove them from their settlements and habitations in the Province ; and as that report may probably have been artfully spread amongst them in order to induce them to withdraw themselves from their allegiance to His Majesty and to take part with the enemy ; His Majesty thinks it necessary that proper measures should be taken to remove any such ill-grounded suggestions ; and, for that purpose, it is the King's pleasure, that you should declare in some public and authentic manner to His Majesty's subjects, the Acadians of that Province, that there is not the least foundation for any apprehension of that nature ; *on the contrary*, it is His Majesty's resolution to protect and maintain all such of them as shall continue in their duty and allegiance to His Majesty, in the quiet and peaceable possession of their respective habitations, *and that they shall continue to enjoy the free exercise of their religion.*”

Here again is a striking instance of the immense superiority of the Home authorities on the score of justice and honor. The provincial government systematically misstates all the facts so as to deceive the Home Government ; and yet the latter never swerves, to any great extent, from its righteous line of conduct. When Shirley has done all he could to get his infamous project ap-

proved, the answer comes back that the Acadians should be promised "*the free exercise of their religion.*"

What is Shirley going to do? We shall see. But first, I shall produce an extract from another of Shirley's letters to the Duke of Newcastle, addressed to him a few days before the receipt of the preceding one. On July 8th he represented to him that the French had just left Grand Pré to retire to Beaubassin; that they ought to be dislodged, that English-American colonists ought to be settled there in place of the Acadians of this district, "*and these Acadians transplanted in New England, and distributed among the four governments there.*"

This shows I was quite right in saying that Shirley's scruples were of a very low order, almost infinitesimal. He was much put out by the orders of the Duke of Newcastle, so much so that, for a long time, he did nothing at all. It was important for the safety of the province to allay as soon as possible the apprehensions of the Acadians, lest they should weary of waiting and allow themselves at length to be seduced and convinced by the French. But Shirley persisted so strongly in his project of Protestantizing the Acadians, that he did nothing for several months, and, when he made up his mind to act, he simply suppressed that part of the Duke of Newcastle's letter which ordered him to promise them the full exercise of their religion.

He explained his conduct to the Duke on Oct. 28th, when a whole year had elapsed since he had promised the Acadians to procure from the King himself the promises they solicited. In this letter of Oct. 28th, 1747, he informs His Grace that he has just drawn up a proclamation conformable to his letter of the preceding 30th of May; but that he has taken upon himself to

omit the clause concerning the free exercise of their religion :

“ Because the treaty of Utrecht does not seem to lay His Majesty under an obligation to allow the Acadians the exercise of the Roman Catholic religion.* And, as His Majesty is as yet under no promise to do it, *I should hope that methods might be found for weakening the ties of consanguinity and religion.* . . which may *possibly* be cut off or at least obstructed by His Majesty making a promise to continue the Acadians in the free exercise of their religion. . . Therefore, I have taken the liberty to *suspend promising them the free exercise of the Romish religion*, though it is mentioned in your Grace's letter to have been part of what was to be included in His Majesty's intended Proclamation, till I could transmit my sentiments to your Grace, and I should have His Majesty's farther directions upon it; and have in the meantime made a declaration of such points as seemed necessary to be ascertained to the Acadians *for quieting their minds and would not admit delay.*”

What an accumulation of frauds from Nicholson to Lawrence! Pelion on Ossa. Shirley would, indeed, have included in his proclamation the promise of the free exercise of their religion, but that promise, emanating from His Majesty, might “*possibly*” have been “*an obstruction.*” A trifle, a mere nothing which could not embarrass a statesman! A simple question of not pledging imprudently the name of His Majesty without absolute necessity, in order to be more at liberty to *seek some means* of weakening this senseless attachment they have for their religion!

Mascarene communicated to the Acadians Shirley's

* By the treaty of Utrecht: “The Acadians are to enjoy the free exercise of their religion according to the usage of the Church of Rome, as far as the laws of Great Britain do allow the same.” In 1730 the Acadians agreed to take the oath only because this privilege was more explicitly granted to them anew by Philipps.

proclamation on Oct. 21st, 1747. To their deputies he wrote :

“ You have in possession His Excellency William Shirley’s Proclamation, whereby you may be made easy in that respect, *you are sensible of the promise I made to you*, the effects of which you have already felt, that I would protect you so long as by your conduct and fidelity to the crown of Great Britain you would enable me to do so, *which promise I do again repeat to you.*”

I do not believe the Acadians were fully satisfied with Shirley’s proclamation. The tenor of Mascarene’s letter seems to indicate that he was anxious about it, and that, knowing the confidence he inspired them with, he relied quite as much on his own personal assurance, to dispel their doubts, as on Shirley’s proclamation. They had been left more than a year under an impression that was but too well grounded. During all this time, in order to maintain their fidelity to the oath, they had resisted the arguments, cajoleries and threats of the French ; and if, by exception, some assisted the enemy, these exceptions were so rare that, taking all in all, they count for nothing ; and it may be reasonably supposed that these exceptions would not have existed, if the projects formed against them had not come to their knowledge.

In all this I fail to see the “ weakness of purpose ” with which Parkman entertains us ; it is rather a firmness that resembles obstinacy. The sequel will show how far this firmness went. Here I shall lay aside the documents I possess in order to quote Parkman himself, who, to my surprise, sums them up faithfully enough in his new work “ Half a Century’s Conflict : ”

“ De Ramesay, who was at Grand Pré, on learning the approach

of an English force, had tried to persuade the Acadians that they were to be driven from their homes, and that their only hope was in joining with him to meet force by force, but they trusted Shirley's recent assurance of protection, and replied that they would not break their oath of fidelity to King George. On this, de Ramesay retreated to his old station at Beaubassin, and Noble and his men occupied Grand Pré without opposition.*

A few months later, in February, 1747, took place the memorable fight at Grand Pré, which we have already mentioned. Surprised during the night by the French under the command of Coulon de Villiers, who had taken advantage of the darkness and a blinding snow-storm, the English troops occupying this new post were obliged to capitulate after losing, according to French reports, a hundred and forty officers and soldiers killed, among whom were Colonel Noble, his brother, Lieutenants Lechmere, Jones and Pickering, and fifty-four taken prisoners, among whom was Edward Howe, commissary of the English troops in Acadia.† Not long before, when some Acadians had warned Colonel Noble that the French were planning an assault on Grand Pré, they were laughed at: "They, the people of Mines," says Murdoch, "had assured the English that the French would come and attack them, but the English were incredulous, relying on the severity of the winter."‡

The French then found themselves masters of Grand Pré, after a battle in which they had defeated and driven

* Parkman must be here alluding only to the first letter of Shirley to the Acadians and not to his proclamation, since Grand Pré was occupied by Col. Noble in the autumn of 1746, and the proclamation is dated Oct. 21st. 1747.

† The French-Canadian nobility were numerous represented at this combat: "Coulon de Villiers, La Corne de St. Luc, de Beaujeu, de Léry, de Gaspé, de Lotbinière, de Ligneris, de Repentigny, de Rigauville, de Langis, de Boishébert, de Lusignan, de la Colombière, de Bailleul;" were present also MM. Marin, Mercier, Major.

‡ Cf. *Hannay*, Hist. of Acadia, p. 349.

away the English ; after a capitulation in virtue of which the conquered had given up the post with all it contained, and had pledged themselves to retire to Annapolis and not to bear arms for six months. It was, properly speaking, a conquest of this part of Acadia. The Acadians, who dwelt therein, thus changed masters, at least they might have reasonably believed they did, and it was possible to find more arguments in favor of this view than of the contrary one. De Ramesay directly understood the advantage he could derive from this situation : he availed himself of it to issue a proclamation in which he declared that, by this battle, France had reconquered this part of Acadia ; that the Acadians had thereby become once more French subjects, and that therefore they owed submission and fidelity to the French Government ; that they should no longer entertain any relations with the English under severe penalties.

To this proclamation the Acadians replied by a letter of which we have only the conclusion :

“ Thus, sir, we beg of you to regard our good will and at the same time our powerlessness, poor people as we are, burdened, most of us with large families, without succor if obliged to evacuate the country, a disaster that daily threatens us, that keeps us in continual fear, for we see ourselves in proximity to those who have been our rulers for such a great number of years.”

Meanwhile, they wrote to Mascarene, explaining their situation and communicating to him a copy of de Ramesay's proclamation.

Not content with the result of his proclamation, de Ramesay applied to the Governor of Canada to obtain from him orders confirming his own. Upon receiving a

reply, he addressed a new proclamation to the Acadians, ordering them in the name of the King of France to take up arms against the English, and adding an extract of a letter of the Governor of Canada, which was as follows :

“ We consider ourselves as masters of the districts of Beaubassin and Mines, since we have driven off the English. Therefore, there is no difficulty in forcing the Acadians of these parts to take arms for us ; to which end we declare to them, that they are discharged from the oath that they formerly took to the English, by which they are bound no longer, as had been decided by the authorities of Canada and Monseigneur our bishop.”

The pressure, it must be admitted, was immense. It was Ramesay's second proclamation, and this time, besides his personal opinion on the lawfulness of his pretensions, he produced that of the Governor of Canada and even that of the Bishop of Quebec. Besides, everything seemed to show that the conquest and capitulation did indeed release the Acadians from their oath of fealty.

Nothing of all this seems to have had any effect on the Acadians. On June 8th following, Shirley wrote to the Duke of Newcastle :

“ I have nothing to add to my letters, which I have lately transmitted to Your Grace, except that Mr. de Ramesay is still at Beaubassin with his party in expectation of a reinforcement from Canada. . . and that he has not thought fit to venture again to Mines, but insists in his messages to the Acadians there, that they should look upon themselves as subjects to the King of France, since the New England troops were obliged to retire out of their District by capitulation, but *that this has had no effect upon the Acadians*, the reinforcement which I sent there afterwards having taken repossession of Mines, . . . and the deputies having thereupon renewed their oath of fidelity to His Majesty at Annapolis.”

It is not easy to see in all of this any sign that the Acadians were "weak of purpose," and such slaves to the influence of the clergy, since they resisted even the opinion of a bishop, if it be true that this opinion was not invented or misapplied. Subsequent events will abundantly prove that their firmness or even their obstinacy was the same up to the deportation.

What more, then, was wanted to satisfy the Government and deserve its gratitude? Mascarene perfectly understood that the safety of the province was due to the firm attitude of the Acadians, and, had he been left to himself, I doubt not they would have received from him a most equitable treatment; but Shirley was far from allowing himself to be guided by such high motives.*

* Not a single one of the documents cited in this chapter is found in the volume of the archives.

CHAPTER XIII.

Signing of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle—Cape Breton restored to France—The French remain in their positions on the north side of the Bay of Fundy—Founding of Halifax, June, 1749—Proclamation of the new governor, Edward Cornwallis—Oath without restriction exacted or departure within three months—Refusal of the whole population—Embarrassment of Cornwallis—Temporizing—Founding of Beauséjour by the French—Their efforts to attract the Acadians.

PEACE was concluded in October, 1748, at Aix-la-Chapelle. The treaty left the respective situations of the two nations as they were before the war. The provinces or towns, that were conquered, were restored. L'île Royale (Cape Breton) was given back to France.

For special reasons this restoration was particularly vexing to the Anglo-Americans. To them, indeed, belonged the honor of having taken Louisburg, where their militia had given proofs of much courage and skill. This fortress, which had cost France so much money, had been a continual menace to the English possessions; the news of its fall had been hailed with great rejoicings, and its restitution left bitter regrets.

Nearly forty years had elapsed since the treaty of Utrecht, which had stipulated that France was to cede Acadia, but without otherwise specifying what constituted Acadia. Its frontiers, as well as those of the whole of Canada, were to be determined by commissioners to be appointed for this purpose. Nothing had

yet been regulated at the time of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, nor did this treaty decide the question.

The neglect to settle the frontier difficulty was to give rise to many other difficulties, and eventually to inflict on France, not only humiliation, but a blow the consequences of which were the most disastrous it had ever experienced. Until now France and England seemed to struggle with equal chances of success for the empire of the sea; Spain had been left in the lurch. The Seven Years' War was about to decide that England should definitively occupy the first place; that its language, civilization, and institutions should spread over all colonizable countries, all the strategic points of the Old and New worlds; that its industry and its commerce should assume an immense development and bring it great wealth; that its wares and its money, scattered broadcast over the surface of the globe, should secure for it a preponderating influence in the council of nations.

The English claimed that Acadia ought to comprise all New Brunswick, besides the peninsula; while the French, on the other hand, claimed all the country to the north of the Bay of Fundy and even the east coast of the peninsula; nor were reasons wanting to support each of these alleged rights, since these rights were based on undefined or contradictory charters granted more than a century before. In each case and for similar reasons the conflicting parties asked for more than they knew they had a right to or than they hoped to obtain.

Meanwhile, Captain Marin, after the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, occupied the north coast of the Bay of Fundy, that is, all the country that is now New Brunswick,

leaving to the English, until the decision of the commission, the present province of Nova Scotia except the island of Cape Breton. Marin's territory comprised the Acadian settlements of the river St. John, of Chipody, Memramcook and Peticodiac. Beaubassin was situated partly on the French side, partly in the peninsula.

This state of affairs awakened in the mind of the English authorities the idea, often expressed by Philipps, Mascarene and Shirley, of founding English colonies in Nova Scotia. The two first-named suggested the establishment of a fort at Beaubassin, and the colonizing of the isthmus from the eastern extremity of the Bay of Fundy as far as Bay Verte. Shirley, as we have seen elsewhere, proposed moreover to take away from the Acadians a part of their lands and to introduce thereon colonists from New England, in order the more effectually to make the Acadians English and bring about their conversion to Protestantism. Whatever may have been the reason, whether neglect, or the dangers of the situation on account of the hostility of the Indians, or because these projects implied too great an expenditure of money, or because already those colonists of Massachusetts inspired the imperial government with distrust; at any rate nothing had been effected.

The first of these projects had become harder to realize on account of the great expansion of the Acadian population in these parts; on the other hand Shirley's project, which implied spoliation and an odious infringement of the religious liberty guaranteed by a treaty, was not to be encouraged by the English Government, always more equitable and humane than the colonial authorities.

The Acadian population had increased with surprising rapidity. From 175 heads of families who arrived in Acadia at different times in the course of a century, a little nation had sprung up, which, at the time of the cession of the country, counted 2,500 souls, 7,114 in the year 1739, and about 12,500 in 1749. Of this number nearly 3,500 dwelt north of the present borders of Nova Scotia on the territory then occupied by the French.

The position of these latter Acadians was going to become exceedingly critical and perplexing. Until then, this part of the country had, properly speaking, been held neither by France nor by England. The inhabitants, who occupied it, especially those of River St. John, Chipody, Memramcook and Peticodiac, had governed themselves, or rather lived peacefully without government, without control, without intervention. As France had ceded Acadia, and as they were the sons of the Acadians established in the peninsula, they made no difficulty in acknowledging themselves English subjects, and in 1730 they took the oath of fealty.

The encroachments of France, before the decision of the commission appointed to fix the limits of Acadia, determined England to found an English colony and a fortified post that might serve as a counterpoise to Louisburg. Chibucto Bay was chosen, and the founding of Halifax decided in March, 1749. Fourteen ships, bearing 2,756 persons with all the necessary provisions and a complete civil organization, comprising an administrative council, magistrates, a schoolmaster, a minister, as well as merchants, artisans, and clerks, set sail on May 14th, and entered Chibucto harbor June 27th following. Edward Cornwallis was the new

governor. Halifax was founded. The place was most judiciously chosen. The French had made the mistake of overlooking the advantages of this harbor and of preferring Louisburg to it. The English were perhaps wrong in delaying so long to occupy it. Acadia had been forty years in their possession, and yet, in 1748, there were not a dozen English colonists in the whole province. The consequence was that the Annapolis garrison would not have been able to subsist without the Acadians, and this dependence on them had been partly the cause of all the efforts and frauds of the governors to retain, against their will, a population which had for a long time wanted to withdraw at any cost.

The much-delayed foundation of Halifax repaired to a certain extent this error, which had no grievous consequences for England, thanks to the mild and peaceful manners of the Acadians; but, later on, it enabled an unfeeling and conscienceless governor to crush this little nation and inflict on it woes, the remembrance of which, after more than a century, still fills with anguish the descendants of those who were his victims.

If, upon the whole, regard being had to the times, the Acadians had been hitherto governed with gentleness, they met with different treatment after the foundation of Halifax; which proves that this gentleness originated in the weakness of the rulers and the submissive spirit of the governed, in the fear of losing a population whose assistance was indispensable. How could they have been governed harshly, when there were only from a hundred to a hundred and fifty soldiers at Annapolis, when the mass of the population was far distant from the only fortified place in the whole country? Such a state of things would have been impossible with any other

but a peaceable and submissive people. Orders may sometimes have been executed reluctantly or slowly; but instances of this kind are so insignificant that they would not deserve to be mentioned, were they not the only instances on record, and had not the deportation invested them with a certain interest. Even when, under Armstrong's administration, several priests were arrested, and ill-used, and the churches closed, we do not hear of any threat or act of resistance from the Acadians. We shall see the same self-restraint later on, despite provocations and an ever-increasing oppression, all of which was seemingly designed to provoke a pretext for deporting them.

As may be supposed, this new town suddenly arising must have greatly exercised the Acadian centres. An event of this importance could not fail to entail upon them very serious proximate or remote consequences; they must have understood its bearings and commented at length upon the new situation. Clearly this was a serious enterprise, a colony that would be strongly encouraged and assisted by England. What boded it for them? Would the actual state of affairs be changed? Would their happiness be troubled thereby, the free exercise of their religion restricted, or entirely taken away from them? Had they not reason to fear that a part of their lands would be confiscated? It may well be supposed that these questions and others of like nature were so many problems stated and discussed at the fireside in evening chats. In this review of possibilities it was very likely the pessimistic opinions that generally prevailed.

The fleet, as I have said, had entered Chibucto harbor June 27, 1749. A few days later, the Acadians of

River Canard, Grand Pré and Pigiguit, sent three deputies to the new governor to present him in their name their respects and their homage.

Jean Melançon, Claude LeBlanc and Philippe Melançon were the three deputies admitted to the presence of the Governor. They were asked if they had any petition to present from the Acadians of their district; they replied that they had come simply to offer their respects to His Excellency and to know if their condition would remain the same as before, especially with regard to the free exercise of their religion. His Excellency, who had just drawn up a proclamation enjoining upon the Acadians to take the oath without restriction, communicated it to them with the order to publish it, to post it up in all public places, to return within fifteen days with the other deputies, and to give an account of the resolutions of the inhabitants of their respective districts.

On July 29th, the date fixed for their return, despite the long distances they had to travel, the Acadian deputies of the whole province, including those residing north of the Bay of Fundy, had reached Halifax, namely:

Alexandre Hébert,	}	Annapolis.
Joseph Dugas,		
Claude Le Blanc,	}	Grand Pré.
Jean Melançon,		
Baptiste Gaillard,	}	Rivière aux Canards.
Pierre Landry,		
Pierre Gautereau,		Cobéquid.
Pierre Doucet,	}	Beaubassin.
François Bourg,		
Alexandre Brassard,		Chipody.

“They were called in before the Council and asked what resolutions the inhabitants had taken in consequence of His Majesty's declarations.

“Jean Melançon delivered to His Excellency a letter wherein, he said, was contained their answer, which letter, being read, the Council was of opinion that with regard to that part of their letter demanding an exemption from bearing arms, it was the opinion of the Council that no exception should be granted them, but that they should be told peremptorily that they must take the oath as offered them. That His Excellency will send persons as soon as possible to administer the oath, and that all such as are willing to continue in the possession of their lands, must appear and take the oath before the 26th of October, which will be the last day allowed them.

“This declaration being read to them, they asked whether, if they had a mind to evacuate the country they would have leave to sell their lands and effects. His Excellency answered, that, by the Treaty of Utrecht, there was one year allowed them, wherein they might have sold their effects, but that at the present time, those that should choose to retire could not be allowed to sell or carry off anything.

“The deputies beg leave to return to their Departments and consult with the inhabitants. Upon which they were warned, that, whoever should not have taken the oath before the 26th of October, should forfeit all their possessions and rights in this Province.

“They then asked leave to go to the french governor and see what condition might be offered them. His Excellency's order was, that whoever should leave this Province without taking the oath should immediately forfeit all their rights.

“The secretary was ordered to write all the priests to repair hither.”

A proclamation conformable to the reply of the governor was left in the hands of the deputies to be published in their respective districts. A few weeks later the same deputies returned, bearing a letter to the governor, signed by a thousand persons, in which they most courteously expressed their views :

“We are very contrite, sir, when we consider the privileges which were granted to us by General Philipps, after we had taken the oath of allegiance to His Majesty. . .

Two years ago, His Majesty was pleased to grant us the enjoyment of our property, etc., etc. We have received all these promises as coming from His Majesty; we have encouragingly relied upon them and have rendered service to the Government, never having had the wish to violate our oath. We believe, Your Excellency, that if His Majesty had been informed of our conduct towards his Government, he would not propose to us an oath which, if taken, would at any moment expose our lives to great peril from the savage nations, who have reproached us in a strange manner, as to the oath we have taken to His Majesty. This one binding us still more strictly, we should assuredly become the victims of their barbarous cruelty."

"The inhabitants in general, sir, have resolved not to take the oath which your Excellency require of us; but, if your Excellency will grant us our old oath, which was given to Governor Philipps, with an exemption from taking up arms, we will accept it.

"But if Your Excellency is not disposed to grant us what we take the liberty of asking, we are resolved every one of us to leave the country.

"We take the liberty, sir, to beg Your Excellency whether or not His Majesty has annulled the oath given to us by General Philipps.

"Thereupon, we hope, sir, that you will take notice of our humble supplications, and that Your Excellency will allow yourself to be moved by our miseries, and we, on our part, we will exert ourselves to the utmost in praying to God for the preservation of your person."

Cornwallis had previously told them that they could quit the country, but that they should take nothing away with them. He had committed the same blunder as his predecessors. He had thought that these men were too much attached to their goods to resign themselves to the utter abandonment of the fruit of their patient labor. Like his predecessors, he was deceived. Perhaps he did not yet see his mistake clearly; but he was soon to be convinced of it.

His reply was, as the preceding ones had been, harsh and haughty:

“ You do nothing but repeat the same story without the least change ; you want to be subjects on such or such conditions. That cannot be. *All those who chose to remain after the Treaty of Utrecht have become British subjects and could not have imposed conditions to their becoming such. You have always refused to take this oath without an unexpressed reservation ; I tell you that Governor Philipps who granted you such reservation did not do his duty. It is only out of pity to your inexperience that we condescend to reason with you, otherwise the question would not be reasoning but commanding and being obeyed.*”

Thus did he dismiss them with these harsh words, without reiterating or even mentioning the orders contained in his proclamation, and without so much as communicating to them a written answer, which they awaited in order to transmit it to the inhabitants.

His letter to the Lords of Trade, five days later, shows us clearly enough the state of his mind and the current of his thoughts :

“ The Acadian deputies have been with us this week. They came, as they said, with their final answer. Your Lordships will see from the enclosed copy, that they are, or say they are, resolved to retire, rather than take the oath of Allegiance. *As I am sure they will not leave their habitations this season, when the letter was read to the Council in their presence, I made them answer without changing anything of my former declaration, or saying one word about it. My view is to make them as useful as possible to His Majesty while they do stay. If, afterwards, they are still obstinate, and refuse the oath, I shall receive in the spring His Majesty's further instructions from Your Lordships.*

“ As they stayed to have copies of my answer *in writing*, I saw some of them in the afternoon by myself, and exhorted them to be faithful to His Majesty. . . They went home in good humour promising great things.”

Cornwallis seems already to be doubtful of the result. Had he known their history and the relations of his

predecessors with them, he would have immediately understood that his haughty manners, his arrogance as of a Roman proconsul, must, while alarming them, produce an effect just the opposite of what he intended. Any humane and tolerably observant man would have realized this. He had flattered himself that, by delivering, in a magisterial tone, these subtilties to poor ignorant people, he would lord it over them and thus stamp out all resistance. This showed great ignorance of their character. Besides, it was a very bad beginning; he was entering upon a line of conduct that could bring him only deceptions and humiliations; he was about to traverse all the phases through which Armstrong and Philipps had passed, before making up his mind to adopt mild and conciliatory measures, and then it would be too late.

Other deputations followed; memorials were presented in which were narrated the facts relating to their sojourn in the country and to the oath. They recalled the treaty of Utrecht, which gave to all those who did not desire to become English subjects the right to depart within the space of a year taking with them their movable property; they mentioned the letter of Queen Anne which enlarged the privileges of the treaty. They reminded him that their decision had been to quit the country, but that they had been always prevented by all sorts of means. "In presence of so many obstacles we have," said they, "offered and taken several oaths, all of which were based on that promise of exemption from service in war; if we have stayed in this country, it has been with this explicit reservation, and the finest phrases could not change our conviction on that point." "Your oaths are illegal,"

said Cornwallis, "and if the preceding governors sanctioned them by their promises, they delivered to you titles that are null and void; you are here subjects of the King of England, even without having taken the oath of allegiance; you have therefore lost all your rights, and it is a favor he granted you when he consented to admit you again to the benefit of his allegiance."

The Acadians replied that their claims were founded on authentic acts, which could not be repudiated or distorted by mere words. "Governor Philipps had begun by denying our claims; then, after examining into them, he recognized our rights and consented to grant this exemption from bearing arms; he assured us he had full authority therefor. If we have been deceived, the King cannot turn against us such a fraud; if the condition of our sojourn be withdrawn, we should, at least, be replaced in the position that the treaty guaranteed." Then these unfortunate persons, who naively believed in justice, brought forth the copy of the acts they had signed. "We have always lived thus on our plighted oath, without having heard from any one that these agreements were null; on the contrary, they were recognized and acted upon in the last war. As for ourselves, we have preserved inviolate our fidelity to the oath, despite seductions and threats." "So much the worse for you," replied Cornwallis, "if you knew not the invalidity of these conventions, you now have only to submit, or you shall be despoiled of all you possess." This is a pretty fair summary of these negotiations, says Rameau, whom I am quoting.

Obliged, before this quasi-Majesty to couch their thoughts in terms of the most profound respect, obliged

to avoid even the appearance of a contradiction, they were condemned beforehand to be in the wrong. It was the earthen jar against the iron pot.

However, says Murdoch, the historian of Nova Scotia: "The memorials which these Acadians sent to the Council were all stamped with a respectful moderation and also with a profound conviction. They all rested on this fundamental point; an oath of allegiance taken with all due restrictions, from which they had never consented to swerve since the conquest."

The Acadians invariably asserted that they willingly recognized themselves to be the very faithful subjects of the King of England; that the obligation to bear arms against their compatriots was repugnant to their feelings; that, if an oath like the one they had already taken were accepted, they would be happy to remain in the country and maintain, under all circumstances, the inviolability of this oath.

While these negotiations were being carried on, the excitement, as may well be expected, was increasing in all the Acadian centres. Would their requests be granted? Should they depart or should they not? Many were getting ready to go away; the majority did not wish to do so without an express authorization of the governor. The French still occupied the north of the Bay of Fundy; they were building a fort which they called Beauséjour at a mile and a half from the village of Beaubassin. Great efforts were made by Abbé Le Loutre and the French to induce the Acadian colonists, and particularly those who dwelt near this frontier, to emigrate over to the French side. The haughty and unjust conduct of Cornwallis was beginning to produce the results he ought to have foreseen. Irritated by the

efforts of the French to attract the Acadians to their settlements, he gave Captain Cobb the following order :

“ You are hereby to proceed to Chignecto (Beaubassin) to seize and secure as many of the inhabitants as you can, or, in case they quit their houses upon your approach, you are to seize and secure as many of their wives and children as you think proper and deliver them to the first English Fort you shall come to, to remain as hostages of their better behaviour.”

This order however, was not carried out.

So, while on the one hand he was forcing the Acadians to choose between swearing allegiance and leaving the country, on the other he was giving orders to prevent them from taking advantage of his alternative.

CHAPTER XIV.

Cornwallis's proclamation is followed by the departure of some families—The emigration threatens to become general—In the beginning of May, 1750, the Acadian deputies, assembled at Halifax, ask leave to quit the country—Cornwallis, frightened, changes his tone—He avoids giving an answer; will give it when they have done their sowing—Seed-time over, the deputies return to Halifax—Fresh subterfuge.

CORNWALLIS seemed at length to understand that he was not going to obtain from the Acadians the oath he required; that they would submit to the cruel alternative of abandoning their property and leaving the country rather than consent to an act that did violence to their feelings. All the old artifices, all the cheats of Nicholson, Vetch, Armstrong and Philipps were to be repeated to prevent their departure.

In Nicholson's time, as we have seen, the Acadians were not allowed the benefit of the clauses of the treaty. Under various pretexts their departure was made impossible. On the one hand, French vessels were forbidden to enter the ports; on the other, the Acadians were not permitted to take passage in English ships. They built themselves small vessels; but, when they wanted to equip them at Louisburg, this was refused. Later on, they were forbidden to apply at Boston. Undismayed, they begged the French authorities to act as mediators in their favor at the English court. When the order of the English Government instructing

Nicholson to give the Acadians full permission to leave was handed to Colonel Vetch, he pretended that he had no authority to act, that he must await the arrival of the governor. Nicholson, on his return, in order to avoid obeying orders, reserved certain points to the decision of the Queen.

For three years the Acadians, who, perhaps, trusted artlessly in the good faith of their rulers, waited for the answer to these reserved points; it never came. Subsequently, Philipps, thinking that the time had come for exacting an oath of allegiance, issued a proclamation ordering the taking of this oath within four months, or, in default thereof, departure from the province without taking away anything but clothes. Ill informed of the character of this people, he believed, as his predecessors did, that love of property and the absence of all means of transportation would force them to accept his proposals. Great was his surprise when he saw them at work opening out a road for their departure. This contingency had not entered into his calculations. He was equal to the emergency and forbade them to continue that road.

At last, finding that matters could not be settled otherwise, the Acadians resigned themselves to remain in the country and to take the oath, on condition that they should not bear arms against the French. This condition being accepted, the struggle came to an end. Thenceforth they were called by themselves, by their rulers, by everybody, "*The French Neutrals.*" During twenty years, relying on this solemn agreement, they lived in the most perfect tranquillity. Not only the agreement was not disavowed, but both sides observed it scrupulously during all that time, and especially

during the war. At bottom, there was good faith only on one side; the government was waiting for an opportunity to repudiate what had been merely a makeshift to get out of a difficulty.

The opportunity was now at hand in the foundation of Halifax. Cornwallis could now, he thought, speak as a master, *ego nominor leo*; agreements were of little weight with him; nor was it necessary for him to plead want of fidelity on the part of the Acadians, for of this he says not a word. Might for him was all sufficient; with that, a soldier of his importance could snap his fingers at arguments. Like his predecessors, he believed the Acadians would elect to take the required oath rather than lose their possessions. Instead of a year or four months—the delay granted by Philipps—he allowed three months only; and, like Philipps, he forbade them to take anything away. When, at last, he came to realize that the Acadians would quit the country rather than submit to his oath, he, too, adopted “ways that are dark:” “*As they stayed to have copies of my answer in writing, I made them answer, without changing anything of my former declaration, or saying one word about it. My view is to make them as useful as possible while they do stay.*”

This happened in September. He hoped that, when the season would be more advanced, there would no longer be question of leaving in winter; by the time spring came round, he could find some other pretext, should they persist in their intentions.

The French, as I have already pointed out, remained, after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, in the northern part of the Bay of Fundy. This territory was disputed by the two crowns, and the question referred to a commis-

sion. As soon as the foundation of Halifax was resolved upon, the French, supposing that the intention of the English was also to occupy and colonize the district of Beaubassin, had a mind to settle there permanently. Cornwallis's proclamation to the Acadians determined the French to improve the occasion and try to win them over. The Governor of Canada, M. de la Jonquière, sent the Chevalier de la Corne with reinforcements strongly to occupy the isthmus from Beaubassin to Bay Verte.

During this autumn of 1749, the English were too busy putting things into shape at Halifax to make any effective opposition to the manœuvres of the French. The latter, taking advantage of the state of alarm into which the Acadians had been thrown by the Proclamation, left no stone unturned to induce them to choose the alternative of departure and emigrate all together. The French had to make haste, for the English would not fail, the next year, to thwart their plans. Meanwhile, as a check on them, Cornwallis threw a small garrison into Grand Pré under Captain Handfield. Instigated by the French, no doubt, three hundred Indians in October (1749), blockaded this garrison with a view to enable the Acadians to quit the country without being molested by the soldiers. The attempt was made in vain; not one of the Acadians wished to leave before obtaining a final answer from the Governor and without his permission. A few days later, seeing the uselessness of their efforts, the Indians raised the blockade, taking away with them the notary Le Blanc, Captain Hamilton and eighteen soldiers who had been surrounded and made prisoners in one of the sorties of the garrison. As no one was killed, it is

evident that the only object of this attack was to facilitate the departure of the Acadians.

On the affidavit of Honoré Gauterot, a warrant was issued for the arrest of Charles Hébert, François Le Prince, Claude Le Prince, Renauchon Aucoin, Joseph Vincent, accused of having assisted the Indians; but they could not be arrested. At Cobequid, where there were no troops, no protection of any sort, the Indians, by threats and violence, forced a part of the population to follow them before the arrival of the troops.

In the following March (1750), Cornwallis wrote to the Duke of Bedford:

"I propose to defer pressing them upon that head (the oath of allegiance) till we see what can be done at Beaubassin, and what settlers come from England; then I will demand a peremptory answer."

This letter had not yet reached its destination when Cornwallis received from the Secretary of State the order not to exact the oath for the present, and to treat the Acadians with kindness in order to wean them from their intention of quitting the country.

At last, in the month of May, when the Acadians came to Halifax to beg leave to depart, there was nothing left but to choose between consenting and inventing some new dodge. Pretexts were getting rare: Nicholson, Vetch, Armstrong and Philipps had almost exhausted the supply. However, listen to Cornwallis:

"You were indebted to me for not having made you leave the country even during winter. But, after having past the winter in the province, it is ridiculous to come and tell me, that you will not now having resolved to withdraw. My friends, you must go and sow your lands in order that they may be left in that condition in which

they ought to be at this season, without that you will have no right to expect the least favor from the government. When you have done your duty in this respect, I will give you a more precise reply to your request."

They had not been allowed to leave in English, French or Acadian vessels, by sea or land, in the autumn ; now the springtime is denied them, for they must sow their land. This long series of subterfuges, which would be incredible if the proof were not before our eyes, consigned in documents written by the governors themselves, is, however, not yet ended, as far as Cornwallis's contribution is concerned. The Acadians were determined to have the last word. Seeing that, in order to obtain permission to quit the country, they had to sow their land for the benefit of strangers, they did so. When this work was over, on May 25th, they once more stood before the Governor, hoping that this time no new objection would be raised. Once more they were doomed to disappointment. There yet remained one pretext which had not been unearthed by Nicholson, nor Vetch, nor Philipps, nor hitherto by Cornwallis himself. Only, there was danger lest the Acadians, detecting his purpose, should refuse any longer to submit to his trickery. Hence the oratorical precautions with which he approaches the subject. The irrepressible martinet, who, shortly before had been so harsh and haughty, finally understood that he must change his face ; he became gentle, insinuating, even flattering. Parkman, who has noticed nothing of the farce played anent the Acadians, or who has purposely ignored it, is deeply affected by Cornwallis's words :

" We promised to give a precise reply to the inhabitants, with

respect to the permission they ask to leave the Province *when they shall have sown their lands*, and, *as it appears that you have obeyed our orders* in that particular, we will explain to you our sentiments on that very important affair, *with the same sincerity that we have always made use of towards you.*

“My friends, the moment that you have declared your desire to leave and submit yourselves to another government, our determination was to hinder nobody from following what he imagined to be his interest.

“We frankly confess, however, that your determination to leave gives us pain.

“*We are well aware of your industry and your temperance, and that you are not addicted to any vice or debauchery. This Province is your country; you or your fathers have cultivated it; naturally you ought yourselves to enjoy the fruits of your labour.*

“When we arrived here, we expected that nothing would give you so much pleasure as the determination of His Majesty to settle this Province. Certainly nothing more advantageous to you could take place. You possess the only cultivated lands in this Province; they produce grain and nourish cattle sufficient for the whole colony. In short, *we flattered ourselves that we would make you the happiest people in the world.* . . . In your petitions you ask for a general leave. *As it is impossible that you could all meet at a certain rendez-vous in order to set out all together, with all your families,* one must understand by the expression, ‘*congé général,*’ a general permission to set out whenever you shall think proper, by land, or by sea, or by whatever conveyances you please. In order to effect this, we should have to notify all the commanders of His Majesty’s ships and troops to allow every one to pass and repass which would cause the greatest confusion. . . .

“*The only manner in which you can withdraw from the Province, is to follow the regulations already established.* The order is, that all persons wishing to leave the Province shall provide themselves *with our passport.* And we declare that nothing shall prevent us from giving such passports, *the moment that peace and tranquillity are re-established in the Province.*”

Cornwallis must have thought himself very skilful, and indeed he showed great skill in striving to reverse the unfortunate impression he had at first produced, and to prevent at any cost the departure of the Acadians. Tired

of short-lived tricks, which had several times betrayed his bad faith, he was now to hold the key of the situation; he would make that situation last as long as he pleased. Nobody could leave the country without first coming to him; it was always in his power to refuse under pretext that the country was not quiet, or under any other pretext, it mattered little which; the main thing was to put an end to these deputations that worried him.

This subterfuge was, I believe, Cornwallis's last; the country was tranquil, and would never be more so. The Acadians seemed to understand that those passports would never be granted to them; for thenceforth they ceased to press their claims. They had been told to take the oath or go; and, in point of fact, they had no alternative but to remain at the good pleasure of the Governor or leave without permission. They remained quietly on their lands until the time of the deportation. Those who had chosen to emigrate to French soil had done so, for the most part, the previous autumn after Cornwallis's proclamation.

Cornwallis's behavior toward the Acadians was not only unjust, it could not have been more unwise than it was at his arrival in the country. He was confronted by a moral and peaceful people, from whom he had reason to hope for the most willing assistance and the most complete submission. To ensure their permanent attachment to the Crown, all he need do was to let them understand that they had nothing to fear from him, and to treat them with gentleness and humanity.

After giving such evident proofs of their fidelity to the oath during the recent war, in exceptional circumstances which enhanced their merit, after receiving the

assurances of His Majesty through the Secretary of State, the Duke of Newcastle, the Acadians might have hoped that the bearing of the governors would not change. Cornwallis had only to let his better nature appear. Mildness and justice have always been infallible methods of action ; obedience and sympathy spring from kindness as water from its source ; no bond is lasting that is not woven of sympathy and justice. Scarcely had Cornwallis touched the soil of Acadia, when the Acadian deputies hastened to do him homage. What must they have thought, when, instead of the cordial welcome they had a right to expect, they were received with arrogance, when so severe a proclamation was flung in their teeth ? Did not this sudden change seem to say : “ So long as we were weak, we had recourse to all sorts of subterfuges and stratagems to keep you in the country ; now that we are strong, we are going to speak as your lords and masters ; we mean to treat you in a very different way ? ” Had they not reason to fear that their privileges would be taken from them one by one ? that the free exercise of their religion would be impeded, perhaps done away with ? Since the solemn agreements made twenty years before in the matter of the oath were no longer respected, why should their other privileges escape the same fate ?

For still another reason was this an excellent occasion for winning their affectionate fealty. The way the French officers had treated them during the invasions of the late war had considerably weakened their natural sympathy for France. A little kindness, together with the assurance that the foundation of Halifax would not alter the good understanding of the last ten years, would have sufficed to bind them to England more closely, and

to induce them later on, without pressure and without trickery, to take the much-desired oath.

It would seem, at first sight, that with the foundation of Halifax the retention of the Acadians had ceased to be an important object. Their farms were the most fertile in the province, their system of dikes represented an enormous expenditure of labor; these farms could give plenty to a population of 12,000 souls. Quite true; but there was a lion in the path, as ready to devour now as he was in 1713. The Indians were still the irreconcilable enemies of the English. This hostility was skilfully fostered by the French of Cape Breton. So long as the latter owned a square mile of territory thereabouts, it would be impossible or, at least, dangerous, to establish new colonies without effectively protecting them at great expense against those Indians. Otherwise no one would risk settling there.

However, the strongest motive for keeping the Acadians was the increase of strength the accession of their great numbers would give to France. This consideration, weighty enough in the days of Nicholson and Philipps, was doubly so now. The addition of thirteen thousand souls might make the situation of England in the peninsula very precarious. This was clear to Cornwallis, and just as clear to his successor, Hopson, when he begged the Lords of Trade not to force him to urge this question of the oath, alleging that, for the moment, it was impossible to make them take it, and that their departure would be the ruin of the country.

The French were as much interested in getting them to quit Acadia as the English were in keeping them there. The question of the oath had been settled under Philipps for the benefit of England, and thenceforth

France had seemed indifferent. But Cornwallis's proclamation, by withdrawing the long-standing agreement, had re-opened the whole question and now left the Acadians free to depart. As the proclamation itself said, the only issue was submission to an unrestricted oath or departure.

Cornwallis severely criticises the conduct of the French striving to win over the Acadians, and their conduct was indeed blameworthy, rather in its methods than in its purpose, for it was France's right and duty, as a party to the Treaty of Utrecht, to have an eye to the fulfilment thereof. Since the Acadians had the undoubted right to quit the country, the French had an equal right to persuade them to do so; further than persuasion this right did not go. Because they used undue pressure and violence, they are to be blamed, and this blame they deserve to receive much more from the Acadians than from the authorities at Halifax. However, the guilt of the French does not surpass nor even equal that of the governors: in the one case there was violence *in* the exercise of a right, in the other, violence *against* the exercise of a right. This oath, agreed to by Philipps, was for the Acadians the necessary condition of their remaining in the country, it bound the English Government quite as much as the Acadians. To say the least, they ought to have been restored to the position they occupied before Philipps's compromise; that is, they ought to have once more become free to withdraw within the space of a year with all their effects, and even with the proceeds of the sale of their property. Cornwallis had, with no little subtlety, laid down the principle that no man can be a subject conditionally. But governments, as well as individuals,

are bound to the conditions which they accept. There is no loophole of escape here. Either leave to depart must be granted to the Acadians who claimed it as a right recognized by a solemn treaty, or the conditions of their settlement must be sanctioned. This latter alternative having been accepted, the Government was as strictly bound as private persons are by contracts. Did not the autocratic Tzar accept the settlement of the Mennonites in his empire under the same condition of not bearing arms? True, this agreement was revoked a century later, but after notice given long beforehand and with the privilege of selling and carrying away all that belonged to them. Could a constitutional government like that of England do less? As the Acadians wished to leave, they would have been justified in taking no account of Cornwallis's hindrances, and in departing with their effects and without passports, since the exacting of the latter was only a trick to keep them. But the generality of them did no such thing. They once more withstood all the seductions and threats of the French, as they had done during the war: a new proof of their firmness and submission to the Government; a new proof also, may be, of the non-intervention of their clergy, if not of the slight influence of the latter.

CHAPTER XV.

Doings of the French—The Abbé Le Loutre—His character—
Parkman's opinion.

THE entire summer of 1750 was devoted by the French to fortifying Fort Beauséjour, which they had begun the previous autumn. It was in the most landward part of the Bay of Fundy, on a high hill north of the village of Beaubassin and of the little river Messagouetche, which the French considered as the frontier of Acadia, until the decision of the commission then sitting. This district of Beaubassin, or Chignecto, as it was sometimes called, had become very populous, and contained a vast extent of very fertile meadow land, of which a large portion was enclosed by strong dikes. Northward of this frontier were the settlements of Chipody, Petitcodiac, Memramcook, Jolicœur, Aulac, la prée des Bourgs, la prée des Richards, Cocagne, etc. Southward were the village of Beaubassin, the Rivière des Héberts, Menoudy, etc. Thus half, or nearly half, of this district was on English territory, and the French naturally expected that the English would lose no time in occupying it, were it only to prevent the emigration of the Acadians.

In the mean time, the Abbé Le Loutre, who was a self-constituted agent of the French, made great but vain efforts to determine the Acadians that lived near this frontier to go over to the French side. Here it

will be well to pause and consider this Abbé Le Loutre, who played so considerable a part in the events of this epoch. He has brought upon himself much hatred, not less from the French officers and even from the Acadians than from the English.

For about ten years he was a missionary among the Micmac Indians of the river Shubenecadie, between Cobequid and Chibouctou (Truro and Halifax). We hardly ever hear of him till the war of 1744. In 1745 he accompanied the Indians of his mission and others in an expedition against Annapolis, after which he withdrew to Bay Verte (on French territory or claimed as such by France) with his Indians. Shortly after, he went to France, whence he returned in 1747, when the war was drawing to a close. Thenceforward, until 1755 he resided at Beauséjour.

The foundation of Halifax alarmed the French; they had always hoped that some day or other a treaty or the chances of war would restore to them Acadia, which the English did not seem to value very highly, as they had done nothing to consolidate their conquest. The foundation of Halifax dashed these hopes; it foreshadowed a colonizing policy, which, in a few years, was to endear this province to England by its sacrifices and its population. Honor showed France what her duty was; but honor in America was, between the two historic rivals, an evanescent quantity which frequently went no deeper than the surface of things. To save appearances was the main point, and these appearances were screened by the Indian allies of either nation. In the west, England had her savage allies, whom she occasionally used to defeat French plans; there France also had hers, so that neither the one nor the other could

move without difficulty. But in the east all the Indians were friendly to France and sworn enemies of England, which, exasperated by their continued attacks, had fought them with a barbarity that frequently surpassed that of the savages themselves. These Indians had many wrongs to avenge, and so intense was their hatred of the English that it was always easy to urge them to hostile acts.

It was dread of these Indians that, for half a century, prevented England from colonizing Nova Scotia. The French imagined that, by harassing the new colonists and spreading terror through skilfully managed hostilities, they would disgust them with the country and frustrate England's projects. It was an inhuman and insane policy, which could only end in embittering England, and in increasing her efforts to dislodge a rival whose presence would ever be an obstacle to her commerce and to her expansion.

The influence of the French on the Indians of these regions was artfully disguised; but we know enough about it to visit it with unqualified reprobation. The instrument employed by the governors of Canada to carry out this wicked and fatal policy was that Abbé Le Loutre whom I have just mentioned. His blind zeal, his efforts urging the Indians to worry the colonists introduced by Cornwallis, his unjustifiable methods for forcing the Acadians against their will to cross the frontier, deserve to be condemned by every one and especially by the Acadians.

Before proceeding, it is well to explain an important point which has never yet been cleared up. All historians speak of the Abbés Le Loutre, Germain, Maillard, Le Guerne, as if they had been missionaries to the Acadians

on *English territory*. On this supposition, their efforts to subserve the interests of France are interpreted as shameful. Now to obviate the confusion introduced by these writers, let it be well understood, once for all, that not one of these priests ever was, as far as I know, a missionary to the Acadians in the peninsula. Mailard, until the dispersion, was never employed as a missionary elsewhere than in the island of Cape Breton, which belonged to France; Germain ministered to the Malecite Indians in the upper waters of the St. John River; Le Guerne was missionary among the Indians of the north shore of the Bay of Fundy, and also attended to the few Acadians living on these coasts. Le Loutre was long a missionary to the Micmacs of the Shubenacadie River; but during all that time he never caused any trouble; when he decided upon another line of conduct, he withdrew with his Indians to Bay Verte on the French territory. Consequently, all of these priests were on the territory claimed and occupied by France; hence their patriotism, ardent though it was, was justifiable, if not deserving of credit. If their actions were not honorable, let them be condemned. Because Le Loutre's conduct is condemnable, I stigmatize it as it deserves. But it is a sovereign injustice toward these men to leave the public under an impression that blames what is honorable, and brands with infamy what is merely blamable.

This important distinction ought not, in fairness, to have escaped the attention of these writers, still less that of Parkman, who lays especial stress on the doings of this Abbé Le Loutre. Yet he seems to have done his best to increase the confusion. Thus, when he tells us that Le Loutre was Vicar-General of Acadia; that

the Indians to whom he ministered lived a day's march from Halifax on the banks of the Shubenecadie River, which implies that that was his residence, he is knowingly guilty of a twofold deception, because Le Loutre was not then Vicar-General, and because both he and his Indians had long since left the Shubenecadie River, and then lived at Bay Verte on the territory claimed and occupied by France. I might add that the deception is threefold, because Le Loutre was named, four years later, Vicar-General, not for Acadia or the peninsula, but for the northern part of the Bay of Fundy, then called French Acadia to distinguish it from Canada and from the peninsula which the French called English Acadia.*

I should be glad to be able to say that Parkman merely blundered; but I cannot: I have studied too closely his methods, I am too fully aware of his constant efforts at disguising the truth, not to recognize, here as elsewhere, the elaborate system of deceit that underlies every page he has written on Acadia. *Dura veritas, sed veritas.*

I have sought to penetrate the character of this Abbé Le Loutre who has heaped well-deserved hatred on his own devoted head. The undertaking was far from easy; however, I think I have had a large measure of success. Parkman, who "rushes in where angels fear to tread," soon measures and weighs him. In a few words, with the laconism of Cæsar describing his conquest in Gaul—"veni, vidi, vici," he says oracularly: "Le Loutre was a man of boundless egotism,

* Parkman saw the proof of this last fact in a report of the Acadian Missions by the Abbé de L'île-Dieu in 1755, who was himself Vicar-General of the diocese of Quebec, on which the missions of Acadia depended, and who was, therefore, the best authority on this question.

a violent spirit of domination, an intense hatred of the English, and a fanaticism that stopped at nothing." Sir Oracle "opes his mouth; let no dog bark." As a literary effect it is startling; the common herd likes to be thus whirled at a gallop through the obscurities of history; nothing is so popular and catchy as this semblance of devouring activity which pierces to the quick, cuts out and fashions, as by magic, a something that looks surprisingly like a brand-new bright and polished gem. Serious writers, however, disdain this claptrap. Seldom, if ever, can a striking portrait of the inner depths of a man's character be drawn by a few strokes of the pen. Caricatures can; and, as a caricature, Parkman's portrait of Le Loutre may bear a distant resemblance to the original. Macaulay also seeks conciseness and rapid movement; but he does not seem to have discovered Parkman's secret; on the contrary, like the great masters, he limns his portraits with the greatest care, the result being that they are generally good likenesses, thanks to the after-touches of pen and brush, to the delicacy of shades and tints, to the painstaking patience of the artist.

With some corrections I might admit, as a background, one or two of the four pen-strokes of Parkman; but I refuse to subscribe to the "boundless egotism" of Le Loutre. I see no proof of this assertion and much proof of the exact opposite. To arrive at a fair estimate of Le Loutre, one must enter into the feelings and thoughts that generally actuate a Catholic missionary. Clearly, this was difficult, not to say impossible for Parkman, even if he had been gifted with that rectitude which, to my mind, he lacks, and with that penetration in which, though to a less degree, he is deficient.

Moreover, this character must be viewed in the light of the ideas of the time and of the special circumstances of the place. Great was national fanaticism, but greater still was religious fanaticism. Prejudices had struck deep roots. Persecution was only beginning to relax its revolting rigor; but intolerance still subsisted in all its strength. Not long before, France had expelled the Huguenots; Ireland was gasping under England's heel; everywhere minorities were oppressed. What crimes were committed in the name of religion! What acts of cruelty done in the name of a good and merciful God! Was this a fruit of Christianity or of human interests and passions? Was this a permanent result, or merely a transient phase, a bad dream that would wear itself out and indirectly serve the cause of Christianity and civilization? This last question must have been in many people's minds; two answers were to be given to it: unbelief, fruit of a spurious and merciless Christianity; and a return movement to the pure Christian spirit, all impregnated with charity, love, and mercy. Man moves and God directs. In the life of religions as in that of commonwealths nothing happens without an aftermath which no one had suspected. Small events added together produce great events; fact is linked to fact by invisible bonds, as thread to thread in the weaver's loom.

Though the true fibre of Christianity was warped, faith was strong; in other words, motives were excellent, methods often deplorable; this double aspect of things should be borne in mind when judging Abbé Le Loutre. It is no easy matter for us, men living in the world, to realize the faith that animates those who consecrate their lives to Christian education, especially to

the irksome catechetical labors of a Catholic missionary Struggling as we are with one another for the necessaries or the comforts of existence, absorbed and, as it were, overwhelmed by the thousand and one details of ways and means for needs and pleasures, we easily lose sight of the motives that actuate and the spirit that animates the missionary. That 'boundless egotism' which Parkman attributes to Le Loutre, applicable, as it very often is, to ourselves, can hardly be applied to the missionary. He who, like Le Loutre, had forsaken fortune, pleasure, kindred, friends and fatherland, to spend his life in the heart of the forest with coarse and cruel savages, he who, in order to evangelize these savages, had voluntarily embraced privations of all sorts, from which the most devoted of men would recoil in disgust and horror, could not be, what Parkman fancies him, 'a man of boundless egotism.'

No doubt human nature is very complex, no doubt a man's high calling does not destroy his natural bent; still, as a general rule, incompatible defects disappear or are dwarfed and replaced by other defects compatible with the new vocation. In the case of a missionary, egotism, having nothing to feed on, must be diminished or obliterated, though it may sometimes be replaced by other defects which are, so to speak, the human excrescences of the divine gift of a lively faith. From this view-point must we examine into the defects of Le Loutre.

In what he did where is the proof of that 'boundless egotism?' In that he harassed the English settlements? In that he tried hard to force the Acadians to emigrate and thus be deprived of their property? Other motives may explain these acts, but certainly not ego-

tism. No other motives at all commensurate with his selfless activity can be assigned but religion and patriotism, especially religion, to which he had sacrificed his life. He had spent twelve peaceful years among his Indians when Halifax was founded. From that moment, his activity, his zeal, his fanaticism rose to a high key; he is no longer a mild and peaceable missionary; he is a dictator, an energumen frantically striving to snatch the Acadians from their country, as if he were struggling with a madman on the brink of a precipice. Unable to persuade even those who lived near the frontier to emigrate willingly, he gets the Indians to burn down their houses in order to constrain them. What had happened to him? Whence this change? Evidently, something had filled his soul with anxiety, and that anxiety could be only the effect of some impending danger to religion. The change wrought in him can scarcely be explained otherwise.

This impending danger is easily found. Have we not seen that Shirley had entertained the project of Protestantizing the Acadians, of expelling their priests? that he had reaffirmed this project with extraordinary persistency? that, a vague rumor of it, having reached the Acadians, had given them great alarm? What wonder that Le Loutre should have been inexpressibly shocked at it and profoundly convinced that this project would soon be realized? Since it had been conceived in time of war, when the neutrality of the Acadians was most needed, when these very Acadians were withstanding seductions and threats for the sake of fidelity to their oath, when Acadia was practically at their mercy, defended, as it was, by a mere handful of soldiers, had they not everything to fear now that Halifax was

founded? Had not Cornwallis marked his arrival by a proclamation which annulled the agreement of 1730 and the recent engagements of the King through his Secretary of State, the Duke of Newcastle? Had not the deportation itself been already thought of by a Secretary of State (Craggs)? Had not the same idea been entertained by Admiral Knowles and by Shirley himself, and in each case without any excuse? Even though Le Loutre may not have known all these things, he surely knew enough to feel his soul stirred to its depths. I do not hesitate to say that his fears were not only justifiable but, to all appearances from what we now know, founded upon stubborn facts. Under such circumstances we need only consider the ardor of his faith and suppose that he was hot-tempered, to find a satisfactory explanation of his conduct, without drawing on our imagination for a fancy picture that has no solid foundation.

How far removed soever we may be from the ideas of a man we wish to judge, we must, in order to pass judgment on him with some degree of precision, put aside our own views and enter, as far as possible, into his, taking into account his beliefs, his education, his surroundings. Le Loutre had sacrificed everything to one single idea; he had sacrificed the enjoyments of this world for the joys of the next. To us, to the man of the world, this Abbé's ideas seem very narrow; to him, perhaps, our struggles to acquire things frivolous and transitory must have appeared very mean; we find him cruel to deprive the Acadians of their homes; for him the sacrifice was nothing compared to the loss of religion. The scientific theorist buried in meditation, and the astronomer soaring in thought through interstellar

space, both strangers to this nether earth they tread, are also to the worldling very narrow-minded; yet we, in our feverish moving to and fro, appear to them, from their high vantage-ground, as so many little ants bustling around an ant-hill.

Le Loutre's faults, to my thinking, are attributable rather to his ill-balanced mind than to a disordered will. Like all men of one idea, he was ignorant of the world and unsuited to the governance of men. His letters to his superiors are impregnated with an ardent faith and the purest spirit of the gospel. In 1740 he wrote to his superior: "Remember that I am here only in obedience to your orders; I am here for the glory of God and the salvation of souls." In 1747, when he had returned to France, his superiors, thinking that he had had his share of hardship, proposed that he should remain there. Deeming that he had not done enough for his salvation, he refused all such offers. We know that, on several occasions, he saved the lives of English officers; that Captain Hamilton, who had witnessed his kindness, esteemed him highly; that, after the deportation and his return to France, he became a ministering angel to the Acadian refugees, that he devoted his time and his money to the alleviation of their lot.

His friend, Abbé Maillard, who had initiated him into the Micmac language and the management of missions, was himself, though in a lesser degree, involved in the same condemnation. He spent the last years of his life at Halifax, in the midst of those who had been his enemies. Now, he conquered them all by the irresistible ascendancy of his talent and virtue. There stood by his dying bed the Protestant minister whose friendship he had won and who read certain

prayers to him at his own request; the élite of Halifax society, civil and military, the government and the council followed his remains to the tomb. Perhaps, under similar circumstances, Le Loutre would have received the same homage. What we know of him rests on so valueless an authority—Pichon—that no historian, except Parkman, has consented to use it. More of this anon.

CHAPTER XVI.

Murder of Edward Howe—What Parkman says of it—He accuses Le Loutre—His partiality and his ruses—"Les Mémoires sur le Canada"—Pichon—What he was.

CORNWALLIS'S proclamation had revived in the French the hope of regaining the sympathy of the Acadians, which the events of the last war had severely shaken. De la Galissonnière, the new governor of Canada, hoped it would now be easy to decide them to emigrate. For this purpose he needed a man active, determined, known to the Acadians and able to exert influence over them. He was not slow to understand how serviceable would be Le Loutre, who was already heading a movement in this direction. Thenceforth until the fall of Beauséjour, four years later, Le Loutre, owing to his high standing with the governor, shared with the local authorities the conduct of affairs in this part of the country. He seems to have inspired all the operations directed against the English in the peninsula.

Surmising that the English would soon occupy Beaubassin and build a fort there, the French vigorously pushed on the works at Fort Beauséjour. They had to make haste and lay waste the English side of the frontier. Having hitherto failed to make the Acadians emigrate voluntarily, Le Loutre, in order to gain his point and to leave the English in a wilderness, decided,

as a last resort, to fire the dwellings of the Acadians. On the approach of the English, commanded by Lawrence, the Indians, doubtless obeying Le Loutre's orders, set about their incendiary work and destroyed most of the Acadian houses. The pretty village of Beaubassin, which contained over one hundred buildings, was reduced to ashes, the church with the rest. The inhabitants, left without shelter, were obliged to take refuge on the French side of the frontier. Lawrence, finding nothing but ruins, and having too small a force to resist if attacked, re-embarked with his troops and withdrew. In September, he returned with seventeen small vessels and seven hundred men. After a slight skirmish with the French outposts, he established himself on the site of the village of Beaubassin and built a fort there, which he called Fort Lawrence, less than two miles from Fort Beauséjour, and a few hundred yards from the little river Messagouetche, which the French looked upon as the frontier between the two countries.

Lawrence was succeeded the following year by Captain Scott, and it was shortly after the arrival of the latter, in October, 1751, that occurred the murder of Edward Howe, which made such a noise at the time and threw a shroud of sadness and stupor over both camps. Howe had been for many years judge of the Court of Admiralty and commissary of the English forces in Acadia. He had been first counsellor to Governor Mascarene, and, when Cornwallis became governor, he sat in the council next to Mascarene.* As com-

* According to a custom established at the occupation of the country. Howe should have succeeded Mascarene as governor; but the foundation of Halifax led to a derogation from this rule. Some weeks before Howe's death, Cornwallis had asked to be relieved, but he had also suggested

missary of the forces, he had had long and continued intercourse with the Acadians, and, as he spoke French fluently, he was Mascarene's principal adviser and go-between in the efforts made to keep them faithful to the Government. His influence with the Acadians rivalled that of Mascarene, and he was distinctly the man for all difficult missions. He was acknowledged on all hands to be a man of great worth, of tried and trusted bravery and devotion.

The mission confided to him by Cornwallis at Fort Lawrence seems to have been to negotiate the return of the Acadian refugees, to conclude a treaty with the Indians and to withdraw from their hands the prisoners made by them two years before at Grand Pré.

Lawrence as his successor, on the plea that Mascarene "had sold out and was worn out, and that Howe, not being a military man, was unfit." Possibly, Cornwallis's objection to Howe might not have been accepted, for Lawrence was not appointed his successor. Howe is almost invariably designated under the title of Captain; the reason probably was that he was commissary of the forces and had often been charged with military operations: thus, when Annapolis was first attacked by Duvivier, he was ordered by Mascarene to dislodge the enemy and to raze the houses that protected them. At the battle of Grand Pré, Howe fell grievously wounded beside Colonel Noble. As he was fast bleeding to death from a wound he had received in the left arm, he asked a French officer to have the wound dressed by their surgeon; but the latter was busy with M. Coulon de Villiers, also badly wounded; then Howe begged the French officer to transmit his request to the English surgeon. This led to overtures of surrender, and Howe, weakened though he was, acted as interpreter during the negotiations. He was allowed to withdraw to Annapolis on parole, and afterwards he was exchanged for M. Lacroix and all the Canadian prisoners then at Boston.

Murdoch says of him: "He left several children. The esteem he won while living, the general usefulness of his conduct as an early founder of our colony, and the cruel circumstances of his death commend his memory to us who enjoy a happy, peaceful and prosperous home; for the security and comfort of which we are bound to be grateful to those who pioneered the way in the earliest periods under many and serious circumstances."

Edward Howe is one of my ancestors. His descendants are numerous in the Districts of Three Rivers and Montreal. Conspicuous among them are Theodore Doucet, Esq., N. P.; his sisters Lady Middleton and the Comtesse de Bigny; Edmund Barnard, Esq., Q. C.; Lieutenant-Colonel Hughes, Chief of Police in Montreal; Odilon Doucet of the Post Office Department in Ottawa; Antonio Prince, M.P.P.; Auguste Richard, Vice-Consul of France in Winnipeg; Canons Jean and Joël Prince.

Listen to Parkman relating in his own way the circumstances of his death :

“ Among the English officers was Captain Edward Howe, an intelligent and agreeable person who spoke French fluently, and had been long stationed in the Province. Le Loutre detested him ; dreading his influence over the Acadians, by many of whom he was known and liked. One morning, at about eight o'clock, the inmates of Fort Lawrence saw what seemed an officer from Beau-séjour, carrying a flag, and followed by several men in uniform, wading through the sea of grass that stretched beyond the Misagouetche. When the tide was out, this river was but an ugly trench of reddish mud gashed across the face of the marsh, with a thread of half fluid slime lazily crawling along the bottom ; but at high tide it was filled to the brim with an opaque torrent that would have overflowed, but for the dikes thrown up to confine it. Behind the dike on the farther bank stood the *seeming officer*, waving his flag in sign that he desired a parley. *He was in reality no officer, but one of Le Loutre's Indians in disguise, Etienne le Bâtard, or, as others say, the great chief Jean Baptiste Cope.* Howe, carrying a white flag, and accompanied by a few officers and men, went towards the river to hear what he had to say. As they drew near, his look and language excited their suspicion. But it was too late ; for a number of Indians, who had hidden behind the dike during the night, fired upon Howe across the stream, and mortally wounded him. They continued their fire on his companions, but could not prevent them from carrying the dying man to the fort. The French officers, indignant at this villainy, *did not hesitate to charge it upon Le Loutre : for, says one of them : ‘ What is not a wicked priest capable of doing ? ’*”

The very special interest I have taken in trying to get at the facts in this mournful tragedy will easily be credited on the score of my descent ; yet, the true state of the case still seems to me very doubtful. I should never dream, in putting any version of the story before the public, of being as dogmatical as Parkman is. I believe I have seen all the documents he has seen himself ; at any rate, I have seen all those he quotes ; how-

ever, he gives new details, which I have reason to think have been evolved by his imagination alone. The story is based on three or four different accounts, all more or less contradictory; he has adopted the one which seems to me the least probable, the least honorable. The authority he relies on is so questionable that serious writers fight shy of it, or, if they refer to it, they are candid enough to warn the reader and let him know their reasons for distrusting that authority.

Some idea may be formed of Parkman's calibre as an historian by the fact that this rejected authority, and another almost as questionable, supply much of the material for the two chapters which he devotes to the history of Acadia in his "Montcalm and Wolfe." These two chapters, one entitled "Conflict for Acadia," and the other, "The Removal of the Acadians," contain ninety pages. He skims lightly over the events of the first forty years in ten pages, in order to get quickly to Abbé Le Loutre and to devote to him the greater part of his narrative.

The doings of this ardent abbé were too keenly interesting to Parkman to allow of his losing this opportunity. What a sensational chapter he could create out of the chaos of historic data! Unfortunately, most of what we know of the doings of Le Loutre rests on the two suspicious sources I have just mentioned. The less contemptible of the two is an *anonymous work* styled "Mémoires sur le Canada, 1749-1760." Parkman takes good care not to say that the book is anonymous, that the author professes a deep hatred for the clergy, that he is so partial to the infamous Intendant Bigot as to call him an honest man. This author's hatred for the clergy is so glaring that Murdoch, who incidentally

quotes him in reference to other matters, has the frankness to cast doubts on his veracity :

" It must nevertheless be remembered that we have derived our information of Le Loutre from sources not friendly to priests—the French of that period being tinged with the philosophy of Voltaire."

This is the caution of an historian worthy of the name ; but Parkman, as usual, is silent about all such matters, nay, he emphasizes his inferences by laying stress on the fact that he is quoting an authority that is French. His fraud, however, does not stop there. To add weight to his assertions, he sometimes uses the author vaguely as "*a Catholic contemporary*," as if a Voltairian could be a Catholic, and thus we cannot even guess that he is alluding to the "*Mémoires sur le Canada*." No alternative is left to the ingenuous reader but to suppose that there is question of some additional authority corroborating what was said by another writer or confirming the "*Mémoires*" themselves. Of one poor authority he cunningly builds up two apparently good ones. This is killing two birds with one stone ; multiplying by dividing. Between such double-dealing and the candor of Murdoch yawns a bridgeless gulf.

Parkman's other authority is very much worse yet, and, in passing from one to the other, he falls out of the frying-pan into the fire. I refer to Pichon, a French subaltern, who, after having been several years at Louisburg, was transferred to Beauséjour in 1753, that is, *two years after the events we are now considering*. Captain Scott was then in command at Fort Lawrence. Pichon found means to secure an interview with him, in the course of which he offered his services, pledging

himself, in return for a pecuniary reward and promises of protection, to communicate all the information he could get hold of on the actions and plans of the French, and copies of all the documents that might pass through his hands. Pichon transacted this hateful business with great assiduity, in his communications, first with Scott and later on with Captain Hussey, who soon succeeded the former in the command of Fort Lawrence. Pichon continued his treachery at Halifax, Louisburg and Philadelphia; after which he withdrew to England, where he published a pamphlet entitled, "Letters and Memoirs relating to Cape Breton."

Such was the man and such the part he played. A creature of this stamp is, evidently, not a weighty authority, even if there were nothing worse against him; but we have plenty of other reasons for discrediting his testimony. He was all that his dirty work implied. Captain Hussey, when transmitting to the Governor the information he had received from Pichon, gave his reasons for believing and for doubting him, and frequently pointed out his inconsistencies and the slender credit one could give to his affirmations; so much so that he ended by expressing the opinion that it would be better to cease all intercourse with him. Dr. Brown also discusses the testimony and the writings of Pichon, and very sagaciously sets off the baseness they reveal. Admiral Boscawen would not believe Pichon, and Murdoch, having to quote him with regard to the taking of Beauséjour, begs the reader's pardon, and alleges as an excuse the absence of all other sources of information.*

* Capt. Hussey to Capt. Scott, 11th of Nov. 1754. The inconsistency, the fear of guilt, *make the guilty commit absurdities ruinous to*

Without the "Mémoires sur le Canada" and Pichon's numerous details, Parkman would have to lose all his anecdotes about Le Loutre and the most interesting part of his two chapters. He knew how all that would be eagerly devoured, how his gifts of word-painting would tell in the book-market. What was to be done? The situation was ticklish in the extreme, full of temptations and dangers. Must he let so fine a plum fall without plucking it whilst it is within easy reach? True, no one had ever dared to touch it before; but this only made it more of a tempta-

themselves. Traitors are never cordially believed; how is it possible to bind them by ordinary ties?"

Later, Hussey to Scott: "enclosed you have some letters I received from Pichon, *I must confess I have some suspicions of his sincerity. . .*"

Hussey to the Commissioner in Chief, 12th Nov. 1754: "The 9th of this month I received the enclosed letter, which, *whether authentic or not, I think my duty to transmit to you. . . I cannot help suspecting Pichon's sincerity, and very often find great inconsistencies in his letters.* I cannot but remark, that in this, sir, he makes the governor of Canada say that he engages Le Loutre and de Vergor to find some plausible pretext to make the Indians break out, and tells me that de Vergor *will take care that they do not attempt anything here.*"

"He hath also, ever since I have been here, complained *how narrowly he is observed and how jealous Le Loutre—whom in contempt he styles Moses—is of him, which I think, is a little inconsistent with his trusting him with his letters so far as to take copies of them.*"

"I think, sir, *I have good reasons to believe that the letter Pichon calls Mr. Duquesne's is of his own composing, for I am this morning informed from. . .*"

"Mr. Pichon *is also mistaken about. . . would you think proper of my keeping up this correspondence with him during the winter?*"

The Rev. Mr. Brown devotes a whole chapter to dissecting Pichon's inconsistencies and character, with the title: "Casual hints from the letters of Pichon indicating the state of his mind during his traitorous correspondence."

Admiral Boscawen, writing to Lord Chatham after the taking of Louisburg in 1758, says: "I received this statement with but a moderate amount of belief in its accuracy, as Pichon my informer was not there himself, and, *being an open scoffer at the priesthood, without impugning his veracity, I think he was prone to believe any canards he heard that tended to disparage French authorities or priests.* . It resembles too closely the harsh charges of pillage at Beausejour for which we have only his assertion."

tion and a relish. *Se non è vero, è ben trovato.* At last, the inevitable has come to pass; Parkman yields and seizes the forbidden fruit. Still, we must give him credit for having long hesitated before plucking it, as is evident from the great pains he takes to disguise Pichon's identity and to suppress whatever might depreciate him.

An analysis of Parkman's embarrassment is extremely interesting; it constitutes a sort of vivisection of the ways and means, ruses and shifts that may be adopted by a tricky writer. We witness the fluctuations of a soul buffeted to and fro by glee and distress, and yet maturing the most skilful combinations of a fertile brain.

As to the "Mémoires sur le Canada," he seems to have made up his mind readily enough. After all, thought he, there was no need to follow Murdoch's example; it was not absolutely necessary to say that the work is anonymous, that it exudes hatred of the clergy. But, in the case of Pichon, the problem was far more difficult; something must be said of the part he played. Here several alternative courses were open to Parkman: he might (1) quote Pichon under the vague designation of "a French officer;" (2) simply refer to his letters or to the page of the volume of the archives for those of his letters that are there; * (3) mention his name without comment; (4) acknowledge Pichon's odious occupation and yet say something in his favor to act as a buffer against the shock of the disclosure; or, (5) finally, take shelter behind some respectable name. Instead of choosing one of these numerous alternatives, Parkman

* The Compiler has yielded to the same temptation; he has inserted some of Pichon's letters in the volume of the archives. *Arcades ambo.*

thought the best way out of the tangle was to take them all up one after another, in skilful gradation, so as properly to prepare the reader. Thus, in case of attack, he had five doors to escape through, not to speak of the windows. In sheer astuteness it would be hard to find a parallel to this feat. All Parkman seems to care about is to cover and protect his retreat in case of an attack, which was very unlikely. Who would be painstaking and suspicious enough to search and ferret out, to weigh and compare? Certainly not the Acadians, whose astuteness would not rise to the level of such refined tricks. If we could have read Parkman's thoughts and seen him chuckling over his discovery of these five tricks for whitewashing or concealing his Pichon, we should have witnessed a scene of high comedy.

First trick: Pichon's name does not appear; Parkman quotes him in this way: "A French officer says," "a French writer relates," doing like the naughty boy in the Spanish proverb who throws a stone and then puts his hands in his pockets, "*tira la piedra y esconde la mano.*" Second trick: a little further on, he refers to the pages of the volume of the archives, still without naming Pichon. Third trick: he names Pichon without a word of comment. Fourth trick: he tells us very briefly what Pichon was, but does his best to raise him in the reader's estimation: "He was *now* acting the part of a traitor, carrying on a secret correspondence. *He was a man of education*, born in France of an *English mother*, he was author of genuine letters relating to Cape Breton, *a work of some value.*"

Thanks to this method, the reader is not aware that Pichon has been really quoted about twenty times. If

he knows nothing of Parkman's dodges (and how could he know them?), he supposes that the "French officer" was very respectable, and that his testimony is all the more convincing because he relates facts that tell against his fellow-countrymen. In the second alternative, the authority is, apparently, no longer "a French officer," still less Pichon, but the volume of the archives, therefore, some official document; this satisfies the reader, and saves him the trouble of consulting that volume. In the third alternative, he reads Pichon's name; but, as he does not yet know who he is, he pays no special attention to that name. At length, in another chapter, towards the end of the story, and far apart from the first, he learns that a certain Thomas Pichon, a *store-keeper*, was a traitor to his country; but there is nothing to show that he is the *French officer* quoted in another chapter, especially as Parkman, by another characteristic ruse of his, speaks of him, no more as an officer, but as "Commissary of stores." Moreover, the reader, being introduced to a man of whom Parkman writes favorably, lays no further stress on the matter. He has been deftly thrown off the scent.

It must be admitted that all this is "very smart," and such smartness, with an attractive style, is a quality with which Parkman cannot but be credited. Yet he seems, at last, to have been ashamed of himself, or rather, to have feared lest perhaps his artifice should be discovered; for—and this is the fifth trick—after what he has admitted about the traitor, he adds, while quoting Pichon once more, "Pichon cited by Murdoch." Evidently he felt he was not quite safe; he must seek shelter behind a respectable name. But Murdoch, who really does cite Pichon once or twice, speaks of him at

some length and tells us immediately and without subterfuge what he was. He cites him anent the siege of Beauséjour on questions that have no further importance than to satisfy curiosity; and, even then, he seems to have felt scruples, and so excuses himself by the absence of other sources: "In the following account of the siege of Beauséjour we have not any English account, official or private, to help us. . . . The main parts of our narrative are derived from Pichon."

Thus, Murdoch's use of him, far from being blame-worthy, gives us a high idea of the historian's character; while Parkman's methods produce a diametrically opposite impression, and, in particular, his attempt to enlist Murdoch as an accomplice, aggravates, instead of attenuating, his guilt.

Painful as is the task I have undertaken with respect to Parkman, I venture to think that the interests of historic truth make it imperative. Leaving to others the duty of applying a similar analysis to his other works, I will confine myself to the ninety pages he has written on the subject in hand.

After this long parenthesis I return to the murder of Edward Howe and to Parkman's account of it, drawn from Pichon, who was then at Louisburg; for, as has already been said, he did not come to Beauséjour till two years later, in 1753, so that he was not even a resident, still less an eye-witness. We have read how Parkman said: "*The French officers* indignant at this villainy, did not hesitate to charge it upon Le Loutre, for, *says one of them*: "*What is not a wicked priest capable of doing?*"

Now, I am going to give Pichon's account of this.

murder. It is to be found at page 195 of the Volume of the Archives :

“ It was very wrongfully and with the greatest injustice that the English accused the French of having a hand in the horrors committed daily by Le Loutre with his Indians. *What is not a wicked priest capable of doing ?* He clothed in an officer's regimentals an Indian named Cope, and laying an ambuscade of Indians near to the Fort, he sent Cope to it, waving a *white* handkerchief in his hand, which was the usual sign for the admittance of the French into the English Fort, having affairs with the commander of the Post. *The Major* of the Fort, a worthy man, and greatly beloved by all the French officers, taking Cope for a *French officer*, came out with his usual politeness to receive him. But he no sooner appeared than the Indians in ambush fired at him and killed him. All the French officers had the greatest horror and indignation at Le Loutre's barbarous actions ; and, I dare say, if the Court of France had known them, they would have been very far from approving them ; but he had so ingratiated himself with the Marquis de la Galissonnière that *it became a crime to write against him*. It is needless to explain further Le Loutre's execrable conduct. *Cruelty and inhumanity has ever been sacerdotal from all ages.*”

On comparing Pichon's narrative with Parkman's, it is easy to see that the one is the offspring of the other. We have Parkman clothed in Pichon's *regimentals* with some additional trimmings drawn from his imagination. On one point Parkman has been imprudent. By yielding to the temptation of quoting Pichon's *ipsissima verba* : “ *What is not a wicked priest capable of doing ?*” he has furnished us with indisputable proof that the officer on whom he relied was none other than Pichon, and that Pichon himself was also his only authority for referring to “ the French officers ” in general and to their supposed indignation at Le Loutre. Was it possible to doubt that Le Loutre was the real culprit, when

Parkman was backed, apparently at least, by the French officers themselves? "*The French officers,*" says he, "did not hesitate to charge it on Le Loutre, for, *says one of them,* etc."

There is much scientific work in all this, and the public, it is to be regretted, seems indulgent when smartly taken in. "*Qui nescit dissimulare nescit regnare*" is one of Machiavelli's sayings. The spirit that animated Pichon is manifest in the closing sentence: "*Cruelty and inhumanity has ever been sacerdotal from all ages.*" The hypocritical traitor thus aimed at flattering the prejudices of those whom he was writing for and increasing his chances of reward. Let us note, by the way, that Edward Howe was neither major nor commander of the fort, as Pichon calls him.

Cornwallis, writing to the Duke of Bedford less than a month after the murder, says:

"I have now an affair of more extraordinary a nature to inform you of. Captain Howe was employed on the expedition to Beau-bassin as knowing the Country well, and being better acquainted both with the Indians and inhabitants, and, poor man, fancied he knew the French better, and personally those villains de la Corne and Le Loutre. His whole aim and study was to try a peace with the Indians and to get our prisoners out of their hands. For which purpose, he had frequent conferences with Le Loutre and the French officers under a flag of truce. *La Corne* * sent, one day, a flag of truce *by a French officer* to the water side of a small river that parts his people from our troops. Captain Howe and the officer held a parley for some time across the river. *Howe had no sooner taken leave of the officer,* than a party that lay perdue fired a volley at him and shot him through the heart."

Cornwallis's account is, clearly, very different from the Pichon-Parkman one. True, Cornwallis speaks dis-

* De la Corne was commanding officer in those parts.

paragingly of the French, and especially of De la Corne and Le Loutre in connection with this murder. It is clear that he entertained suspicions of complicity, but it is equally clear that his suspicions are of a vague, general character. Other accounts there are which Parkman knew of, since he refers to them at the foot of the page. Prévost, intendant-commissary (commissaire-ordonnateur) at Louisburg, says distinctly that Howe had been forewarned by Le Loutre himself of the risk he ran by trusting too much to the Indians, and that it was owing to his own imprudence, and for not having followed Le Loutre's advice, that he was killed.

"Mr. Howe," says Prévost . . . "*having long annoyed the Indians*, took it into his head to risk it again, notwithstanding the warnings of *Abbé Le Loutre and even of the Indians themselves*. He came, with a white flag, opposite one of them, and the Indian, having a *red flag*, fired his gun at him and stretched him dead." *

The Abbé Maillard seems to confirm Prévost's testimony. "If that man did not wish to perish in this way, he ought to have carefully avoided any meeting with the Micmacs. He had been warned to that effect shortly before this fate befell him."

Another version is from M. de la Vallière, an officer who was then at Fort Beauséjour and who kept a journal of local events from September 19, 1750 to July 28, 1751; therefore, to all appearances, a man well able to form a correct opinion.

He thus related Howe's death :

* Two years later this same Prévost, writing to the Minister, said: "I have learnt that the man named *Cope*, a bad Micmac who has always been uncertain in his behavior and suspected by both nations, has made several journeys to the English settlements in Acadia, and that he has ended by signing at Halifax a sort of treaty."

“About the 15th of October, the Indians, who had observed and had been informed that Mr. Howe, commissary of the English troops, often came to walk on the river bank, where he had already had conferences with the officers and missionaries, in order to speak to the inhabitants and persuade them, by making many promises, to come over to the English side, went during the night into ambush with some Acadians behind a levee that runs along the river; and, at about eight o'clock in the morning, Stephen Bâtard went with a white flag opposite on the other side of the river. The Indian, after putting a few questions to Mr. Howe, threw down his flag and gave the signal to his men, who fired immediately on Mr. Howe and wounded him mortally.”

These are the only authorities I know; Parkman mentions another in a note, “*Les Mémoires sur le Canada*,” which, he says, declares that Le Loutre was present. So it does, but it does not accuse him of complicity in the murder, evil-minded though its author always is against the priests.* Now, whosoever weighs and compares these different accounts cannot help thinking that Parkman's view, expressed with so much assurance and as though it was the only one, is by far the most improbable. I felt a lively personal interest in ascertaining the truth, and yet I am now far from inclined to advance a positive opinion in favor of any view: in fact, no one could do so with the diverse and conflicting testimonies which we possess.

* This anonymous writer, often quoted by Parkman, is so inaccurate in all that concerns Acadian affairs that it is better to ignore him. His version of Howe's murder is a new one and evidently absurd in more than one point. We should bear in mind that the author must have resided in Quebec or Montreal, as his book treats chiefly of Canadian affairs.

Although I have not yet solved the problem, I will, however, hesitatingly hazard an explanation. Howe, as may have been gathered from Cornwallis's letter, had been sent to this post with a view to concluding a treaty with the Indians and to withdrawing from their hands the prisoners they held. Having been there some weeks, if not some months, he had already had several conferences with the Indians on the banks of the little river that was the border-line between them. Though he had hitherto been unsuccessful, he still persisted in his efforts. He also had frequent interviews in the same place with Le Loutre and the French officers. My view is, that, on this occasion, Howe went to the usual place to meet an officer, who was perhaps accompanied by Le Loutre; that Cope, chief of one Indian tribe, Le Bâtard, chief of another, and some other savages, were in ambush along the levee, watching for an interview between Howe and the French officers in order to carry out their purpose; that, directly after the French officer and Le Loutre had left, at the end of the interview, and before Howe had withdrawn, the Indians waved a flag as a signal that they wished to have a parley. This interpretation has, at least, the merit of reconciling otherwise irreconcilable differences in the various accounts. Pichon says Howe went down to the river bank to meet an Indian dressed as an officer. This is scarcely possible, as Cornwallis, who was not likely to be mistaken about a fact which he could verify, says that "*Howe and the officer held a parley for some time across the river.*" "*Howe had no sooner taken leave of the officer than a party that lay perdué, etc.*" The Indians had to make haste in order not to let Howe escape; consequently, the French

officer and Le Loutre, if indeed the latter was present, cannot have been far off. Prévost pretends that the Indian who killed Howe was Cope; La Vallière accuses Stephen Le Bâtard; perhaps both of them had a hand in it.

Cornwallis makes it clear that Howe had a conference with a genuine officer, that he held *for some time* a parley with him, that when their parley was over they took leave of each other. It could not have been so if that man had been an Indian in an officer's regimentals, as the fraud would surely have been detected at once; and this is made clearer by Cornwallis's further statement that it was after taking leave of the French officer that "a party that lay perdue fired a volley." The absurd story of an Indian clothed in an officer's regimentals is not alluded to by any other than Pichon, and is, inferentially, contradicted by Cornwallis. Moreover, according to Cornwallis, that officer was sent by De la Corne himself, so that, if there was an ambush by others than Indians, we should have to connect with it the commander of the French post and the officer who held the parley. Thus, Parkman, who, for these particulars, had the testimony of the English governor about facts part of which he had been able to verify and control, has preferred to accept in all details the fanciful and absurd story of Pichon, for no other motive, it seems, than the better to connect Le Loutre with this murder.

To sum up in a few words: Parkman's proof of Le Loutre's complicity in the murder of Howe has no other foundation than the testimony of Pichon, of Pichon who then, and for the two subsequent years, lived at Louisburg. Directly, inferentially or in essential details, he was contradicted by Maillard, Prévost, La Vallière and

Cornwallis, that is, by a distinguished priest, two officers of high rank and one governor. The odds were thus very heavy against the version Parkman sought to foist on the public, and few even of the most artful and unscrupulous writers would have faced such odds. Parkman, however, did. He was bound to get Pichon admitted and to give him a solid backing. Audacity is an insatiable craving which every success develops more and more. Parkman had succeeded so well in recommending the "Mémoires sur le Canada" thanks to his little trick of division by which this witness suspected of partiality and irreligion is made to reappear *incog.* under the veil of "a Catholic contemporary," that he thought he could adopt similar tactics in Pichon's case; only he must make them more elaborate to fit the higher importance of this new accusation. His first step was to give Pichon an air of respectability by speaking of him, without naming him, as "a French officer." His next was to make use of this officer as a voucher that all the French officers held the same opinion. But now Parkman was confronted with a more serious difficulty. What was to be done about Maillard, Prévost, La Vallière and Cornwallis? Must he reproduce the substance of their version, or should he ignore them completely? Neither of these extreme courses suited him; he sought and found a third alternative. He ingeniously contrived to put their names at the foot of the page with an unimportant remark about each of them, so worded, however, as to create the impression that they had not taken a different view of the matter, but that the little they had said tended to corroborate his "French officer."

So with nothing, or something worse than nothing in

his favor, and with an overwhelming proof against his charges, Parkman has constructed crushing evidence against Le Loutre. He has so twisted and disfigured every authority as to make it appear that Le Loutre was accused and condemned on all sides: by "a French officer," "all the French officers,"* by Prévost, Mailard, La Vallière, Cornwallis, and "Les Mémoires sur le Canada."

Thus, Parkman has given an honorable character to the worst accusations against Le Loutre, particularly to that which implicated him in a murder. After that, he had no doubt people would believe whatever he chose to advance against him.

With such methods you can prove anything. Give Parkman a blackmailing letter from the veriest blackguard, and, if not closely looked after, he might bring about the conviction and electrocution of the President of the United States. Have we not a right to apply Pichon's virtuous indignation to Parkman and exclaim: "What is not a wicked story-teller capable of doing?"

Let us not forget that the first use made of Pichon is about Le Loutre; that, subsequently, he quotes him no less than fifteen or twenty times in five different disguises. He could safely divulge the name and character of Pichon when once he had extracted from him all his venom against Le Loutre, and when the divulging thereof did not remove the euphemism under cover of which he had administered his poison. †

It may be very difficult to get a correct idea of the details of Howe's death; but I refuse to believe that an

* It is Pichon who says that the French officers accused Le Loutre.

† Pichon is introduced as "a French Officer" in Parkman's book at page 118, in the fourth chapter; and it is not till page 243, in the eighth chapter, that his name and his vile business are revealed.

officer or a priest, great as may have been their prejudices or their fanaticism, can have had the smallest share in a crime of this sort, when they had nothing to gain or more to lose than to gain by even an indirect participation in it. Barbarians alone could have conceived and executed such a crime.

I do not believe that suspicions were then entertained at Halifax of Le Loutre's complicity in the murder; though, if they were, these suspicions would lead, as a natural consequence, to the further supposition that he was capable of any villainy. But if, in fact, according to the affirmations of Prévost and Maillard, Le Loutre had really warned Howe of the danger he ran, we are confronted no longer with a crime, nor with the suspicion thereof, but with a praiseworthy action that exhibits Le Loutre in a less unlikely character and one far more in keeping with his past devotedness as a missionary.

In order to elucidate this mysterious affair, I have, as I usually do in such matters, tried to fathom the motives of the actors therein. I find that, though Le Loutre may have been jealous of Howe's influence with the Acadians, this jealousy is far from sufficient to implicate him in this murder. My first reason is that, without convincing evidence, no one can be warranted in making a monster of a man who had sacrificed all the comforts of life to the salvation of his soul and to the higher interests of religion. Secondly, this crime would be altogether at variance with what we already know of him. Thirdly, it were impossible to suppose him shortsighted or blind enough not to have foreseen the disastrous and inevitable consequences of such a deed for him and for his dearest interests. Fourthly, to connect Le Loutre with this crime seems necessarily to imply

the complicity of certain French officers, in particular of the Commandant De la Corne, and thus charge them with the same perverseness and blindness. Now we have the clearest proofs that these officers had excellent reason to be jealous, and were indeed jealous, of Le Loutre's influence and of his share in the conduct of military and civil operations. Moreover, we know that Howe was held in high esteem by these same French officers. Therefore, I infer, they cannot have conspired with Le Loutre against Howe.

What, then, can have been the motive of the Indian assassins? I do not know. Written proofs are wanting, as they are wanting in so many other chapters of this history, where clearly-defined facts are the exception. Though the Indians may have had many a long-standing grudge to wipe out, they probably had no more valid excuse than the harm Howe was doing them by his zeal for the service of England.

However, we are justified in supposing that Le Loutre, by his overstrained ardor and his violent diatribes, may have, indirectly and unconsciously, influenced to some extent the conduct of the murderous Indians. For many years he had been fanning the flames of fanaticism; and to the savage mind the logical and practical consequence might have been the removal of the man who personified all that made against their nation, against France and Catholicism. This is the conclusion I am inclined to arrive at, in virtue, not of documentary evidence, but of arguments based on the study of human motives and the teachings of history.

Seeing that Parkman undoubtedly aimed at imparting a flavor to his narrative by implicating a priest in this

murder, he might have attained his object in a less sensational fashion but more plausibly, had he used the method I have adopted. This method, albeit necessary, he seldom follows. For him, as all his works show, history is merely a clever game of legerdemain, a hunt after anecdotes, a salmagundi of items picked up everywhere without much regard to their origin or their value. He has no misgivings, he cuts the toughest Gordian knots with a few swift strokes of the pen, with a few admirably balanced sentences which give the reader no inkling of the tremendous difficulties involved. Small wonder that he should thus deport himself; analysis would shackle his dainty feet, would overweight his style; analysis is a painful process, which suits the sincere writer alone; analysis is the weapon of him only who, seeking in history nothing but the truth, is not afraid to place the reader in a position to judge by himself of the facts at issue, and of the value of conflicting testimony. Hence it is that Parkman, even if he had the necessary penetration, seldom sifts and analyzes evidence in such a way that the public may judge of his power of analysis.

The facts that form the basis of the foregoing chapter are important, not only in that they afford full play to Parkman's peculiar methods, but also in their bearing on the subsequent history of the Acadians. Howe's death had much to do with the sequel of that sad history. By increasing the irritation of the English against the French it made the deportation possible.¹

¹ Since writing the above, I see that Parkman, in his last work, says, without explanation, that Le Loutre's complicity is not proved. "*Quantum mutatus ab illo!*" Whence comes this change? What has happened? Nothing, except that Casgrain has taken exception to his inferences, telling him that La Vallière, Prévost, Maillard, whom he cites, draw inferences very different from his and from what he leads the reader to infer; but

CHAPTER XVII.

Intrigues of the French to urge the Indians to hostilities—Letter of La Jonquière to the Minister—Indian warfare against the English—Hostilities between English and French—Le Loutre's methods against the Acadians—He is blamed by the Bishop of Quebec—Divers acts of cruelty against the Indians of Maine.

I AM proceeding with a sincere desire to discover the share of blame which belongs to each of the conflicting parties ; endeavoring to be just to the English as well as to the French, to the Home Government as well as to the local authorities, to the Acadians as well as to the priests. The materials for this history are so scanty, there are so many gaps to fill, that here, more than elsewhere, it becomes imperative to enter successively into the minds of the interested parties in order to detect the motives that impelled them to adopt one course rather than another. One must become, so to speak, by turns, a missionary, an Acadian peasant, an Englishman and a Frenchman, a Catholic and a Protestant ; one must divest oneself of preconceived notions, narrow or broaden one's views, penetrate into the prejudices of all. This is not always easy, nor equally easy for every one. My life has been spent amidst these opposite elements,

Casgrain has produced no new proof. True, Casgrain has not discovered the great secret ; but he may be on the right scent, and he must therefore be immediately turned away from it by some concession ; else either he or somebody else might make further researches and possibly ferret out Parkman's artful dodges and his dear Pichon. Matters had reached a point where Parkman might say, as children do when they play Hunt the Slipper : " It's getting very hot ! "

and, owing to exceptional circumstances and perhaps also to my turn of mind, I experience no difficulty in seeing with the eyes of others. If some writers have examined more documents than I have, perhaps no one has more honestly and deeply pondered the true inwardness of the facts.

Under different circumstances it is possible, by a mere compilation of documents connected by such explanations as are necessary for understanding the narrative, to compose a history that would be a pretty faithful picture of events; in this case, such a compilation would be altogether insufficient. Not only are materials few, not only have the most important been suppressed, but those which remain are generally but the story as written by one side, in stiff official letters calculated to show merely the deceptive surface facts, merely what it pleased the writer to say. Motives, intentions, secret thoughts, all the inner springs of action, which are revealed in private letters, secret journals, documents from the other side, are completely wanting here.

The circumstances did not favor an international code of honor equal to that which obtained among the civilized nations of Europe. The interference of Indian allies in war made peace factitious, war doubly cruel and hatred incredibly intense. Each nation had its savage allies, sometimes fighting on their own account, oftener egged on by one or the other of the two nations. Even when they spontaneously took to the warpath, they were suspected of doing so at the suggestion of interested whites. An act of hostility committed on the great lakes was avenged later on in New England or in Nova Scotia, and vice versa.

Numerically, France was much inferior to her rival.

The assistance of the Indians was, therefore, a necessary condition of her existence ; and so we find that France always more assiduously and more successfully cultivated their friendship. Her most powerful lever was the missionary. Whilst this spurner of creature-comforts plunged into the forest to follow the Indians in their expeditions for the chase, for barter or for war, sharing their privations, associating with their daily life and their interests, the Protestant minister, bound to civilization by family ties, could not expose his loved ones to the trials of such a life and to the contact of those barbarians ; yet this was the best means of evangelizing them and ultimately of winning them to civilization. We can readily understand how, for the missionary, the interests of religion were closely linked with those of his nation, since his efforts became or might become useless as soon as the territory passed into English hands. It was, assuredly, very natural that the missionary should preserve his love for France ; but Parkman, in viewing him as too exclusively dominated by this sentiment, does not realize the intimate connection which the missionary saw between his religion and his country.

Those vast and fertile regions that had no other masters than a few savage tribes were coveted by both nations, and had to be occupied as early as possible, so that the rival nation might not step in beforehand. However, there were no exact and definite titles to legal possession accepted and recognized as such ; much stress must also be laid on the friendship of the Indians, often an uncertain and easily-broken bond, often threatened by underhand seduction. Thus it happened that there was no distinct line of demarcation beyond which

honor could not safely go. In Europe the most insignificant actions were done before the eyes of all, honor was held in check by public opinion, ever such a mighty power. Here, the blackest crimes frequently were without echo, or were lost in the solitude of the forest. We need not, then, be surprised that rival interests should have prompted many acts of duplicity, and that both nations are responsible for deeds the memory of which may well make them blush. Indulgence is, therefore, opportune; still, there are misdeeds so blameworthy that history cannot ignore them; and, if such blame is deserved by France, it applies particularly, I believe, to her conduct in this part of the country, and at the very period upon which we are entering.

The eight years' peace, from 1748 to 1756, in America, was nothing but a series of continued hostilities, getting worse each year. Macaulay says: "The peace was, as regards Europe, but a truce; it was not even a truce in other quarters of the globe."

Cornwallis's proclamation, ordering the Acadians to take an unrestricted oath, was, for Acadia, the cause or the pretext, at first, of secret hostilities, and ultimately of open war.

The enmity of the Indians for the English had always been carefully fostered; it was the counterpoise which equalized the advantages of the two nations in this part of the continent. We shall presently see, as Parkman rightly says, that nothing was neglected by the French to urge them to hostilities, whether with a view to discourage the colonists introduced by Cornwallis or to force the Acadians to cross the frontier. A few days after this proclamation, De la Jonquière wrote to the

Minister of Colonies that Cornwallis, on his arrival, had issued a proclamation requiring from the Acadians an unrestricted oath; that this proclamation had filled them with alarm; and that he himself had given instructions to Captain de Boishébert to favor their departure. He informed him of the conferences he had had with the Indians:

“I did not care to give them any advice upon the matter, and confined myself to a promise that I would on no account abandon them; and I have provided for supplying them with everything, whether arms, ammunition or other necessaries. It is to be desired that these savages should succeed in thwarting the designs of the English, and even their settlement at Halifax. They are bent on doing so; and if they can carry out their plans, it is certain that they will give the English great trouble, and so harass them that they will be a great obstacle in their path. These Savages are to act alone; neither soldier nor French inhabitant is to join them; everything will be done of their own motion, and without showing that I had any knowledge of the matter. This is very essential; therefore, I have written to the Sieur de Boishébert to observe great prudence in his measures, and to act very secretly, in order that the English may not perceive that we are providing for the needs of the said Savages. It will be the missionaries who will manage all the negotiations, and direct the movements of the Savages, who are in excellent hands, as Father Germain and Abbé Le Loutre are very capable of making the most of them, and using them to the greatest advantage for our interests. They will manage their intrigue in such a way as not to appear in it.”

He went on to say that he hoped thus to prevent the English from making any new settlement, to remove the Acadians from them, and to discourage them by continual attacks of Indians, so as to make them give up their pretensions to the territories of the King of France.

Nothing can be clearer. De la Jonquière's suggestions, it appears, were approved by the French govern-

ment. This approval is both contemptible and inexcusable. This document is a stigma on France's honor, and is doubly so, as it directly involves the Home Authorities. True, hostilities had been committed shortly before in these parts by the English on the French and Indians; it would be no easy matter to ascertain satisfactorily which side was the first aggressor and on whom the blame, or most of it, rests; yet, as this letter shows that peace might have been restored without these instigations, France's guilt cannot be excused nor diminished to any great extent. The same reprobation may be applied, though with less force, to the participation of Le Loutre and Germain; history is justified in charging them with the vexations and atrocities committed by the Indians on the colonists of Halifax. However, in all fairness, I must once more direct attention to the fact that Fathers Germain and Le Loutre were missionaries among the Indians of French Acadia (New Brunswick), and not among those of the Peninsula (Nova Scotia).

I have already mentioned how Le Loutre failed to make the Acadians of Grand Pré and of all the Mines Basin emigrate; I have also indicated the means he used toward those who dwelt at Beaubassin near the frontier. For fuller details as to these latter, I will quote Parkman, not because of the absolute accuracy of his facts, for his information is mainly derived from the questionable sources examined in the previous chapter, but because, in the absence of all other information, his account may be received as containing a substratum of truth, now that the reader is in a position to estimate the value of his authorities.

At page 116 of his work, "Montcalm and Wolfe,"

Parkman says: "Resolved that the people of Beaubassin should not live under English influence, Le Loutre with his own hand (?) set fire to the parish church and this compelled the Acadians to cross to the French side of the river."

Speaking of the inhabitants of Cobequid (now Truro), he says: "They began to move their baggage only when the savages compelled them."

When Lawrence landed with his men to found Fort Lawrence on the frontier, there still remained, in the neighborhood of Beaubassin village, which had been destroyed some months before, and, on the English side, quite a number of houses and barns that had not been burned. "Le Loutre's Indians," says Parkman, "now threatened to plunder and kill the inhabitants if they did not take arms against the English. Few complied, and the greater part fled to the woods. On this the Indians and their Acadian allies set the houses and barns on fire, and laid waste the whole district, leaving the inhabitants no choice but to seek food and shelter with the French."

At page 120 Parkman says: "Le Loutre, fearing that they would return to their lands and submit to the English, sent some of them to isle St. Jean. They refused to go, but he compelled them at last, by threatening the Indians to pillage them, carrying off their wives and children, and even kill them before their eyes (?)"

After making allowances for the exaggerations of details, I am not far from believing that these events really occurred pretty nearly as they are described. It must be said, however, in extenuation of Le Loutre's conduct, that he acted on the understanding that the

Acadians would be fully indemnified for all their losses, and, if these promises were partially frustrated, the fault lies at the door of Intendant Bigot, Vergor and their accomplices, who kept, for their own benefit, the funds set apart for the relief of the Acadian refugees.

Men who, like Le Loutre, allow themselves to be carried away by religious fanaticism, almost always become dangerous as soon as they quit the sphere of religion to come down into the arena of worldly conflicts. He should have ceased pestering the Acadians to move, as soon as he met with decided resistance on their part; and, since he was so vigorously opposed by those who lived near the frontier, he had nothing to hope for from those whose remoteness placed them beyond his reach. His machinations could only serve to aggravate a situation that was already painful enough. Although the Acadians, as we shall see, never did anything that could justify either their deportation or any severity even remotely comparable to that, yet, when they weigh all the causes of their exile, they cannot shut their eyes to the unforgotten fact that the conduct of France toward them was impolitic, selfish and cruel, that it quickened latent prejudices and antipathy against them, and paved the way for the misfortunes that ensued. And here, as Parkman, in quoting Pichon, states facts of a public nature, which could not be altogether unknown to the Halifax authorities, and which are partly sustained by, or in line with, De la Jonquière's letter, I would find no fault, provided he had given out the name of his authority, objectionable though it be.

The following letter of the Bishop of Quebec to Le Loutre shows what the prelate thought of his behavior:

" You have at last, my dear sir, got into the very trouble which I foresaw, and which I predicted long ago.

" The refugees could not fail to get into misery sooner or later, and to charge you with being the cause of their misfortunes. The Court thought it necessary to facilitate their departure from their lands, but it is not the concern of our profession. It was my opinion that we should neither say anything against the course pursued, nor anything to induce it. I reminded you a long time ago, that a priest ought not to meddle with temporal affairs, and that, if he did so, he would always create enemies and cause his people to be discontented.

" I am now persuaded that the General and all France will not approve of the return of the refugees to their lands, and the English Government must endeavour to attract them. . . . But, is it right for you to refuse the sacraments, to threaten that they shall be deprived of the services of a priest, and that the savages shall treat them as enemies? I wish them conscientiously to abandon the lands they possessed under English rule; but can it be said that they cannot conscientiously return to them?"

The above letter shows the vast difference between a distinguished prelate and a fiery abbé of Le Loutre's stamp.

In the absence of clear documentary evidence to prove which side provoked the hostilities, prior to De la Jonquière's letter, we have to guide ourselves by the circumstances of the time, which show that the French had every motive to hinder the English from colonizing Nova Scotia, whereas the latter were just as much interested, for the moment, in avoiding all aggressions.

The first attack made by the Indians occurred August 19, 1749, about six weeks after Cornwallis's arrival at Halifax. They captured twenty persons who were cutting hay at Canso, and brought them as prisoners to Louisburg, where they were freed on the intervention of the French commandant: "The Indians pretend they did this," says Cornwallis, "because a New England

man who had ransomed his vessel of them for £100, and left his son hostage, never returned to them, though Colonel Hopson advanced him the money. I have written to Boston to have this examined and have the master, one Ellingwood, taken up."

In September, Cornwallis again informs us, the Indians, under pretext of barter, attacked two vessels at Beaubassin; three Englishmen and seven Indians were killed. On the 30th of this same month, four men who were working in a mill were killed by the Indians, and another made prisoner. The next day, the Council of Halifax passed a resolution ordering all the commanders "to annoy, distress, and destroy the Indians everywhere. That a premium of ten guineas be promised for every Indian killed or taken prisoner."

While throwing most of the blame on the French, I think it only right to refer to the counter-accusations consigned in the French archives or elsewhere. Invariably the archives of one or the other nation contain nothing but accusations against the opposing nation; so that history based on the exclusive testimony of one of them, as has been more especially the case for Acadia, cannot but be altogether one-sided and incorrect.

"Everybody knows," wrote to the French Court the Comte de Raymond, commander at Louisburg, "that, since the year of the last peace (1748), there has hardly been a month in which the English have not sent armed corsairs to visit the coasts of this colony."

"Since the end of the year 1749," says he elsewhere, "a date at which the English began to come in crowds to Chibouctou (Halifax) to settle there, the French have not been able to navigate in safety along the east coast, and even in the neighborhood of the island of

Canso. . . . on account of the frequent threats made there. They have continued to capture vessels of all kinds, to lay hands on whatever they contained, and, at the same time, to seize on the mariners themselves."

The Comte de Raymond supported these accusations by a number of facts related with the most circumstantial and precise details. He mentioned, among other things, that the English had seized, in this very year 1749, in a port of Cape Breton, three boats together with their crews, and had released them only after taking all the codfish the boats contained.

"They attacked and captured French boats plying between Cape Breton and Prince Edward Island, ill-used the crews, laid hands on their cargoes and sometimes on their boats."

On October 16, 1750, a brigantine belonging to the French navy, the *Saint François*, laden with the provisions, clothing and arms destined to the French posts of the St. John River, was captured and looted.

In the *Lettres et Mémoires sur le Cap Breton* (*Pichon*) we read :

"Towards the end of July, 1749, when the news of the truce between the two crowns had not yet reached New France, the Indians had taken some of the English prisoners on the island of Newfoundland; but these prisoners, having informed them of the truce signed the previous year at Aix-la-Chapelle, they believed them on their mere word, treated them as brothers, released them from their bonds; but, in spite of so much kind treatment, these perfidious guests massacred, during the night, twenty-five Indians, men and women."

"Towards the end of the month of December, 1744," says another document, "Mr. Ganon- (?), commanding

a detachment of English troops . . . found, in a lonely place, near Annapolis, two huts of Miemac Indians. In these huts were five women and three children, two of the women being pregnant; but, despite the feelings of humanity that such persons were likely to excite, the English not only plundered and burned these huts, but also massacred the five women and the three children. It was even found that the pregnant women had been disembowelled."

I have no intention of drawing a parallel between the misdeeds of the two nations, so as to decide which of them deserves more blame for the cruelty practised by the savages in the wars between the two nations or in those which they waged against the Indians. Owing to the circumstances of the time, the historian must shut his eyes, provided the authorities took reasonable pains to repress cruelty. A distinction must also be made between the conduct of subalterns and that of superior officers. But the atrocious crimes perpetrated by the whites themselves against the Indians are inexcusable, and, in particular, those which are traceable to the authorities of Massachusetts against the Indians of Mainé far exceed all other atrocities committed elsewhere, even those of the Indians themselves. I do not think that the French ever were guilty of anything that can remotely be compared to what I am about to relate. These facts are told in the same way by many historians; but I take them from Hannay, whom I have at hand:

"The Eastern Indians renewed the war in June, 1689, by the destruction of Dover, N. H., where Major Waldron and twenty-two others were killed and twenty-nine taken captive. Waldron richly deserved his fate, for more than twelve years before he had been guilty of a base act of treachery towards the Indians, which

has doubtless since caused the spilling of much innocent blood. In 1676, Waldron, then commander of the militia at Dover, *had made peace with four hundred Indians*, and they were encamped near his house. Two companies of soldiers soon after arrived at Dover, and by their aid Waldron contrived a scheme to make the Indians prisoners. He proposed to the savages to have a review and sham fight after the English fashion, the militia and soldiers to form one party and the Indians another. After manœuvring for some time, Waldron induced the Indians to fire the first volley, and the instant this was done they were surrounded by the soldiers, and the whole of them made prisoners. Some of them were set at liberty, but over two hundred were taken to Boston, where seven or eight were hanged and the rest sold into slavery. It was to avenge this despicable act that Waldron was slain in 1689."

Again, page 238 :

"One hundred and fifty Penobscot Indians made an attack on York in February, 1692. The place was surprised and all the inhabitants who were unable to escape killed or captured. About seventy-five were slain. Several aged women and children were released and allowed to go to the garrisoned houses, to requite the English for sparing the lives of some of the Indian women and children at Pejepscoot a year and a half before. This proves that the savages were not wholly destitute of gratitude, and that they had rather a nice sense of honor, for, it is worthy of note that at Pejepscoot Church did not spare all the squaws and children, but only the wives of two chiefs, their children and two or three old squaws. All the other Indian women and the children, of which there was a large number, this squaw-killer Church slew in cold blood."

Elsewhere, again :

"During the winter the English were guilty of an act of treacherous folly, unparalleled anywhere. Stoughton, Governor of Massachusetts, sent a message to the Indians, telling them to bring in their prisoners for exchange. They brought five English prisoners to Pemaquid for exchange. Captain Chubb persuaded them to deliver them up, promising to send to Boston at once for those desired in return. A conference was proposed inside the Fort, nine Indians and nine English only to be present without arms ;

the nine English had pistols concealed in their bosoms. They were surrounded by a party of soldiers and all killed except two who escaped. Three of the Indians were chiefs of great renown. It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the character of this scandalous transaction, further than to observe that it was a crime not only against the Indians, but also against the English settlers, who, in the end, were the greatest sufferers by all such treacherous acts. Such inexcusable crimes against faith and honesty as those of Waldron and Chubb, made it impossible for the Indians to believe that the English would keep any truce with them; for those instances of English treachery were told at the camp fires of every tribe from Cape Breton to Lake Superior, and they were repaid in kind in after years."

It will not be amiss to insert here the treatment of Father Rasle, who had been a missionary on the Kennebec River for forty years.

"This Romanist," says Smith, * "was highly accomplished, and his life literally one long martyrdom. Being a correspondent and friend of the Governor of Canada, the English believed he might be the instigator of hostilities of the Indians. Their village was taken by surprise; Father Ralle, in hopes of diverting the attention of the enemy to himself and screen his beloved flock by his voluntary offering of his own life, fell together with seven Indians who had rushed out to defend him with their bodies. When the pursuit had ceased, the Indians returned to find their missionary dead at the foot of the village cross, his body perforated with balls, his scalp taken, his skull broken with blows of hatchet, his mouth filled with mud, the bones of his legs broken and otherwise mangled. The death of Ralle caused great rejoicings in Massachusetts, and when Harmon, who was senior in command, carried the scalps of his victims to Boston (this string of bloody trophies including the scalps of women and children and an aged priest), he was received as if he had been some great general, fresh from the field of victory. †

* Philip H. Smith: *Acadia—A Lost Chapter in American History*, p. 119.

† This episode is related otherwise by Parkman. I have not tried to get at the most correct version; I give this one as I find it without vouching for its exactness. However, this is the version adopted by all the historians I have seen. Murdoch attributes these cruelties and others of the same kind to the peculiar notions of the Puritans. "We must bear in

“A certain Captain Lovewell,” says Hannay, “emulous of Harmon’s fame as a taker of scalps, and with patriotism fired by the large bounty offered by Massachusetts for that kind of article, gathered a band of volunteers and commenced scalp-hunting. They killed one Indian for whose scalp the company received £100. He started next year with forty men, surprised the Indians whose scalps netted £1,000. In a subsequent fight he lost his own scalp, as did thirty-four of his men.”

These barbarities were not, as is clear, perpetrated by irresponsible individuals acting on their own impulse, but by superior officers yielding to the stimulus of a government bounty. In the war which had just come to an end (1744–1748), this very government of Massachusetts had offered a bounty of £100 for the scalp of each male Indian above twelve years of age, and of £50 for the scalp of *each woman or child*. I am aware that, in certain circumstances, the French also offered bounties to the Indians for the scalps of their enemies, but I have yet to learn of a single instance where this bounty was applicable to either women or children; and—an essential difference—this hateful work, instead of being performed by whites, as was continually done in Massachusetts, was left to the savages. Moreover, during the last fifty years of the French régime in America the manners of the Indians had become more gentle, most probably thanks to the missionaries, so much so, indeed, that the usual custom was to make prisoners who were afterwards released on ransom.

mind,” says he, “that the doctrines of the New England Puritans at that period were deeply tinged with ideas drawn from the ancient Jewish history, in the Old Testament, whence they also drew their maxims of reprisals and retaliation.”

No doubt the barbarous outrages of the Indians upon defenceless colonists put the latter into a state of great exasperation. They honestly thought that the only means of putting a stop to those crimes was to make use of reprisals in kind. This was a fatal blunder from every point of view; it was provoking a repetition of the same crimes, perpetuating hatred, delaying and spoiling the work of civilizing the savage. The least that white men should have done would have been to exhibit to the Indians a higher civilization by respecting pledges, by sparing the lives of women and children. These Indians were as amenable to gratitude as to revenge; and never would the French have acquired the immemorial ascendancy they enjoyed over them, had they not respected their rights and abstained from such barbarities as I have related above. All the Indians of New Brunswick and Maine: Malecites, Abenakis, Medoctetes, constituted, together with the Micmacs of Acadia, one great family united by the bonds of kindred and friendship. An injury done to one of these tribes rankled for a long time in the breasts of all the others as a personal wrong. Under such conditions it is not to be wondered at if the Indians of Acadia were always the mortal enemies of the English.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Treaty of peace concluded between the English and the Indians of Acadia during the autumn of 1752—An infamous deed committed by Conner and Grace, two inhabitants of Halifax, puts an end to the treaty—Revenge of the Indians—Captivity of Anthony Casteel, messenger of the Council—His journal—Mistakes of historians with regard to these two incidents.

WHETHER it was that the French were ashamed of their own conduct, or that they began to see it was impolitic, or that they met with more apathy on the part of the Indians than they had expected, or, perhaps, for all these motives together; at all events, we have every reason to believe that they soon gave up the odious plans they had formed against the English settlements; this, at least, is the inference to be drawn from the general trend of events.

In November, 1752, the preliminaries of a treaty of peace between the governor and the Micmac chiefs were arranged at Halifax. Three years before, a similar peace had been signed with the Indians of the St. John River, and until now this peace had not been broken. However, this peace was so short that Le Loutre and the French are almost invariably accused of having prevented the treaty from being concluded. This might be considered probable if we had not manifest evidence of the contrary.

The act which gave rise to this accusation was the following: In April, 1753, two inhabitants of Halifax,

John Conner and James Grace, came before the council and presented seven Indian scalps for which they claimed the usual bounty. They related how that, with John Poor and Michael Hagarthy, they were wrecked on the coast; that their companions were killed and scalped; that, after several days of captivity, they took advantage of the absence of the Indians to butcher the woman and the child that had been left with them; and that, on the return of these Indians, they had fallen upon them, killing and scalping them.

The tale was improbable. It was hard to explain why they had been left alone with a woman and a child, and still more difficult to account for their not having run away instead of waiting for the return of the Indians. This was, doubtless, the impression produced on the council, which ordered: "that John Conner and James Grace do give security for their appearance at the next general court, in case any complaint should be brought against them by the Indians."

"This is the substance of their story," said the surveyor Morris, afterward judge of the province, writing to Cornwallis, who was then in England; "but, as the Indians complained, a little after the sailing of Conner's schooner, that one exactly answering her description put into Jedore, where these Indians had their stores, and robbed them of forty barrels of provisions given them by the Government, 'tis supposed that these men might afterwards have been apprehended by some of this tribe whom they killed as they describe.

"If this be the case, 'tis a very unhappy accident at this juncture, and time only can discover what its consequences will be. *The chiefs of every tribe in the*

Peninsula had sent in messages of friendship, and, I believe, *would have signed articles of peace* this spring, if this *accident* does not prevent them."

The Reverend Andrew Brown, who comments on what Morris called an *unhappy accident*, adds these remarks :

"Thus far Mr. Morris ; but the facts were still blacker than he suspected. After having robbed the Indian store-houses, Conner and the crew of his unfortunate schooner were obliged to encounter the fury of the deep. They suffered shipwreck ; the two survivors, Conner and Grace, were found by the Indians drenched with water and destitute of everything, were taken home, cherished, and kindly entertained, yet watched their opportunity, and to procure the price of scalps, murdered their benefactors, and came to Halifax to claim the wages of their atrocious deed.

"The Indians, as may well be supposed, were exasperated beyond measure at this act of ingratitude and murder. (Revenge boils keenly in their bosoms, and their teeth were set on edge.) To procure immediate retaliation they sent some of their warriors to Halifax, to complain of the difficulty they found to keep their provisions safe during the fishing season, and to request that the Governor would send a small vessel to bring their families and their stores to Halifax. In compliance with this desire, the vessel and crew mentioned in the Journal of Anthony Casteel were engaged, tho' several suspected from the first that it was an Indian feint to spill blood."

The ruse the Indians had adopted for the sake of revenge met with complete success. A schooner was put at their disposal in order to bring back their families to Halifax. The crew consisted of Anthony Casteel, messenger of the council, of Captain Bannerman, of a Mr. Cleveland, and of four sailors. All were butchered and scalped except Casteel. How he was saved is explained minutely in the journal he kept, which, on his return, was sworn to and transmitted by the Governor to the Secretary of State. It is a thrilling tale and

shows the base treachery of which Conner and Grace had been guilty against the Indians.

Casteel, after the massacre of his companions, was dragged from Jedore, not far from Halifax, to Bay Verte. Near this place they reached a camp of almost five hundred Indians, who made a circle around him. After deliberating on his fate, an old man, the father-in-law of the chief whose prisoner Casteel was, declared to him that his life would be spared on payment of a ransom of three hundred *livres*. "We were on the point of signing a lasting peace," said the old man; "we had for a long time abstained from any act of hostility against your countrymen; but now that the English have begun, we will not stop. We had sheltered two shipwrecked men, who, the day before, had stolen most of our provisions; they were almost lifeless; we had brought them into our camp, where we fed and took care of them; we were soon to take them to Halifax when, taking advantage of our absence, they massacred during the night two men, three women and two children, one an infant at the breast. In return for such a deed our vengeance would not be satisfied even if we had killed as many English as their victims had hairs on their heads. We have hitherto always spared women when we could; henceforth, we will not even spare the infant in its mother's womb." Then he tore up before Casteel the paper that bore the preliminaries of the treaty.

These facts, Casteel goes on to say, were confirmed by other persons. The culprits were Conner and Grace, who, some weeks before, had brought to Halifax seven scalps, for which they claimed the bounty.

The chief who held Casteel prisoner stopped at the

house of an Acadian named Jacques Vigneau dit Maurice. There he met some Indians and a French officer. One of them asked him what ransom he wanted for his prisoner. "Three hundred *livres*," said Casteel's master. "I will give them to you," said another Indian, "my father was hanged at Boston." He rushed at Casteel to stab him; but the French officer, who had been watching the Indian's movement, gave Casteel a great shove that stretched him on his back and saved him from the blow. The sons of James Vigneau carried him into a little room, where he swooned away. When he came to himself, Vigneau's wife offered him a glass of wine and asked him if he was wounded. He said no. She then went to a chest, opened it and took from it fifty pieces of six *livres* forming the three hundred *livres* of his ransom. Jacques Vigneau called Casteel's master and counted out the money to him saying: "This man belongs to me; let none of you come here to molest him, or I will break his bones." "I then asked Vigneau," says Casteel, "if he would take my note, he answered no; that he believed I was an honest man, but, if he was never to receive one farthing, that should not hinder him saving the English to the utmost of his power, even to the last shirt on his back. The next day Vigneau gave me a shirt, a few other articles, a six-*livres* piece, and we parted."

I have dwelt at some length upon these two incidents, the Conner and Grace butchery and Casteel's adventures, because all the historians that mention them point to the murder of Casteel's companions as to an infamous crime traceable to French instigation. Some of them, literally believing the declaration of Conner and Grace, count this as another crime referable to the same source,

although the companions of these two miscreants really perished when their vessel was wrecked.

Parkman, as usual, must needs fall into the worst possible view against the French. It is amusing to see with what a sagacious air of superior penetration he strives to entangle the facts and circumstances so as to implicate the French. He harks back five years in order to weave a chain of circumstantial evidence that justifies him in concluding, or in insinuating, that the preliminaries of the treaty in the previous autumn were only a stratagem invented by the French.

It is true that the Compiler has not summarized the contents of Casteel's journal as satisfactorily as could have been wished. However, there is enough in what he has given, provided the summary of Casteel's journal be compared with Conner's declaration, to show that the incidents of the one are connected with those of the other. There might still remain some uncertainty; but, if Parkman was in doubt, he ought either not to have touched the matter or to have pushed his researches farther. Instead of a cruel crime committed by Indians at the instigation of the French, we find an act of excusable hostility done by these Indians to avenge a shameful crime committed against their tribe by Conner and Grace.*

Though the responsibility of this deed rests only on two unimportant individuals and not on the government, yet it is none the less certain that the peace, which was about to be definitively signed, was broken for a long time to come on account of this crime, and that

* About this time, the crew of a vessel hailing from Boston had treacherously killed, near Cape Sable, two Indian girls and an Indian boy, who had been invited on board their ship.

deeds of blood were the outcome of it, deeds that exasperated the authorities and largely contributed to shape the unfortunate events that followed. It would seem that the Governor's duty was, as soon as he had discovered the atrocious conduct of Conner and Grace, to confer with the Indians, repudiate this crime, and give them satisfaction in some way or other. Nothing of the sort appears. Those haughty soldiers had too much contempt for the savage to treat him as a human being. We do not even hear of any punishment inflicted on the monsters, Conner and Grace. One thing I cannot understand is the strange conduct of the Government signing the preliminaries of a treaty of peace with the Indians in the autumn, and yet keeping up, during the ensuing winter and spring, the bounty on Indian scalps.

In a letter of July 23rd, 1753, the Governor, communicating to the Lords of Trade the sworn deposition of Casteel, mentions the facts of the case. This letter is in the volume of the Archives; but the Compiler has thought proper to suppress all that it contains on this subject, just as he has completely omitted another letter of the 29th relating to this affair. Whatever may have been the Compiler's motives, his omissions have had the effect of leaving the question somewhat muddled; hence it is that some historians have eluded it, and others have fallen into an erroneous interpretation of it.

Mistakes of this nature, shifting the crimes of one party on to the shoulders of another, are not calculated to inspire confidence in history. The events related above contain the key to an important situation. By throwing on the Indians or the French the odium that really belonged to English subjects, the entire sequence

of facts in this obscure epoch becomes very seriously distorted. Had not Casteel escaped the fate of his companions, or had he not kept a journal of his adventures, we should never have been able to get at the truth of this story; for, even with his sworn declaration before them, men have found means to palm off as the truth what is only a shameless counterfeit. All history, and particularly the history of Acadia, is perforce honey-combed with similar lies, which one writer passes on to another, and which ultimately crystallize into indisputable facts.

The most barbarous have not always been the Indians. It would be hard to find any Indian misdeeds that can be compared to the duplicity and atrocity of the crimes attributed to Stoughton, Church, Waldron, Chubb, Lovell and Harmon. And these were not irresponsible individuals like Grace and Conner; one of them was a governor, another a colonel, a third a major, and the three others captains. It may truly be said that the government of Massachusetts is responsible for these horrors, since it tolerated or encouraged them by tempting bounties for scalps of Indian men, squaws and children.

In striking contrast with these colonial cruelties is the bearing of the Home Government toward the Indians. Had its counsels been heeded many misfortunes might have been averted. Such acts as I have just related could only perpetuate hatred and revenge. Twice was Cornwallis lectured by the Lords of Trade because he wished to wage against the Indians a merciless war:

“As to your opinion of never hereafter making peace with the Indians and of totally extirpating them, we cannot but think that as the prosecution of such a design must be attended with acts of

great severity, it may prove full of dangerous consequences to the safety of His Majesty's other colonies upon the continent, by filling the minds of the bordering Indians with ideas of our cruelty and instigating them to a dangerous spirit of resentment."

In a subsequent letter the Lords of Trade, apparently dreading Cornwallis's impetuosity, renewed the same advice: "Gentler methods and offers of peace have more frequently prevailed with the Indians than the sword."

These gentle methods do not seem to have been congenial to the English national character; and, though circumstances made it the evident interest of Englishmen to adopt these methods, they seldom have been able to count on the absolute fidelity of any Indian tribe. One would think there lies, deep down in the Anglo-Saxon, a rock-bed of roughness which the best instruments of civilization cannot smooth, just as in the Gaul there lurks a mercurial substratum of levity which no disasters can solidify. In spite of his defects, the Frenchman was much the more successful with the Indians; he honestly strove to make the latter forget the difference between the pale-face and the red-man, whereas the Englishman ever sought to emphasize his own superiority. The former's first thought was, "How shall I win the Indian's heart?" The latter's main question was, or seems to have been, "How shall I make that d——d redskin respect me?" and he proceeded to enforce this respect by a dignified demeanor, if he was well-bred, or by surliness, if he was a cad. This scornful bearing led to brutality, and brutality led to that curious historical fact which Sir Charles Dilke chronicles when he says that the Anglo-Saxon is the only race that exterminates the savage.

Soon after the events recorded above it seemed likely that a treaty of peace would be made between the English and the Micmac Indians. Captain Hussey, commanding at Fort Lawrence, notified Le Loutre to bring with him, according to agreement, a delegation of Indians to confer about the preliminaries of a treaty. He received them, says Le Loutre, with such disdainful haughtiness that the Indians, who had taken the trouble to come from a long distance, went back greatly offended. The negotiations were broken off. History is full of similar incidents. What disasters might have been averted had the advice of the Lords of Trade recommending gentle measures been followed! Something of the same kind occurred about this time, when General Braddock undertook his disastrous expedition to the Monongahela River. He received the Indians with such contemptuous stiffness that they all abandoned him with the result we know.

CHAPTER XIX.

Peace-making—Peregrine Thomas Hopson succeeds Cornwallis in 1752—His conciliatory spirit—He inspires great confidence and secures happy results—After fifteen months his health obliges him to return to England.

LE LOUTRE'S efforts to make the Acadians emigrate were soon exhausted. He may have been disheartened by his failure; he may even have changed his mind as to the advisability of such a course; but probably what made him give up was especially the way the English thwarted him.

On the other hand, there was no longer any talk at Halifax of requiring the oath from the Acadians, who, relying on the righteousness of their claim and on their experience of the past, must have believed that this silence was equivalent to a definitive return to the old state of affairs. This was a cruel illusion. Meanwhile, however, quiet was restored everywhere; so much so, indeed, that, from 1750 to September, 1752, the date of Cornwallis's departure, hardly any mention is made of the Acadians in the despatches of the governor or in the deliberations of the council. The most important reference to them is in a letter of Cornwallis to the Lords of Trade in September, 1751:

“There is a visible alteration in the behavior of the Acadians; they have this year cultivated well their lands and have great crops, a quantity of corn to dispose of over and above what will serve their families; this will be of great service to this settlement

at this critical juncture. Both as to the Acadians and Indians, it would be improper to send the Germans into that part of the country."

Hitherto Cornwallis had several times suggested that Protestant colonists should be placed here and there among the Acadians, "in order to remove their prejudices in favor of the Romish faith." But each time the Lords of Trade had rejected his suggestion; and now Cornwallis seemed won over to their views. His attitude towards the Acadians appears to have notably altered. In September, 1750, he had applied for leave of absence, suggesting Lawrence as his substitute; and yet we find Hopson succeeding Cornwallis at the latter's departure in 1752. In 1750 Cornwallis leaned to harsh measures, and in this policy Lawrence was the man to continue and improve upon his predecessor. Undoubtedly, from 1750 to 1752, a great change had come over Cornwallis; he seems to have realized that he had blundered, that harshness and stiffness raise up obstacles instead of removing them. Had harshness been the basis of his character, he never could have so materially altered his demeanor. Strongly imbued with military notions, having but an imperfect knowledge of the special status of the people under his jurisdiction, he had honestly thought that it was wise to act as he did on his arrival. He had the good sense to turn back from the error of his ways. However, the consequences of his first mistake were too disastrous to admit of complete reparation; and, able and worthy though he may have been at bottom, the change came too late for a full development of his latent virtues.

Peregrine Thomas Hopson, who succeeded Cornwallis, had been commander-in-chief at Louisburg, and, when

this fortress was surrendered to France, after the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, he, with the troops under his command, joined Cornwallis at Halifax. I venture to say that Hopson shared with Mascarene the honor of being the most straightforward, humane and conciliating of all the governors of Acadia since the Treaty of Utrecht. His letters, orders and all his acts prove this assertion. Though Cornwallis left him a legacy of trouble, yet he managed, in a very short time, to make peace with every one. Despite an unfortunate event that hindered his liberty of action, he would probably have reconciled the Indians to English rule had not ill-health obliged him to resign after fifteen months of office.

His kindly disposition led, only two months after his inauguration, to offers of peace from John Baptist Cope, the great chief of the Micmacs. An understanding was arrived at, and some weeks later a treaty of peace was concluded and signed between Cope and the government. Cope pledged himself to exert his influence to persuade all the Indians of his nation to make a final treaty the following spring.

Was this peaceful issue due to the good reputation Hopson had already earned? Was this a bona fide pledge on the part of the Indians, and what share in it should we attribute to Le Loutre? For this John Baptist Cope was, I believe, chief of the Indians in Le Loutre's mission. The latter could not but be aware of this step; and if he really wielded over the Indians the power that is commonly attributed to him, this treaty, whether feigned or sincere, must have been, at least in part, his work. True, it was broken eight months later, but the motive, viz., the infamous crime of Conner and Grace, affords a full explanation of the rupture; and for

eight entire months the Indians observed the treaty faithfully. Now if, as seems probable, Le Loutre favored this treaty, the question naturally presents itself, why did he favor it? The only reason I can see is the confidence inspired by Hopson's noble character and the sincerity of his dealings with the Acadians. This makes the inference probable that, had there been no violence nor arrogance on the part of Cornwallis, Le Loutre would have done nothing to force emigration upon the Acadians or to stir up the Indians to hostilities. Perhaps the very foundation of Fort Beauséjour had no other motive than resistance to the arbitrary proceedings of Cornwallis.

On the 10th of December, 1753, soon after the departure of Cornwallis, Hopson wrote to the Lords of Trade :

“ I should be glad to have Your Lordships' opinion as early in the spring as possible, concerning the oath I am to tender to the Acadians, as directed by the 68th article of my instructions.

“ Mr. Cornwallis can thoroughly inform Your Lordships *how difficult, if not impossible it may be, to force such a thing upon them, and what ill consequences may attend it.* I believe he can likewise acquaint you that the inhabitants of Beaubassin—who had taken it before *with General Philipps's conditions*—made it a pretence to quit their allegiance and retire from their lands, though it was not otherwise offered to them than by issuing the King's Proclamation to that effect.

“ As they appear to be much better disposed than they have been, and hope will still amend, and, in a long course of time, *become less scrupulous,* I beg to know from Your Lordships in the spring how far His Majesty would approve *my silence* on this head *till a more convenient opportunity.*

“ Mr. Cornwallis can inform Your Lordships *how useful and necessary these people are to us, how impossible it is to do without them, or to replace them even if we had other settlers to put in their places;* and, at the same time, how obstinate they have always been when the oath has been offered.

It appears evident by this letter that Cornwallis had come round from his earliest impressions and shared Hopson's views as to the manner of treating the Acadians. How easy it is, on reading this letter, to feel that we are in the presence of a man in whom kindness, gentleness, calmness and reflection predominate! He neither can nor will blame his predecessor; yet he none the less implies that there has been blundering, that time and tact will be needed to bring back the spirit of trust so rudely shaken, and to do away with the *scruples* aroused by exacting the oath. No stranger is he to the feelings of the Acadians; he has put himself in their place; he seems to experience their own sentiments. He has gone down into his own soul to listen there to the answer of his conscience, and has heard his own heart tell him that, were he in their place, he could not easily make up his mind to bear arms for strangers against his brothers, for enemies of his religion against his co-religionists, for people whose language he does not understand against those with whom he has familiar intercourse; hence he sees before him "a long course of time" before their scruples can be effaced. That phrase, "less scrupulous," shows that he has in very deed consulted his conscience and his own feelings.

Cornwallis had perceived merely the material aspect of their situation. He had thought that attachment to their property was the great, the only motive of their actions; it had seemed clear to him that all that was needed, to get the better of their sheer stubbornness, was resolutely to place them face to face with the cruel choice between abundance on the one hand and destitution on the other. But, when he saw deputation after deputation unhesitatingly accepting destitution, begging

for leave to depart, he was quite upset; he could make nothing out of such conduct; either he himself is really moved or he wishes to move them by his words, but his emotion all turns on the enjoyment or the loss of their goods: "Your lands produce grain and nourish cattle sufficient for the whole colony. It is you who would have had the advantages for a long time. We flattered ourselves we would make you the happiest people in the world."

Hopson's vision was clearer and more far-reaching; he saw that conscientious motives threw all purely material interests into the shade, and therefore he *implores* the Lords of Trade not to oblige him to urge the question of the oath. "Mr. Cornwallis can inform you how useful and necessary these people are to us, how impossible it is to do without them, etc., etc."

Could such a description apply to a turbulent and dangerous population, ripe for revolt? Clearly not. And yet the period we have just traversed has been more agitated than that which is to follow and which immediately precedes the deportation. We have reached 1753, only two years before the terrible event. Advisedly do I use the word "agitated," for I intend to convince whoever is open to conviction, without hiding anything and without going beyond official documents, that nothing more serious than agitation occurred throughout the whole extent of the peninsula. And what did this agitation amount to? Merely peaceful meetings of men who discussed the situation, simple peasants who weighed the pros and cons to decide upon the alternative imposed to them. This agitation, if indeed it deserves the name, lasted some months, at most one year, the first of Cornwallis's governorship.

There is not the slightest sign that these meetings were seditious or even noisy ; quite the reverse. When they had decided to choose the alternative of leaving the country, they went directly to inform the Governor and to ask his permission. Before granting it, he obliged them to sow their fields ; without a murmur they did so ; they sowed what they believed would be reaped by others ; then they came back for the promised permission ; again were they put off with wretched pretexts, again did they return to their homes without a murmur and remain perfectly quiet. In all this there is not the vestige of a single act of insubordination or even of resistance. And yet there were strong excuses for sedition. Seeing that they had been kept in the country against their will, that a compromise had been made with them in 1730, they certainly had the right of carrying off their movable goods, which was an important consideration for them. To deprive them of this right was to cast them from plenty into beggary. And yet, without complaint, they yielded up this manifest right. Does not this submissiveness afford a safe standard by which to judge of their dispositions and of their subsequent conduct ?

Cornwallis had mapped out his plan of action before hearing them ; Hopson had taken pains to see and hear everything and consider the motives on which their claims were based. The following order, addressed to the commanders of Forts Vieux Logis (Grand Pré, now Horton), and Edward (Pigiguit, now Windsor) by Hopson, reveals the same kindly temper observed upon above :

“ You are to look on the Acadians *in the same light with the rest of His Majesty's subjects*, as to the protection of the laws and Gov-

ernment, for which reason nothing is to be taken from them by force, or any price set upon their goods but what they themselves agree to ; and, if at any time they should obstinately refuse to comply with what His Majesty's service may require of them, you are not to redress yourself by military force, or in any unlawful manner, but to lay the case before the Governor and wait his orders thereon. You are to cause the following orders to be stuck up in the most public part of the Fort, both in English and French.

" 1st. The provisions or any other commodities that the Acadians shall bring to the Fort to sell, are not to be taken from them at any fixed price, but to be paid for according to a free agreement made between them and the purchasers.

2d. No officer, non-commissioned officer, or soldier, shall presume to insult or otherwise abuse any of the Acadians, who are upon all occasions to be treated as His Majesty's subjects, and to whom the laws of the country are open, to protect as well as to punish.

" At the season of laying in fuel for the Fort, you are to signify to the Acadians by their deputies, that it is His Majesty's pleasure they lay in the quantity of wood that you require, and when they have complied, you are to give them certificates specifying what quantity they have furnished, which will entitle them to payment at Halifax."

P. T. HOPSON.

This order was evidently intended to modify or completely change previous orders ; else it would have been purposeless. It amounted to saying : Hitherto the Acadians have not been on the same footing as the rest of His Majesty's subjects ; henceforth they *shall* be. You shall take nothing from them by force ; they shall have, like others, the privilege of making bargains for their produce ; and if you have reason to complain of them, you shall not employ force or any other illegal means.

This order is just as eloquent a eulogy of Hopson's character as it is a powerful plea against Cornwallis.

Thus, to all appearances, under the latter's government the treatment of the Acadians was one thing and that of His Majesty's other subjects was quite another. The pettiest serjeant could lay hands on Acadian produce, and any resistance might be punished as he chose without trial and without appeal. When one reflects on the tyranny inseparable from a military rule, even in our day, a tyranny sometimes bearable from superior officers, but ever growing less endurable with lesser rank, one feels that the abuses of this power committed to subalterns must surely have been occasionally deplorable. Yet, save in one instance under the ferocious Lawrence, there does not appear in the entire volume of the Archives a single case of recrimination on the part of the Acadians.

Perhaps this order may have been inspired by the Lords of Trade; but, as the Compiler does not publish so much as one of their letters to Hopson, we can only indulge in conjecture. However, this document is altogether in keeping with what we know of Hopson's character.

On another occasion he gives us a new proof of his excellent sentiments. Among the emigrants landed at Halifax in the course of the autumn of 1752 were a certain number of decrepit old men and some orphans. Hopson complained to the Lords of Trade against such people being sent out to the colonies. In the course of his letter he cannot refrain from pitying the woes of these wretched beings: "I can assure you, my Lords, that I find this very shocking, for no mortal that has the least humanity can do otherwise than feel to the very heart at the sight of such a scene of misery."

The character of Cornwallis does not stand out so

clearly; he may have been merely haughty and imperious; but he shows no signs of commiseration. Hopson, on the contrary, proves that he was not only full of equity and kindness, but also that he had the gift of exquisite sympathy. All his acts are impressed with the same stamp; and so his administration, unfortunately too short, was fertile in happy results, and would have been still happier, had it not been for the dastardly crime of Conner and Grace which revived Indian hostilities for a time.

If his administration had lasted some years, he would, most likely, have won from the Acadians, without any show of force, the unreserved oath required of them. He wrote, July 23rd 1753, to the Lords of Trade that he was privately informed that some Acadians who had left their lands had been delegated to confer about the situation with their fellow-countrymen dwelling on English territory;

“That they went so far as to hold consultations whether they should not throw themselves under the protection of the English Government *and become subjects to all intents and purposes*; but there arose a considerable objection to their taking this step, which was, that, *as they lived on farms very remote from one another, and of course are not capable of resisting any kind of enemy*, the French might send the Indians among them and distress them to such a degree, *that they would not be able to remain on their farms.*”

Was Hopson's information correct? Most probably, for what he relates is in full accordance with the well-known sentiments of the Acadians. No doubt they had the greatest repugnance to the obligation of bearing arms against the French; but the danger of Indian hostility was an equally important matter, and recurs in all their petitions whenever the question of the oath is raised. Cornwallis and afterward Lawrence laughed at

this as at a foolish dread. But, as we have here their deliberations among themselves, unknown to the authorities and free from all outside pressure, it is easy to see that this danger was thought by them to be a serious one, since it alone stood in the way of their accepting the oath.

Would they really have been molested by the Indians at the instigation of the French, if they had taken the oath? I cannot say; however, I am inclined to believe they would not. It was plainly in the French interest to perpetuate the status of neutrality; they tried to make the Acadians believe that they would be molested by the Indians if they took the oath; but, once that oath had become an accomplished fact, I am convinced that no hostility would have been manifested on the part of the French or Indians until the Acadians should actually have had to take up arms against either of them. From that moment, however, they would have been just as much exposed to the hostility of the Indians, just as much their enemies, as were the English colonists, and then, as Hopson says, "As they live on farms very remote from one another, and of course not capable of resisting any kind of enemy," their position would have been untenable. The Acadians, deliberating with a full sense of their grave interests at stake, and with long experience of the character of these Indians, must be considered the best judges of what was likely to happen. Hopson seems to admit the force of their reasons; unlike Cornwallis and Lawrence, his delicacy of feeling and sympathetic nature enabled him to enter into their views.

Although there is nothing surprising in these deliberations of the Acadians, there is something that rather de-

tracts from the heroic aspect we are wont to view them in, since they now were ready to sacrifice their sentiments to their material interests. However, the residue of virtue in them is quite sufficient to endear them to their descendants. Heroic sacrifices are above nature ; hesitancy before making them is therefore not astonishing. More than a century had elapsed since their forefathers had opened out the country, several generations had sat by the same hearth. Whatever makes man, especially the husbandman, cherish life, whatever is dear to simple and honest hearts, they saw there in Acadia. It was their fatherland, the home of their ancestors, all the dearer to them because they had founded and created it. Each hill and dale, each glimpse of smiling landscape was sparkling with sweet memories. Those luxuriant meadows that fed their immense herds had been wrested from the sea by their own patient and painful toil. That church whither they came to kneel each Sunday had witnessed the only important events of their simple and peaceful lives. That graveyard held the remains of their kindred, and told in its inscriptions the story of those who had gone before. How their hearts must have been wrung at the mere thought of going away ! Going ! Why, that meant bidding an everlasting farewell to home and country, to all they had and all they loved, quitting ease and plenty, the joys of the dear old fireside, for exile, separation and penury.

Dear were the homes where they were born,
Where slept their honored dead ;
And rich and wide, on every side
Their fruitful acres spread.

On the 12th of September, 1753, Hopson read to his council the following petition :

“The inhabitants of Grand Pré, River Canard, Pigiguit, etc., etc., take the liberty of presenting their very humble petition to Your Excellency, begging you to remove the difficulty which presents itself with respect to the missionaries who came here, by exempting them from the oath of allegiance which is required of them.

“We hope, sir, that Your Excellency will be kind enough to grant that favor, inasmuch as, when we took the oath of Allegiance to His Britannic Majesty, we took it only on condition that we should be allowed the free exercise of our religion, and a sufficient number of ministers to perform the services.

“It appears, sir, that we would be deprived of this last article, if the Government were to force them to take this oath, because the missionaries would certainly not remain among us on terms which they cannot agree to; we should therefore see ourselves deprived of the main point granted to us.

“Moreover, sir, when we submitted on the terms by which the practice of our religion is granted to us, it was by no means specified that our missionaries should be obliged to take this oath. That is proved by the two missionaries who were present when we took the oath, and who were also entrusted with our affairs, without its being thought necessary to exact of them what is now required of them. Notwithstanding all the expense we have incurred in endeavoring to get them at Louisburg and even at Quebec, the difficulty of this oath prevents them from settling amongst us.”

Hopson granted this request on condition that the priests would conform to what was required of them in the regulations. It was Cornwallis who had, on the 31st of July, 1749, issued an order obliging the priests to take the oath of allegiance. Here again Hopson gives a new proof of his liberality.

On the 27th of the same September another petition was presented to him by those Acadians who had crossed the frontier three years before :

“We, the inhabitants formerly settled at Beaubassin and vicinity, beg to inform you that the reason which caused us to leave our property was the new oath which His Excellency M. Cornwallis

wished to exact from us, desiring to break and revoke the one granted to us before. Having learnt since our departure, that if we were willing to return, we should have the same favors that were granted to us formerly, we are ready to accept it under these conditions. It is impossible for us to sign any other oath *on account of the Indians*, as we have stated on several occasions to His Excellency M. Cornwallis. *If he had known better our circumstances he would have seen that it was impossible for us to sign any other than that which we have signed.*

“We hope that these articles will be granted to us by Your Excellency, and even ratified by the Court of England, so that those who may succeed Your Excellency shall not make the pretext that His Excellency M. Cornwallis made in saying that M. Philipps had no authority from the Court of England for the oath which he granted us.

“These being granted, we shall feel constrained to continue, and even increase our prayer for Your Excellency’s health and prosperity.”

This proposed return of the voluntary exiles was another happy result of the good reputation Hopson had so soon earned. He granted all their requests except that which bore on a restriction to the oath, for he had not then the necessary authority for making this concession.

It is worth noting that the petitioners, though always respectful, yet, being safe from restraint beyond the frontier, freely stigmatize as a pretext Cornwallis’s proceedings towards them when revoking the agreement entered into with Philipps. The statement was true, but they would not have dared to express it in this way had they still been under English rule. Now, if their proposition was accepted, they wanted to be shown an express ratification from His Majesty.

Here ends Hopson’s career as Governor of Acadia. Ill, and perhaps disgusted with the part he had to play, he set sail for England, leaving the temporary adminis-

tration of the province to Lawrence, his first councillor. Hopson carried away with him the esteem and the confidence of every one, after fifteen months of a firm and energetic administration, tempered by a spirit of justice and conciliation the like of which no other governor but Mascarene had shown.

CHAPTER XX.

General Considerations—England and France.

It is painful to take leave of so worthy a man as Hopson, endowed with all the gifts that were called for by the perplexing condition of the province. He had governed it but one year and a quarter. In that short space, without violent orders, without threats, without apparent effort, by the mere persuasiveness of his kindly character and gentle ways, he had so far restored confidence as to induce the Acadians, of their own accord, to consider the question of an unrestricted oath. Had it not been for the dread of Indian hostility, the problem was in a fair way of solution. Those Acadians who had crossed the frontier, learning of the Governor's favorable dispositions, asked leave to return to their farms.

During these fifteen months, in spite of Indian hostility aroused by an untimely crime, for which the Governor was in no way responsible, the greatest tranquillity reigned in the Acadian settlements; no sign of discontent, no act of insubordination is mentioned anywhere. Is this not a fresh proof of the mild and peaceable character of the Acadians? A little kindness, some consideration for their difficult position, care not to alarm them by arbitrary or violent measures, which might make them fear interference with the free exercise of their religion: this was all, and yet this—if sup-

plemented by protection against Indian attacks—was enough to win from the Acadians the desired consent.

This fact also proves to a demonstration that the heads of small absolute governments are alone responsible for the good or evil conduct of their subjects. Therefore it is strange that the majority of those who have written about this period of Acadian history have laid no stress at all on the respective characters of the various governors. Surely this point was here, more than in most countries, essential to a clear understanding of the facts. In a representative and responsible commonwealth it might have been overlooked as of slight importance; but here was an absolute ruler, and what is more a soldier, whose will was law, whose wishes were commands. In such small despotic governments good rulers make good subjects. Let the governor be kind, humane, just, careful of the interests of all; peace and contentment will flow from him as naturally as water from a spring. Let him be haughty, arbitrary or cruel; mistrust, discord, uprisings perhaps, will be just as certain to follow. The mass of the people will have remained the same; the governors only have changed. So true is this that the Home Office might have said to each of these governors: "Your administration has been marked by much trouble and dissatisfaction; therefore you have ruled unwisely;" or, "During your governorship there have been no complaints, no unrest; therefore you have been a wise ruler."

The first thing, then, is to study the character of the governors. When this has once been carefully done, it is easy to pass judgment on the various events of their administration. Those who are unable or too careless to undertake this critical examination should refrain

from writing history. Though sometimes difficult, and especially so here, this inquiry is, nevertheless, possible, even without any other assistance than that supplied in the official documents.

We cannot expect that an autocratic governor, when writing to his superiors, will make a clean breast of all he does and of all his plans. Far from it. He has every incentive to show himself in the best light, to omit facts that tell seriously against himself, to defend himself against all comers, to throw the blame on all who thwart his designs or interfere with his tastes and caprices. And yet the attentive observer will almost always detect, either in the details or in the general tone of his correspondence, something that will reveal the undercurrent of his character and his secret motives.

Other historians of this period give us little or no insight into the character of the governors. They pass from Armstrong to Mascarene, from Mascarene to Cornwallis, from Cornwallis to Hopson, from Hopson to Lawrence, as if there had occurred no material change, as if they were talking of an impersonal being, devoid of passions, interests, caprices, prejudices and defects. Yet, what a fathomless abyss yawns between a restless, whimsical spirit, like that of the ill-balanced Armstrong, by turns benevolent and tyrannical, and Mascarene, the cultured quiet gentleman, too particular perhaps on occasion, but ever paternal, firm and kind! Again, what a striking contrast between Hopson, so upright, so conciliatory, so humane, and Lawrence so false, so despotic, so cruel!

After carefully weighing the whole matter, and without taking into account the possible adverse action of Hopson's successors, I feel convinced that the latter,

in a few years, thanks to his kindness, would have obtained from the Acadians an unrestricted oath. Their attachment to France was no doubt great, but not great enough to have been the sole motive, as Parkman and other writers make it, of their refusal. Indeed, the Acadians did not object to remain British subjects. What is more, I do not hesitate to say that, if the restriction to the oath had been maintained, if further grants of land had been made to them in proportion to the growth of their population and to their needs, if they had had no cause to dread any interference with the free exercise of their religion, they would probably have preferred to see Acadia remain an English possession in order that they might enjoy their neutrality. So long as the restriction subsisted, they were under the protection of a contract that gave them the undoubted right to leave the province if the stipulations of that contract were violated. To take an unrestricted oath was to forfeit this right. This they must have realized.

To bear arms against the French was a thing they had a horror of. It seemed to them a monstrous crime against nature. Yet, such was their situation, so badly had they been treated by them, that they would perhaps, at this time, have sacrificed this question of sentiment, with the vague hope that they would never be actually called upon to fight the French. But, what they never would have sacrificed—and this was the most delicate question of all—was their religion, which they thought threatened and exposed to cureless ills by the rescinding of their neutrality contract, as it was indeed menaced by projects of which they had heard.

Never was a people in such a desperately critical situation. Both French and English were too busy with

the coming conflict to take serious thought of Acadian sentiment or to pity the woes of Acadia. This people, with its spirit of obedience, had no shield but the might of right. They were clearly free either to go if they refused the proposals of England or to accept them and remain. They artlessly thought that justice would finally prevail. The bold intriguer who succeeded Hopson was about cruelly to undeceive them.

As to the insurmountable horror the Acadians had of bearing arms against the French, we French Canadians and Acadians by descent can thoroughly understand it and speak of it knowingly; for we need only analyze our own feelings.

We esteem England and her institutions the blessings of which we enjoy; we admire her creative genius, her civilization, the wisdom of her statesmen, her far-seeing plans and the tenacity with which she carries them out. We have served her faithfully; we are willing to do so again. We have had more liberty than French rule would have granted us. We are satisfied; our lot is just about what we should have chosen ourselves. And yet, after 130 years of separation, we still love France as we did in 1763. Is ours an exceptional case, or would Englishmen feel as we do if they were in our place? Human nature is pretty nearly the same everywhere. But the question is not practical, since England—however the fact may be explained—has always managed to keep her conquests, and above all she has never been forced to abandon her children to the enemy.

Our love for France seems to surprise our English fellow-countrymen. They seem to think love of country is a chattel that can be transferred by order from place to place on a given date. Is this thoughtlessness or

narrowness of mind? Does it arise from the fact that Englishmen have never had any personal experience of a situation like ours? Or are they less sensitive to the finer feelings?

Suppose, for a moment, that the Province of Quebec became once more a colony of France. Ask the English residing in Quebec if they would not feel scruples and an insurmountable horror at the thought of fighting for France against England, against Ontario, even after a century of allegiance to France with the greatest possible freedom. Their answer admits of no doubt; but, whatever it might be, this is our view: nothing could induce us to fight against France on foreign battlefields; and if the refusal to do so were to entail upon us what the Acadians suffered, our hesitancy would be short, with this difference, however, that we would meet force with force. Cold-blooded reasoning has no place here; we are not free to change the feelings which are ingrained in our nature. Should Englishmen act differently in similar circumstances, the inference would be that their nature is diametrically opposed to ours.

It is a matter of common observation that a Frenchman is swayed more by sentiment than by self-interest; that an Englishman, on the contrary, places self-interest alongside, and sometimes above sentiment. Some think this distinction is merely a difference of degrees and shades, not of natures. But may not the divergence be radical?

When the United States revolted against the mother country, the Acadians, unable to understand such conduct, never called that struggle by any other name than *the mad war*. Still, the Americans, struggling for their money interests, were fighting for a principle; whereas

the Acadians could have invoked no principle to justify their taking up arms against France.

An important distinction must be drawn between the immigrant and the man that claims the country he dwells in as the home of his forefathers. The immigrant's object is business ; unwittingly, perhaps, he has made up his mind beforehand to become, to all intents and purposes, a citizen of his new country. His children, if not himself, will claim hardly any other country than this new land of theirs. The native, on the other hand, is still more firmly rooted to the soil. His attitude towards the immigrant must be carefully considered. His traits of character, his customs, traditions, language, are all dear to him ; he means to cling to them as long as possible, he hopes, forever. His eye is on the immigrant, who may easily excite his suspicions. If he finds out that the newcomer wants to dislodge him, he will never forget it ; he will ever attribute to him the same purpose, even in the latter's most harmless behavior. If the natives constitute a people, be it ever so small, they will close up their ranks and become more and more clannish ; and, should they come of a strong and manly race, whose past history is glorious, there is no knowing what complications may ensue.

But if the incoming settler is prudent, gentle and generous ; if he lets the native know that, far from having any designs upon the autonomy and maintenance of the native nationality, he is anxious to keep up all the dearly loved traditions of the country, then a few generations will suffice to win over the native element to the immigrant nation, fusion will take place without friction, without hitch, without bitter regrets. A contrary course on the settler's part would leave the various

elements unharmonized after ten generations. The consequent need of prudence is especially great where the natives are French, because of the extreme delicacy of their feelings.

In colonies conquered by England, the English settlers have almost always striven to implant their language and religious beliefs by stratagem or by force. They are striving to do so more or less even now. Their great object seems to be the formation of one solid, homogeneous, despairingly monotonous mass of human beings instinct with the same ideas, the same tastes, the same feelings, as if this objective were indispensable to the security and progress of the country. They seem to forget that such ill-concealed strivings produce an effect exactly contrary to that which was expected, and tend to weaken those bonds of sympathy which a kindly observance of the advice, "live and let live," would have helped to strengthen. Agreement in essentials is quite enough; to aim at more is to secure less.

France, with all her faults, has ever adopted a very different line of conduct with much more satisfactory results. Her Brittany, after so many centuries, still speaks Breton, and is none the less very French. Alsace was German, spoke and still speaks German; but, after two centuries of French rule, it groans in German under the German yoke, and sighs for return to France. Corsica, Nice, Savoy, treated as sisters, never uttered a murmur. The Arab, reconciled after a short resistance, dies for France on every field of battle, only too proud to be able to defend her flag. In spite of the errors and the levity of France, the nations she takes to her bosom become French in heart and mind.

While France was urged on by her feelings, England

was stimulated by her interests. While the former aimed at assimilating her new subjects by respecting their customs and traditions, by making them sharers in the privileges and rights common to Frenchmen, by acts of kindness and urbanity, the latter strove to bring the colonists into line by sheer force or by craft. Had England added to her other gifts, so numerous and so imperial, the further gift of winsomeness, she would have been by this time doubly the mistress of the world; the whole of this continent would now be hers; Ireland would be to her a garland of honor instead of a thorn in her side. Alas! It is with nations as with individuals; there are virtues that exclude one another.

Throughout all her vicissitudes France always remained, politically and economically, one with her colonies. In war, in peace, in revolution; under king, emperor or republic; under Bourbons, Bonapartes or the Orleans citizen king; with one tariff or another, the colonies submitted to every change without complaint. Never could England achieve such a result. Self-interest bars the way.

CHAPTER XXI.

Major Charles Lawrence, President of the Council, acts as administrator in expectation of Hopson's return—His character—His behavior towards the English colonists, the Germans and the Acadians, causes great dissatisfaction.

THE good feeling which Hopson had so happily restored was to disappear with him. He had made the governorship an easy task, if only his successor had had some of the virtues for which he himself was so eminently distinguished. Unfortunately, Lawrence, a first-rate soldier, a bold and active man, endowed with more than common intelligence, with that insinuating manner which so often is the intriguer's passport to success, was totally devoid of moral sense and utterly heartless. The be-all and end-all with him was his ambition, to which he had vowed all the resources of his lively mind. Imperious and cruel to his subordinates, he was supple and obsequious to his superiors. Of humble birth, having begun life as an apprentice to a house-painter, he had raised himself, while yet in the prime of life, to a position which a nobleman's son might have envied.

A knowledge of the character of this man is very important: for on the judgment that shall be meted out to him depends, to a great extent, the judgment history must pass on the extraordinary act that marked his government. By the help of the public documents alone—his own documents, garbled as they are—any one

can convince himself that my opinion of him is not too severe, since, throughout his whole career, one looks in vain for a single deed, and, in all the documents, for a single line that might hint at the semblance of any feeling of delicacy.

My search after further information to confirm or modify the impression produced upon me by the mere perusal of the volume of the Archives has been rewarded beyond my hopes; and I can now safely assert that my first view fell far short of the reality. I will adduce some of my proofs in the course of the narrative; for the present, I need only give a short extract from a long petition addressed by the citizens of Halifax in 1757 to a distinguished person in England whose name does not appear in the document supplied by Rev. Andrew Brown.

“ We are extremely obliged to you for your favor of the 3rd of July last and *for your assiduity in our affairs.*

“ We can assure you, sir, that we were almost without hopes of being considered as English subjects; *the haughty and disdainful behaviour of our governor to all our remonstrances, although tendered with the utmost submission,* gave us much reason to think he was countenanced at Home. . . .

“ Your letter has revived the hopes of the inhabitants, and it has been great comfort to them to find an Englishman in England who has *their unhappy state and condition at heart and commiserates their bondage under oppression and tyranny.*

“ These are all the friends Governor Lawrence has at Home, *for on this side of the water he has none, either of the inhabitants or gentlemen of the army, who hold him in the utmost contempt, except those formerly mentioned to you his agents in oppression.* . . .

“ Perhaps you will be surprised to hear how this gentleman, who, some time ago, was only a painter's apprentice in London, should have advanced himself to such heights. We are obliged to confess that he has a good address, *a great deal of low cunning, is a most consummate flatterer, has words full of the warmest ex-*

pression of an upright intention, though never intended, and with much art most solicitously courts all strangers whom he thinks can be of any service to him. By these and such arts has he risen to be what he is, and, elated with his success, is outrageously bent upon the destruction of every one that does not concur in his measures.

*“Another of the Governor’s acts is to misrepresent and abuse all below him. He has publicly called his Council a pack of scoundrels, the merchants a parcel of villains and bankrupts, and has represented at Home the whole as a people discontented and rebellious.”**

Such was, according to his fellow-countrymen, the man who conceived and carried out the deportation of the Acadians. If he painted the citizens of Halifax in such sombre colors, we need not wonder that the Acadians should have met with the same treatment. Nor should we wonder that he grievously oppressed them, since the oppression he exercised on those whom it was manifestly his interest to spare had driven them to extreme exasperation.

His must have been a strangely cruel and perverse nature, since he could not curb it when his fellow-citizens might denounce him, overwhelm him with disgrace and ruin his prospects forever. But what had he to fear from the Acadians? Would their complaints find an echo beyond the sea? Would these complaints even so much as reach England? Clearly not.

In dealing with a man of this stamp, would it be wise to take his own documents literally, garbled as they were purposely later on by himself and his accomplices, in order to justify an unjustifiable act? Have we not at least the right of requiring from him well-proved facts and not unsupported assertions? Now, as I am about to demonstrate, in all that part of the Archives

* See Appendix, Vol. II.

which refers to Lawrence's administration, despite the one-sidedness displayed in the compilation of that volume, there is not one single instance, throughout the whole extent of the peninsula, of resistance that can be imputed to the Acadians, subjected though they were to intolerable provocation.

The better to set this forth, I will review the documents contained in the volume of the Archives, dwelling especially on those which contain accusations or complaints against the Acadians.

At first, while Hopson, absent on leave for his health, was expected to return, Lawrence was merely Administrator *pro tem.* of the province with the title of President of the Council. By making himself measurably agreeable to the people under his care, and still more to the Lords of Trade, he could reasonably hope, provided his friends helped him at home and Hopson did not return, to be soon appointed governor. The nomination was slow in coming, but it came at last in the November of the following year. Up to this time his conduct seems to have been more guarded and perhaps also less harsh and more just.

On December 5th, 1753, shortly after Hopson's departure, he wrote to the Lords of Trade :

" I take the earliest opportunity of doing myself the honour to write to Your Lordships, though hardly anything worth your notice has happened since Governor Hopson's departure. . . .

" I come next to the Acadians who are tolerably quiet as to government matters, but exceedingly litigious amongst themselves. As this spirit shows the value they set upon their possessions, it is so far a favorable circumstance. But, *as there is no regular method of administering justice amongst them, they grow very uneasy at the decision of their disputes having been so long put off.* To give them a hearing in our Courts of Law would be attended with insuperable difficulties ; their not having taken the

oath of allegiance is an absolute bar in our law *to their holding any landed possessions*, and Your Lordships may imagine how difficult it must be for the courts to give judgment in cases where the proprietors' claims *are far from being ascertained*, and where the disputes *commonly relate to the bounds of lands that have never as yet been surveyed* that I know of.

"The French emissaries still continue to perplex them with difficulties about their taking the oath of allegiance; and though they have not been in the least pressed to it of late, yet *they seem to think we only wait a convenient opportunity to force it upon them, as they every day magnify to themselves the difficulties they should lie under with the Indians if they take the oath, as well as the notion that it would subject them to bear arms.*"

From the foregoing it appears that the Acadians were then "pretty quiet as to government matters, but exceedingly litigious amongst themselves." There is no reason to question this statement. Hopson had given them satisfaction on many important points, and, for a long time, there had been no talk of the oath; this was all that was needed to ensure quiet. Nor have we any motive for doubting that there must have been difficulties among themselves anent the limits of their lands. More than twelve years before, Mascarene, in a letter I have produced elsewhere, had begged the Lords of Trade to alter the regulations excluding Catholics from Crown Land grants:

"They have," said he, "divided and subdivided amongst their children the lands they were in possession of, as His Majesty's instructions prescribe the grant of unappropriated lands *to Protestant subjects only*. . . . If they are debarred from new possessions, they must live here miserably and consequently be troublesome, or they must withdraw to French colonies. If we give occasion of disgust to these people, the French in case of war will soon make an advantage of it."

Now we gather from Lawrence's letter that nothing had been done to right this crying wrong; and yet the

sinister forecasts of Mascarene had not been realized, in other words, the Acadians had neither given trouble to the government nor left the country because of a wrong which was in itself so grievous. In spite of this "occasion of disgust," and of Shirley's plans *more disgusting yet*, the French had failed, during the late war, to shake their fidelity. How grave soever was this question of land grants, it was after all a matter of secondary importance to the Acadians in comparison to the oath and its consequences, and therefore was not made the subject of complaint to the authorities. Still it stands to reason that lands which had never been surveyed, and which had been divided and subdivided into small parcels during forty years, must have given rise to many disputes. And, as if to perpetuate this state of affairs, the settlement of the difficulty was indefinitely postponed and evaded, for the unavowed reason that the non-acceptance of the oath "was a bar in our law to their holding any landed possessions." This really meant, according to Lawrence's contention, that the Acadians had no legal right to the property which they enjoyed in virtue of the treaty of Utrecht.

Up to 1730, in spite of the growth of the population, the Acadians did not address themselves to occupying new land nor to fixing the limits of the old, nor to making improvements, for the very obvious reason that their stay in the country was uncertain. After the agreement with Philipps, exempting them from military service, they thought their status was definitely settled, and then only did the land question assume importance in their eyes. As new grants were refused to them, they were forced to subdivide their old farms, and as these had never been properly surveyed, difficulties

arose. Their disputes were submitted to the governor as early as 1731, when Armstrong said of them that they were litigious. The only way to settle the rival claims was to have the land surveyed; but, in Lawrence's time, ten, fifteen, twenty and more years had elapsed since the disputed claims had been filed and placed in the governor's hands, and as yet nothing had been settled. No wonder Lawrence could say: "They grow *uneasy* at the decision of their disputes having been so long put off." Surely there was more than enough to make them uneasy. Lawrence lets out the secret of these endless delays when he says: "Their not having taken the oath of allegiance is an absolute bar in our law to their holding any landed possessions." This amounts to an avowal that, since 1730, the delay of surveys and settlement of claims was intentional, and was owing to the restrictive clause contained in the oath accepted by Governor Philipps. But, then, it becomes evident that the acceptance of this oath was only a deception, since it did not give the Acadians any right to their land. If, however, I should happen to have mistaken the drift of Lawrence's letter, there is at least this other inference to be drawn, that the governors were but very little concerned to end the bickerings of the Acadians, or they might have readily done so by ordering the necessary surveys.

To deprive them of new grants called for by the increase in their numbers was not enough of an injustice; they must, furthermore, be refused all right to the parcels of land which they held in virtue of a treaty. They were ordered to take an unrestricted oath, which would not even have given them any claim to new grants of land, these grants being reserved, by regulation, "to

Protestant subjects only." Thus was being secretly prepared for them the fate of outcasts and pariahs. Perhaps their only resource now was to buy land from those Englishmen who had taken up, as I mentioned elsewhere, 100,000 acres around the settlements of Mines and Beaubassin. But it is easy to understand that the precariousness of their position was apt to make them mistrust such purchases. Besides, was there any security against future annulment of all their title-deeds in virtue of Lawrence's contention as to their being barred out by the law?

These few considerations give an inkling of Lawrence's deep-laid schemes. The sequel will show that it is well nigh impossible to find one of his state papers that is not a fresh masterpiece of duplicity.

The Acadians must, forsooth, have been the most submissive and peace-loving people under the sun. "The lenity and the sweet of English rule," on which Parkman dilates, may apply reasonably enough to the Home Government, but assuredly not to the provincial administration. Had the New England colonists been in the same situation, they would long ago have raised the standard of revolt and broken every trammel, as indeed they did a few years later to destroy abuses that were far less blameworthy and affirm rights that were far less important, for the sake of stamps and tea, when their language, their religion, their feelings, their lands were in no way threatened. Because the Acadians scorned rebellion, because they were too nobly obedient, they were deported like cattle, they were hunted like wild beasts, while statues were raised in honor of successful rebels; and, to crown their misfortune, they have to-day to bear the humiliation of the dying lion kicked

by the ass from one who—be it said without blame—bends low before the heroes of the revolution. To the vulgar mind success is the proof of merit, and the old saying,

Donec eris felix, multos numerabis amicos,

is accepted as an exhortation to the worship of success. Had England quelled the revolt, as she very probably would have done without the timely succor the French gave Washington, and had she deported the American rebels, true rebels these with far less grievances than the Acadians, how would Parkman have attuned his lyre?

It is strange that Mascarene's equitable suggestions were not acted upon by the Lords of Trade. Their conduct in this matter contrasts with their usual equity. Had the grantees of the 100,000 acres—amongst whom were a Secretary of State, his brother and a future Secretary of State—enough influence successfully to plead in bar of Mascarene's request? I cannot say.

Lawrence's letter threw the Lords of Trade into great perplexity, as may be seen by the following extract from their answer of March 4th, 1754:

“The more we consider this point, the more nice and difficult it appears to us; for, as on the one hand great caution ought to be used to avoid giving any alarm and creating such a diffidence in their minds as might induce them *to quit the Province, and by their numbers add strength to the French settlements*, so, on the other hand, we should be equally cautious of creating an improper and false confidence in them, that by a perseverance in refusing to take the oath of allegiance, they may gradually work out in their own way a right to their lands.”

To a man of Lawrence's character this was tantamount to saying: Deceive them if necessary, give them

vaguely to understand that titles will be granted to them, taking great care, however, not to commit yourself to any formal promise. Nevertheless, do all that is needed to prevent them from leaving.

And yet this much must be said in palliation of the Lords of Trade: from their point of view, they were imparting counsels of prudence and moderation that might serve as a check on Lawrence's impetuous and perverse nature. Of course there is no denying the trickery implied in this letter; but we should bear in mind that, for the last forty years, trickery had become so interwoven with the traditional policy that it was impossible for the best of well-meaning men entirely to free themselves from its meshes. Moreover, this letter was written at a time when the Lords of Trade hardly knew what decision to take on the matter at issue; and, in order to be perfectly fair towards them, this letter should be collated with another dated on the 29th of the ensuing October, which may be viewed as completing and greatly modifying it.*

In the letter cited above from Lawrence, there is a long account of an insurrection of German Protestant settlers at Lunenburg, who belonged to Cornwallis's colony. Before becoming president of the council, Lawrence had been commandant at that place, and his presence had been marked by troubles and by many desertions doubtless due to the severity of his rule. Directly after his departure the discontent broke out, men rushed to arms, and to avert the actual shedding of blood nothing less was needed than the presence of troops from Halifax, and as Murdoch says: "Monckton advised that, as the people there were so generally im-

* This letter is inserted further on.

plicated, the better course would be to grant a general forgiveness, but Lawrence desired to punish the ring-leaders. . . .”

According to his invariable habit the Compiler has mutilated Lawrence's letter, leaving out all that relates to the insurrection of the Lunenburg colonists. As we know the Compiler's purpose, we quite understand that it would have been impolitic for him to bring to light such facts, for they constitute a glaring contrast to the obedience of the Acadians, albeit the latter must have been still worse treated than those Protestant colonists who had been brought out and established at the expense of the government.

Now that we know the effect of Lawrence's administration among the English and German colonists, and what they thought of him at the outset of his career, we are in a position to judge of the reputation he had left behind him among the Acadians according to a letter from Captain Murray, commander of Fort Edward (Pigiquit) to Lawrence himself, wherein he reports to him what they had said of him: "That he was a man they personally hated, and dislike his government so much *they would never be easy under it*, he having treated them so harshly when amongst them." However, he had never been able to provoke the least resistance, whereas the Germans had no intention of so meekly enduring oppression.

On June 21st, 1754, Lawrence "informed the Council that he had received a letter from Captain Scott, commandant at Fort Lawrence, acquainting him that on the 14th of June instant, the deserted inhabitants of Beaubassin District who had petitioned for leave to return to their lands, came and brought him their

answer in relation to the resolution of Council of 27th September last, which was that, *unless the President of the Council would assure them, from under his hand, that they should remain neuter and be exempt from taking up arms* against any person whatsoever, it would be impossible for them *even to think of returning, as they would every day run the risk of having their throats cut and their cattle destroyed by the savages*, and this they gave as their last answer."

"Wherein it was resolved that nothing further would be done than as resolved by the Council on the said 27th of September."

This resolution of September 27th had been passed under Hopson's administration, and the communication of the Acadians mentioned above was the answer thereto; but, since that time, Lawrence himself had made proposals to them inducing them to return to their lands. He had declared to them that it was not his intention *at present* to oblige them to military service; which meant that he bound himself to nothing. Such an offer coming from Hopson would have deserved consideration; coming from Lawrence, it was worthless. Some more formal engagement was needed, with his signature into the bargain; else it were impossible "even to think of returning."

Their motives for mistrusting Lawrence were too numerous to admit of their falling into the snare, and they had been too often deceived to be satisfied with vague promises. But, why was Lawrence so anxious for their return? For we must not forget that the deportation is now less than a twelvemonth ahead. Had the Acadian voluntary exiles been turbulent, seditious, dangerous, it would have been the acme of im-

prudence to receive a hostile element in the very heart of the province, and worse still to invite them to come. Now, contemptible as Lawrence was, he was no fool. Therefore, we may safely say, the presence of this new Acadian element was desirable, useful, almost or quite free from danger; therefore their behavior had been hitherto submissive enough to warrant Lawrence's pressing invitations; therefore, in fine, to justify the deportation, motives must be sought in the twelvemonth that followed. In point of fact no valid reason exists anywhere, not more and perhaps less during this twelvemonth than before it.

CHAPTER XXII.

Lawrence becomes Lieutenant-Governor—His accusations against the Acadians—Project of expulsion—The Lords of Trade.

MY aim has been to pick out by preference and relate the facts supposed to tell against the Acadians, as they are to be found in the volume of the Archives. This I have faithfully done hitherto and will continue to do. The following letter from Lawrence to the Lords of Trade, dated August 1st, 1754, is clearly the document that contains the gravest accusations against them. I produce it almost entire despite its length :

“Your Lordships well know, that the Acadians have always affected a neutrality, and as it has been generally imagined here, that the mildness of an English Government would by degrees have fixed them in our interest, no violent measures have ever been taken with them. But I must observe to Your Lordships, that this lenity has not had the least good effect ; on the contrary, I believe they have at present laid aside all thought of taking the oath voluntarily, and great numbers of them are at present gone to Beauséjour to work for the French, in order to dyke out the water at the settlement I informed Your Lordships they were going to make on the north side of the Bay of Fundy, notwithstanding they were refused passes which they applied for to go thither. And upon their complaining that they could get no employment with the English, they were acquainted that as many as would come to Halifax should be employed, tho' in reality, I had no employment for them, but I proposed to order them to widen the road to Shubenacadie, as I very well knew if I could get them once here, it would put off their journey to Beauséjour, and would be no expense to the Government, as I was sure they would refuse the work

for fear of disoblising the Indians. But, as they did not come, I have issued a Proclamation, ordering them to return forthwith to their lands, as they should answer the contrary to their peril.

“They have not for a long time brought anything to our markets, but on the other hand have carried everything to the French and Indians whom they have always assisted with provisions, quarters and intelligence, and, indeed, while they remain without taking the oath to His Majesty—which they never will do till they are forced—and have incendiary French priests among them, there are no hopes of their amendment.

“*As they possess the best and largest tracts of land in this Province, it cannot be settled with any effect while they remain in this situation, and, though I would be very far from attempting such a step without Your Lordships’ approbation, yet I cannot help being of opinion that it would be much better, if they refuse the oath, that they were away.*”

Why this change of tone from the pressing invitation to return which he sent to the emigrated Acadians a few weeks ago? The reason is very plain: Lawrence had just made up his mind to deport the Acadians, nor does he scruple to let his intention be known. Up to this time he had been only president of the Council awaiting Hopson’s return. Now he must be aware that Hopson is not to return and that his own appointment as lieutenant-governor is sure; it was, indeed, officially announced a few weeks later.*

The better to prepare the Lords of Trade for his perfidious designs, he had to depict the conduct of the Acadians in the most sombre colors. The above letter is the result of his efforts in that direction. As the correspondence and the official acts of the governors

* *Philip H. Smith*, who, in his “*Acadia; a Lost Chapter in American History*,” shows so much fairness and perspicacity, says of this letter and the following ones: “The reader cannot fail to note the change in the tone of the letters sent to the Home Government relative to the *French Neutrals*; Lawrence proved himself the sort of ruler that was needed to carry out the harsh measure of the deportation.”

for the past four years did not hint at the slightest infringement of orders throughout the entire peninsula, it behooved Lawrence to pave the way for specific allegations by general complaints, so that his change of tone might seem to be supported by facts. This is the only explanation that can be offered of the general accusations contained in the above letter, which are either false or greatly exaggerated.

My purpose being to reply to each and every one of Lawrence's accusations, I now take up those which are contained in the foregoing letter. He accuses the Acadians of intercourse with the French and of having assisted the latter by selling them their produce. This must have been true in Mascarene's time, and before, when there was only one fort at the extremity of the province, and when there was practically no protection of the frontier line. But no government has a right to complain of such infractions, when it neglects the necessary precautions against them. Experience proves that, when breaches of a law are easy and unaccompanied by risk of punishment, the most virtuous and loyal people will wink at them. Loyalty and obedience offer no remedy to the greed of gain. Surely, the Acadians would need to have been endowed with superhuman perfection, if they had not sometimes taken advantage of a situation that enabled them to do a good stroke of business without let or hindrance. Moreover, Mascarene never complained of these business relations with the French in time of peace; on the contrary, in one of his letters he very wisely remarks that this traffic should be ignored, because the Annapolis garrison could not consume all the produce of the farmers, and therefore, to stop that traffic was to paralyze farming

interests ; besides, he adds, it is a source of profit to everybody because it brings into the country French money, which otherwise would go to Canada or elsewhere. When war broke out in 1744, the Acadians, as we have seen, whether at the Governor's suggestion or perhaps of their own accord, formed an association to prevent all such business relations. They themselves undertook police duty for the Government against their fellow-countrymen, and, after the war, those of them who were suspected of infringing the prohibitory decree were arrested on complaint of the members of this association. The most loyal of subjects could have done no more and would have been justified in doing less.

Since the foundation of Halifax and the building of forts at Grand Pré, Pigiguit and Beaubassin, the English Government had the means of preventing all commercial or other relations between the French and the Acadians ; and, in point of fact, such misdemeanors in this line as eluded the vigilance of the English must have been few and far between, as the Archives do not mention one single complaint before the courts. Had there been any complaints, Lawrence would not have been slow to order an investigation and severely to punish the guilty.

Granting, however, that there may have been some breaches of law on this score, they would be but the veriest trifles, occurring in all times and places and among all nations, subject to the cognizance of law-courts, and at any rate quite too unimportant to figure as an argument in a tragic event like the deportation.

“ They have not for a long time brought anything to our markets,” was Lawrence's perfidious assertion, I say

perfidious, because he wrote these words to the Lords of Trade on the 1st of August. At that date it could not well be otherwise: the preceding harvest must have been sold or consumed long before, and the coming harvest was still standing. Probably Lawrence's implied accusation had no other ground than this; but this was a plausible ground for a man that was on the look-out for pretexts to make his point. He relied upon the Lords of Trade not noticing that the beginning of August was a date far removed from the usual time for the sale of last year's crops. There were also other local conditions which would no doubt escape their notice. For instance, it cannot be supposed that the Acadians went one by one to sell their produce at Halifax, which was so far off, and the road to which was almost impassable on foot. They must have employed agents to carry their produce by water. Now the only commercial agents in Acadian centres were English: Blin, Donnell, Winniet, Jr., at Annapolis; Rogers at Cobequid; Arbuckle at Fort Lawrence; Dyson and Mauger at Pigiguit and Grand Pré. Mauger had another store at Halifax, and, if I mistake not, Blin, Donnell and Winniet had other stores either at Grand Pré or Fort Lawrence.* To these men, therefore, must the Acadians have sold their produce, and through them must all purchases have been made. As in Lawrence's mind the smallest things easily usurped the proportions of great ones, or took their place when the latter could not be found, he has taken the trouble to enter the following item in his official papers: "Their desiring—

* Alain, Nicholas Gauthier and Joseph Le Blanc had closed their stores during the war, and, as far as I can ascertain, there was not at this time one Acadian merchant in the whole peninsula.

the Acadians—to sell their grain to Mr. Dyson and refusing it to Mr. Mauger for the same money *appears very extraordinary.*”

While the public documents do not contain, to the best of my knowledge, one single specific case of commercial relations between the Acadians and the French, attributed by name to one in particular or to several collectively, they do contain many cases of business transactions between the French and some English merchants, particularly Arbuckle and that very Mauger whom Lawrence seems to have taken under his protection.* And as to general charges against Englishmen, many will be found at pages 630, 638, 646 of the Archives. I will quote one only. Writing to the Lords of Trade, November 27th, 1750, Cornwallis said: “I am assured the New England people have this year carried numbers of dollars to Louisburg. . . . They supply Louisburg with every necessary, and the advantage upon this traffic is so great, that they go sooner there than to this Port.”

I am almost ashamed to have to weary the reader with these trifles; but, as the deportation has no more solid basis than these, and as its justifiableness must stand or fall with the accusations of its author, I am forced to discuss these childish charges with becoming gravity.

In the letter of August 1st, 1754, Lawrence speaks but tentatively and hesitatingly as yet of his deporting plan, though this is clearly what he means in spite of the care with which he veils his design. He is content with humbly submitting to the Lords of Trade his opinion that, if the Acadians, *who have the finest farms of the*

* Mauger became a member of the House of Commons in 1763. Murdoch mentions, as doing business at Louisburg with the French: W. Blin, Barber, S. Butler, Jenkins, Breed, Lord, Turner, Clarke, Aubin, Green, Dyke, all from New England.

province, refuse to take the oath, "*it would be much better that they were away, though*" he "*would be very far from attempting such a step without*" their "*Lordships' approbation.*" Doubtless the deportation is already decided upon; the means thereto and the date alone remain to be settled. Lawrence's only concern now is to prepare the Lords of Trade for an approval of the deed beforehand, if possible, or for an acceptance of accomplished facts which is to be wrung from them by dint of misrepresentations. This letter is the first step in the course he has already planned. He cannot hope to bring the Lords of Trade to approve so cruel a measure as deportation would be; so, as yet, he confines himself to an indefinite suggestion: "*it would be better that they were away;*" and he submits his will to theirs with the most humble deference: "*I would be very far from attempting such a step without Your Lordships' approbation.*" For the time being he intends merely to predispose them against the Acadians. By a skilful renewal of the dose he hopes to bring them gradually round to his way of thinking. Besides, has he not full power in his own hands? Can he not, by continued severity, provoke the Acadians to some acts that will justify on his part an increase of rigor?

When Lawrence wrote that the Acadians had better be away, his real intention cannot have been to let them join the French at Beauséjour, since he had, precisely at that time, issued a proclamation obliging, under severe penalties, those who had just left the country to return immediately. He knew of the pressing and reiterated instructions of the Lords of Trade to his predecessors, and to himself a few months ago, urging the governors to avoid whatever might, by alarming the Acadians,

lead to their departure. The consequences of their voluntary departure must have seemed to him too disastrous, or at any rate too threatening, to be thought of for a moment. No; what he had in view was, manifestly, a forced departure to places chosen by himself, that is to say, a deportation such as he accomplished twelve months later.

For the past four years at least the only act of disobedience specified in the volume of the Archives is mentioned by Lawrence in the letter I am now reviewing. Three hundred Acadians had gone off to Beauséjour, as he tells us, to assist their emigrated countrymen in the work of dike-building. Had they or had they not left with the intention of returning no more? It would be hard to say. What we know, through Lawrence himself, is that they asked leave to go and were refused. Nor should we forget that, five years before, Cornwallis, driven to his wits' end, had promised passports, as soon as the state of the country would allow, to all who might wish to quit the province. If the three hundred intended not to return, then, with or without passports, it was high time to take advantage of the promises of Cornwallis, whether these were sincere or not. If, on the other hand, those absentees had left with a mind to come back, then Lawrence might be justified in taking proper measures to enforce their return and even to punish their disobedience. Very likely some of them had left for good, while others intended to decide at Beauséjour whether or not they would return. Lawrence's increasing severity was already making people anxious, as this unauthorized departure shows.

The season for the building of dikes was a very short

one, and the present undertaking at Beauséjour was the first serious attempt to secure farms for those who had emigrated in Cornwallis's time. These refugees were the relatives, the brothers of the Acadians, who naturally wished to assist them in a labor that promised to lift them out of poverty and furnish food for their families. The helpers who had gone to Beauséjour were themselves exposed, at any moment, to be expelled from the province if the unrestricted oath were exacted. In such a juncture they would be glad to find beyond the frontier relatives and friends able to help them in their turn. Thus in a way they were really working for themselves.

They were ordered to return directly. In all likelihood the order was promptly obeyed by those who, intending to return, had left their families behind; else the Archives would certainly mention severe measures against the disobedient, their families or their property. When Lawrence gave an order, he was not to be trifled with, as the Acadians knew to their cost.

That Lawrence had by this time determined on the deportation is, I think, clear enough. True, the evidence is still vague and indefinite, though convincing as far as it goes. Patience will be needed by those who follow my line of proof: for the chain of evidence is a long one. But every link is there. The last letter I have quoted from Lawrence is, properly speaking, only the first link in the chain that constitutes the main strength of this Lost Chapter. The entire evidence, strong in induction and analysis, will be equally strong in official documents of undoubted authenticity.

However, before proceeding further, let me anticipate an objection which doubtless is already taking shape in

the reader's mind: viz., the improbability of such an inhuman purpose based on no grave cause and born of sheer cruelty. Right here, then, let me affirm that the deportation, in the mind of its chief authors, was neither a justifiable act nor a deed of cruelty pure and simple, but a means of acquiring wealth by despoiling the Acadians of their cattle and their lands. On this point I entertain the hope that, long before the reader has finished the book, he will be fully convinced that I am indulging in no historical fiction.

Forestalling somewhat the strict chronological sequence of events, I will now give the answer of the Lords of Trade to Lawrence's insidious letter:

"We cannot form a proper judgment or give a final opinion of what measures may be necessary to be taken with regard to those inhabitants, until we have laid the whole state of the case before His Majesty and receive his instructions upon it.

"We were in hopes that the lenity which had been shown to those people by indulging them in the free exercise of their religion, and the quiet possession of their lands, would by degrees have gained their friendship and assistance and weaned their affections from the French, and we are sorry to hear that this lenity has had so little effect.

"It is certain that by the Treaty of Utrecht their becoming subjects to Great Britain (which we apprehend they cannot be but by taking the oath required of subjects) is made an express condition of their continuance, after the expiration of a year, and therefore it may be a question well worth considering how far they can be treated as subjects without taking such oaths, and whether their refusal to take them will not operate to invalidate the titles to their lands; *it is a question, however, which we will not take upon ourselves absolutely to determine*, but could wish that you would consult the Chief Justice upon this point and take his opinion, which may serve as a foundation for any future measure it may be thought advisable to pursue.

"As to those of the District of Beaubassin who are actually gone over to the French at Beauséjour, if the Chief Justice should be

of opinion that by refusing to take oaths without a reserve or by deserting their settlements to join the French, they have forfeited their title to their lands, we could wish that proper measures were pursued for carrying such forfeiture into execution by legal process. . . ."

Lawrence must have expected something better. Of course he had gained his point in that he had indisposed the Lords of Trade and prejudiced their minds; but he may have hoped that their reply would contain some declaration that should be a more definite step toward his chosen goal. Unfortunately for him his proposal, "it would be better that they were away," was merely referred to His Majesty or rather eluded. Politeness forbade the Lords of Trade expressing doubts about Lawrence's accusations; but the difference of tone between him and Hopson in so short an interval must have struck them, as the tenor of their letter seems to show. However, they in no way depart from their habitual wisdom and serenity. They seem to fear that he may act arbitrarily; they strongly advise him to keep to the rules and traditions of his office, to consult the Chief Justice as to whether the refusal to take the oath will invalidate the title-deeds of those who remain in the province, and even to ask his opinion on this matter with respect to those who have quitted the province. Should the Chief Justice decide that these latter have by their departure forfeited their titles, resort should be had to legal process of confiscation.

This letter is a fair average specimen of all those addressed to the governors of Acadia; and from one who, like myself, seeks nothing but historic truth, distributing praise or blame irrespective of persons, though

always finding it more agreeable to praise than to blame, this letter naturally elicits the remark that the Lords of Trade hardly ever swerved from this wise and prudent course. If we take into account the circumstances of time and place, the pressure exercised upon them, the misrepresentations made to them, their conduct, viewed as a whole, certainly deserves no very severe censure and is often praiseworthy. I have not the slightest doubt that they would have treated the Acadians very differently in the matter of the oath, had they been aware of all the facts I have recorded about the hindering of their departure by Nicholson, Vetch, Armstrong, Philipps, and Cornwallis. These hindrances are, for obvious reasons, not mentioned in the letters of these governors; they could not mention them without condemning themselves. This important fact must not be overlooked by those who wish to be just to the Lords of Trade.

Furthermore, this letter seems to prove conclusively that, when Cornwallis placed the Acadians in the cruel dilemma of taking the oath or of leaving without their movables, he must have been going beyond his orders, since the Lords of Trade here show that they are doubtful even as to the Government's right to confiscate the *immovables* of those who had left the province.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Lawrence's persecution—Its effect—Complaints to justify the deportation collected in the Archives—Order not to quit the province under pain of military execution for the families of delinquents.

IT was all the easier for Lawrence to be tyrannical and cruel because he was naturally so violently prone to such behavior that he persecuted his fellow-countrymen of Halifax and his German co-religionists of Lunenburg, when it was his interest to stand well with them. From the Acadians, on the other hand, he had nothing to fear; and if, as seems likely, he had already planned their deportation, it became his interest to drive them to acts of insubordination in order to give a semblance of justice to the execution of his project.

Nor is it at all difficult to follow every step Lawrence took as he matured his decision. This decision was come to in or about July, 1754, when it was known that Hopson was not to return and that he, Lawrence, was to succeed him. Hitherto he had laid no charges against the Acadians; he had even gone the length of begging those who had emigrated to return; and, to all appearances, he had not indulged in excessive rigor. Now, however, comes a complete change. On the 1st of August he addresses to the Lords of Trade a letter filled with accusations, concluding thus: "*they have the best lands in the Province*, it would be better that

they were away." His resolution is taken. Persecution begins. Hopson, as we have seen, had ordered the officers to treat Acadians in all cases exactly like the other subjects of His Majesty, and not to take anything from them by force or without a voluntary agreement on their part as to prices. Lawrence's first act after his letter of August 1st was to revoke the just and humane orders of Hopson, and—a circumstance worth noting—this iniquity was consummated on August the 5th, four days after the letter just referred to. Here is the order, bearing the above date, addressed by him to Captain Murray, Commandant of Fort Edward, at Pigiguit. Similar orders were sent elsewhere :

"You are not to bargain with the Acadians for their payment; but, as they bring in what is wanted, you will furnish them with certificates, which will entitle them to such payments at Halifax as shall be thought reasonable. If they should immediately fail to comply, you will assure them that the next courier will bring an order for military execution upon the delinquents."

In another letter to the same, dated 1st of September following, we find this : "*No excuse will be taken for not fetching in firewood, and if they do not do it in proper time, the soldiers shall absolutely take their houses for fuel.*" This was over and above the military execution.

As always happens when the documents have not the desired tendency, these letters are not to be found in the volume of the Archives. Haliburton, who reproduces them, adds :

"The requisitions which were occasionally made of them were conveyed in a manner not much calculated to conciliate affection, and when they were informed by Captain Murray, that unless they supplied his detachment with fuel military execution would follow, they were not slow to notice the difference between the contracts of Government with the English and the compulsory method adopted towards them."

With reference to the same orders Philip H. Smith says :

" Murray was in command of a handful of men at Fort Edward (now Windsor), and like other upstart despots, laboring under an abiding sense of his own importance, clothed with absolute authority over life and property, and secure in the fact that French evidence would not be received against him, he was not likely to be at a loss for a pretext to display his authority."

These orders, as may be readily supposed, provoked discontent; but they were obeyed everywhere except at Pigiguit, and even in this case there was no refusal, merely delay until the inhabitants should receive an answer to their representations addressed to the Governor.

This incident would seem unimportant, since the people declared that, if their demurrer were not favorably received, they would obey. This is what Murray himself wrote to Lawrence :

" All the affair of the Indians or inhabitants taking up arms is false, for M. Deschamps * told me this morning that, in conversation with some of the Acadians, he told them what Daudin (the priest) had said, they were astonished and declared that they had no intention ever to take up arms, for, if at the return of the party from Halifax, they were ordered to bring in the fuel, *notwithstanding their representations, they were resolved to obey.*"

A great fuss was made about this disobedience, which in reality was no disobedience at all, since the Acadians made the execution of these orders depend on the Governor's answer. At most it was a short delay. Was the right of complaint by petition, one of the basic rights of British freedom, non-existent for them? In the name of the most elementary common sense, was it not fitting to grant them the slender satisfaction of

* Deschamps, later a judge of the province, was then a clerk at Mauger's store at Pigiguit (Windsor).

waiting till the answer came? Surely, any man with the faintest spark of kindness would have done this; nay, I feel confident that Lawrence himself, in spite of his ferocity, would have waited, had he not intended to exasperate them by his severity, to make trouble and thus create pretexts for deporting them.

But he would brook no delay. The following order-in-council, refusing to entertain their petition, left them no time to obey and summoned to Halifax five of the principal citizens together with Abbé Daudin their missionary.

“The Council having taken the same into consideration, were of opinion and did advise that the commanding officer should be instructed to repeat his orders to bring in the firewood upon pain of military execution. *And it was likewise resolved* that Mr. Daudin and five of the principal of the said inhabitants should be ordered to repair immediately to Halifax to give an account of their conduct.”

Captain Murray ordered five of the principal inhabitants to appear before him, viz., Claude Brassard, Charles Le Blanc, Baptiste Galerne, Jacques Forêt and Joseph Hébert. “As they had the impudence,” said Murray to Lawrence, “to ask me to show them your instructions, I turned them out of the house.” Daudin and these five inhabitants were taken to Halifax, escorted by Captain Cox, Lieutenant Mercer, Ensign Peach, and a strong detachment of soldiers.

After a week's detention the laymen were released; but Daudin was kept prisoner till an occasion should offer for sending him out of the province. The documents here given by the Compiler are not sufficient to afford a clear notion of Daudin's part in this affair. The charge was that he had used disrespectful language towards the authorities, that the insubordination of the

inhabitants dated from his return from Annapolis. Daudin produced a written defence which was not deemed satisfactory. It does not appear in the volume of the Archives.

Murray, reporting to Lawrence his conversation with Daudin, said :

“ Daudin said to me that he was ignorant of the representation made by the inhabitants until Monday morning. That I had taken a very wrong step in not consulting him before I acquainted you of the affair, which, if I had, he would have brought the inhabitants in a very submissive manner to me, but, *instead of that, I had sent a Detachment to you who was a man the inhabitants personally hated, and disliked your Government so much, they could never be easy under it, having treated them so harshly when amongst them.*”

This would seem to show that Daudin had known nothing of the resolution of the inhabitants till after they had formed it; that, on the contrary, he would have been ready to use his influence in bringing them to obey the Government's orders; and that he merely objected to Murray's proceedings. The last part of the above quotation is probably what constituted the “disrespectful language toward the authorities.” Lawrence was not likely to forgive so personal an offence.

I gather, moreover, from all the foregoing incidents, that the Acadians expected Murray would present their petition to the Governor in the usual way, without attaching to this step nor to their momentary suspension of work more importance than was proper; that, instead of doing so, Murray confided the petition to a detachment of troops, thus giving an exaggerated idea of the affair and exposing the Acadians to fresh severity from Lawrence: and they were evidently in mortal terror of this despot.

Such is the conclusion deduced from the sole testimony of the accuser. This is one of those rare cases in which we might have been allowed to study both sides of the Daudin incident, since Daudin produced a written defence; but this defence is wanting in the volume of the Archives, which also omits the petition of the Acadians. With such one-sided testimony it is impossible either to exonerate or to condemn Daudin. We must, however, bear in mind that in Captain Murray, as will be proved later, we have the most inhuman of all the officers in Lawrence's clique. Murray was a great hand at making much ado about nothing, and this seems to have been a case in point.

Another incident that occurred eight months after the one I have just related is inserted here, in spite of its futility, because it will serve to show that, in culling from the volume of the Archives, I neglect none of those documents that might militate against the Acadians and their submissive spirit. Under date of the 27th of the following May, 1755, Lawrence wrote to Murray informing him that he had been advised by Major Handfield of Annapolis that three French soldiers from Beauséjour were in the Mines district, ostensibly as deserters, in reality to seduce the inhabitants and urge them either to take up arms or to leave the province:

“ I would have you issue a Proclamation offering a reward of twenty pounds sterling to whomsoever shall discover when any one or more of these pretended deserters may be apprehended. You will publish this Proclamation by means of the Acadian Deputies, and you must assemble them for that purpose and inform them . . . that if any inhabitant either old or young *should offer to go to Beauséjour*, or to take arms, or induce others to commit any act of hostility upon the English, or make any declaration in favor of the French, they

will be treated as rebels, their estates confiscated, and their families undergo immediate military execution.

“I desire also that you will immediately publish a Proclamation offering a reward of twenty pounds sterling to any person that will apprehend and bring Joseph Dugas of Cobequid, or any or more of the couriers who arrived at Beauséjour on the 5th May instant with letters for Le Loutre, also the same reward for apprehending the couriers who arrived at Beauséjour the evening of the said 5th May with letters for said Le Loutre from Mines and Piguit.”

The information Lawrence had received might be true or false, we have no means of knowing which; but, as the volume of the Archives reports no later proceedings with regard to these proclamations and the possible results thereof, I am inclined to think that the whole story was a groundless rumor. Nor is there anything surprising in that, since the events that led Lawrence to write were supposed to have occurred in the immediate neighborhood and in the jurisdiction of Captain Murray himself, whereas the information came from Annapolis at the other end of the province. At any rate these events are of no real importance, except inasmuch as they prove that Lawrence's rule had become so oppressive and so odious that the French were renewing their attempts to make the Acadians emigrate.

And yet the above facts must have been the gravest that could be trumped up, since they are the only ones that occasioned governmental interference, or at least the only ones that figure in the volume of the Archives. Thus—incredible as it may seem—these are the only facts on which the reader can base his judgment as to whether or not the deportation was justifiable. Barring the refusal to take an unrestricted oath, there is not, up to the very deportation itself, one single other incident that might, by any constructive process, be twisted into

a pretext therefor. Would any man in his senses maintain that such petty incidents, trifling in themselves and devoid of all general significance, could constitute adequate motives for inflicting upon a whole people a chastisement that implied the accumulation of all human ills? In the Pigiguit incident the only culprit was Lawrence himself. His orders upsetting the equitable regulations of Hopson were unjust and barbarous. He ought at least to have allowed them the right to make respectful remonstrance, especially when they had declared that they would obey directly if their petition was rejected, and when Lawrence was informed of this by Murray himself. In the case of the French soldiers coming to seduce them, the Acadians could not be blamed unless they listened to their proposals. Seductions of this kind, but much more serious, were not lacking during the war from 1744 to 1748, and we know how inoperative they were. If such motives could justify Lawrence's conduct, he might have found still stronger ones against the Germans of Lunenburg, and perhaps against the colonists of Halifax, though in both these instances his government was far more equitable. The fact is, a despot can always find means to justify any act of cruelty; and we read of no other people who, if situated as the Acadians were, would have borne such injustice and so much provocation with so little unruliness.

It will be remembered that Cornwallis, after exhausting many subterfuges to prevent the departure of the Acadians, finally took refuge in the passport ruse. Events are there to prove that his promise was nothing but a subterfuge, and now we have Lawrence carrying ferociousness to the extent of threatening with military

execution the families of those who should leave the country.

As the list of subterfuges is a long one, I may be allowed to summarize them thus :

- 1st subterfuge (VETCH)—You shall not depart before Nicholson's return.
- 2nd " (NICHOLSON)—You shall not depart till after such and such points shall have been decided by the Queen.
- 3rd " (VETCH)—You shall not depart in English vessels.
- 4th " (VETCH)— " " " " " French "
- 5th " (VETCH)—You cannot procure rigging at Louisburg.
- 6th " (VETCH)—You cannot procure rigging at Boston.
- 7th " (VETCH)—You shall not depart in your own vessels.
- 8th " (PHILIPPS)—You shall not make roads to depart by.
- 1730—Restricted oath accepted.
- 1749—Your oath was worthless.
- 9th " (CORNWALLIS)—You shall not depart this autumn.
- 10th " (CORNWALLIS)—You " " " " till after you have sown your fields.
- 11th " (CORNWALLIS)—You shall not depart without passports.

After this last subterfuge, they now were prisoners, kept in their country in spite of themselves, herded like a lot of cattle awaiting the butcher's pleasure. Does not this afford strong presumption that, when Lawrence wrote the Lords of Trade, "it would be better that they were away," he had not in view a free exodus but a deportation such as really took place?

CHAPTER XXIV.

Situation of the Acadians at Beauséjour—Venality of Vergor and the French officers—Le Loutre.

THE time has now come to review briefly the principal events that had occurred within the last few years at Beauséjour on French territory. I have already spoken of the efforts Le Loutre had made to force the Beaubassin Acadians to cross the frontier. He then had a promise from the Governor of Canada that those who should emigrate from English territory would receive compensation for their losses. A line of dikes was to be constructed that would provide for the majority of them excellent farms ready for tillage. Unfortunately Le Loutre's efforts seem to have been, for a long time, frustrated by the extortions and venality of the French officers. France was then traversing one of the most shameful epochs of her history. She was taking all available roads to ruin. Every incentive to great movements and noble undertakings, whatever had hitherto commanded respect and provoked enthusiasm was fast disappearing under the polished irony of gentlemanly scamps whose wit amused France and stood to her instead of glory. There was pulling down without building up. All that had been the strength of France was wasting away before this destructive blast, and nothing remained but the wilderness it created. Pleasure was the standard of all things. The example was

set by the throne and imitated in the higher classes of society. In this madcap race after sensual delights the treasury, carelessly guarded, became a prey to favorites and venal hangers-on.

In Canada Intendant Bigot was the vampire which, sucking the life-blood of France, was rapidly hurrying her to ruin and dishonor. Not content with his personal delinquencies, he incited his friends to similar speculations. Thus he wrote to Vergor, commandant at Beauséjour: "Make the best of your position, my dear Vergor; shear and pare to your heart's content, so as to join me one day in France and buy yourself a mansion near mine." As might well be supposed this invitation to pillage was sure to find a response in that venal wretch, and so the promise of assistance to the emigrated Acadians was made void. In the face of all these obstacles Le Loutre went to France for the help he so much needed. A sum of fifty thousand francs was confided to him, and on his return dike-building was vigorously pushed. To protect himself against the venality of middlemen, he personally procured the necessary provisions and distributed them to the Acadian workers. This is, I believe, what afforded a pretext for the charge that Le Loutre was engaging in commercial transactions on his own account. The officers, whom he was thus balking in their attempts to defraud the treasury, were naturally very jealous of his great influence. They must have dreaded and hated him. This being the case, one understands Pichon's saying: "He had so ingratiated himself with the Marquis de la Galissionnière that it became a crime to write against him."

Oddly enough, Parkman has failed to give publicity

to this charge of unpriestly traffic. Perhaps he was not aware of it, for Pichon, I think, does not mention it. Or perhaps Parkman's silence may be due to the fact that he had found means to implicate him in a murder, compared to which the peddling of wares by a priest became a mere peccadillo.

The funds did not arrive till the autumn of 1753, too late to begin operations that year. So far, little had been done to allay the distress of the emigrated Acadians. They led a rather miserable existence, working sometimes for the French of Beauséjour, sometimes for the English of Fort Lawrence, in full view of the fields they had watered with their sweat and where they had spent happy years in plenty and peace. Their lot would have been more endurable had there been any prospect of stability in the future; but the part of the country offered them was disputed territory. The Commission appointed to settle the frontier line was then sitting; it might decide that their new lands belonged to England; in which case they would have either to go into exile once more and face its concomitant tribulations and distress or to accept conditions they had just refused at the cost of the greatest sacrifices. The circumstances of their departure, their forced expatriation after the destruction of their dwellings, were so many overwhelming memories. The storm which Cornwallis had raised about the oath had long since been lulled. Their relatives, their brothers, their friends of Grand Pré, Piguit and Annapolis were no longer molested. They dwelt in tranquillity and abundance as in the happy days before the foundation of Halifax. They were once more beginning to hope that the question of the oath would never again be raised. To Cornwallis, himself consider-

ably humanized during the last two years of his administration, had succeeded a kindly and sympathetic man, the praise of whose intentions and actions was in every mouth. The combined result of all their surroundings was an increase of fear on the one hand and of regret on the other. Many crossed over with their families and their cattle to Ile Saint-Jean (Prince Edward Island). There at least, if they took up land, they ran no risk of relapsing into the state of affairs which had brought about their departure; for the island was incontestably French soil and not disputed. But there also they would have a precarious and dangerous situation. This island, being long and narrow, left them ever exposed, in case of war, to the depredations of corsairs and to the horrors of an invasion. However no choice was left to them, and so most of them preferred this alternative.

As we have seen, those who remained at Beauséjour had addressed a petition to Governor Hopson, expressing their desire to return to their farms, provided they were exempt from bearing arms. This proposal had been rejected. In the first months of his administration, when Lawrence had not as yet conceived his sinister design, he had made overtures to them through the commandant of Fort Lawrence. He had authorized him to declare that he had no intention, *at present*, of obliging them to bear arms. His guarantees were deemed insufficient.

In making a report to the Lords of Trade of these negotiations, Lawrence said: "I was privately informed that at their return, they were in a very ill humor with Le Loutre and with the French commandant; and that they represented to them the hardships they labored

under in not being suffered to accept the proposals of the English in a remonstrance that I am told was very little short of a mutiny." This information was furnished by Pichon.

Some months later, when Abbé Daudin was arrested, Pichon, writing to Captain Scott, told him "that the affair of Abbé Daudin was making a great stir at Beau-séjour; that Le Loutre had preached a very violent sermon, in which he abused the English, and showed the Acadians what they could expect from a treacherous nation which thus expelled a holy priest; that the same fate was in store for the other priests, and that, if they recrossed the frontier, they would perish miserably, deprived of the sacraments and of the helps of their religion." He requested them—this is the substance of Pichon's further statements—to meet at the Commandant's after Mass, saying that he had to read to them a letter from the Governor of Canada. But the refugees did not come. M. de Vergor twice sent a sergeant to notify them. Only about twenty came. As they seemed loath to enter the house, the Commandant got angry and ordered them to enter under pain of being put in irons. The letter of the Governor of Canada, which Pichon said was a forgery, was then read to them. It promised various kinds of assistance. "You must know," continues Pichon, "that, last month, eighty-three of the Acadian refugees sent two of their number with a petition to the Governor of Canada, in which they requested to be allowed to return to their farms, seeing that we could not give them suitable ones, those which we offered them being claimed by the English Government. They further said that they did not deem themselves released from the obligations of their oath of

“fidelity to the King of Great Britain, and that they were threatened with the punishment of rebels should they be taken among the French.”

It is impossible for me either to contradict or to confirm these assertions of Pichon. I quote him because what he relates is not unlikely; on the contrary, his story is quite in keeping with the idea I have formed of the situation and of Le Loutre's motives. There is this contrast between Pichon's accusations anent the Howe murder and his present testimony that he is now on the spot at Beauséjour, and therefore able to be thoroughly well-informed. In this case he seems to have had no motive for lying.

After the excitement caused by Cornwallis's conduct on his landing at Halifax, Le Loutre had considerably cooled down, most probably because the danger he had foreseen had, for the time being, disappeared. But when he saw that Hopson was not coming back, and that Lawrence, whom he had had occasion to know, became titular governor and was already yielding to his cruel instincts, he once more took alarm. And when his colleague Daudin was dragged to Halifax and condemned to quit the country, no doubt his impetuous zeal found in this incident all that was needed to set it aflame. From his point of view, and I am inclined to think it was the right one, Daudin was a victim of persecution. This was, as Pichon makes him say, the beginning of a régime which would soon deprive the Acadians of their priests and of the free exercise of their religion. Was he mistaken? Certainly not, and this certainty increases in the light of subsequent events. He knew enough of Lawrence's character to suppose him capable of any crime. Of course Le Loutre's im-

pulsiveness, his religious enthusiasm—some would say, his fanaticism—might cloud his better judgment and make him see intentions that did not exist, or at least exaggerate them; but I am convinced that, Cassandra-like, he saw clearly the woes that were to overwhelm the Acadian people, if the French were dislodged from their hold on the Bay of Fundy. Abbé Le Guerne, who was also a missionary near Beauséjour on the French side, without sharing Le Loutre's ardor and vehemence, thoroughly shared his fears. He himself tells us that Le Loutre, after the taking of Beauséjour, and on leaving the country, strongly urged the Acadians to be submissive towards the English, in order, if possible, to avert the misfortunes which he saw threatening them.

CHAPTER XXV.

Pichon's letter provokes an expedition against Beauséjour—Preparations in New England—Monkton, assisted by Lieutenant-Colonels Winslow and Scott, arrives at Fort Lawrence with 2,000 men, June 2nd, 1755—Consternation of the French and weakness of the garrison—Assistance impossible—Siege of Beauséjour—The Acadians refuse help—Three hundred are forced to take up arms—Capitulation—Le Loutre's flight—Pichon claims his reward—What England owes to the Acadians.

DURING the autumn preceding the capture of Beauséjour, Pichon communicated to Captain Hussey, then commanding at Fort Lawrence, a letter supposed to have been addressed to Le Loutre by Duquesne, Governor of Canada, in which was the following: "I invite you and M. de Vergor to seek a plausible pretext for a vigorous attack on the English." Hussey, when transmitting this letter to Captain Scott, enumerated at some length the reasons for which he believed that it must have been fabricated by Pichon himself.* Yet, three weeks later, Lawrence wrote to Shirley:

"*Being well informed* that the French have designs of encroaching still farther upon His Majesty's right in this Province, and that they propose, the moment they have repaired the fortifications of Louisburg, to attack our Fort at Chignecto (Fort Lawrence), I think it high time to make some effort to drive them from the north side of the Bay of Fundy."

* See Chapter XVI.

Under other circumstances Lawrence would have hesitated to base an important decision upon a letter the spuriousness of which was demonstrated to him by solid arguments ; but, in view of the projects he entertained, he now thought it advisable to seize the opportunity and to act as if there were no doubt as to the contents of that letter. He said he was " well informed," for he knew that this would be quite enough to make Shirley, whose ardent nature was cousin-german to his own, chime in with him and help him with all his might. Nor was he mistaken. Shirley immediately resolved to levy 2,000 men in New England for an expedition destined to dislodge the French from their strongholds on the isthmus the following spring. Preparations were pushed on with vigor, and the fleet, comprising thirty-three vessels under the orders of Colonel Monkton, assisted by Lieutenant-colonels Winslow and Scott, appeared before Fort Lawrence on the 2nd of June, 1755.

There is reason to believe that the letter sent by Pichon to Hussey as if it came from Duquesne, was really, as Hussey thought, " of Pichon's own composing ;" for, since the preceding autumn, the French had done nothing to give a color of likelihood to this letter. The Indians were quieter than they had been for a long time. The garrison of Beauséjour had not been reinforced and numbered hardly 160 soldiers ; the fortifications had not been improved. At the very moment when the fleet appeared at the entrance of the Bay, Le Loutre was busily engaged in the building of those dikes that were to ensure farms to the Acadians. So skilfully and secretly had this expedition been organized and conducted that its appearance before the fort was the first intimation of the danger that threatened the

French. Although the two nations were, ostensibly at least, on terms of peace, there was no mistaking the purpose of this display of force; and great was the consternation at Beauséjour, which became greater still, a few days afterwards, when it was realized that no assistance could be hoped for from Cape Breton; for English vessels were cruising before Louisburg, and to force the blockade in order to assist Beauséjour would expose Louisburg to be taken by surprise. There were, it is true, on the French side of the frontier, from twelve to fifteen hundred Acadians able to bear arms, and this was quite enough to hold the besiegers in check and perhaps to make the expedition a failure; but for many reasons De Vergor could not count upon them.* Those who had always lived in this part of the country, and they were the majority, were undoubtedly French subjects. So were also those who, in Cornwallis's time or later, had chosen to emigrate; on their arrival they had taken the oath to the French government; but Lawrence, knowing their dispositions, had shrewdly played upon their feelings by signifying to them that they still remained British subjects, and that, should they ever be taken in arms against England, they would be treated as rebels. He knew that this declaration, how absurd soever it was from a legal point of view, would trouble their consciences and give them scruples of which he would take advantage. These scruples coupled with his threats would produce the desired effect.

De Vergor issued severe orders, commanding all able-bodied Acadians to repair without delay to the fort for

* De Vergor, in a letter to M. de Drucourt the preceding year, said that in case of attack he could not rely on the assistance of the Acadians, whom the English intimidated by their threats.

enlistment; but, though his orders were repeated and accompanied by threats, they remained deaf to his commands: "He sent them orders upon orders," says Murdoch; "they answered that he should have used them better when they were in his power." De Vergor could get together only about three hundred of those who, having no homestead, lived in Fort Beauséjour, and, receiving rations from the Government, were under its control. But even they, in the straits to which they were reduced, with a view to protect themselves against disaster, stipulated that the orders should be repeated in writing. This force was insufficient for a long resistance, especially as two thirds of it were men who had never done military duty, and, what is worse, were fighting unwillingly under compulsion of the most terrible threats. "Many of the Acadians," Murdoch adds, "escaped from the Fort, but seventeen of them were caught and brought back."

Nevertheless, had the chief been brave and determined, it would have still been possible to make a fine stand and save the honor of France; but the defence was most miserable: nothing that I know of in the military annals of that nation approaches, in point of stupidity and cowardice, the conduct of this siege, which the French themselves derisively nicknamed "the velvet siege." With Vergor and his kinsman and accomplice De Vannes, the greed of gold had stifled every feeling of honor and patriotism. Their only care seems to have been to save their ill-gotten gains and their precious persons. Without waiting for the investment of the fort, without any deadly fight, despite the protests of Le Loutre and some officers, De Vergor made overtures to Colonel Monkton, and on June 16th, only fourteen

days after the arrival of the expedition, Beauséjour capitulated on the following terms : *

" 1st. The commandant, officers, staff and others, employed for the King, and the garrison of Beausejour, shall go out with arms and baggage, drums beating. 2nd. The garrison shall be sent direct by sea to Louisburg, at the expense of the King of Great Britain. 3rd. The garrison shall have provisions sufficient to last until they get to Louisburg. 4th. *As to the Acadians, as they were forced to bear arms under pain of death, they shall be pardoned.* 5th. The garrison shall not bear arms in America for the space of six months.†

" ROBERT MONKTON.

" AT THE CAMP BEFORE BEAUSÉJOUR.

" 16th June, 1755."

This capitulation involved at the same time that of Fort Gaspereau on Bay Verte. This latter was defended by a mere handful of soldiers and was, strictly speaking, only a storehouse for provisions and ammunition. Vergor ordered M. de Villeraï, the commandant, to surrender his fort; which he did a few days later. Beauséjour was immediately occupied by the English troops and its name changed to that of Cumberland. In the course of the ten days that followed the capitulation, all the Acadians came one by one to surrender their arms to Colonel Monkton. Not long afterwards the French also evacuated the fort of the River St. John; thus there remained no vestige of French domination north of the Bay of Fundy, except the trading posts at Miramichi and on the Gulf coast in the neighborhood of Bay des Chaleurs. Le Loutre had prudently slipped off

* Before the overtures for a surrender a bomb thrown by the besiegers fell on one of the casemates that was used as a prison, and killed four Frenchmen and Mr. Hay, an English officer who was a prisoner. This officer had been captured some days before by the Indians, who were getting ready to scalp him when he was snatched from their hands by an Acadian named Brassard and led to the Fort, where he was very kindly treated.

† Document omitted in the volume of the Archives.

before the occupation of Fort Beauséjour, and on his way to Quebec, through the solitudes of the St. John River, he had leisure to meditate on the instability of human affairs. From Quebec he embarked for France in the following August; but another misfortune awaited him: the ship he was on was taken at sea by the English, and he was imprisoned in Elizabeth Castle in the Isle of Jersey, whence he did not recover his freedom till eight years later on the conclusion of the peace.

The capture of Beauséjour was really Pichon's work. It was the letter of Duquesne, whether true or forged, that gave rise to the expedition. According to a previous agreement between him and Captain Scott, instead of accompanying the French garrison to Louisburg, he was held prisoner for some time at Beauséjour, then sent to Fort Edward at Pigiguit, and finally to Halifax, where he remained apparently a prisoner, in order that he might mingle with the French officers who were already there or who would be brought thither, and learn the secret plans of the French.

It was time for him to claim the full price of his services. The memorial he addressed on this subject to the Governor's secretary bears, as may well be supposed, the stamp of his baseness and cupidity. Men of this kind can hardly possess aught else than second-rate skill, ingenious enough, perhaps, in the playing of their vile parts, but puerile and lame when they have to seek their own interest, for then all the vileness in their make-up oozes at every pore. Pichon's memorial contains, together with much sycophancy, a long enumeration of his services and losses: "I have lost," he says, "a fine future with my countrymen, in order to attach myself to the fortune of a nation which I loved, and which

I know to be the most reasonable and the most generous of all those that exist in both hemispheres. . . . Mr. Scott had promised that he would surround me with comfort and ease. Am I not now warranted in desiring the fulfilment of these promises, by securing for myself a *solid and advantageous* position? . . . Kindly bear in mind that I had a good social status in France, where I still own property. The Court had charged me with . . . These posts would have been very profitable; I have had to give them up, as well as all I have in France, whither I must never think of returning. I have lost the extensive property I had bought near Fort Beau-séjour, moreover two houses and gardens on a very fine site. By the taking of this fort I have lost two valuable horses, a quantity of provisions, furniture, linen, clothes, books and *a thousand guineas stolen from me. . . .*

“There are circumstances when a man should be allowed to speak in praise of himself, and when it is his interest to make himself known and to direct attention to the services he has rendered. . . .

“I am well aware of all the power the Admiral wields and of the advantages I may hope for from his illustrious patronage and from that of His Excellency the Governor. May I not request the honor of a recommendation from them to General Shirley, as well as to the other governors of the English provinces, in order to invite them to exercise their generosity by doing good to the *most devoted of men* in the service of *the wisest of nations*? The main point would be to beg their Excellencies to grant me their powerful patronage at the Court of England and with the Prime Minister, in order to obtain special favors for me. I am pretty well stricken

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in years and have reached an age *when one's needs become generally greater.*"

Among services rendered, Pichon mentioned his having brought about the surrender of Beauséjour, by persuading the Acadians that were in the fort to refuse to fight at all and to insist on immediate surrender. Although any assertion of Pichon's carries very little weight, especially when, as in this instance, it was his interest to make the most of his services, still, with due allowance for his bragging about his influence in the matter, his affirmation may well be true as to the Acadians refusing to fight, a fact which could easily be verified at the time and which is sustained by much other evidence. If so, as we already have proof that the great majority of the Acadians refused to bear arms, we may also rest assured that those who, under pressure of cruel threats when they were absolutely at the mercy of the authorities, consented to enlist, did, by refusing to fight at the critical moment, bring about the surrender of Beauséjour. *As to the Acadians, said that article of the capitulation which concerned them, as they were forced to bear arms under pain of death, they are pardoned.*

All this proves that Lawrence was not mistaken when, at the beginning of his administration, he wrote to the Lords of Trade concerning the Acadians who had emigrated: "I believe that a very large part of them would submit to any terms rather than take up arms on either side." Lawrence knew them well and could make correct forecasts with respect to their future conduct. And yet this opinion of Lawrence seems strange. Why should they not have taken up arms for the French? Were they not subjects of France and as such had they not


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the right to serve her cause? Undoubtedly. The greater part of them had dwelt for generations in this part of the country; the remainder were those to whom Cornwallis, revoking the compromise of 1830, had given the choice between an unrestricted oath and departure, that is, the choice between English and French allegiance. "My friends," he had said, "the moment that you have declared your desire to leave *and submit yourself to another Government*, our determination was to hinder nobody." Even had he not made this declaration, it is evident that, by revoking the condition of their stay, he set them free to depart, and, once gone, as soon as they dwelt on French territory, they became French subjects. It mattered little that the part of the country where they took refuge was then disputed by the two crowns. The telling fact was that it was then occupied by France; this was enough to settle the question of their French citizenship in virtue of the most elementary principles of the law of nations and especially of the diplomatic formula *uti possidetis*. How, then, could Lawrence, in the teeth of this evident right, believe that they would not take up arms against him? Simply because he knew that a question of this sort, clear enough in itself, would not appear to them clear enough to satisfy their conscience; that the scruples that would beset them would suffice to keep them from acting; that the oath they had formerly taken and the habit of looking upon themselves as British subjects would be a powerful deterrent; that long years of peace had made them lose the taste for fighting; and that, by taking up arms, they would provoke their tyrannical oppressor to wreak his fury on their brothers of the Peninsula. To make his belief a certainty, Lawrence had taken care to

issue a proclamation in which he warned them that they still remained British subjects, that they were not released from their oath of fidelity, and that, should they be taken armed, they would be treated as rebels.

Lawrence's forecast was fully confirmed. Despite the efforts and threats of the French, out of fifteen hundred Acadians only three hundred took up arms, and, even of these, several deserted; finally those who remained refused to fight, and Beauséjour had to capitulate.* To an impartial observer these Acadians would seem to have won for themselves, not merely the pardon which the capitulation granted them, but the eternal gratitude of England for the territory, the prestige and the glory they had brought her. At any rate the official pardon in the deed of surrender should have implied perfect immunity from annoyance for anything that might have happened in the past. We shall see that it was not so, and that, for want of valid motives, Lawrence made the events just related serve as pretexts for the deportation of the Acadians of the Peninsula. Hence the importance, on the reader's part, of deeply fixing these events in his memory; they will help him to understand subsequent developments. Meanwhile, the conduct of the Acadians on either side of the frontier should be separately examined. I will first take up the case of the Acadians who remained on English territory.

* De Vergor and De Villeray were brought before a council of war at Quebec, three years later, on account of their cowardice at the siege of Beauséjour and Gaspereau. "De Vergor and De Villeray," says *Les Mémoires sur le Canada*, "were discharged; the first explained his feeble defence by the fact that the Acadians refused to assist them and raised a mutiny."



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