






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


civilisation
du québec

THE SIEGE OF QUÉBEC IN 1759

THREE EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNTS

PRESENTED BY JEAN-CLAUDE HÉBERT



THE SIEGE OF QUÉBEC IN 1759

THREE EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNTS

**Texts presented by
JEAN-CLAUDE HÉBERT**

SÉRIE HISTOIRE

MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES CULTURELLES

1974

Our cover picture:

A General View of Quebec from Point Levy during the Siege.

Engraving of a drawing by Richard Short.

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FOREWORD

As we witness the phoenix-like rising from the past of Place Royale, the privileged spot on our Continent which Frontenac called "the capital of an empire", and as it resumes its character as the framework of that mighty dream, it is a surprising reflection that these imposing stone houses, proud and unshakeable, have survived as the most faithful witnesses of the glories and misfortunes of Canada's destiny. Indeed, they not only proclaim the accomplishments of Champlain and of Frontenac; they also recall the sombre hours of the Capitulation.

We might have offered the public a learned treatise, fully documented down to the very least detail of these tragic events¹. Instead, we have chosen to publish the simple accounts of three on-the-spot witnesses.

Notes have been added either to clarify the meaning of certain expressions or to indicate landmarks and points of comparison between the three texts. Of the several diaries of the Siege of Quebec, the best known is that of Father Jean-Félix Récher, which was published in 1959 by the Société historique de Québec². Another, *le Journal du Siège de Québec en 1759*, written by Jean-Claude Panet, was published in 1866³. A third, by an anonymous author, discovered in the archives of the Séminaire Notre-Dame, was printed by Aegidus Fauteux in 1921, in the first Report of the Archivist of the Province of Quebec (pp. 137-241).

The present booklet presents three other eye-witness accounts by people

(1) The principal reference book is still *The Siege of Quebec and the Battle of the Plains of Abraham*, Doughty, Arthur and Parmelee, G.W., in 6 volumes, Québec, Dussault & Proulx, 1901.

(2) *Journal du siège de Québec*, Jean-Félix Récher, Québec, Société historique du Québec, Cahiers d'histoire, No. 11, 1959. Text presented and commented by Rev. Honorius Provost, Archivist of the Séminaire de Québec.

(3) *Journal du siège de Québec en 1759*, Panet, Jean-Claude, Montreal, Eusèbe Sénécal, 6, 8, 10, rue Saint Vincent, 1866.

who were personally involved in the dramatic events of 1759; one a narration written after the Siege, and the others diaries or logbooks which narrate the day by day development of the situation.

The identity of only one of the authors is known to us: the Narration of the Siege of Quebec in 1759 (*Relation du siège de Québec en 1759*) was written by a nun of the Hôpital Général of Quebec, Sister Marie de la Visitation (Marie-Joseph Legardeur de Repentigny, daughter of Pierre)⁴.

The English version we give here was published in 1826 on the occasion of the unveiling, by Governor General Lord Dalhousie of the Wolfe-Montcalm monument in what was then the Saint-Louis Palace grounds. The translator is unidentified.

The Diary of the Expedition on the Saint Lawrence River . . . etc, in the handwriting of a British officer or soldier, was published in the New York Mercury, on Monday, December 31, 1759 (No. 385)⁵.

The other diary, better known as *The Siege of Quebec in 1759*⁶, is a manuscript document, a copy of which was brought back from London, England by Denis Benjamin Viger⁷, and published in 1836. The author must have been an officer in the French army. This text is published in English for the first time, we think, thanks to the excellent work of the Translation Service of the Quebec Department of Communications.

As is but natural, the *Relation* is more sensitive than the two diaries written by military men. In a vivid, colorful style the author, a cloistered nun, has the gift of etching brilliant miniatures of the various events which occurred during the siege. The account's originality derives from the author's special

(4) *Relation du siège de Québec en 1759*, printed at the offices of *The Mercury*, Buade Street, Québec in 1855.

(5) *Diary of the Expedition on the St. Lawrence River, etc.*, published in the *New-York Mercury*, (No. 385) dated New-York, December 31, 1759. 16 octavo pages. Translation published by *The Journal of Québec* in 1855.

(6) *Copy of a manuscript in the Hartwell Library, England*, 41 octavo pages, Fréchette et Cie, 8 rue de la Montagne, Québec. The original manuscript is now in the Archives of the Séminaire de Québec.

(7) Denis Benjamin Viger (1774 — 1861)

A leading political figure in Québec in the first half of the XVIIIth century. Elected to the Assembly in 1808, he was the constant supporter of his cousin, Louis-Joseph Papineau. In 1828 and 1831, he went to London to explain the French Canadian viewpoint. In 1838, he was charged with inciting the people to revolt and imprisoned for 19 months. Under the Union, he continued to play an outstanding rôle on the Canadian political scene. He was the cousin of Jacques Viger, first Mayor of Montreal.

viewpoint, for we are given the impressions of a home front observer (the Hospital General was beyond range of the British artillery), living in a kind of neutral area in which the dedication to the sick of these nursing sisters makes abstraction, one might say, of national rivalries.

Although the author skims fairly rapidly over the events leading up to September 13, and the Battle of Abraham's Heights itself, she dwells on events which followed, notably the counterattack led by Lévis, and all the various problems the situation imposed on the nuns of her hospital.

The Journal of the Expedition on the Saint Lawrence River . . . etc. is, all things considered, a dispassionate narration of events, at times bordering on the statistical. Yet, in spite of the apparently dispassionate tone, we can read between the lines the terror the Indians inspired in the British throughout the siege. Certain passages are blatantly partial, and leave no doubt as to the nationality of the author, who is mainly interested in the course of events leading up to September 13.

Le Siège de Québec en 1759 is a copy of an original document annotated by Commodore Schomberg, and later given by him to one Captain Smyth, through whose care it finally reached the Hartwell Library, in England, where it still is. It is presented here in English for the first time, we think, from a copy made in 1831, and printed in Quebec in 1836.

This account is longer and more detailed than the first two documents. Not only does it give a lively account of the incidents of the war, but it provides precious information on the civil and military administration during the final days of the French Régime. The notes were presumably added by Commodore Schomberg, who hastens to rectify certain affirmations made by the author. The diary is limited to events leading up to September 13, and the defeat of Montcalm is very briefly related in a footnote by the British commentator.

To this diary is appended another document, obtained likewise by Denis Benjamin Viger, this time from a private collection, and brought by him to Canada from England, and published at the same time as the Diary. It is a Memorial, or Petition, addressed to the Prime Minister of England, William Pitt.

John Denis de Vitré was the son of the same Denis de Vitré who, under duress, had piloted Admiral Durrell's fleet as far as Québec in 1759. The document reveals a case of treason, at first sight of little importance, but which in the long run was of great consequence for the outcome

of the struggle between France and England. In his Memorial, the traitor's son goes so far as to claim a pension from the British Government, in gratitude for the services rendered by his father to that country at the time of the Siege of Quebec in 1759.

He claims that, by going over to the English, his father had sustained considerable financial and material losses, and that his mother had been deprived of her pension since her return to France. The petitioner makes himself out a victim of injustice, since he has been unable to obtain certain advantages on account of the attitude of his family still in Canada. In a pathetic appeal, he insists on his own service record in the British Navy, not omitting to emphasize his kinship to several families of the French nobility.

His dealings with the English Government constitute nonetheless an admission of the "eminent services" his father rendered to the British during the Siege of Quebec in 1759.

The present booklet, published originally in French, has been published in response to the great number of requests made for an English version by English-speaking visitors to Place Royale in the last two years.

Jean Claude Hébert

SIEGE OF QUEBEC,

IN

1759.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.

NARRATIVE of the doings during the SIEGE OF QUEBEC, and the conquest of CANADA; by a NUN of the General Hospital of Quebec, transmitted to a religious Community of the same order, in France.

MY VERY REVEREND MOTHERS,

As our constitution requires us to consult the other establishments of our Congregation, in any difficulties that may occur, tending to impede the progress of our holy Institution, it must also give you the same power, I imagine, when necessary to promote our edification. The simple narration, which I am about to give you, of what passed since the year 1755, when the English determined to use every effort to acquire this colony; the part we took, by the immense labours which were consequently imposed upon us, will be the subject.

The General Hospital is situated in the outer limits of Quebec, about half a mile from the walls.

The fire, * from which our Sisters in Quebec have lately suffered, having rendered it impossible for them to continue their charge of the sick, Mr. Bigot, the In-

* The Hotel Dieu (nunnery) had been recently destroyed by fire, communicated by an incendiary.

Footnotes in *italics* were added either by the original authors, by copyists, or by the editors of previous editions. Notes added in the preparation of the present edition are in roman typeface.

SIEGE OF QUÉBEC IN 1759

Translated from the French

NARRATIVE of the doings during the Siege of Quebec, and the conquest of Canada; by a Nun of the General Hospital of Quebec, transmitted to a religious Community of the same order, in France.

My very reverend Mothers,

As our Constitution requires us to consult the other establishments of our Congregation, in any difficulties that may occur, tending to impede the progress of our holy Institution, it must also give you the same power, I imagine, when necessary to promote our edification. The simple narration, which I am about to give you, of what passed since the year 1755, when the English determined to use every effort to acquire this colony; the part we took, by the immense labours which were consequently imposed upon us, will be the subject.

The General Hospital is situated in the outer limits of Quebec, about half a mile from the walls.

The fire,* from which our Sisters in Quebec have lately suffered, having rendered it impossible for them to continue their charge of the sick, Mr. Bigot, the *Intendant* (or Governor) of the country, proposed that we should receive them in our hospital. We readily agreed so to do; being desirous of rendering service and zealously fulfilling the duties of our calling, the Sisters lost no time in entering upon the sacred work. His Majesty, attentive to the wants of his subjects, and being informed of the preparations making by the English, did not fail to forward succour to the country, consisting in numerous vessels, laden with munitions of war and provisions, of which we were entirely destitute; and several regiments, who landed in a deplorable state, unfit for service, a great many men having died soon after.

** The Hotel Dieu (nunnery) had been recently destroyed by fire, communicated by an incendiary.*

They were suffering from malignant fever¹. All the sick, officers and privates, were conveyed to our hospital, which was insufficient to contain them; we were therefore compelled to fill most parts of the building, even to the church, having obtained the permission of the late bishop Pontbriand, our illustrious prelate. He whose zeal and charity all must readily acknowledge, being desirous of partaking in the labours of the Almoners, passed days and nights in ministering to the sick and dying; exposing his life in the midst of infection, which contributed materially to affect his health and to abridge his days. He had the misfortune to lose four of his Almoners, who perished in a few days from the pestilential infection they inhaled in their attendance upon the sick. He ministered to them himself, and his charitable attentions were readily bestowed upon his flock generally. The heavy duties with which we were charged, seemed to touch his noble heart; the loss of ten of our youngest Nuns affected him most sensibly. In their last moments they were not without consolation, conscious of having done their duty. They prayed that God would be pleased to receive them as acceptable victims in appeasing his wrath; but this was only a small portion of the bitter cup of affliction prepared for us. The loss deprived us of the power to attend to all the calls upon us, arising from our numerous patients. The bishop caused ten Nuns to come to our assistance from the Hotel Dieu of Quebec; who, full of a sense of their duty, really edified us by their exertions, and indefatigable zeal, in attending day and night upon the sick. Our gratitude towards their community increased from day to day. The poverty of our establishment did not admit of our assisting them in their distress as we desired, their house having been destroyed by fire. Let us now, dear Mothers, endeavor to give you some details of a war and captivity, which our sins have drawn upon us. Heaven, so far favorable to our supplications, preserved us on several occasions. The most holy Virgin, patroness of this country, having baffled the efforts of the enemy, enabled our vessels to escape their vigilance, and the tempests and storms of the ocean. But alas! want of sufficient gratitude, deprived us of a continuation of her protection. Still, during the first attacks of our enemy, we continued to enjoy it; every where they appeared, they were beaten and repulsed with considerable loss. The taking of† of Fort St. George and several others, of which they were deprived, are proofs. The victories we obtained at Belle Rivière and at Carillon, were most glorious; our warriors returned crowned with laurels. They probably, did

† Fort Chouagen probably.

not return thanks to the God of armies, to whom they were indebted for success, as it was miraculous; their small numbers, without heavenly aid, could not so completely have accomplished it. Thereupon, the enemy, despairing of vanquishing us, ashamed to retreat, determined to fit out a formidable fleet, armed with all the artillery that the infernal regions could supply for the destruction of human kind. They displayed the British flag in the harbour of Quebec on the 24th May, 1759.* On the receipt of intelligence of their arrival, our troops and militia came down from above. Our Generals left garrisons in the advanced posts, of which there is a great number above Montreal, in order to prevent the junction of their land forces, which it was understood were on the march², from Orange. Our Generals did not fail to occupy most points where the enemy might land; but they could not guard them all. The sickness suffered by our troops, lately from France, and the losses they sustained in two or three recent actions with the enemy, though victorious, weakened us considerably; and it became necessary to abandon Point Levi, directly opposite to and commanding Quebec. The enemy soon occupied it and constructed their batteries; which commenced firing on the 24th July, in a manner to excite the greatest alarm in our unfortunate Communities of religious ladies³.

The reverend Mother Saint Helen, Superior of the Hospital, wrote to us the same day, supplicating admission into our House, for herself and her Sisters. Although we could not doubt that our building would be speedily filled with wounded from the siege, we received our dear Sisters with open arms. The tears which we shed and the tenderness exhibited towards them made it evident that we were happy to share with them the little comfort that remained to us. We surrendered the rooms to them, and confined ourselves to our dormitories. We were not long before another dislodgement took place. Next day at six o'clock in the evening, we beheld in our meadows the reverend ladies of the Ursuline Convent, who seized with fright, occasioned by the shot and shells, which had penetrated the walls of their dwelling⁴, were hurrying towards our asylum. It became necessary to find place for upwards of thirty Sisters, who were received with no less tenderness and affection than was exhibited to the ladies of the Hospital.

* This is erroneous — On June 26, 1759, the first division of the English squadron came to anchor opposite the church of St. Laurent, Isle of Orléans. On July 1, several frigates hove in sight of Québec; and it was not till the 4th of the same month that the entire squadron anchored at the entrance to the Basin.

It now became necessary to ascertain how we should accomodate ourselves. On the arrival of the English fleet, all the families of distinction, merchants, &c. capable of maintaining themselves, were removed to Three Rivers and Montreal, thereby relieving the garrison during the seige. Several members of our families and others whom we could not refuse, sought shelter with us, being at hand to succour their husbands and sons who might be wounded. As our house was beyond the range of the enemy's artillery, the poor people of the city did not fail to seek refuge there. All the out-houses, stables, barns, garrets, &c. were well filled⁵.

The only consolation we enjoyed was that of daily seeing our Bishop, tho' in a dying state, exhorting and encouraging us not to relax in our good works. He was induced to retire from his capital, his palace and cathedral being reduced to ashes. He would not quit his flock while any hope remained of saving them; he lived with the curate of Charlesbourg, three miles from Quebec. He permitted the several Almoners to celebrate Mass in our Choir, the Church being occupied by the wounded. Most people of the neighbourhood assisted at Mass, so that we were extremely crowded. It was consolatory to us, that we were enabled to have divine service during the seige, without interfering with the attentions to the sick and wounded. The only rest we partook of, was during prayers, and still it was not without interruption from the noise of shells and shot, dreading every moment that they would be directed towards us. The red-hot shot and carcasses⁶ terrified those who attended the sick during the night. They had the affliction of witnessing the destruction of the houses of the citizens, many of our connexions being immediately interested therein. During one night, upwards of fifty of the best houses⁷ in the Lower Town were destroyed. The vaults containing merchandise and many precious articles, did not escape the effects of the artillery. During this dreadful conflagration, we could offer nothing but our tears and prayers at the foot of the altar at such moments as could be snatched from the necessary attention to the wounded.

In addition to these misfortunes, we had to contend with more than one enemy; famine, at all times inseparable from war, threatened to reduce us to the last extremity; upwards of six hundred persons in our building and vicinity, partaking of our small means of subsistence, supplied from the government stores, which were likely soon to be short of what was required for the troops. In the midst of this desolation, the Almighty, disposed to humble us, and to deprive us of our substance, which we had probably amassed contrary to his will, and with too great avidity, still mercifully




Fig. 2 The Bishop's Palace in 1759, from a drawing by Richard Short. The artist's viewpoint is the middle of Mountain Hill. The foundations of this palace lie buried under Montmorency Park. The engraving shows part of the palisade, hastily set up by the defenders when the enemy fleet came in sight on the St. Lawrence.

preserved our lives, which were daily periled, from the present state of the country.

Our enemy, informed of our destitute condition, was satisfied with battering our walls, despairing of vanquishing us, except by starvation. The river was the only obstruction we could oppose to the enemy; it likewise interfered to prevent our attacking them. They remained long under our eyes, meditating a descent; finally they determined upon landing at Beauport. Our army, always on the alert, being apprised by the advanced guard, immediately rushed to the spot, with that ardour natural to the French nation, without calculating upon the many causes likely to wrest the victory from their grasp.

The enemy, more cautious in their proceedings, on observing our army, hesitated in landing all their forces. We drove them from our redoubts, of which they had obtained possession. They became over whelmed, and left the field strewed with killed and wounded. This action alone, had it been properly managed, would have finally relieved us from their invasion⁸. We must not, however, attribute the mismanagement solely to our Generals; the Indian tribes, often essential to our support, became prejudicial to us on this occasion. Their hideous yells of defiance tended to intimidate our foes, who instead of meeting the onset, to which they had exposed themselves, precipitately retreated to their boats, and left us masters of the field. We charitably conveyed their wounded to our hospital, notwithstanding the fury and rage of the Indians, who, according their cruel custom, sought to scalp them. Our army continued constantly ready to oppose the enemy. They dared not attempt a second landing; but ashamed of inaction, they took to burning the country places⁹. Under shelter of darkness, they moved their vessels about seven or eight leagues above Quebec. There they captured a great number of prisoners, including women and children, who had taken refuge in that quarter. There again they experienced the valour of a small garrison of invalids, commanded by an officer, having one arm only, placed there in charge of military stores. The enemy, after a severe struggle, succeeded in capturing them.

After remaining in vain nearly three months at anchor in the Port, they appeared disposed to retire, despairing of success; but the Almighty, whose intentions are beyond our penetration, and always just, having resolved to subdue us, inspired the English Commander with the idea of making another attempt before his departure, which was done by surprise during the night. It was the intention, that night, to send supplies

to a body of our troops forming an outpost of the heights near Quebec. A miserable deserter gave the information to the enemy, and persuaded them that it would be easy to surprise us, and pass their boats by using our countersign¹⁰. They profited by the information, and the treasonable scheme succeeded. They landed on giving the password; our officer detected the deceit, but too late. He defended his post bravely with his small band, and was wounded. By this plan the enemy found themselves on the heights near the city. General De Montcalm, without loss of time, marched at the head of his army; but having to proceed about half a league, the enemy, had time to bring up their artillery, and to form for the reception of the French. Our leading battalions did not wait the arrival and formation of the other forces to support them, they rushed with their usual impetuosity on their enemies and killed a great number; but they were soon overcome by the artillery. They lost their General and a great number of officers. Our loss was not equal to that of the enemy; but it was not the less serious. General De Montcalm and his principal officers fell on the occasion.*

Several officers of the Canadian Militia, fathers of families, shared the same fate. We witnessed the carnage from our windows. It was in such a scene that charity triumphed, and caused us to forget self-preservation and the danger we were exposed to, in the immediate presence of the enemy. We were in the midst of the dead and the dying, who were brought in to us by hundreds, many of them our close connexions; it was necessary to smother our griefs and exert ourselves to relieve them. Loaded with the inmates of three convents, and all the inhabitants of the neighbouring suburbs, which the approach of the enemy caused to fly in this direction, you may judge of our terror and confusion. The enemy masters of the field, and within a few paces of our house; exposed to the fury of the soldiers, we had reason to dread the worst. It was then that we experienced the truth of the words of holy writ: "he who places his trust in the Lord has nothing to fear."

* It is the memorable battle of the 13th September, 1759, which took place on the Plains of Abraham, that is alluded to. The Official account of the English loss on this occasion, is as follows:

Officers, Serjeants and privates killed	61
Officers, Serjeants, Drummers and privates wounded	598
Soldiers missing	5
Total	664

After the battle, several French officers admitted their loss amounted to nearly 1500 men, killed, wounded and prisoners.

But tho'not wanting in faith or hope, the approach of night greatly added to our fears. The three sisterhoods with the exception of those who were dispersed over the house, prostrated themselves at the foot of the altar, to implore Divine mercy. The silence and consternation which prevailed, was suddenly interrupted by loud and repeated knocks at our doors. Two young Nuns, who were carrying broth to the sick, unavoidably happened to be near when the door was opened. The palor and fright which overcame them, touched the officer, and he prevented the guard from entering; he demanded the appearance of the Superiors, and desired them to assure us of protection; he said that part of the English force would entour and take possession of the house, apprehending that our army, which was not distant, might return and attack them, in their intrenchments; — which would certainly have taken place had our troops been enabled to reassemble before the capitulation. Soon after we saw their army drawn up under our windows. The loss we had sustained the day before led us to fear, with reason, that our fate was decided, our people being unable to rally. General De Lévi, second in command, who became chief on the death of De Montcalm, had set out, some days previous, with about 3000 men, to re-inforce the upper posts, which were daily harassed by the enemy.

The loss we had just sustained, and the departure of that force, determined the Marquis De Vaudreuil, Governor General of the Colony, to abandon Quebec, being no longer able to retain it. The enemy having formed their entrenchments and their Camp, near the principal gate; their fleet commanding the Port, it was impossible to convey succour to the garrison. Mr. De Ramsay, who commanded, with a feeble garrison, without provisions or munitions, held out to the last extremity.

The principal inhabitants represented to him that they had readily sacrificed their property; but with regard to their wives and children, they could not make up their minds to witness their massacre, in the event of the place being stormed; it was therefore necessary to determine on capitulation.

The English readily accorded the articles demanded, religious toleration and civil advantages for the inhabitants. Happy in having acquired possession of a country, in which they had on several previous occasions failed, they were the most moderate of conquerors. We could not, without injustice, complain of the manner in which they treated us. However, their good treatment has not yet dried our tears. We do not shed them as did the good Hebrews near the waters of Babylon, we are still in the land

of promise; but our canticles will not again be heard until we can shake off this medley of nations, and until our temples are re-established; then we will celebrate, with the utmost gratitude, the merciful bounty of the Lord.

After the capitulation of Québec, all that remained of the families of distinction followed the French army to Montreal. His lordship the Bishop, having no place to dwell in, was compelled to follow their example. Before his departure, he made all necessary arrangements in his Diocese; he appointed Mr. Briand Vicar General, who is justly considered a godly man, and of such established merit, that our enemies could not withhold their approbation, and, I may say, their veneration of him. He maintained his rights and those of his curates, in such a manner as to meet with no obstacles from the English. The Vicar selected our house for his residence; beholding us charged with an infinite number of people, without resourcès, exposed to many evils, — he did not consider us safe but under his own eyes. He was not mistaken; and, in the end, we were much indebted to him.

The reduction of Québec, on the 18th September, 1759, produced no tranquillity for us, but rather increased our labours. The English Generals came to our Hospital and assured us of their protection, and at the same time, required us to take charge of their wounded and sick.

Although we were near the seat of war, our establishment had nothing to fear, as the well understood rights of nations protected Hospitals so situated, still they obliged us to lodge a guard of thirty men, and it was necessary to prepare food and bedding for them. On being relieved they carried off many of the blankets, &c. the officer taking no measures to prevent them. Our greatest misfortune was to hear their talking during divine service.

The Sisters from the other Convents determined to return to their former dwellings. It was very painful for us to part with them. Their long residence with us, and the esteem and affection created thereby caused our separation to be most sensibly felt. The Revd. Mother St. Helen, Superior, observing us overwhelmed with work, which was daily augmenting, left us twelve of her dear Sisters, who were a great relief to us. Two of the Ursuline Sisters were too weak to be removed, and they terminated their days with us. The fatigues and sickness they endured, with much patience and resignation, merited I trust, an eternal reward. The departure of the dear Sisters, gave us no additional space, as it became necessary to place the sick of the English army in the same apartments.

Let us now return to the French. Our Generals not finding their force sufficient to undertake the recovery of their losses, proceeded to the construction of a Fort, about five leagues above Quebec, and left a garrison therein, capable of checking the enemy from penetrating into the country. They did not remain inactive, but were constantly on the alert harassing the enemy. The English were not safe beyond the gates of Quebec. General Murray the commander of the place, on several occasions was near being made a prisoner; and would not have escaped if our people had been faithful. Prisoners were frequently made, which so irritated the Commander, that he sent out detachments to pillage and burn the habitations of the country people.

The desire to recover the country and to acquire glory, was attended with great loss to our citizens. We heard of nothing but combats throughout the winter; the severity of the season had not the effect of making them lay down their arms. Wherever the enemy was observed, they were pursued without relaxation; which caused them to remark, "thay they had never known a people more attached and faithful to their sovereign than the Canadians."

The English did not fail to require the oath of allegiance to their King but, notwithstanding this forced obligation, which our people did not consider themselves bound to observe, they joined the flying camps of the French, whenever an opportunity offered¹¹.

The French forces did not spare the inhabitants of the country; they lived freely at the expense of those unfortunate people. We suffered considerable loss in a Seigneurie which we possessed below Quebec. The officer commanding seized on all our cattle, which were numerous, and wheat to subsist his troops. The purveyor rendered us no account of such seizures. Notwithstanding this loss, we were compelled to maintain upwards of three hundred wounded sent to us after the battle of the 13th September.

The stores of the French government, now in the possession of the English, being exhausted, we were therefore obliged to have recourse to the enemy. They gave us flour and clothing. But how little suited was it for our unfortunate wounded! We had no wine nor other comforts to afford them. Drained long since by the great numbers, nothing remained but good will. This however did not satisfy them. Our officers represented to the English commander that they were not accustomed to be treated in that manner by the King of France. The Commander, piqued by this reproach,

attached the blame to us, and required us to make a statement of what was necessary for the relief of these gentlemen, and then caused us to pay for it. (a) We flattered ourselves that the French government, more just, would be proud to reimburse all our extra expenses, which were unavoidable at this time¹². (b) The desire to obtain our rights and recover the country, induced us to do our utmost in support of the cause. As we had in our Hospital many French soldiers of the garrison of Quebec, and of the sufferers in the action of the 13th, they implored us, when their strength was re-established, to allow them to fly and join the army; we readily agreed to it, and furnished them with clothing and provisions, to enable them to accomplish their object, which drew upon us the most severe reproaches and menaces from the enemy. They threatened to allow us to die from starvation.

As our house was still full of sick, the Grand Vicar, who attended closely to our welfare, removed several of the Almoners, who contributed to embarrass us, from the scarcity of provisions. He and the reverend Mr. De Rigauville, our Chaplain, administered to the sick, and attended them in their last moments, night and day.

We have at this time upwards of two hundred English, who occupy our dining rooms and dormitories; and as many French, in our infirmaries, leaving us merely one small room to retire into. There assembled, and left to our reflections, we anticipated the worst. All communication with our friends being interrupted, we knew not what was passing in the upper parts. Our enemies, better informed, announced the approach of our army; the measures they adopted, and the additional fortifications they constructed in Québec, supported by a strong garrison, caused us to dread the result of the struggle. On our side we had false prophets; women painting in their imaginations sieges, without mortars or cannon; the town taken by assault. Nothing more was required to stir and animate those who were eager for the fray.

(a) Note — That, apart from what Monsieur Cadet, the supply officer, had seized and taken from our farm, as above mentioned, a certain Grandmaison also took five cows and eight oxen, of which the supply officer did not consider it necessary to render account, since Monsieur Grandmaison had commandeered them as supplies for the Indians from the Lower River who had been brought up to help defend Québec.

(b) Refreshments supplied to the French Officers. The British Government had ordered them to be supplied, and charged the Community for them, a matter of about three thousand livres, which the Community did not even have a hand in distributing, since the French Officers simply took them and distributed them as they thought fit. It is nonetheless true that the British Government exacted payment for them.




Fig. 3 A map of Quebec in 1759, titled in English on the original drawing Quebec engineer Chaussegros de Léry.



As soon as the season appeared suitable for campaigning, our army followed the ice, scantily provided with provisions, and still less with artillery suited for a siege. Our Generals did not doubt the valour of the troops; but they only flattered themselves with the prospect of success, in the event of the arrival of succour from France. In the expectation of their arrival, our army commenced their march; they arrived near Quebec on the 26th April. The 27th was employed in landing the few guns brought from Montréal. An artilleryman in landing, fell on a loose piece of ice, which floated him directly opposite to the city. The extraordinary conveyance attracted the attention of the sentinels; they notified the Commander, who immediately sent relief to the artilleryman. He was brought before the Commander, and questioned. The poor man, seized with fright, after his dangerous escape, was quite unprepared for evasion; he candidly acknowledged that he was one of the French army, who were within two leagues of Quebec. He related how he had been transported down the river against his will. So far the march of the army had been secret¹³. The secret being now developed, it appeared to us a bad omen; an event governed by a power beyond our reach or opposition. The English Commander, General Murray, informed by this means, lost not a moment. He immediately withdrew a strong advanced post, stationed about a league from Quebec, with their cannon, and blew up the Church of St. Foy¹⁴, which had served as a shelter for the troops; after which he summoned a council of war, and appeared to be alone of opinion that it was expedient to march out with a considerable portion of the garrison, and take up a strong position, establish his batteries, and there meet the enemy. This proposal did not meet with the sanction of the majority; but, notwithstanding, he carried it into execution.

Our army, ignorant of the information accidentally obtained by the garrison, continued their march. During the night of the 27th and 28th it rained incessantly. The heavens appeared to contend against us. The thunder and lightning, very rare at this season, seemed to be the forerunner of the shock to which our forces were about to be exposed. The rain falling in torrents, and the roads rendered impracticable by the melting of the snow, prevented their marching in good order. General De Bourglamarque, second in command, at the head of the leading battalions, came in sight of the enemy before forming his men. The enemy's artillery lost no time in opening a destructive fire upon them, which placed many hors de combat. The General was wounded and forced to retire. The main body of our troops, marines and militia, better acquainted with the roads,

arrived in time to support a regiment, which was near being cut to pieces, rather than retreat. The action then became most furious and general. The English having had the choice of position, possessed considerable advantage. Our army did not expect to find their foes drawn up in order of battle; they were consequently compelled to halt, and not finding the ground suitable for extending their lines, the first divisions had to bear the brunt of the fire. The main struggle took place near Quebec, on a height opposite our house. Not a shot was fired which did not resound in our ears. Judge, if possible, what must have been our situation; the interest of our country, and our close connections were amongst the combatants, producing a state of anguish it is impossible to paint. The Grand Vicar, at present our Bishop, who suffered equally with us, exhorted us to bear the shock with resignation and submission to the decrees of the Almighty; after which he retired to the church, penetrated with the deepest affliction, and threw himself at the foot of the altar, where he poured forth his prayers, imploring with confidence that the divine ruler of events would be pleased to stay the deadly conflict, and spare the flock confided to his care. He then arose full of hope, in order to proceed to the field of battle, notwithstanding our remonstrances, which were not urged without reason, as he must be exposed to great danger. He was induced to proceed to the field, because he apprehended that there were not a sufficient number of clergy on the spot to minister to the dying, who he believed were very numerous.

Mr. De Rigauville, our Chaplain, full of zeal, was desirous of following the Grand Vicar. He was not without anxiety, his only brother, and several of his nearest connections being in the army. He had the satisfaction of seeing the enemy turn their backs and fly. The engagement lasted two hours. The intrepidity and valour of the French and Canadians drove the enemy from their strong position, and followed them up under the guns of the city. We remained masters of the field, and of their cannon, and made many prisoners. The enemy retired within the walls, and dared not again venture out. The victory, however, was dearly bought, and caused many tears to flow.

M. De Lévi, on approaching Quebec, assembled a council; it was proposed to blow up our house, fearing that it might be a rallying point for the enemy. But God was pleased to spare us and them; he opened their eyes, and convinced them that it was most essential to their purposes. The French commander directed us to dismiss all persons who had taken refuge in our establishment, as he looked to us as the only persons capable of

taking charge of the wounded during the siege, about to be commenced. We did not fail to answer, that we would proceed to empty our house, with the exception of two hundred English sick, which it was not in our power to remove; but in other respects we were always ready to second his intentions, and to render all the service in our power.

After the battle he sent us an officer with a French guard, which however, did not free us from the English guard. It became necessary to find room for them. But this was but the prelude to what was yet to happen. It would require another pen than mine to depict the horrors which we were compelled to witness, during twenty-four hours, which were occupied in the reception of the wounded; their cries and the lamentations of their friends were truly heart-rending. It required supernatural strength to bear such scenes.

After having prepared upwards of five hundred beds, which were procured from the public stores, as many more were required. — Our stables and barns, were filled with these unfortunate men. It was very difficult to find time to attend to all. We had in our Infirmeries seventy-two officers, thirty-three of whom died. We saw nothing but amputation of legs and arms. To crown our distress there was a deficiency of linen; we were under the necessity of giving our sheets and our body-linen. The French army did not fail to provide that article, but unfortunately, the vessel conveying their stores from Montreal was captured by the English.

In this instance we were differently situated from what we were after the battle of the 13th September; we could not expect assistance from the religious ladies of the city; the English had taken possession of their establishments for the reception of their wounded, who were more numerous than the French. About twenty officers of the English army who were left wounded on the field, were also brought to us.

Reverend Mothers, — as I give you this account, merely from memory, of what passed under our eyes, and with a view to afford you the satisfaction of knowing that we sustained with fortitude and in an edifying manner the painful duties, imposed upon us by our vocation; I will not undertake to relate to you all the particulars of the surrender of the country. I could do it but imperfectly, and from hearsay. I will merely say that the majority of the Canadians were disposed to perish rather than surrender; and that the small number of troops remaining were deficient of ammunition and provisions, and only surrendered in order to save the lives of the women and children, who are likely to be exposed to the greatest peril where

towns are carried by assault.

Alas! Dear Mothers, it was a great misfortune for us that France could not send, in the spring, some vessels with provisions and munitions; we should still be under her dominion. She has lost a vast country and a faithful people, sincerely attached to their sovereign; a loss we must greatly deplore, on account of our religion, and the difference of the laws to which we must submit. We vainly flatter ourselves that peace may restore us to our rights; and that the Almighty will treat us in a fatherly manner, and soon cease to humble us; we still continue to experience his wrath. Our sins, doubtless, are very great, which leads us to apprehend that we are doomed to suffer long; the spirit of repentance is not general with the people, and God is still offended. We, however, yet entertain the hope of again coming under the dominion of our former masters.

You must, no doubt, have learned that the English, moved and wearied by our importunities, have granted us a Bishop for this unfortunate colony. Their choice, and ours, has fallen upon one who was born in our Province of Brittany. This then should not leave you indifferent, for there is a man who has brought glory and happiness to his country. It is unnecessary to dwell upon the merits and virtues of the man who comes to us.

Such a choice in these critical times speaks for itself. I will say only that the late M. De Pontbriand, who knew him perfectly, having always been near him, chose him and entrusted him with the Diocese during his illness. He acquitted himself with so much dignity that at the death of this holy Bishop, the Chapter appointed him Grand Vicar, to the satisfaction of the French, and of the English who had him go last year to London for consecration in some Province and then return to take possession of his diocese.* My dear Reverend Mothers, join us in our prayers that he may return at an earlier time. We deluded ourselves in thinking that his absence would last only seven or eight months, and now the year will soon be at an end without our knowing the length of time Providence has ordained to fulfill our wishes and to ensure the salvation of these poor people whose only hope for the renewal and continuation of their rites lies

* Bishop Henri-Marie Dubreuil de Pontbriand died in Montreal on June 8, 1760. His successor, Bishop Jean-Olivier Briand, went to England towards the end of 1764 and, with the consent of the King of England, received his Bull of Appointment from Pope Clement XIII, dated January 21, 1765. He was consecrated on March 16 of that same year in Paris, in the chapel of Sainte-Marie de Merry. He returned via England and arrived in Quebec on June 28, 1766.

in their Bishop. For us, the general interest, in addition to the particular interest we have, the loss of this country would have been our loss without his intercession and protection which has gained us that of the English. Our convent and propriety would have been sold to satisfy the debts contracted to support the French troops; our creditors were compelled by order of the Governor to desist from their persecutions. To him our establishment is indebted for its present existence.

Honour is due to Mr. Briand for having kept our cloister intact, which would have been impossible had he not, through his own acts of charity and the means given him by Providence, delivered us from our poverty denying himself the necessities of life to provide for ours. His pity for us was all the greater since he saw that the disturbance of our temporal life was not our doing but that of the court, which is indebted to us in the sum of one hundred and twenty thousand livres¹⁵, for expenses incurred for the maintenance of French troops. We look for no compensation for our services; He to whom we devote ourselves will repay us a hundredfold. We are threatened with becoming a public burden, which we cannot believe, as the English Court having witnessed the expenses we have incurred, will plead our cause with France who would do us such a serious injustice. Should this happen we shall have to trust in Providence.

JOURNAL
DE
L'EXPÉDITION
SUR LE
FLEUVE SAINT-LAURENT,

CONTENANT UN RAPPORT DÉTAILLÉ DES MOUVEMENTS DE LA FLOTTE
ET DE L'ARMÉE ANGLAISES, DEPUIS LE MOMENT DE SON EMBAR-
QUEMENT, A LOUISBOURG, JUSQU'A LA REDDITION DE
QUÉBEC, EN 1759. (*)

Extrait du *New-York Mercury*, No. 385, daté de New-York,
31 décembre 1759.

Le premier juin, 1750, nous nous embarquâmes sur les transports stationnés à Louisbourg, qui devaient nous conduire en Canada.

Le 4.—Nous fîmes voile vers le St. Laurent dans les eaux duquel, nous ne sommes entrés toutefois que le 16,—à environ quarante lieues au-dessus de l'embouchure du fleuve nous jetâmes la sonde, nous mesurâmes 100 brasses.

Le 19^e jour, nous n'avions qu'une faible profondeur d'eau, 17 brasses environ; et le 23, nous atteignîmes l'Amiral Durell qui, avec sept vaisseaux de ligne et quelques frégates, protégeait la Rivière vis-à-vis l'Île-aux-Coudres. Cette île est dans une position agréable. Son sol s'élève graduellement. Elle était bien peuplée avant notre apparition sur ses bords. Nous jetâmes l'ancre à environ une

(*) Ce Document Anglais que nous publions aujourd'hui, ne peut en aucune façon engager notre responsabilité. Le respect que nous devons à l'histoire et aux documents de toute nature, qui peuvent en constituer les sources et les témoignages, est supérieur même à nos sympathies nationales.—*L'Éditeur.*

A JOURNAL OF THE EXPEDITION UP THE RIVER ST-LAWRENCE;

containing a true and particular Account of the Transactions of the Fleet and Army, from the time of their Embarkation at Louisbourg 'til after the Surrender of Quebec.

New York Mercury, Monday, December 31, 1759.

On the 1st of June, 1759, we embarked on board the transports at Louisbourg, bound on the expedition to Canada. The 4th Day we set sail for the river St. Lawrence, which we made on the 9th, and were 'til the 16th before we got into it. For about 40 leagues up the river, the depth of water is 100 fathoms. The 19th day we came into 17 fathom water; and on the 23^d we joined admiral Durell, who with 7 sail of the line, and some frigates lay as guard to protect the river at the isle of Coudre¹.

This island is pleasantly situated, lies partly nigh, and was very well peopled before we came up. And passing this island about a league up, we anchor'd and two of our small boats went in shore and was attacked by a small party of Canadians and Indians, and were obliged to retreat to their ships.

The 25th, we made the out end of the isle of Orleans, and on the 27th landed on it without the loss of a man. A small party of the rangers were almost surrounded by a large party of Indians; but the rangers rush'd through them with the loss of only one man, what damage the enemy sustained is uncertain.

The 29th, The French sent down five fire ships amongst our fleet; but did no damage². The same day we march'd 6 miles under the Command of Colonel Carlton, and encamped that same night in sight of the French army, and likewise in sight of the town. General Monckton's Brigade and a party of rangers landed on the south side; we had a small attack, by which we had 3 killed, 2 wounded and 4 taken prisoners.

July 1st, the enemy came against our detachment on the south side of

the river with floating batteries³; but our shipping soon drove them off. The same day the Louisbourg grenadiers went a-foraging; we had two killed and scalp'd belonging to the 22^d regiment⁴.

The 5th, a barge was sent between the island and the main land to sound the depth of water; the French fired four cannon shot at her, and came down on a large bar of sand, from whence they fired small arms; also five canoes came down the river, full of Indians, who took the barge, made one man prisoner and wounded another. On the same day their floating batteries attacked our shipping; they were soon obliged to quit their firing. Gen. Monckton open'd a small battery upon the south side; the first day they cannonaded and bombarded on both sides, but lost not a man.

The 8th, we landed on Quebec shore, without any interception, and marched up the river about 2 miles, when the Louisbourg grenadiers were ordered out to get fascines⁵. They had scarce set down to take a small refreshment, and detach'd a small party of rangers to guard the skirts of the wood, before a large party of Indians surrounded them, kill'd and scalp'd thirteen, wounded the captain-lieutenant and nine privates; they likewise kill'd and wounded 14 royal Americans, wounded 2 of the 22^d and one of the 40th regiment, we got only 3 prisoners and kill'd two of the savages.

The third day our shipping was drove off by the enemy's shells. We got only some few prisoners, 'til the 12th day, when the French built a battery against us, but had not time to mount any guns on it, for we soon demolish'd it with our field pieces and hautzers. The 14th day their floating batteries came out after our boats, but soon drove them back again. The 17th we set the town on fire, about 12 o'clock, which continued burning all that day⁶.

On the 17th, we went out a-fascinating, and to make oars, with a small party to cover us, 5 were killed, of which 4 were scalp'd, and we were oblig'd to quit the wood directly; the Indians came up very near, and killed and scalp'd one man close by us; the grenadiers of the 45th regiment fired upon them, and kill'd one, but the Indians carried him off; we had five killed and three wounded; but our people returning upon them, made them fly so fast that they were oblig'd to leave their match-coats, with several other things behind them; but could not get one of them prisoners. A deserter came to us, from whom we got some account of their forces which, however imperfect gave us some encouragement.

The 18th, the deserter went out with the light infantry, to show them a place to cross the falls; the Indians fired on them, but hurt none; likewise the same night some of the shipping pass'd the town, and one run ashore on the south side the river. The 19th day the floating batteries came out to attack our shipping round the harbour: but our batteries on the land side drove them off, so that the shipping received but two shot.

The 21st, all the grenadiers cross'd over to the island of Orleans; the Indians attacked us very smartly as we were marching to the water side. The same day the enemy open'd two batteries on us, which raked our camps. Our troops with seamen, stormed a battery on the south side, spiked the cannon⁷, broke the mortars, broke into their magazine, took all their powder, and threw their shot and shells into the water.

The 22^d, set the town on fire, which burnt all the next day; some of the shipping attempted to pass the town, but the enemy fired so hot at them, they were obliged to turn back.

The 23^d, 300 provincials landed on the island of Orleans, which was some reinforcement.

The 25th, the Louisbourg battalion and three more companies of grenadiers, with three companies of light infantry, went round the island of Orleans. The 27th they arrived again at the camp; and received the news, that our forces on Montmorency side had been attack'd the day before, and had got the better of the enemy, in which 'twas said they had 300 kill'd. Our loss was five officers and 32 privates, 12 of whom were kill'd, the rest wounded. The same day went to get the plunder which was discover'd on the march round the island, consisting chiefly of wearing apparel, and some cash. The same night the French sent down five fire-floats, which were tow'd ashore by the men of war's boats, where they were burnt without doing our shipping any damage.

The 29th, Atway's, Hopson's, Whitmore's and Warburton's grenadiers went on board two transport-ships, the rest in flat-bottom boats, with a full intent to land on a part of the French shore; so as by that means we might come at the town; the first push we made was on the 31st of July, with 13 companies of grenadiers, supported by about 5000 battalion men; as soon as we landed we fixed our bayonets, and beat the grenadier's march, and so advanced on; during all this time their cannon play'd very briskly on us; but their small arms, in their trenches, lay cool till they were sure of their mark; then they pour'd their small shot like showers of hail, which caus'd our brave grenadiers to fall very fast; the General saw that our

attempts were in vain, retreated to his boats again; the number of the kill'd and wounded that day was about 400 men; in our retreat we burnt the two ships which we had ran ashore on that side to cover our landing⁸.

The 3^d of August, a party of Capt. Danks's rangers went from the island of Orleans to Quebec's side, 9 leagues down the river; they were attack'd by a party of French, and was smartly engag'd for the space of half an hour; but the rangers put them to flight, kill'd several and took one prisoner; the rangers lost the lieutenant, who died of his wounds, and two or three privates. They got a great deal of plunder.

The 4th, the French made an attempt to cross the falls, but our hawits and cohorns obliged them to retreat without accomplishing any thing.

The 8th, two sentinels being at the falls, they took an Indian and brought him prisoner to the General, who sent him on board the Admiral. At 12 o'clock at night we threw a carcass and one shell on the enemy's battery of nine guns⁹, which blew up their magazine, platforms, and burnt with such violence that some of the garrison were obliged to get into boats to save themselves from the flames. The 9th day we set the town on fire, being the third time.

On the 10th the French sent down a sort of floating battery; one of the ships boats being sent out to see what it was, and just as the seamen were going to get on it, it blew up and killed one midshipman, and wounded 4 sailors. The same day about thirty sailors went a-plundering on the south side of the river, but were surprised by a party of Indians and drove off, with the loss of their plunder.

The 11th, there was an engagement between our scouting parties and the Indians; our people drove them off; we had several killed and wounded.

The 12th we had an account of Gen. Murray's going to land above the town; he made an attempt to land twice, and was beat off; he made the third attempt, and landed on the south shore with the loss of about 100 killed and wounded. The same day we had an account from the enemy, that General Amherst's army was in such a bad condition, that they were obliged to return back again¹⁰.

On the 13th we had an account by a deserter from the enemy, that they were in great want of provisions¹¹, and that a body of French and Indians were come over the falls, the same side our army was on, had with them four days provisions, and were there still.

DEFENCES OF QUEBEC.

Batteries.	Canons.	Men.
A. The Citadel.	80.	600.
B. The Clergy on the Point.	10.	50.
C. Salineau's Battery.	10.	50.
D. The Hospital.	10.	50.
E. A New Battery over the City, pointed through Pointe à la Pivoine.	10.	50.
F. Quebec Battery, on the Pointe à la Pivoine.	10.	50.
G. New Battery on the upper part of the Pointe à la Pivoine.	10.	50.
H. New Battery on the lower part of the Pointe à la Pivoine.	10.	50.
I. Royal Battery.	10.	50.
J. Dauphin's Battery.	10.	50.
K. New Battery.	10.	50.
L. New Battery.	10.	50.
M. New Battery.	10.	50.

Authentic Plan of the River St. Lawrence, with the Operations of the Siege of Quebec.

Fig. 5 English map of the Siege of Quebec, describing all the operations.

The 15th, Capt. Gorham returned from an incursion in which service were employed, under his command, 150 rangers, a detachment from the different regiments, highlanders, marines, etc. Amounting in all to about 300; an arm'd vessel, three transports, with a lieutenant and seamen of the navy to attend him; of which expedition they gave the following account: "That on the 4th of August they proceeded down to St Paul's bay, where was a parish containing about 200 men, who had been very active in distressing our boats and shipping. At three o'clock in the morning, Capt. Gorham landed, and forced two of their guards, of 20 men each, who fired smartly for some time; but that in two hours he drove them all from their covering in the wood, and clear'd the village, which they afterwards burnt; it consisted of about 50 fine houses and barns; destroyed most of their cattle etc. That in this they had one man killed and six wounded; but that the enemy had two killed and several wounded, who were carried off. That from thence they proceeded to Mal Bay, ten leagues to the eastward on the same side, where they destroyed another very pretty parish, drove off the inhabitants and stock without any loss; after which they made a descent on the south shore, opposite the isle of Coudre, destroyed part of the parishes of St Ann's and St Roc, where were many handsome houses with good farms, and loaded the vessels with cattle, and then returned from their expedition¹².

The same day a party of highlanders came to the isle of Orleans from General Monckton's encampment, in order to destroy all the Canada side. The same day our people set one of the enemy's floating batteries on fire; and in the night General Monckton set the town on fire, (being the 4th time) and the flames raged so violently that 't was imagined the whole city would have been reduced in ashes.

The 18th the enemy hove a bomb from the town which killed one of our men and wounded 6 more.

On the 20th the Louisbourg grenadiers began their march down the main land of Quebec, in order to burn and destroy all the houses on that side. On the 24th, they were attacked by a party of French, who had a priest for their commander; but our party kill'd and scalp'd 31 of them¹³, and likewise the priest their commander; they did our people no damage. The three companies of Louisbourg grenadiers halted about four miles down the river, at a church called the Guardian Angel, where they were ordered to fortify themselves till further orders¹⁴; our people had several small parties in houses, and the remainder continued in the church. The 25th,

they began to destroy the country, burning houses, cutting down their corn, etc. At night the Indians fired several scattering shot at the houses, which killed one highlander and wounded another; but they were soon repulsed by the heat of our firing: It was said that the number of the enemy consisted of 800 Canadians and Indians. Sept. 1st. They set fire to the enemy's houses and fortifications, and then marched to join the grand army at Montmorency.

The 26th of August, a serjeant of the 35th regiment deserted across the falls, and tho'our people fired several shot at him, he got clear off to the Enemy.

The 27th, some of our shipping went past the town, notwithstanding the enemy kept a constant firing of shot and shells at them, tho' without doing them much damage. The 29th, five sail more pass'd the town, up the river, amidst the constant firing of the enemy; and on the 30th, four more of our vessels passed the town without receiving any considerable damage from the enemy's batteries ashore tho' they kept up a very brisk fire upon them as they pass'd up. September 1st, all the sick and wounded that were on Montmorency side, came over to the isle of Orleans. On the 2^d inst. a large body of Wolfe's troops came over with the Louisbourg grenadiers, and encamped that night on the same island.

The 3^d day all the enemy left Montmorency side, they set all the houses and fortifications on fire, and then embark'd in flat-bottomed boats and came up above them; the French fired very brisk all the time of their passing, but did them no damage. They went over to Point Levee and encamped there.

The 4th, The Louisbourg grenadiers and the remainder of the army cross'd over to Point Levee from the isle of Orleans, and encamped there. The same day four men came from General Amherst's army; they were 26 days on their journey, and informed us, that we were in possession of Ticonderoga and Crown-Point.

The 5th, about 5 or 600 men march'd up the river, on Point Levee side, to go above the town, and carried one month's provision up in sloops¹⁵. The same day one of the Royal Americans, who was taken prisoner by the French Indians on the 31st of July, made his escape and came to the Porcupine sloop of war, which lay a little below the fall; he inform'd us, that there was but about 300 Indians with the enemy, that carried arms; but that there was a great number of women and children, and that they were

very scant of provisions; likewise that he himself had been 48 hours without any thing to eat; he further said that the enemy were very numerous in their intrenchments consisting of at least 14,000 men, of which 11,000 were Canadians and the rest regulars, the latter of whom were heartily tired of the seige.

The 6th, the schooner Terror of France, went above the town, in the middle of the day, as she pass'd the enemy kept up a constant fire at her, and she received several shorts in her sails, but lost none of her hands.

The whole army being on Point Levee side, the main body were ordered to get ready to march above the town, on the south side, and to take with them only one shirt and one pair of stockings, besides what they had on: they marched up the river about eight miles, and then embarked on board the men of war and transports that were up the river; the number that embarked was 3349 men, with a party of the train of artillery.

The 10th, the weather being very wet, and the troops very much crowded on board the men of war and transports, the General thought proper to land them on the south side again; which was a great decoy to the French¹⁶; we then marched to the church of St. Nicholas, under the command of General Monckton, where we halted. The next day we received intelligence of a small number of French and Indians, who were driving some cattle; we dispatched a party of 500 men, who took the cattle but the enemy got off.

The 12th, we received orders to embark on board the transports again, and to hold ourselves in readiness to land next morning at day light, under the heights of Abraham; accordingly we landed at break of day, and immediately attacked and routed a considerable body of the enemy¹⁷ and took possession of their battery of 24-pounders, and one 13-inch mortar, with but a very inconsiderable loss on our side. We then took post on the plains of Abraham, where M. Montcalm (on hearing that we were landed for he did not expect us) hasted with his whole army, consisting of cavalry as well as infantry, to give us battle; about 9 o'clock we observ'd the enemy marching down towards us in three columns, at ten they formed their line of battle, which was at least six deep, having their flanks covered by a thick wood on each side, into which they threw above a 1000 Canadians and Indians, who gaul'd us much. We got two six pounders to fire against the enemy very soon, six more, besides two royal hawitzers¹⁸, came up while the enemy were making haste to attack before our artillery should be got up, as they dreaded our quick firing; accordingly their regulars then

BEC, Sep. 13. 1759.



Fig. 6 Positions of the opposed forces at the battle of September 13, 1759.

marched briskly up to us, and gave us their first fire at about 50 yards distance, which we did not return, as it was Gen. Wolfe's express orders not to fire 'till they came within 20 yards of us; they continued firing by platoons advancing in a very regular manner, 'till they came close up to us, and then the action became general: Our artillery fired so briskly, seconded by the small arms from the regiments, who behaved with the greatest intrepidity, order, and regularity, with a cheerfulness which foretold victory on our side, and in about 15 minutes they gave way, so that we fairly beat them in open field, drove them before us¹⁹, part into Quebec, the rest ran precipitately cross St. Charles river, over a bridge of boats, and some thro'the water, The enemy lost in the engagement, Lieutenant General Montcalm, who had three wounds from our six-pounder grape, of which he died next day; one Colonel, two Lieut. Colonels, and at least 1500 officers and men killed and wounded, and 200 taken prisoners at the very sally-posts, of which many were officers. We lost the brave Gen. Wolfe, who received three wounds, but had the satisfaction before his death to see his own Plan so executed as to beat the enemy totally; he then said: "I thank God, now I shall die contented." were his last words. Brigadier General Monckton; Col. Carlton, Quarter-master-General; Major Barry, adjudant-general, and several other officers were wounded²⁰.

At four in the afternoon, M. Bougainville appeared in the rear, with about 1500 foot and 200 horse, upon which Brigadier Gen. Burton, with the 35th and 48th regiments marched to the left to receive him but he no sooner saw our dispositions made to engage him than he faced to the right about, and made a most precipitate retreat.

At ten o'clock at night we surprised their guard and took possession of their grand hospital²¹, wherein we found between 12 and 1500 sick and wounded.

We remained that night on the field of battle, and on the 14th in the morning we secured the bridge of boats they had over Charles river, and possessed ourselves of all the posts and avenues that were or might have been of any consequence leading to the town and began to prepare for attacking the garrison in form, and got up for that purpose, twelve heavy 24-pounders; six heavy 12-pounders, some large mortars, and the 4-inch hawitzers, to play upon the town, and had been employed three days, intending to make a breach, and to storm the city sword in hand, but were prevented by their beating a parley, and sent out a flag of truce with articles of capitulation, and next day being the 18th of September, the articles were signed (see

Hutchin's Almanac) and we took possession of the city, where we found 180 pieces of cannon, from 2 to 36 pounders; a number of mortars with a large quantity of artillery stores, etc. etc.

The day after the engagement the enemy abandoned Beauport, leaving behind them about 30 pieces of cannon, and 4 mortars, having first set fire to all their floating batteries, and blown up their magazine of powder.

M. Vaudreuil, the governor-general of New-France, stole out of the city before the capitulation²²; leaving only about 600 men, under the command of Mons. Ramsay, by whom the capitulation was signed. The poor remains of the French regulars, with about 10,000 Canadians, retired to Jacques Quartiers under the command of M. Levy, but the Canadians deserted from him in great numbers, and came in and surrendered themselves.

Sept. 19th., the French garrison were embarked on board transports; such of the inhabitants as would come in and take the oath of allegiance were permitted to enjoy their estates.

Brigadier General Murray is governor of the town, and the whole army left to garrison it.

During the whole siege from first to last, 535 houses were burned down²³, amongst which is the whole eastern part of the lower town (save 6 or 8




Fig. 7 Two four-pounder French cannon captured by the English at Québec in 1759 and subsequently taken to the Tower of London (Document, British Museum).

houses) which makes a very dismal appearance.

The enemy were above double our number by their own confession, besides their Indians, and were entrenched, had breast-works, fletches, redoubts, shore and floating batteries etc. The enemy kept a diligent look out up St. Lawrence river, from thence to hinder any communication with Gen. Amherst, and had intercepted two officers and four Indians coming from him to us. We burned and destroyed upwards of 1400 fine farm houses, for we during the siege were masters of a great part of their country along shore, and parties were almost continually kept out ravaging the country; so that 'tis tho't it will take them half a century to recover the damage.

A return

of the Killed and wounded of the army under the command of General WOLFE at the Battle of Québec, September 13, 1759.

	Killed										Wounded						Total
	Captains	Lieutenants	Ensigns	Sergeants	Rank and File	Gunners	Captains	Lieutenants	Ensigns	Sergeants	Drummers	Rank and File	Bombardiers	Gunners	Matrosses	Total	
Regiments																	
Amherst	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	5	8	
Bragge	—	—	—	—	2	1	—	4	—	5	—	52	—	5	1	63	
Atway	—	1	—	1	3	—	3	1	1	4	1	39	—	—	—	54	
Kennedy	—	1	—	—	6	—	2	4	—	1	—	28	—	—	—	42	
Lascelles	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	1	2	—	18	—	—	—	24	
Webb	—	1	—	—	1	—	2	4	2	1	—	26	—	—	—	37	
Anstruther	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	3	
Monckton	—	—	1	1	8	—	2	1	1	3	—	80	—	—	—	97	
Lawrence	—	—	—	—	5	—	1	3	2	2	1	80	—	—	—	94	
Fraser	1	2	—	1	14	—	2	5	3	7	—	131	—	—	—	2	
Louisburg grenadiers	—	1	—	—	3	—	1	4	—	—	—	47	—	—	—	166	
																56	
																	Total 656

Major-Gen. Wolfe, killed.
 Brigadier Monckton.
 Col. Carlton, Q.M. General.
 Major Barry, adjt. General
 Major Spittle, wounded.

SIÈGE
DE
QUEBEC,
EN 1759.

COPIE D'APRES UN MANUSCRIT
APPORTÉ DE LONDRES, PAR
L'HONORABLE D. B. VIGER,
LORS DE SON RETOUR EN CANADA,
En Septembre 1834. — Mai 1835.

COPIE D'UN MANUSCRIT DÉPOSÉ A LA BIBLIOTHÈQUE DE
HARTWELL EN ANGLETERRE.

QUEBEC :
DES PRESSES DE FRECHETTE & C^{ie},
NO. 8, RUE LAMONTAGNE.
—
1836.

THE SIEGE OF QUÉBEC — 1759

Copy of a manuscript in the Hartwell Library, England, brought to Canada by Denis-Benjamin Viger in 1835

The following note explaining how this manuscript came to this library is written on the back of the cover.

J.H. LEE HARTWELL

May 1831

Presented to the Hartwell Library by Captain W.H. Smyth, R.N.

This manuscript was given to Captain Smyth, by Captain, now Commodore Schomberg, son of Sir Alexander Schomberg, who wrote the notes which are in the margin.

Sir,
Mr. Garneau, who works for me, profited from the moments during which he was free of his duties to copy the manuscript journal written during the siege of Québec and deposited in your Hartwell Library and which you were good enough to send me to have a copy made. I too profit, in sending it back, from the first period of leisure my own occupations have left me to request that you accept my expressions of gratitude for what I consider a gift to my country; I regret that the author of the work is unknown; I would like to be able to discover his name. Meanwhile I must say that he gives proof of a truthful character which renders him precious in my eyes; a good many of the author's observations are in keeping with traditions I have myself collected on the state of affairs in the country during that very important epoch in the history of Canada.

Pray accept the assurances of respect and gratitude with which I have the honour,

Dear Sir,
to be

Your very humble
and obedient servant,
(Signed) D.B. VIGER

London Coffee House,
Ludgate Hill,
May 28, 1832.

Dr. Lee
London.

1759 — May 1 to May 10

Some prisoners taken by different parties and brought to Montreal as early as the beginning of May, all unanimously* . . . that great preparations were being made in the English colonies for the invasion of the whole of Canada. They spoke of three different attacks to be made at the same time, which would involve over 60,000 men.

These rumors were very credible, but either through indolence or lack of food supplies, as was said, little thought was given to taking the necessary precautions, particularly to protecting Québec from attack. It was the place most threatened with the largest forces, which people did not want to believe, considering the river to be an impenetrable boulevard because so difficult to navigate.

The de la Reyne battalion and the Government of Québec's two de Berry battalions were nevertheless sent to Carillon although they were the most distant; to relieve this Government which was considered the most depleted (although it was not, as there will later be occasion to remark) M. de Bourglamarque was sent to command this front and it was decided that M. de Montcalm and the other generals would remain at Montréal waiting for the enemy's plans to become better known, when they would remove to those places where the need was most pressing.

May 10 to May 20

The first news from France, brought to Québec on the 10th by M. de Bougainville, along with all the letters from the court began to open eyes to Canada's danger. The letters from the minister and all those from Europe revealed England's massive arming against Canada and the too apparent probability of the siege of Québec. On the other hand, consideration of the small number of vessels sent for the army supply officer and the fear that no more would be received threw all into consternation and led to a thousand projects but no decision as to which would be adopted.

M. le marquis de Montcalm strongly opined that it was essential to go to Québec to examine the position of the place and its surroundings, and consider, without losing a moment, how it could be put in a state of defence.

It then became obvious that an error had been made sending off the

* reported. *This word was omitted in the original and is supplied here to render the meaning.*

three battalions already mentioned, that precious time would be lost in having others come down.

M. de Montcalm arrived in Québec around the 20th and the very next day news arrived from the small posts set along the river of fifteen English vessels anchored at Bic¹. Such a bold undertaking so early in the season had a numbing effect. The north-east wind which had been blowing constantly for some days, followed by the clearest blue sky (which everyone said had never been seen in this climate) led to the belief that the enemy fleet would gather in a day or two at St. Bernabie² and that with good weather, it could reach Québec before thrice twenty-four hours had passed.

Alarm was universal throughout the country; no troops in Québec, a town open on all sides; no plan of operation or defence; everyone hurried to pack his belongings and send them to Trois-Rivières or Montréal for safekeeping.

M. de Vaudreuil arrived in the midst of this chaos; council upon council was held to which anyone who pretended to importance was invited but no decisive resolution was urged.

Orders were sent to hasten the departure of regular troops from their quarters and assemble the militia of the Governments of Montréal, Trois-Rivières and Québec.

At the beginning of May orders had been sent down the river from Québec commanding the settlers to make hiding-places in the woods to which their wives, children and belongings could be sent upon the approach of the enemy; couriers, officers, were therefore sent to carry out these orders and in particular to completely evacuate Isle aux Coudres and Isle d'Orléans. These orders, so precipitate and doubtless given without much thought as to the possibility of the enemy fleet's coming straight up the river, did more harm to thousands of settlers than the enemy could have done; many families were ruined by this haste; three-quarters of the livestock perished and for a long time, Isle aux Coudres and Isle d'Orléans which supported at least 5000 head of cattle, will not recover from their loss, not to mention some of the settlers, women and children, who unfortunately perished after gathering at one end of the islands without having first provided for boats to transport them or food supplies to live on and places to withdraw to.

The first surprise past however, the work to be done was organized

in an orderly fashion; it was decided to enclose the town within palisades, put up batteries at all the most appropriate points, that is along the ramparts of the place or along the shore where a descent seemed easy³.

May 20 to May 30

All the colony's forces gradually gathered at Québec and on the 25th of the month, there were 1000 able-bodied men, including the colonial land forces, the militia, seamen and savages; they were camped below the town; they were detailed to the different works and by the end of the month palisades had been raised, batteries built and the town protected from a surprise attack. During this time, the north-east wind having doubled in strength, the English squadron could not hold on at Bic but was forced to go up river in spite of itself and came to Isle aux Coudres; the surprising thing is that under a strong wind and without accident, it managed to drop anchor in the safest and best place without a pilot.* This news gave rise to renewed consternation; no one doubted that the entire fleet followed. Our seamen, who had always held this passage to be a navigational feat, which was readily believed in view of the unfortunate accidents which so often befell our vessels, blushed to see that the English had so easily succeeded without any danger. Councils were immediately held to decide upon the obstacles which could be brought against the enemy by water; it was decided to sink two or three large merchant ships in the place called the Traverse⁴ which all our seamen confidently held to be less than six hundred and fifty feet wide⁵; success was considered assured because it was said that only one ship at a time could pass through. As a precautionary measure, men were sent to examine the place, but they discovered it was over one mile wide and that almost an entire fleet could go through it abreast. This report caused as much surprise as the first news of the arrival of the enemy, so great was the government's ignorance of everything concerning this country, even ten leagues from the capital, and because of the little credit which could be given the knowledge of the seamen whose understanding does not extend beyond their own interests and the means of making a fortune. This project was therefore abandoned; another tack was adopted; it was decided to sacrifice eight of the largest merchant vessels to make of them fire-ships; to build fire-rafts⁶, gunboats and a floating battery, a new invention which would cost

* The copy in appendix of J.D. de Vitré's petition reveals that his father, an English prisoner-of-war, piloted the English fleet to Québec.

as much as a 50-gun ship. Adventurers, encouraged by the large reward promised in order to attract them, offered to burn the enemy vessels with brimstone bombs which they had invented and experimented with in public. These preparations made, it was resolved to await the arrival of the enemy vessels before Québec.

A colonial captain (M.D.L.N.) had been sent to the Isle aux Coudres with a detachment of three hundred men and was to be joined by all the settlers from that and other areas: this gave him a considerable body of men. This officer, as soon as he perceived the first enemy vessels in the distance, hastily evacuated the island to the great despair of the settlers who believed the well-treed island could be held and the English rebuffed to great advantage each time they should endeavour to land and that should the enemy prove too strong, they would always be in a position to retreat without danger to parts of the island whose waters were unnavigable. Events justified their point of view since the English waited eight days before daring to put a man ashore and sent only very small parties, and that only after having seen from the crow's nest that there was no sign of settlers.

The enemy took full advantage of this desertion to prepare stores and disembark their sick who were increasing in number each day.

During this time, the highly placed and most influential persons sent their belongings and those of the King to Trois-Rivières or to some of the ships from France; the main frigates were ordered two leagues upstream from Québec to the Anse des Mères to prevent the enemy's descending from that side.

June 1 to June 10

Once the first fright had passed and it became clear that even if the entire enemy fleet were assembled at Bic, it would still take three weeks to reach Québec since a large fleet cannot go as fast as one individual vessel, thought was given to putting a little more order into the various arrangements.

The first step was to pay a little more attention to the consumption of food supplies the lack of which, becoming more evident from day to day, was growing more redoubtable than the enemy.

It was also recognized that there was sufficient time to extend defences against a descent far beyond the main place. The troops were divided into different corps, as far as Beauport, about two short leagues away.

Some were employed in building breastworks on the right bank of the River Saint Charles, some in building a bridge and regularly strengthening the head; others in building redoubts in places where a descent seemed easiest. During that time, it was reported that the settlers on the Isle d'Orléans, before evacuating the island, had hidden their grain in the woods, but in such a way that it could very easily be found. Orders were given to have the grain recovered on condition however that those who declared themselves the owners be paid. The quantity of corn thus recovered amounted to 20,000 minots, a prodigious volume for an island of less than 2500 settlers, without counting the other places which could not be found and the grain the inhabitants must have taken as supplies for themselves; evident proof that the scarcity had never been real and that the shortage felt was rather the result of vice within the government administration than of a material lack.

At the same time a detachment of 150 Canadians and 100 savages was put under the command of a single officer (named Berville), to go in the direction of the Isle aux Coudres, engage the English who had landed and ambush them in the woods with which the entire island is covered; but for no special reason, this officer stopped short at sight of the island and limited his mission to contemplation of the English vessels. Four or five Canadians, indignant at being reduced to idleness, escaped under cover of night and approached the island; and with morning they surprised three young men, killed their mounts and took the men back with them unharmed. They were three midshipmen placed on vedette duty to send signals should they sight vessels to the south; one of them was the grandson of Admiral Rudel*, the squadron commander.

Since this detachment returned having accomplished nothing, two others were sent out under other officers considered more able; one to station itself on the Isle of Orleans, the other to go downstream on the north side of the river.

A bad habit which has always existed in Canada, which may be noted in passing is that of putting sometimes 200 or 300 men under one officer rather than several, which would be very easy in view of their large number. The officers could observe and control each other and their timidity would not go unpunished. Moreover, the more officers there are, the more the men are heartened.

* Error. The rear-admiral's name was Durell

During this time, it was learned that the English squadron had advanced to the foot of the Traverse, doubtless to sound and reconnoitre it. Everyone then expostulated against the failure to take the precaution of sending one of the frigates out to rebuff the small vessels which would come to sound the Traverse, it being very obvious that the large ships would not venture forward before the Traverse had been properly studied and that a frigate could without any danger push back or sink to the bottom any scout vessel that might come.

The supply officer⁷ offered his two frigates for this purpose, each mounted with 28 cannon, requesting security only for their cost price in France should they be lost; but doubtless out of caution or for reasons of economy, this proposal was not accepted and the small English ships had every opportunity to sound and mark the Traverse.

Several meetings were held to discuss what to do with the Lower Town; some were for its total destruction, since it was completely open on the river side; others opined that only the roofs of all the homes should be removed to prevent their catching fire, which could spread to the houses in the Upper Town; neither of these points of view were given attention. (Québec in truth would be nothing were the Lower Town destroyed). It was decided to enclose it insofar as was possible either with walls or palisades and to mount as many cannon as possible the fire of which would be destructive⁸.

Through negligence, fire caught in one of the fire-ships just as it was completed, because of the inattention or ignorance of the workers; twelve men perished in the blaze and great was the fear that the fire would spread to the town or the other vessels in the roads, which fortunately it did not.

The Governor of Montréal, in command of the town while all the generals were absent, wrote then that he was petrified because of the large number of prisoners in that place and the small number of troops he had to contain them. Orders were sent to have them taken down to Trois-Rivières and divided among the vessels from France which had been sent up from Québec.

A victory in favor of the English, once they had made their descent, being feared, it was decided to have ovens built from Québec up to Trois-Rivières and to prepare stocks and little stores in different places to secure a retreat.

The troops were ordered at the same time to keep only a minimum of

necessary equipment and send the rest to the rear.

The news brought from Carillon still did not announce any movement by the English from that side; only on our side was every precaution taken for evacuating to St. Jean and ceding the land foot by foot as the enemy forced us back with its superior strenght, for St. Jean was regarded as the only place where it was necessary to face the enemy whatever their number, and consequently to vanquish or perish.

Since the north-east wind continued to favour the English, as has been remarked, they could recognize the most dangerous part of the river with the greatest ease and finally, news was received to the effect that seven or eight fully armed vessels had passed through the Traverse and that they had anchored abreast of the Isle of Orleans 5 leagues from Québec.

This news did not cause any fright since messages from down-river did not annouce the arrival of any vessel other than a ship so small it was hardly visible.

Experienced hands *said** that if the English fleet was still in the ports of Halifax and Louisburg, they would be unable to leave in the strong north-east wind and that there was therefore more than enough time to make all the planned preparations.

These preparations included finding out how red-hot shot could be fired on the English ships should they appear in the bason but it is rather amusing to note that in the entire colonial artillery corps not one person was ready to learn how to heat the cannon balls⁹.

The fire-ships completed, the person who was to command them was ordered to sail them one league upstream from Québec and there to take up positions and have them ready to leave the moment it was time.

The arrival of the English fleet and the time of their descent still appearing distant, it was decided to increase the number of redoubts planned for Beauport; council was held on the operations to be carried out should the enemy be victorious at this stage. M. le marquis de Montcalm felt as always that *one*† battle alone could favorably decide the future of Québec¹⁰; he insisted that few or no persons be left in the place and that the corps destined to combat the enemy be made as large as possible, quite persuaded that an army outside the walls of a town sooner or

* This word was omitted in the original.

† This word was omitted in the original.



Fig. 9 A Louis-Joseph de Saint-Véran, marquis de Montcalm, commander of the land forces in Canada.



B Pierre de Rigaud, marquis de Vaudreuil, first governor-general born in Canada.



C James Wolfe, Brigadier General, commander of the English forces.



D Sir Charles Saunders, Rear-Admiral commanding the English fleet.

later forces it no matter how numerous the defenders; this was all the more true in the case of Québec since the town has no fortification and, at the most, is protected only in that it can ward off a surprise attack.

June 15 to June 20

That part of the English squadron, consisting of eight vessels, that had passed through the Traverse and anchored abreast of the Isle of Orleans seeming to be deterred to remain there, discussions were held on means of incommoding them.

A seaman suggested that one of the fire-ships be sent around the island by the north to throw itself among the English vessels from behind and that a few fire-rafts be launched on the ships on the opposite side at the same time.

The positions were reconnoitered however, and on the basis of the report, four cannon were sent to the Isle of Orleans but without effect; the boat with the artillery having been perceived by the English, they detached four or five armed longboats to seize it; as they approached a few canoes with savages aboard suddenly appeared and put them to flight; one of the longboats, however, not advancing fast enough, fell into their hands and they took eight prisoners.

The prisoners, when questioned, said that the entire fleet was to meet at the Trou St. Patrice which is the name of the place where their vessels were at anchor, that in truth they had not yet received any news of the fleet but that the rendezvous was fixed at that place for the first day of July.

They said further that eight or ten days earlier their squadron had been reinforced by three ships of the line and two frigates which had not been able to leave with the squadron.

At the same time it was decided to reinforce the detachment on the Isle of Orleans by sending 500 or 600 Canadians there and a few troops of savages newly arrived from up the river, to prevent the English from landing until such time as their fleet were superior or even to delay their landing once they were in a position to make it.

The works within the walls apparently finished, attention was turned to discovering to what use the merchants of the town could be put. M. de Bernetz, former commander of Roussillon, was appointed to act as second-in-command of the place and, in this capacity, to dispose and organize

the burghers and use them as guards for the gates of the place.

At this time, a proclamation was posted obliging the settlers, with whom officers detailed to various parts had left their effects for safekeeping to go to declare them to the war commissioner so that he might see to their preservation amidst all these troubles.

It may be observed in passing that the English expedition seemed much further away than it had at first appeared; such a delay could only be extremely prejudicial to the colony.

Had they appeared after the first moment of consternation, courage and animosity would have compensated for the works which did not then exist and this first heated moment would have augured favourably for victory.

The ardour seemed to weaken, on the other hand, with the delay: the Canadian is an impatient man and yearns only for a prompt decision on his fate.

The number of redoubts and entrenchments within the place and beyond the field increased prodigiously every day because of the great number of men employed on the works, but, on the other hand, the consumption of food supplies was prodigious, partly because of the large number of men to be fed, perhaps also because the distribution had never been made in a very orderly or regulated fashion; it was to be feared that when the moment of action arrived, the stores would be exhausted and it would no longer be possible to hold the field.

The news brought from Carillon during this period still did not say that the English had begun their campaign on that side; they gave mention only of an accident to one of the bastions of the fort which had been destroyed in a fire imprudently set and had killed or injured a few men.

June 20 to June 23

The dispositions made to go and cause damage to the English at anchor abreast of the Isle of Orleans all proved fruitless. The fire-ship sent, having been discovered, was forced to flee to shore. The fire-rafts were unable to leave because of a small revolt among the Canadians who were to man them and who refused to cooperate upon hearing the rumor spread among them that they would be hanged if taken by the enemy.

The adventurer who was supposed to set fire to one of the largest ships with brimstone bombs returned after having lost his artifice on the road,

saying that the weather was not favorable and the enemy's guard too vigilant.

With the food supplies running lower every day and there being no doubt that there remained great amounts of corn in the countryside, but which it was not possible to obtain because of the discredit of paper money or the lack of confidence in those at the head of the government, it was suggested that an order be given inviting all the officers and those who had gold or silver coin to bring it to the Intendant who would give them bills of exchange on sight from the royal treasury or his own banker, holder of his own considerable funds, and that such coin would be used to buy corn, it being believed that the settler would willingly cede some of his surplus at sight of such solid payment.

This expedient does not seem to have produced much effect, although there was no doubt that there was much minted gold and silver in the country and that the owners were not in difficulty; but on the one hand lack of confidence caused people to keep a tight fist on their money, and on the other, the settler suspected a trap such as those of which he had often been the dupe and victim.

The new arrivals from downstream announced the arrival of a large number of vessels of all sizes and a second courier 24 hours later said they could not be counted and that although the wind was very contrary, a large part was already anchored at Isle Verte.

The estimation made from all the counts gathered amounted to 164 vessels, which, according to the prisoners, was still not the entire fleet.

It was a veritable cause for amazement and surprise to see so many vessels come up the river, pass places said to be so dangerous without a single accident to any vessel, even with a contrary wind. Our seamen were disconcerted in their confidence and they had to blush more than once at the skill of the English. One of the prisoners taken by the savages said before the Governor General and all the principal officers gathered there that three days before he had been taken he had twice sounded the *Traverse* and would undertake to pilot through it, blindfolded, even the "*Royal George*", a 120-gun vessel, so slight did he consider the danger and that it was one of the safest beds in the river.

The officer of the port of Québec answered that in truth he had not sounded it for 25 years; but that in the end, when he had proposed to do so, he had been refused the amount it would have cost.

At about the same time, news arrived from the direction of Acadia that an English detachment had gone up the River St. Jean and was building a fort at the most 20 leagues from Kamouraska and 40 leagues from Québec. It was also learned that a Canadian officer who had been sent directly the snows had melted was roaming the woods thereabouts with about one hundred Canadians and was making numerous certificates* on the pretext of harrying the English in that area.

At all the redoubts and other works built on the Beauport shore to prevent a descent, a plan was made to block the River St. Charles with huge masts and spars chained together, behind which two old merchant ships were beached each with about ten cannon on the bridge for protection.

June 23 to June 27

The invitation made to the officers to change their money against bills of exchange for the first term, on the Intendant's banker or the royal treasury, whichever they chose, brought in over sixty thousand francs in silver coin, through the example of the most highly placed persons who gave what they had for such a good cause.

Some difficulties then arose among the seamen in charge of the fire-ships and fire-rafts as to who would go first. A great council was held on this occasion to which the seamen were invited and charged to give their opinion in writing.

Since councils are several times spoken of in this journal, it is a good idea to mention in passing how council is held and who participates.

One would think that in a Government such as Canada where authority resides, these councils would be held with ceremony in a decent place where each councillor would gravely expose his opinion for the good of the Government and that the number of councillors would be fixed, that, finally, these councils would be miniature copies of the councils held by the king in his court.

Not at all. A small, long and narrow chamber, two ordinary chairs one beside the other, where everyone enters *pele-mêle* — where whoever dares act important, however low his rank, can shine at ease — where everyone pushes and elbows their way — where the smaller men duck under the arms of the taller to obtain the front places — where everyone shouts — where everyone interrupts — where everyone talks at once even

* It is not known what the author wanted to say.

of things that are completely irrelevant, etc., etc., etc. Such is the place and such is the aspect of these councils.

M. le marquis de Montcalm, not being the man to instill a proper dignity in these acts, and realizing the need for results to enlighten him, requested and forced any and everybody whenever the subject was important, to give his advice in writing and keep a record of it. This was an innovation; but the need he demonstrated to at least be in a position to present a well-ordered plan of operations to the court, to serve at the same time as justification, put some order into this assembly; but by an unhappy or laughable misunderstanding this record, composed of loose sheets, was burned with other, useless papers; a misfortune soon repaired, because all the documents were found in order at M. de Montcalm's residence.

A courier arrived from Carillon bringing back letters from General Amherst, (that part) for M. le marquis de Montcalm, which contained a printed copy of the cartel between the French and English courts.

General Amherst declared that he had orders from the court to conform strictly to the terms, that he was going to give the promptest orders for their execution, and requested M. le marquis de Montcalm for his part to do as much: this same general also asked that the English prisoners receive the reimbursement he had given the French prisoners.

It is worth remarking in passing that the English generals in all their messages, never addressed themselves to any person other than M. le marquis de Montcalm, not mentioning even the Governor General of Canada; which might have sometimes created little jealousies¹¹. The reason is doubtless that the English general, not being subject to the Governor and thinking less highly of that position than of the rank of general of the army, would have thought it beneath him to address himself to another.

During this same time, it was learned that a large part of the English fleet had passed through the Traverse and that over 50 ships of all sizes were abreast of the Isle of Orleans where they could be seen manning their flat-bottomed boats.

The order was consequently given to the troops to leave their camp below Québec and to camp one and a half leagues further on at Beauport, there being no other more obvious place for a descent.

It was decided that only 1200 men would be left in the place, burghers,

seamen, in a word, everyone included, and the rest would march to the camp where 15,000 men, including the savages, several hundred of which had just arrived, were expected to assemble. The Governor-General, the Intendant, the treasurer and all the highly placed persons would follow the army; there would remain only the King's titular lieutenant, M. le chevalier de Bernetz, former battalion commander, retired with a commission as second-in-command and war commissioner, to deal with correspondence and take charge of the hospitals.

It was generally felt that the colony's salvation was in the open rather than within the walls of the town, which was sufficiently well-enclosed not to be taken by surprise and which could not be besieged by land while covered by the army.

News from Carillon and Lake Ontario remained unchanged except to say that the English had assembled at Fort Edward and Fort de Bulls.

At the sight of so many vessels opposite the Isle of Orleans, the women panicked and most of them left the city to withdraw to the country.

June 27 to July 1

June 27 was remarkable for a north-easterly squall giving rise to hopes that the English fleet would suffer great damage. The first news brought that very day was full of complete shipwrecks and ships running aground on the shore; but it turned out that the damage suffered by the English consisted only in two ships broken up and five or six of the same size grounded which could easily be put afloat again. Several flat-bottomed boats were in truth thrown onto shore and retrieved by the Canadians.

For the remainder, this all took place opposite the Isle of Orleans and it was impossible to say whether the storm had done more damage beyond the Island. The fact is that all the ships dragged their anchors and fouled each other, and had the gale lasted only one hour in all, perhaps two thirds of their fleet would have foundered.

On the morning of that same day, with a clear sky and a blue sea (the storm did not strike until the afternoon), a 60-gun vessel and two frigates came as far as Point Lévi, passed it, and remained there for some time as though to examine the lay of the land and then returned to the fleet. About the same morning, the English put some 5,000 men on the Isle of Orleans. As has already been said, there were 1200 men, Canadians and savages, on the island who would doubtless have incommoded the





Fig. 10 The attack by French fire-ships, June 28 (painting by Samuel Scott)



English while disembarking; especially during the storm when consternation reigned among them; but the day before, M. le marquis de Vaudreuil had sent orders to evacuate the island and move to the Beauport shore.

Again remarked was the same lack of foresight in not having kept on the south shore 300 or 400 savages who had stayed in Québec where they only caused disorder. They could easily have destroyed many English left high and dry on the shore when their ships ran aground.

On the 28th, the wind having veered violently from north-east to west and the entire English fleet being once again in confusion, and the night tides seeming very favourable, the moment was judged suitable for sending off the fire-ships which, had they been efficiently run, would have put an end to the enemy's undertaking.

These seven fire-ships each one a 300 or 400-tonner, which cost over 120,000 francs, were commanded by the same merchant captains who had brought them from France.

These captains were ordered to decide among themselves upon the manner of carrying out this undertaking. They had very different opinions; several of them were even noticeably lacking in resolution and courage. Their council finally ended at 10 o'clock in the evening and they immediately prepared to set sail; but without having decided on any plan of action or attack or any order to follow; they had only agreed that the commander who would be in the lead would fire two gunshots as a signal for lighting the ships.

But half an hour after setting sail, having rounded Point Lévi and still over two leagues from the enemy vessels, each fire-ship being over a quarter of a league from the others, the commander, a cowardly man lacking in character, set fire to his ship and the others coming behind him, seeing this, did likewise.

Some lieutenants pointed out to their captains that there was surely some mistake; that the enemy vessels were still over three leagues away and that the ships were being burnt for nothing; but a panicky terror had taken hold of all these captains and one of them was disordered to such an extent that he perished with his ship along with several members of his crew.

The leader's example was followed so faithfully that two fire-ships which had not yet passed Point Lévi were lit, and burned in the bason, so to speak.

The only precaution the Governor General had thought fit to take had been to send the King's procurer to the south shore to see at what distance from the enemy vessels the fire-ships were burning and to examine the disorder created. He had also ordered a detachment of 300 men to go along the same shore and pick up the crew members who were to escape by rowboat.

Such was the result of this very costly enterprise which caused the greatest apprehension among the enemy on the report of the prisoners. All the fire-ships had been destroyed by midnight and the river was covered with the thickest smoke which lasted until daybreak.

The King's procurer reported that the entire enemy fleet, (*Note*) at sight of this fire, although two leagues distant, had set sail as though preparing to withdraw, and that had the fire-ships manoeuvred as they were supposed to, every effect desired would have been attained¹².

With the new day, each and everyone, having witnessed the adventure of the night before, cried of treason and crime against the state; the populace went so far as to insult the commander of these fire-ships and demand he be tried; he went to the palace where, before many people and with as much insolence as lack of respect for his surroundings, he pretended to justify himself with the reasoning of children and fools.

To give some form to the affair, M. de Vaudreuil ordered the captains of the fire-ships to go to him at three o'clock in the afternoon when he would listen to and judge their reasons. They went and threw all the blame on their commander whose orders they had simply followed. One of the group spoke up and declared aloud that they were all guilty and deserved to be punished; that if their error were to be expiated this could only be done by giving them a remaining fire-ship; all the captains and their mates would serve as sailors to take it into the midst of the enemy fleet and thereby wipe out their shame either through death or some noteworthy damage to the fleet. This fine speech was applauded and nothing more was done about the affair which was so shameful for the colony.

July 1 to July 3

The English, seeing from our great loss in hapless fire-ships that all

(English in the original) (Note) A most flagrant untruth. The Centurion and Sutherland were the only ships which got under sail. The Great Fire ships of the enemy passed close by me in the Diana, and we lay fast at anchor as our boats were towing the enemy's ships on fire, clear of our fleet.

danger from that quarter was past, advanced with a great number of sails of all sizes to Point Lévi and four of their frigates entered the bason beyond the range of the town's cannon. That very day they landed at the tip of the Isle of Orleans and made a large camp.

The sight of such a prompt approach sent all the generals flying to the camp except M. de Vaudreuil, in fear that an attempt be made that very night.

The following day, the river was seen to be covered with a number of boats going from the Isle of Orleans to Point Lévi and a great lot of people disembarked at the latter point to take up positions at the church and in the surrounding houses. About fifty Canadians who had gone over that morning to fetch some cattle there had not yet been time to bring to the town, found themselves within shooting range of some English detachments on whom they fired from the protection of the woods where they were hidden. Two or three hundred savages ran from the town to support their fire and forced the English to rejoin the main body at the church.

Upon hearing of their success, M. de Vaudreuil judged it à propos to reinforce them with 1000 to 1200 men, Canadians and savages, on the basis of the arguments everyone made, that that area being heavily wooded, it was the natural terrain of Canadians and savages and they would surely disconcert the English however numerous they were. But at this point, the savages having brought in a prisoner from that place, it was discovered that the descent at Point Lévi was only a ruse and that that very night they were to attack at Beauport with 10,000 men. At this, the detachment was immediately countermanded and M. de Vaudreuil left for the camp with all he could take from the town; and all that night the camp and the town were kept under arms and the enemy did not appear.

The following day, savages from the town, having returned to Point Lévi, again fired on the English. M. de Vaudreuil wanted to repair the previous day's error and again gave orders to the same detachment. While commands to the proper effect were being given, he thought to return to the town and have the prisoner questioned again. The prisoner persisted in his first statement, and said that if the descent had not taken place the previous night, it would be carried out the next and that all the orders had been given in consequence; the same scene as the preceding day; the detachment countermanded, everyone went to the camp and the night was spent under arms to no purpose once again.

The next day, the English were thought to have landed at least 5,000

men on this side and much artillery; this based on the use of telescopes and on the reports from the savages and Canadians who had returned from Point Lévi; and their plan seemed to be to build batteries opposite the town and since their numbers amounted to barely 1,000* men, the camp on the Isle of Orleans had to be very poorly manned; this too seemed apparent through the telescopes. As a result of these observations, it was planned to have 5,000 men, savages, Canadians and regular troops, go over to the Isle of Orleans by night, it being believed that with the protection of the woods, the camp could be stormed but the bad weather which rose delayed the project.

During this period, a few cannon shots were exchanged between the English frigates and our gunboats, which these latter undertook without orders and without success to the displeasure of all, for the secret of their presence, which the English might not have known, was thus betrayed before the proper moment.

The three-day gunfire exchange with the Lévi coast does not seem to have produced any effect other than to wound 4 of our savages and to kill, wound or make prisoner 40 or 50 on the English side. But it is quite evident that had there been 500 or 600 Canadians and savages on the Isle of Orleans and at Point Lévi they could have killed a great number of English and perhaps even destroyed them entirely at the time of the descent or as they entered the woods; especially considering that they were only regular troops who marched in close file and dared not engage wherever the woods seemed to them to be rather thick.

Repetition of the same mistake made at the Isle aux Coudres, at the other end of the Isle of Orleans, during their first landing.

July 3 to July 5

The planned detachment, to be sent to the Isle of Orleans to attack the few English presumed to be there, was never organized: always because of the fear that during that very time the English might descend upon Beauport, that too great a number of men, more useful in case of a descent, would be required, and in a word, that responsibility for the event would be incurred. Since all the troops were assembled on the Beauport shore and the town was reduced to its own resources, so mediocre that the enemy

* There is an error in this figure, the author obviously meant 10,000 men, but omitted a zero.

could have taken it by surprise if they had been informed of its position, it was to be feared that the English, masters of the Lévi shore, might advance along the heights above the town, by sailing up river, and from there reconnoitre the terrain, find it empty of life and perhaps conceive of taking the place from that side although all the country appeared wooded. To prevent this, it was decided to send 300 Canadians to the place called Anse des Mères¹³, to camp with a sufficiently considerable quantity of tents to give the impression there were three times their number, which could not but fool the enemy.

While this was going on, the English admiral sent a letter to M. de Vaudreuil by a longboat with a blue standard to the effect that among the few captives his vessels had made were some ladies of the colony whom he was ready to send back, out of consideration for their sex, if he would accept.

There was reason to believe that this was perhaps a pretext to send an engineer disguised as a sailor to study the town's strength at closer range; this they did not manage for as soon as they were sighted, a boat was sent out to meet them which had them remain at large and took the letter.

That same day, M. de Vaudreuil answered, accepting the offer made by the English general, I mean admiral, and telling him that the young prisoners taken at the Isle aux Coudres were in perfect health, that he had given orders to ensure they lacked for nothing and that he would give orders to have them sent back, as soon as he was certain of the fleet's departure.

The following day, each side sent boats to deliver and take the ladies in question and this was the occasion for polite and courteous acts on both sides¹⁴.

That same day the four frigates anchored at the entrance to the bason were seen to advance on the Montmorency Falls side, to within range of the land cannon, a point where French vessels, even the smallest merchant vessels, had never dared anchor, so little known was the depth even half a league from Québec.

It was noted that one of their large vessels had left Point Lévi to sail downriver while all their vessels of all sizes gathered in force at that point.

It was also remarked that they were building strong entrenchments at Point Lévi and that they were making little fortified posts in front, opposite the town, while on the other hand, their camp on the Isle of Orleans grew

visibly each day.

All the men in the town were then formed into companies one of which was a reserve company composed of the most worthy merchants to guard the Government and the posts within the place; another was composed of workers to prevent fires and do whatever work proved necessary.

All the artillery in the place, in number exceeding 200 guns, was handled by seamen camped in tents, each by his battery; — the town's firmest defence was thus placed in the hands of these seamen.

All the gates to the place were barricaded and condemned under penalty of a fine, except the Intendant's which was the line of communication with the army; and since as of that day no one could enter the place, all the men were given soldiers' rations and there remained only the women who received bread from the baker upon payment, at the rate of a quarter loaf per person.




Fig. 11 Plate taken from Diderot's Encyclopedia. The Roman numerals indicate the calibre.

It should be noted that from June 28 to this day, every night was passed under arms at the camp and in the town in the fear that each night might be that of the landing; three watchwords were given in the place, one for the land, one for the sea, and one for the savages with which the town was always full although everything possible was done to make them keep to the camp¹⁵.

It may also be observed that despite great fatigue, rain and continuous storms, no one fell ill and in all the hospitals there were not two hundred patients.

The camp was set up thus: — The army held about five long quarter leagues along the shore; its left, composed of a large corps of Canadians was one quarter of a league from the Montmorency Falls facing the tip of the Isle of Orleans and was commanded by M. le chevalier de Lévi, brigadier; its right began a short half league from the River Saint Charles, composed of another large corps of Canadians, first under M. Dumas, Major General of the colony but later under M. de Bougainville acting as Colonel.

The battalion of land forces camped in the center; behind them, to their left, M. de Montcalm; to their right, M. de Vaudreuil and the Intendant with all the commissaries of provisions and business men; the savages were dispersed on all sides, as they deemed best, subordinated to no discipline whatsoever.

There were redoubts along the bank in front of each camped corps with a few pieces of artillery, and redans and ditches in the spaces between them.

July 5 to July 10

At this time it seemed by their manoeuvres that the intention of the English was to trick us and conceal the true site of their descent. It was difficult to judge where they had the most men, on the Isle of Orleans, or at Point Lévi. In the latter place they could be seen during two or three days bringing a large number of faggots to a point opposite the town, raising entrenchments and redoubts and working on a battery as close to the shore as possible. Cannon and mortars were fired from the place; but although the shots were almost all good, they seem not to have incommoded the enemy, being too far to be properly aimed.

The evening of the 5th, a few English barges having been sighted opposite

the Montmorency Falls, some savages camped to the left of our army launched their canoes, gave chase and took a barge after killing all who were in it; they followed the others to the very shore, where the number of troops which appeared forced them to retreat in turn.

The newly invented floating battery, already mentioned, mounted with 14 cannon, two being 24-pounders, six, 18-pounders and the rest, 12-pounders, at the same time fired on these barges and some frigates which had advanced close to our side. The force of these cannon undoubtedly astonished the English since they immediately had five vessels advance, two of which were strongly armed, and bombarded the machine for a long time but to no avail.

On the 6th, a frigate and an English trysail¹⁶ were seen to enter the north channel and advance more than one and a half leagues above the Montmorency Falls; this greatly surprised our pilots who had always held that there was not enough depth even for a 10-tonner. That day a deserter from the Isle of Orleans swam over to us; he gave assurance that the




Fig. 12

English plan was to land on the north side beyond the Montmorency Falls.

In fact, about forty flatboats were seen going towards these frigates and it was judged to be only another diversion. The following night the English sent a bomb galiot towards the Montmorency Falls and fired cannon balls and bombs on the camp of our right all night forcing the Canadians to withdraw to a more sheltered place. During that same night, they landed 6,000 or 7,000 men at the northern end. They had had their boats go all around the island to achieve this with greater secrecy, and when they had reached the frigate and trysail they made their descent towards morning. A party of savages with a few Canadians, having passed the Falls, met a party of one hundred English coureurs de bois, routed them and followed them until they met a large number of men who had already advanced into the woods. The news brought to the camps revealed the large number of English that had landed and even that they had artillery with them. Immediately that afternoon M. le chevalier de Lévi with his entire camp of some 3,000 men, Canadians, passed the Falls and threw themselves into the woods which cover almost that entire area.

Once the mortars of the place had fired across the river on Point Lévi, most of the English vessels at the entrance to the bason, doubtless astounded by their great range, retreated considerably and took up positions as close to land as possible off the Isle of Orleans.

A courier from downriver who arrived during this period reported having seen thirty sails the size of which he could not give and which were judged to be English supply ships.

That morning, a deserter came over to the town from Pont Lévi by canoe. He confirmed that the English had landed in numbers exceeding 6,000 beyond the Montmorency Falls, that very few men remained at Point Lévi and that their battery facing the place consisted of four mortars and several cannon.

On the morning of the 11th, the English appeared camped on the heights by the Montmorency Falls, as numerous as reported. They sent several scouts into the woods where they encountered our savages who pushed them back.

An evil that had existed for a long time came to light that day: desertion by Canadians; either through fear or little practice in steadfastness and inaction of long duration camped on a plain. The measures taken served

to arrest the progress of this evil.

At the same time, everyone clearly saw the enemy with teams of oxen carting the mortars and cannon to the battery facing the place.

There was great alarm; everyone thought to see the town in ashes the very next night and no shelter from the bombs. The complaints already heard so often then rose once again about the enemy having been allowed to peacefully establish itself in that completely wooded area. Persons of note, some merchants and those most interested in saving the houses, gathered together and resolved to send that very day deputies to M. de Vaudreuil to expose to him the dangers with which they would be faced and to ask him to favor them with a detachment of his army which all the townspeople of good will would join to cross to the other side by night and surprise the English, known to be in small number, before the break of day; and if they were lucky enough to succeed, they would save the place by destroying the artillery and spiking the cannon. M. de Vaudreuil finally took it upon himself to agree to this expedition. The detachment was appointed and put under the command of M. Dumas; but the orders having been given so late, there was no time to see to provisions, and the expedition did not take place that night; it was postponed until the next night and in order that it be carried out with all possible speed, the detachment, consisting of 1200 men, a few of whom were regulars, the rest Canadians and savages, was camped a league and a half above the town, in the Sillery woods, from where they were to cross the river, in order that they not be seen by the English.

That same day, a part of the army camped at Beauport manoeuvred to present a more extended front to the Montmorency Falls and be better positioned to worry the enemy the moment they endeavoured to cross over.

There was evidence at that time of a few small disagreements among all the officers in charge of certain details or main parties, because of ignorance of military rules and ordinances; everyone wanted to be supreme master in his detail and exempt from service formalities.

That day yet another deserter arrived who said nothing more than what the previous ones had already declared except that there was no longer anyone on the Isle of Orleans and that the main munition depot was in the entrenchment made at the Point Lévi church.

On the evening of the 12th, all the arrangements had been made and precautions taken for the success of the large detachment which was

to go over to Point Lévi. It consisted of 1,500 men of all kinds of troops. All gave proof of the greatest good will and ardour; they were going to attack and surprise a lesser number; everyone was on the heights to witness their success. The detachment crossed the river one and a half leagues above Québec and landed unnoticed. After marching for some time, some men in the rear, wishing to reach the fore, advanced on the side through the woods and when they came to rejoin the main body, some students took them for the enemy and fired on them.

One man was killed and two wounded. With this exchange, a panicky terror took hold of all the Canadians; through the exhortations of their



Fig. 13 English cannon ball stuck in the wall of the Maison Charest, St. Pierre St., near Place Royale.

officers, they seemed to take heart once again and resumed their march but, when a* from the redoubt protecting the battery, which was the object of their mission, terror again overcame them and nothing could rekindle their courage; neither prayers nor threats from the officers. Many threw down their axes and guns and began to run back to the boats and by six o'clock in the morning the entire detachment had recrossed the river except the two men who had been killed as a result of the misunderstanding.

This shameful, willful rout¹⁷ threw the whole town into the greatest fright and a kind of despair. That same night, at about nine o'clock, the Point Lévi battery began its first attack.¹⁸ It seemed to consist of five mortars and six cannon which fired three rounds each. All the bombs were aimed at the Upper Town where the biggest buildings were to be seen and the largest groups of houses, with a different target each round. They continued the same tactic with the new day, which proved that they did not so much want to destroy the batteries as to frighten the people; no quarter of the town was safe from such a terrible onslaught; everyone was forced to leave his house and take refuge on the land-side rampart; and once day had broken, the gates were opened and women and children were seen to flee in groups to the country; the damage seemed great that very first night.

At the same time as the Point Lévi battery opened fire, a galiot which had advanced also fired bombs on the town; but because of the distance, none found their target; seeing this and not daring to draw closer, the English discontinued fire and withdrew the vessel.

It is worth noting that from nine o'clock in the evening until noon, over 300 bombs were fired, and that no one was injured, which proves that evacuation of the houses was general¹⁹.

July 15 to July 20

The Lévi battery reduced its fire considerably, almost ceased to fire its cannon and only sent a bomb at half-hour intervals; on the other hand, the two armies camped on either side of the Montmorency Falls maintained rather heavy artillery fire on each other.

It seemed that the enemy was building a second battery above the first, facing that section of the town where the powder magazines were to be

* A few words were omitted here in the manuscript; probably the words "short distance".

found. It was immediately decided to empty these and distribute the powder in the St. Louis and St. Jean faubourgs.

The people had been forced to evacuate the faubourgs at the very beginning, and enter the town or withdraw to the country but fear of the bombs sent them back to their homes and in an instant the Upper Town thus became almost as deserted as the Lower Town; among others, the ladies of the Hospital and the Ursuline sisters, whose buildings had been destined for use as a hospital, abandoned their homes and the town from that instant found itself without a hospital or any means of obtaining one. The General Hospital, a short half league from the town, became the only one and a house was set up at the town gate in one of the faubourgs to receive the sick and injured and send them on to the General Hospital.

Action and anxiety was no less great with regard to other things. Most of the effects in the King's store had been locked up in the Jesuits' house and other religious houses; including the flour. With these houses a target for the bombs, most of which fell true, thought had to be given to removing the stores and returning them to the warehouses in which they should always have remained; the enemy could storm these warehouses only after defeating the army at Beauport and in that case the town fell as well as the stores it contained.

On the 16th, the Lévi battery, which until then had done little damage to the town, created havoc there; several houses collapsed and fire broke out in the center of the town, entirely consuming 5 or 6 of the finest houses. The enemy endeavoured to encourage the blaze by re-doubling the fire of all the cannon in their battery. Half the town would have been reduced to ashes and a great number of people would have perished had the King's lieutenant, against the orders of the Governor General, not finally commanded all the batteries to fire on that of the enemy. This was done with such success that the enemy's fire ceased on the spot and gave a poor showing that night, which facilitated the task of arresting the progress of the flames. The most regrettable loss due to the holocaust was undoubtedly that of 1200 minots of grain, an extremely precious commodity at that time.

In addition, several persons were struck by bombs that day. During this time, the enemy army, camped beyond the Falls, night and day without discontinuing exchanged cannon and mortar fire with our army's left, camped opposite it. The number of mortars was about equal on

both sides but the English had many more cannon and these of greater calibre. The danger of our position in this exchange becoming very serious, and extremely grave because of the number of men killed or wounded, it was decided that the entire army would be brought in and the left wing relieved.

During this interval the number of English vessels was seen to increase and advance to the entrance of the bason within cannon range, taking advantage of the spectacle offered by the artillery fire from the two armies on their right and from their artillery and the place on their left.

Owing to the hazard of the flames and the continuously falling bombs, all the ovens in the town had ceased to function; the town was reduced to eating biscuit while waiting for new ovens to be built in one of the faubourgs.

Since the war seemed to be dragging on contrary to the will and taste of the Canadians, who, accustomed to making what they call "coups", that is, campaigns lasting two or three weeks, and then going home, expressed their disgust, the natural result of their lack of steadfastness, and were deserting at every opportunity in spite of the solutions applied to the situation.

The night of the 18th to the 19th, the battery fire against the town being much reduced, two large English vessels, with a few small ones, ventured past the town sailing up river. One of these, a sixty-gun vessel, passed successfully and was spotted only when it was too late to fire upon it, the other* hugging the point too closely, ran aground on Point Lévi. *Not true*†. But twenty-four hours later, the English fetched it back into their squadron without its seeming to have suffered any damage. At the first knowledge of the manoeuvres of these ships, there was alarm in the town; the general alarm was sounded and it was thought that the enemy was about to attack the place. With daylight, the ship of the line and the four small boats were recognized as such. They anchored in the Anse des Mères about half a league above the town.

When the news was brought to the camp, about 600 men and a few savages came to guard the shore above Québec. That same day a few

* (English in the original) This was his Maj. Ship Diana. She was run on board in a very dark night by a Gun Vessel and as she was brot too for the Sutherland to pass ahead, she unfortunately got on Shore. However she was got off again.

† The words "Not true" do not seem to be written in the author's hand.

cannon and a mortar were brought up from the place but when they were ready, and fired, the enemy's answering manoeuvre was to raise anchor and rise and fall with the tide, thus drawing away from the fire without suffering any damage.

There was a small boat at the Anse des Mères which had been prepared as a fire-ship but had not been ready when the others were sent; with morning the English fired a few cannon shots at it and seeing no one around, sent their boat and set fire to it.

There were also in that place 5 or 6 of our gunboats which left and did not save the fire-ship as they could have done, since they had no orders.

July 20 to July 25

The 20th during the day, the English were seen from the town to be drawing several barges up on to Point Lévi. With this discovery, the first detachment was reinforced with 600 more men sent under M. Dumas to prevent a descent above Québec.

The following night was remarkable for the quantity of bombs the enemy fired at the greatest range, so that some passed the ramparts of the place: doubtless on word they had received that all the militia had withdrawn to these extremities and were camped along the rampart within the place.

On the 21st, there was news that with the flat-bottomed boats they had transported, they had sent a detachment to Pointe aux Trembles²⁰, and taken the church and neighbouring houses; but they left that night without having done any harm to the frightened inhabitants, and rendered pointless the detachments sent to push them back.

The strongly-armed vessel, above the town, served as a sure retreat for the flat-bottomed boats which could run up and down along both shores at any moment and make themselves masters of all navigation on the river while waiting in case the real landing of their entire army be made in that part, which was becoming possible. During this period several of our soldiers deserted to the English; in return, we received several of their deserters. The report from these deserters, and the English manoeuvres, led us to understand that they expected to succeed in their undertaking only by wearing down the steadfastness of the Canadians; by threatening several places at one time; and since they were all regular troops, they




Fig. 14 Côte de la Fabrique. Drawing by Richard Short. In the background, the cathedral; to the right, the Jesuit College; the house with verandahs in the center still exists.

believed they had nothing to fear as long as they avoided the woods and built entrenchments whenever they established themselves in a new place.

From that moment, then, they had men in four places: at the Montmorency Falls where the main body was to be found; on the Isle of Orleans at Point Lévi and on the river above Québec.

There is no denying that the population, seeing all our forces always assembled at one point and concerned only with defense, was intimidated upon seeing the English, on the other hand, who were much fewer in number, divide their army and undertake several bold operations without any opposition.

The large number of bombs fired on the town eventually resulted in great damage; numerous houses were already destroyed; several persons killed or injured and the fire had spread to several places.

During these disorders, those defending the place were not far from becoming so many robbers. A bomb had barely broken a door or a window of a house during the night, but the house was pillaged or devastated. To put an end to this disorder, an ordinance was published making robbery punishable by death, and rather with the idea of frightening them with the threat than with the actual punishment, a double gibbet was erected near the ramparts.

The enemy army still remained stationary at the Montmorency Falls, and continuously sent parties into the woods where they did not fail to meet our savages and take flight at the sight.

The English several times endeavored to throw a bridge across, either by the Falls or to the south, under cover of the artillery which fired without cease; but they did not succeed although they were opposed only by small advance guards.

On the 21st, to profit from the advantages they had gained by having positioned an armed vessel above Québec, which was like a citadel in that place, they sent a detachment of 300 men in barges up as far as Pointe aux Trembles, which took the church for its drill hall. This detachment was guided by the Sieur de Robeau, one of the hostages from Fort Necessity who had managed to escape.

The detachment's mission was to destroy all the canoes and boats it might find along the river and discover the provision and powder stores

they had been told of by prisoners they had taken or deserters they had received.

The detachment spent almost an entire day at Pointe aux Trembles, took some fresh supplies, and left with about one hundred women and their children, without doing any harm.

The next day, the commander of the ship sent word to the commander of the place that he would return all the women taken the previous day and asked at the same time for a six-hour cease-fire to have his sick and wounded sent down the river to their hospital on the Isle of Orleans. Both propositions were accepted. The women were landed at the Anse des Mères and all hostilities were suspended.

The expedition made by this detachment revealed, but too late, the error of sending our frigates so far up and that because they were so distant, both shores of the river were exposed to attack by the English barges with no possibility of opposing them.

The following night, the 22nd to the 23rd, was remarkable for the horrors of a prodigious quantity of bombs which fell on the town, started fires in two or three places, which it was impossible to extinguish, which became a terrible inferno, consumed the center of the place and completely destroyed the cathedral.

It was noted that they changed the range of the bombs; they at first aimed them all into the midst of the place, but informed by the letters taken from the women they had made prisoners, and in which they read news of what was happening in the town, they used the longest range, directing the bombs as far as the faubourgs to which the people had retreated.

On the morning of the 23rd, doubtless persuaded that the ravages wrought by their bombs and the violence of the blaze had made everyone leave their posts, they lifted anchor, and set full sail to pass beyond the town and join the vessel already there. But as soon as they were within short cannon range, all the batteries fired at them forcing the ships to turn and regain their place of departure.

On the 24th, hostilities were again suspended to leave the English free to send their sick to the Isle of Orleans; but it was only between the town and the Lévi battery that fire was suspended. The night that followed was not less terrible than the preceding one in the number of bombs and carcasses thrown, all directed at the Faubourg St. Jean where they had doubtless learned that almost all those with a few details in the service

of the place had retreated. Fire caught in one place but there were no further consequences.

It is impossible to avoid mentioning in passing the astonishment and surprise, even the discouragement of everyone in general at our army's inaction, gathered behind its entrenchments at Beauport while the enemy army, which was smaller by a fifth and a quarter, was divided into four corps and seemed to be blocking the town and the army, formed parties, sent them into the woods, acquainted themselves with the nature of the country and grew each day in boldness and confidence because of the few obstacles it found; for our part, all the advantages the country provided had been lost, and it would have been easy to keep the enemy disquieted at all points with a corps of 2000 men whose absence could not have weakened us and which would have aroused war-like emulation by the little advantages it would not have failed to obtain under cover of the woods. There were over 900 savages billeted in the camp who refused to march because they were not accompanied by an equal number of French; they thus remained idle, consuming our provisions or roaming our country-side where they caused more damage than the enemy himself would have done.

July 25 to July 27

There were several cease-fires of 2 or 3 hours each during which the generals of the two armies communicated with one another. The letters contained nothing of interest; in some, the English complained at length of the behaviour of our savages and threatened to retaliate indiscriminately on all that fell within their hands²¹. These letters were answered with reasons which were quite as firm and more just.

The night of the 25th to the 26th, because of poor manoeuvring by the crews of our gunboats, two of these latter fell to the enemy after the men had escaped to shore. The following day there was a great skirmish in the woods at the Montmorency Falls between our savages and an enemy advance guard. Some of our men were killed and the English must also have lost some.

That same night, a detachment of one hundred men went over to Point Lévi in an attempt to take the enemy from the rear and there was a small encounter that same day.

At about the same time a detachment with an engineer was sent to establish an entrenchment to the right of Jacques Cartier which was known

to be such an advantageous post that if the enemy had anticipated us with only 200 men, it would have been impossible to dislodge them and all communication with the country beyond would have been cut off.

The news received at that time from Niagara and Carillon said, (the first), that the English were already in strength half a league from that place preparing to besiege it; the news from Carillon announced only the great slowness of the enemy; that the enemy's forces were not a third of what there had been reason to suppose and that being almost entirely provincial militia, they were discouraged.

The night of the 26th to the 27th was the worst that had yet been seen because of the fire from the enemy who was continuously shooting 2, 3 or 6 cannon balls at a time.

Such rigorous action against inanimate objects astonished everyone and with reason, and it was learned from deserters at the same time that the enemy general's intention was to destroy Québec from top to bottom, without our being able to learn the reason for an undertaking so contrary to the ordinary practices of war.

July 27 to July 31

The night of the 27th to the 28th about 70 fire-rafts were launched; the unhappy remains of so many expensive artifices made to destroy the enemy fleet, and which had been intended to go into action at the same time as the fire-ships but their great distance had not rendered the project possible at the time.

*They were led by an able man as intelligent as they come and taken to within half-range of the gun on the advance guard frigate. The fire spread from one fire-raft to another with rapidity but since their progress was very slow, and the night not excessively dark, the enemy vessels had time to cut or lift their anchors and give way to the fire-rafts. They escaped amid great alarm. It then became clear what an advantage would have been gained by converting some vessels into-ships, which, with the brisk little wind that blew, and covered by the fire-rafts, could have penetrated the enemy fleet and caused real damage²².

Toward daybreak, the enemy revealed a new battery against the town,

** (English note in the manuscript) Not true — only 2 or 3 Transports moved and we tow'd these 'cageux' (as they are called) off as easily and indeed with more facility than the first fireships. As there were 70 of these they had a serious appearance when on fire.*

placed to the right of the first but on the sides, composed of twelve cannon, with which they fired without cease. During all this time, our batteries remained silent and it was not believed necessary in eight days to fire one shot, as much because of the small damage the enemy suffered as to avoid using ammunition needlessly. However, since it was admitted that the bombs had sometimes caused some damage, an effort was made to erect a battery of four mortars on the cape above the château, in a place closest to the enemy batteries and with an elevation which dominated them considerably and from which all their manoeuvres could easily be seen. A striking fact is that this was only decided upon the lively representations of a sailor who had every difficulty in making the advantage felt although it was very evident in itself.

It had thus far been difficult to judge of the enemy's plans from the way in which he was seen to behave. According to information received, the enemy forces did not exceed 12,000 men in all; four or five thousand were spread along the Lévi shore; a small body at the Isle of Orleans and the rest at the Montmorency Falls. This last group was not strong enough to vanquish all the Canadian forces opposing it on that side; the Point Lévi detail did not seem to be a source of anxiety. From their determination to destroy the town, their slow and timid manoeuvres, there was reason to believe they had made a mistake in their calculations, that they had not expected to find the resistance they met, that they were trying to protract the campaign, to do all the damage they could to facilitate the conquest of the country at a later season.

On the 29th there was evidence of much movement among the English on the Point Lévi side. It was reported that they had several barges on the shore of the *deux chemins** and the shore opposite Sillery. At the same time, their warships and other vessels which had gone upstream beyond Cap-Rouge a few days earlier were seen coming down to that place, which gave rise to a suspicion that they planned to descend upon Sillery; a reinforcement of a few Canadians and savages was therefore sent to that area but nothing new occurred.

On the 30th at about 10 o'clock in the morning when the tide was rising, three ships were seen to set sail, the smallest of which came up to the entrance to the Montmorency Falls, within two musket ranges of our entrenchments on that side, and grounded there; the second vessel did not

* The author means the shore of the Etchemins.

advance as far and also went aground. These were two pinks²³ each armed with 14 cannon. The third of the king's ships remained afloat in the channel.

†As soon as these vessels were so placed, they began the heaviest fire ever seen, which was imitated by all the batteries on the Montmorency escarpment; at the same time more than 500 barges were seen to advance, going back and forth as though to carry out a descent.

On our side, there were only four cannon with which to answer them which could never be dismounted owing to the excellence of the breastwork. The exchange lasted until evening and it was estimated that the enemy fired 3000 cannon shots. We lost three gunboats from fire, two small boats with one cannon each, and a few men, killed or wounded. Towards evening they themselves set fire to their two grounded vessels either because these might have been burned during the night since they were high and dry or because they had been put out of action by the shocks they must have received from the cannon.

A detachment from their side, under cover of their artillery, passed the Falls to take our entrenchments from the front, believing them deserted because of the heavy fire; but they were rebuffed with a few losses.

That same day through letters of authority, M. de Vaudreuil created a body of twelve majors to serve the place, chosen from the most alert and notable burghers and invested with the same power as court commissions would have given them. This arrangement was judged necessary for a place whose staff consisted only of a king's lieutenant and a junior (?) major and where there were only sergeants available for the night rounds.

The duty of these twelve majors was to make all the rounds every night within and without the ramparts, with fusiliers, and maintain discipline within the place, and with patrols prevent robberies and pillage.

July 31st, we learned through prisoner captured the previous day that the English movement towards the Falls was a real attack; that the two ships had been purposely grounded in order to bombard our entrenchments from the rear; that the flat-bottomed boats we had observed coming and going carried 6000 regulars for the landing that would take place about five o'clock in the evening at low tide. Eleven companies of grenadiers were in the vanguard; 200 picket guards followed to support

† *English note in the manuscript. — We landed and were obliged to re-embarque.*




Fig. 15 View of the north-western section of Québec, from the River Saint-Charles. Drawing by Richard Short. Towards the center in the lower part, the Intendant's palace, the vaulted cellars of which still exist. The Intendant's gate, mentioned in this recital was on the côte du Palais.

them and the rest formed three columns. The grenadiers rushed the entrenchments, the pickets entered the first abandoned redoubt, in which the cannon had been spiked. The Canadians who had retreated to the second redoubt half way up the hill offered lively and heavy fire which forced the pickets to withdraw in confusion leaving their commander there; with this, everyone withdrew and re-embarked after having set fire to their own grounded ships. The enemy's loss amounted to about 400 killed and wounded²⁴.

Our salvation that day was a storm that struck at the moment of the attack, all the more propitious in that we were lacking in powder and balls: for some time we had no wicks for the cannon which we lit with a flintlock pan.

It may be remarked in passing that everyone was whispering of an alleged consumption of powder behind the enemy lines.

The account mentioned over eight hundred thousand; experts said that consumption had not yet reached one hundred thousand. It was bruited about that by dint of moving the powder from place to place a prodigious quantity had been diverted to be dearly re-sold to the King when the magazines were empty. Such is the manner in which immense fortunes are made in this country, and that with impunity, although it is well known that no merchant orders powder, that only the King and the West Indies Company can do this and that any individual with ten pounds of powder has surely stolen it from the King.

August 1 to August 5

The officer commanding the English pickets who had remained behind during the rout because of injuries, was transported to the General Hospital. Advantage was taken of this occasion to request a cease-fire. On August 3rd, letters were sent to the enemy to apprise him of the situation, but the true reason was to send 300 or 400 workers to the town to clean the streets of the debris with which the cannon fire had filled them and where no one dared work while the enemy was shooting.

This cease-fire was followed by two others on the two following days solely to allow both sides to send letters. One of the letters from the English general contained twenty pounds sterling which he requested be given to the de Guienne soldiers who had saved the above-mentioned officer from the hands of the savages. The money was given to the English captain in question with M. de Vaudreuil's excuses for not having been

able to consent to such generosity to his soldiers who had after all only been carrying out their orders.

In one of the letters the same general expressed his great gratitude for the attentions of the ladies of the Hospital who were caring for this officer and declared that should fortune favour his arms he would have their house honoured and respected²⁵. This letter gave that place a reputation for the greatest security and from that moment everyone had their most precious belongings transported there.

These cease-fires were used to build breastworks for our rampart batteries where it was no longer possible to hold on and where thirteen men had been killed or mortally wounded in 4 or 5 days.

The Point Lévi battery's fire continued day and night with the same intensity. It was noted only that their bombs were not numerous but this was compensated for by cannon fire.

From the night of the 12th to the 13th, until August 5th, it was estimated that the enemy shot 4,000 bombs and 9,000 or 10,000 cannon balls at the place²⁶.

Two days after the attack by the English, their army at the Falls was seen to move towards the woods; our camp was put on the alert; guard details in the woods were reinforced with 500 or 600 men and the rest of the troops received orders to be ready to march on the first order, but the enemy returned to camp.

News from the country up the river reported that Niagara had been under siege for 10 days, the trench breached and the town bombarded with mortars and cannon and that the garrison had 60 killed or wounded.

August 5 to August 10

The night of the 5th to the 6th being rainy, with much heavy mist, the town sentinels heard the sound of several flat-bottomed boats being rowed up the river; the alert was given in the place and the general alarm sounded.

The enemy did not seem to move during that time but fire from its Lévi batteries was maintained as violently as ever against the town. Each night they threw a large number of carcasses but always without success.

Nevertheless, the night of the 8th to the 9th, they aimed several at the lower town and fire caught in four places. The fire became so violent and widespread that almost 150 burned houses were counted. The fortune




Fig. 16 Place Royal in ruins after the fire of August 9. Drawing by Richard Short. In the center, Notre-Dame Church; on the left, the Maison Barbel and Maison Fornel, now restored, and the house of the West Indies Company; in the foreground, to the right, the Maison Hazeur, the square's largest, still in existence today, but not yet restored. The perspective of this drawing is distorted; the square seems much larger than it is.

of a great number of private persons who had once been rich was turned to ashes. The enemy re-doubled the fury of the flames, and increasing the fire from its batteries which worked without stop, the damage was such that it was impossible to remedy it. As soon as the flames had broken out, the troops withdrew and there was only one man killed and another wounded.

The batteries suffered little damage owing to the courage and intrepid character of the seamen, and their bravery appeared so great that M. le marquis de Montcalm had one hundred louis distributed among them as a reward. These fires and the two preceding ones, in the Upper Town, resulted in no less than 180 houses being reduced to ashes, which was half the town: the most attractive sections and the finest houses²⁷.

At the same time, the enemy, under cover of the large ship and small frigates that had been sent above the town, and the flat-bottomed boats which they had had pass by night, sent along the shore about 300 flat-bottomed boats carrying 12 men. M. de Bougainville was sent from the camp with about 1000 men, with orders to follow them by land and oppose their landing under cover of the woods which are thick on the shore in some places. He surprised them and pushed them back twice with some loss on their side.

It has already been said that all those with gold or silver coin had been invited to give it for use for the purchase of corn. The sight of the metal money produced all the desired succour. In a very short time, 12,000 minots of corn were gathered in the Government of Montreal, convincing proof that there had never been a famine in the country.

It had been some days earlier that several copies of a kind of manifesto signed by the English general's adjutant, had been found, in which the adjutant declared in the name of his general that mercy would be shown the Canadians only until August 10 and that after that date, no quarter would be given those who fell into English hands. Since at the same time, deserters were arriving from one day to another and they were all in agreement in saying that were it not for fear of the savages, there would be far more deserters, it was resolved to take the opportunity to answer this paper. A manifesto was drawn up in French, English and German²⁸, and signed, which promised in the name of M. le marquis de Montcalm that all those who wished to desert the English army would receive the greatest favours, would have nothing to fear from the barbarity of the savages, and the manner of holding their arms was prescribed (the butt

of the rifle); that at this signal the savages would fly to their aid, fire on those pursuing them and lead them faithfully and safely to the French camp.

August 10 to August 15

On the evening of the 9th a messenger arrived from up the river with disagreeable news. The fall of Niagara to the English was confirmed in various letters.

Sieur Pouchet, Captain de Guyenne, who was in command there, had expected help from Fort Machault which M. de Lignery was to bring, after he had assembled all the Canadians scattered in that area. He gathered 2,000 men; nearing Niagara he fell into an enemy ambush, which resulted in considerable carnage, and those who were not killed were taken prisoner. Sieur Pouchet, after these events, and 10 or 12 days in the trenches during which time enemy artillery killed many of his men, had to surrender. He received the honours of war until embarkation, and was made a prisoner of war along with his garrison because of the surrender; which he sent himself, rendering an account of his conduct, which the enemy allowed him to do.

The same messenger brought the news that M. de Bourglamarque had bombarded Carillon, then Fort St. Frederick, and had withdrawn with his forces to the Isle aux Noix which there had been efforts to fortify, and endeavoured through the location of this post to prevent the English from reaching Fort St. Jean. The most unpleasant news was an account from M. de Bourglamarque himself saying that he had been unable to obtain help from the savages who were all gradually deserting.

It was immediately decided to send M. le chevalier de Lévi, with 800 or 900 Canadians and two other pickets of land troops and troops from the colony to Montreal so that they might go either to Isle aux Noix, if M. de Bourglamarque was in too weak a position there, or to the Rapide de la Présentation, if the English army which had taken Niagara tried to go there.

On the morning of the 17th many cannon shots were heard from the area of Pointe aux Trembles, which made us think that the English, numbering 1500 men, camped opposite, intended to make a descent and establish themselves there. But this was probably a ruse, in order to do the same elsewhere since they put down more than one thousand men at Deschambault, seven leagues further.

This news was particularly alarming since much of the army's equipment was in that place, guarded by 25 invalids. At that same time the large convoy of flour and cattle was to pass there, and its loss meant the fall of the colony. Moreover, that area was the loveliest in Canada, and we counted most heavily on its harvest. It was feared that the English, who had devastated by fire more than one and a half leagues of the land on the shore opposite Pointe aux Trembles, would do the same there.

M. de Bougainville, who was at Pointe aux Trembles with 8000 men marched in that direction; and on the evening of the 18th M. le marquis de Montcalm with his aides-de-camp and the major general of the land forces left incognito to go to compensate by his presence for the small number of troops there and the difficulty encountered in sending a larger number because it was so far away.

It was to be feared that, Deschambault being well situated, the enemy would establish themselves there and could then easily take the Jacques Cartier post from behind, establish themselves in the two places and cut off all communication between Québec, Trois-Rivières and Montreal, which would also result in the loss of the country.

One cannot help observing that the enemy's good fortune was due to the decision to abandon the river, and to have all vessels and frigates go up as far as Trois-Rivières, against the opinion of a few reliable persons who held that the king's two frigates should be kept, well armed, above Québec; they would have prevented the English barges from appearing there and would have ensured us the navigation of the river.

The English vessels would not have been able to dislodge them since they could not have gone up the river without sounding it, and this the frigates would not have allowed, or if they had tried to force their way at the risk of foundering it would have been easy to give way and do so at a propitious moment.

From the very beginning we recognized the great advantage of gunboats and small boats armed with cannon; there were fourteen in all. Half had been destroyed since the beginning of the siege, or had been put out of action. Everyone would have wished an effort had been made to build more, which would have been very easy and there was enough time; but false economy would not allow this, while everyone saw that the artillery in the place and at camp caused great expense daily, without firing, so to speak; of course it was forbidden to do this except in case

of dire need because of the scarcity of powder which was beginning to be felt.

The commanders of this artillery spent all their time taking down and putting up batteries, moving pieces needlessly from one spot to another, for the sole purpose of creating expense which made them richer, or using an alleged 50 carriages assigned to their service when there were really only 14. The general rumour was that the commander of this artillery pocketed 50 louis a day and his subalterns a proportionate amount.

In the absence of M. le marquis de Montcalm and M. le chevalier de Lévi, command fell to M. de Sennezergues, commander of the Sarre and an army brigadier, a prudent military man, but one who was not of sufficient consequence to make M. de Vaudreuil and those around him come to the most judicious and reasonable decisions.

Such superior forces in three different places with so few men to stand them off made us fear the end was near and that the entire colony would fall under the enemy yoke.

On the 10th, 11th, and 12th, the English at Pointe Lévi seemed to occupy themselves only with the constant shelling of the Town, and at times the Montmorency Falls. On the night of the 11th to the 12th they tried under cover of darkness to send frigates up above Québec, but fire from our batteries, warned in time by a signal of their movements, prevented them from carrying out their intentions, and only one small schooner was able to pass under cover of night.

They sent a detachment of some 1000 to 1200 men on the same side who tried to go down as far as Pointe aux Trembles, but M. de Bougainville, who was in command in that area, repelled them twice, forcing them to disembark on the southern shore where they camped. Since they did not seem very well entrenched and had no advantage from the terrain, it was planned that the detachment leaving for Montreal with M. de Lévi should cross the river and attack them under cover of night and whatever the outcome, whether fortunate or unfortunate, the detachment should continue on its way, but heavy rain prevented all this.

In the Falls area it was noticed that every day the English sent a large party of men to strip the woods in order to make clearings; a plan was made to surprise the workers and if possible to start a general engagement there. To do this, 300 Canadians and 300 savages were marched at nightfall, followed by 900 Canadians and, at a little distance, another

detachment of 1500 men, and the rest of the army was to stand ready to receive orders. The attack was to be made as soon as the three cutters commenced work. The first detachment did advance, but when the time came to attack, the savages withdrew. Only the Canadians fired, at the sound of which the English left camp in two columns, disengaged their workers and retreated with them to their entrenchments.

From deserters we then learned that the English fleet had just received a supply of provisions from 22 ships.

August 15 to August 20

On the 14th the town's general staff was changed. M. de Ramsay, the king's lieutenant, was in poor health and went to the hospital, and his place was filled by the battalion commanders in turn. M. Bernetz, commander of the Lower Town for the past 43 days, had done the same 24 hours earlier and his post was filled by the commanders of the battalions and the sentries alternately.

The abuse, disorder and negligence reigning at headquarters in the Upper Town came to light with this change in the general staff. Only half of the number of people for whom food was distributed each day were found there; among others, half the company of workers, officially numbering 114 and paid 40 sous each, did not exist; the carriages used by the artillery which were paid for at a rate of 7 fr. 10s. per day and accounted at more than 40 were in reality not more than eight in number. Discipline in the place was not at its best; no fixed posts, no regular guard. Sometimes a sentry was positioned in one place, sometimes in another, without any reason; those available for guarding the place were forced to be constantly on duty, night and day. Since such service was unbearable, there was much abuse; many had deserted. No one troubled to obey orders and when called to arms, no one came.

The battalion commanders, coming to command the town, brought their majors who finally put some order in the service, approximately as should be in a town when the enemy is nearby.

On the night of the 15th to the 16th the enemy threw several carcasses, one of which started a fire that was promptly extinguished.

On the 16th and 17th the English were seen to withdraw part of the artillery they had brought up to the Falls, but it was not possible to see if this was done in order to place it elsewhere or to reload it onto the ships.

They were also thought to be seen carrying out the same manoeuvre at Pointe Lévi where they were loading heavy pieces aboard their ships.

During that time it was learned from deserters that every day the English sent a detachment of 600 men from the camp at the Falls to pick peas in the fields. A plan was made to surprise these parties, which could easily have been done, but the savages always caused the failure of our venture, either by refusing to march or by exposing themselves too soon or too late. These misfortunes came from the spitefulness of the interpreters, and the officers attached to the savages, who could not tolerate the zeal and regularity M. Répentigny, who commanded the outposts near the woods, showed in having them perform their duties. Moreover, these officers, coarse by nature, resembling the savages in character, whose manners and customs they follow, wanted not only to be independent but even to become important, by inspiring the savages with their own feelings. They told whatever they wanted to them since they were the only ones who could understand and explain their language.

August 20 to August 25

The English detachment which made its descent at Deschambault burned all the equipment of which we have spoken after having pillaged part of it; killed some one hundred cattle and re-embarked long before our troops which had been dispatched there arrived.

On the 24th they threatened to make another descent in the same place, but M. de Bougainville, who was responsible for guarding these shores, judged that it was a ruse to draw him there so that they might make another descent at Pointe aux Trembles during his absence and set fire to the whole place. M. de Bougainville contented himself with dividing his troops into different parties which he spread along the coast in the most advantageous places because of which the enemy, although six times superior in number, dared do nothing.

It was noticed that during these descents the English lost more than 300 men and that we only lost three or four; which can be attributed in part to the drunken state of most of the English ²⁹ and in part to the initial fire by which they were always taken by surprise.

Some divisions of the convoy over which there was so much anxiety and which it would have been very easy for the English to intercept and destroy, had they unfortunately been alerted, arrived during this period.

On the 23rd and 24th they set fire to all the houses beyond the Falls;

at the same time they ravaged the south shore opposite Pointe aux Trembles in a similar way.

On the 24th there was a short cease-fire during which we sent back the personal effects of the English captain who had died of his wounds on the 14th — these were precisely listed in the report which had been made of the affair, along with the sum of twenty pounds sterling destined by the general to reward the soldier who had saved the captain from the savages, but which had not been used and was being returned in the same coin.

An Outaouais savage, made prisoner during the engagement of July 31st, had been brought aboard a large vessel and was kept chained and guarded by four men; one night while the sentries were asleep he managed to free himself from part of his irons and jumped through a porthole into the water, abandoning himself to the current. The English fired a number of shots at random into the water, but the savage reached shore safely at some distance from there and rejoined our army. He reported that the English had intended to give him to their king.

The Point Lévi batteries continued their rather regular fire on the town but their cannon were more numerous and they no longer fired as many bombs.

At the Falls the enemy now only rarely fired its cannon.

A long time before, M. de Vaucrain, captain of the king's frigate and commander of the roads, who had remained in the town to command all seamen in the service of the place, had received orders to rejoin his vessel, which had gone up towards Trois-Rivières, as soon as the English ships had forced their way past the town, for fear they might attack our ships.

Hardly had M. de Vaucrain ³⁰ arrived on the spot than he sent a plan to the Governor General asking for five or six hundred men and promising with the king's two frigates to take the English warship by boarding.

However, either because it was decided not to unman the batteries of the Town at that moment or no one wanted to be responsible for the two frigates if they should yield in the attack, a deaf ear was turned to the plan.

Sieur Cadet, supply officer, filled with enthusiasm by this idea, during an expedition he made in the area to gather food, offered to carry out the plan with the frigates belonging to him, under Sieur Canon, commander of his fleet. His offer was accepted. Consequently on the 26th 450 seamen were withdrawn from all the batteries of the place, whom he himself reviewed and who left by boat during the night to board the frigates.

During the night of the 27th to 28th, when the tide was rising, a little squall blew up from the northeast which hardly lasted two hours, from which the English profited to slip above the Town a frigate with 30 cannon, a trysail with 14, and three other small transports. In passing they were under the fire of the Town but it seems they were little inconvenienced and that the darkness protected them.

Because of these reinforcements, the English found themselves with twelve vessels of varying sizes in the river above Québec, the largest of which was mounted with sixty cannon.

Hearing the sounds of this movement, a company of grenadiers, three pickets and some troops from the colony were dispatched from the Beauport camp to go to Pointe aux Trembles and other places where the English might attack.




Fig. 17 Shot bar (French?) found in a cellar in Place Royale. Used to break the masts and cordage of ships.

This movement was all the more surprising since an English sergeant, who had deserted from the Falls, reported with an air of sincerity that that very night they were to send down all the vessels they had above Québec.

Since this is not the first time that deserters reported things contrary to events, it is probable that the English generals, more secretive in their deliberations than we are, spread rumours among their troops which were contrary to the movements they intended to make, and which duped us more than once.

At the same time it was noticed that the bombs they fired on the Town were much less frequent, but that the fire from their cannon always continued with the same animosity.

On the night of the passage of the English vessels, there were some twenty men wounded on our side, some of them very slightly, not by enemy fire but through carelessness in loading our weapons.

That same night, even before we knew the enemy's plan, M. de Vaudreuil sent a messenger to bring back the 450 seamen, fearing that the English would moor five or six vessels to fire on the Town.

The messenger arrived at our frigates just at the moment all was ready to carry out the suggested plan and the ships were preparing to go down the Richelieu with a favourable wind, and the seamen felt success was certain. Upon receipt of the letters from the Governor General it was necessary to desist, return the seamen to the Town, and never was discontent as great as theirs, to see themselves cheated of a sure opportunity for distinguishing and enriching themselves.

On the evening of the 29th it was reported that English vessels were massed between Cap-Rouge and Saint Augustin, along three leagues of the river. At the same time it was also learned that a corps of 1200 to 1500 Englishmen was leaving Point Lévi to go up the same side as far as their vessels.

The discontent of M. de Vauclain, who had distinguished himself the previous year at the siege of Louisbourg and whom the court recommended be employed, and that, on all occasions, cannot go unmentioned here. This officer, a man of merit, formulated several plans, but doubtless, not having the good fortune to please certain courtiers, he experienced the chagrin of seeing his plans carried out by others who lacked strength of character, and in contempt of his rank. Such was the lot of the fire-

ship expedition which he should have commanded by virtue of his rank, and such was the plan for this latter expedition in which the king's frigates should have had precedence over those of the supply officer, if the intention had not perhaps been to protect these from any happenstance by having the king pay for them, should they perish in the attack.

In order to give an air of deference to court orders, this officer was made inspector of the Town's batteries, a useless, senseless task to which no real authority was attached and which he performed for no more than two weeks, having received orders to see to the preservation of the king's frigates as soon as the English had sailed a fully-armed vessel above Québec.

September 1 to September 5

On the night of the 31st to September 1st, an English frigate and four other small ships again went up above the Town in spite of fire from all the batteries, so that the English had 17 vessels above Québec, one with two decks, two frigates and the remainder, small transportation vessels, several of which, however had a few cannon.

On the first of September we saw much movement in the English camp at the Falls; it was noticed that they were embarking their artillery, their baggage, and that part of their army was evacuating to go back to Point Lévi.

They continued this on the 2nd and that night set fire to the breastwork of their battery and part of their entrenchments; so that on the following day there seemed to be but a small number of sentries there, just to occupy the post which still remained fortified on the woods side.

Each night they continued burning the houses on the Island, on both north and south shores.

Since the movements of the English were not made for a retreat, but to look for posts elsewhere and make a descent, or perhaps as a ruse to make us abandon our invincible position, we tried to be on our guard everywhere. Several detachments were sent from the Beauport camp to Pointe aux Trembles; small posts were set up in all the most advantageous places, from Québec as far up as the vessels could go; small temporary camps were made to follow all the movements of the ships, that is, to go up or down as they did and to be ready to repulse a descent if they should try one.

They tried several times to send parties ashore, but were always repelled by a few men in ambush.

Letters from up the river on September 1st led to the belief that there was no reason to worry about the Lake Ontario side.

The English troops which had taken Niagara had no intention of going back to Montreal, and M. le chevalier de Lévi, after having established two posts on the river at the place called the Rapides, sent most of the people into the fields for the harvest and orders were given to cut the corn as soon as it was ready since this was the only resource which could save the country.

M. de Lévi went from there to join M. de Bourglamarque at Isle aux Noix, the place for which there was the most concern.

Letters from that place, at the same time, informed us that the commander had had work done on the entrenchment on that island so successfully that there did not seem to be anything to fear from an enemy attack both because of the works on the island and on the mainland on both sides, and because of the xebecs which he had had placed in the two channels, which formed a line of artillery entirely closing off the river at that point and shutting off the entrance to Lake Champlain. Both sides of the mainland were swampy and covered with thick woods, removing any fear that they might be taken on the sides or from the rear.

The news we received from there of General Amherst led us to think he would restrict his campaign to Carillon and Fort Frederick, where he had set men to work building new forts while his undertakings, to put a navy on the lake, were progressing very slowly.

At that time Québec and the army defending it were in a most critical position. Rations had been reduced to three quarters of a loaf of bread along with a little brandy. Despite this economy there did not seem to be enough food to last until September 20th. The only resource was the new corn which was already ripening everywhere, and was so abundant that the part of the colony which was safe from the English could replace what they caused the country to lose in areas of which they were masters and from which no harvest could be expected. But the enemy was successful in cutting all communication between Québec and the country up the river, it would be necessary to resign oneself to losing all the fruits of a three-month campaign, in which the enemy had been unable to gain any advantage with such large naval and land forces.

On the 3rd the English completely evacuated the Falls; our cannon caused them some damage during their embarkation, judging from the débris of several barges seen later and from several casks of salt meat abandoned on the shore. Since they feared that some French detachment would fall upon their rear guard during embarkation, they used a ruse to prevent this; they placed before their ships facing the Town, 60 or 80 barges as though to suggest they wanted to attack from that side, or on the right of our camp, and the barges hove to until everyone had withdrawn from the falls.

On the 2nd the English general had thought of another ruse, which was unsuccessful. At the Falls, around noon, he had everyone embark excepting some sentries who did not seem numerous and were left to occupy the post. Never doubting but that the following day at dawn the French would come to take this guard, he had 2000 men return at nightfall, some of whom lay prone on the ground behind the entrenchments and some of whom hid in ambush in the woods.

These movements were not carried out in such secrecy that M. de Montcalm could not see something which made him suspect a trap and he attempted nothing. The English remained in ambush thus until 9 o'clock in the morning, when they came out of hiding, and it was acknowledged that M. de Montcalm had been right.

On the 4th the enemy was seen to be nearly reassembled at Point Lévi from where they sent several detachments on the same day along the shores below Québec to set fire to all the houses.

In the afternoon of the same day, they appeared behind their battery at point Lévi in three corps, lined up for battle and they marched from there to the River Etchemins* where they put up some tents as though to suggest they were going to camp there; but during the night they took down the tents and boarded their vessels anchored across the way. Because of the darkness, it was not possible to tell whether everyone seen there had embarked or whether some had returned to their camp at Point Lévi. It was noticed simply that on the 3rd and 4th they fired more heavily on the Town than usual.

These movements by the enemy changed little in the dispositions first made by M. le marquis de Montcalm. He still felt that the Beauport area

* It can be assumed that it was indeed the Etchemins River. The letters "Et", which could not be deciphered in the manuscript, have been added.

was the important one to guard and could not hold a position where the enemy could more successfully arrive to conquer the town.

Since the army was no longer as tired because of the presence of the English, he set up four small camps between the Montmorency Falls and the River St-Charles. He gave orders that the entrenchments be repaired, and since the slopes of Québec could be threatened by an enemy disembarkation, he reinforced the detachment commanded by M. de Bougainville with various others, and increased it to more than 3000 men.

September 5 to September 10

On the 5th the English remained quietly aboard their ships, threatening to descend first at one place, then at another.

They carried out the same manoeuvre on the 6th. In the afternoon one of their big decked boats passed in front of the town³¹ without being hit, in spite of all the shots fired at her; at the same time a considerable detachment was seen to leave the camp at Lévi and board the ships into which the English had already poured so many troops two days before.

After the English left the Falls the Canadians hastened there to see the damage they had done. It was confined to all their houses which had only been burned, all the fruit trees cut down; the church had been spared and the cornfields had not been damaged.

At the camp, or in that area, they found some fifty horses browsing peacefully; but some beef was found either because they had not been able to eat it or their intention was to destroy anything in the way of cattle, large or small, when they were unable to transport it to the Island of Orleans where two or three immense herds had been seen which were judged to number over 7,000 to 8,000 head, although they ate at will daily, showing the uselessness of having had to eat horse meat³² the two previous years, except to increase the fortunes of those who monopolized everything.

On the night of the 7th to the 8th with a favorable northeast wind, they had five more vessels pass, including one frigate and four other transportation ships, which meant they had a fleet of more than twenty ships above Québec. This caused much anxiety since we did not know their plans, whether they wanted to ravage the shores or cut off communication, the season seeming too advanced to set up an establishment and since they seemed to have given up the idea of taking the place³³.

Here the journal ends, and at the foot is the following note written



Fig. 18 Place d'Armes after the fall of the town. Drawing by Richard Short. To the left, the church of the Récollets; to the right, the Cathedral; in the background outlined against the sky, the spire of the Jesuit chapel. Certain houses on Ste. Anne Street still exist.

in the same hand as that which made the few remarks in English in the margins of the journal:

"The Place was nevertheless taken. Gen. Wolfe brot Montcalm to Action on the heights of Abraham above the Town on the 13th Sept. when he and the French Gen. fell and the Place was taken by Gen. Townshend."

APPENDIX — Memorial of Lieutenant de Vitré

Copy.

Memorial of Lt John Denis de Vitré to the Rt Hon^{ble} Wm Pitt
Original petition in the possession of John Rose, Esqr, No. 2 New-Inn London.
16 July 1831.

(Signed) J. LEE,

This copy was made by his consent.

To The Right Honorable William Pitt
Chancellor of His Majesty's Exchequer etc.

The Memorial of John Denis de Vitre a Lieutenant of His Majesty's Royal
Navy of Great Britain etc.

Most Humbly Sheweth

That Your Memorialist's father (Matthew Theodosius Denis de Vitré Esq.) was born in Canada of a Family enobled in 1663 by Louis the 14th of France for Military feats and other Deserts. That Your Memorialist's father from his conduct and merit as a Naval Officer obtained in the Year 1759 (when at an early period of life) the Command of a French 32 Gun Ship called Le Renommie with the trust of another loaden with Troops and warlike stores from France to Quebec. Soon after putting to sea Your Memorialist's father had the fate to fall in with two English ships of the Line, the Rochester and Somerset. Overpowered by a force so superior he was obliged to surrender, but obtained the admiration and esteem of all who witnessed the able manoeuvres he displayed by which he affected the escape of his convoy. He was brought to England and sent to Alesford in Hampshire a prisoner on parole. Soon after Lieutenant Bateman of His Britannic Majesty's Navy waited on Your Memorialist's father with orders which he did not explain but forced him into a post chaise and drove to Portsmouth where he was immediately put on board the Admiral's Ship

of the Fleet destined for the Conquest of Canada.

That Sir Charles Saunders the Admiral and Commander in Chief² no sooner came on board than he desired General Wolfe and some other Officers who spoke good French to make every assurance to Your Memorialist's father of the high opinion entertained of his character and professional abilities by Your Honor's late Worthy father the Earl of Chatham³ and that from the perfect knowledge which Your Memorialist's father had of the soundings in the River St. Lawrence it was hoped by Government he would give that assistance to the British Fleet which so perilous an expedition naturally required.

They also informed him that all hopes he might sustain either in France or Canada would be amply compensated together with the expenses that accrued from the migration of his wife and family to England with the addition of a handsome provision after their arrival. The impression on the mind of Your Memorialist's father occasioned by such a communication was agonizing in the extreme and after rejecting the proposal he was almost immediately informed the orders of the Ministry were such that if gentle methods would not induce him to acquiesce the most coercive would be put in practice and the short interval of an hour allowed for his determination. These threats were followed by preparations for the most ignominious death without shaking that intrepidity and heroic virtue Your Memorialist's father was so eminently distinguished for. The present Marquis Townsend, then Brigadier General in the expedition, endeavoured to make your Memorialist's father reflect on the situation he was in and the dreadful affliction that would attach to his family were he to fall a victim to his obstinacy⁴. These ideas by awakening his sensations to all he held dear in life, was touching the only string capable of vibrating on his feelings. Relying on the solemn assurances of General Wolfe, Lord Townsend, and the present Sir John Jarvis, then Lieutenant on board the Admiral's ship, Your Memorialist's father complied.

That by the abilities of Your Memorialist's father in this Expedition the British fleet were rescued from the most imminent danger on their entering the Gulph and River St. Lawrence and brought in perfect safety to Quebec. This has been frequently acknowledged by the high characters concerned in the expedition and greatly contributed to subsequent success⁵.

That on the arrival of Your Memorialist's father in England (after this expedition and his wife and family having come over to him from France)

he presented to Government a statement of his losses amounting to 235,000 French Livres (nearly 10,000 Sterling). It was answered that due attention should be paid to his claim and soon after a Pension on the Admiralty of £200 per annum was granted him as a compensation intimating that for the present nothing better could be done. From this period to his death the same answers were given to his repeated applications except an additional £50 per annum procured him by the humanity of Lord Townsend.

That in the year 1775 Your Memorialist's father died a victim to his Sorrows leaving behind him a disconsolate Widow and Children unprovided for as the whole of the pension or yearly Sum he enjoyed was suspended at his death and it was with great difficulty that Your Memorialist's Mother obtained a pension of £100 per annum of the Admiralty for the support of herself and her children.

That after various ineffectual attempts made by Your Memorialist's Mother for a further allowance she went to France by the advice of her friends there in the year 1783 to gain protection in support of her claim. A few days after her arrival in Paris an English gentleman then lately from London called to inform her that his Britannic Majesty's (then) ambassador (the late Duke of Manchester) wished to see her. Adding that the result of the interview would most probably render unnecessary the application she was about to make at the Court of France and so the event proved. His Grace on hearing all the circumstances attending the situation of Your Memorialist's Mother and what had happened to her unfortunate husband appeared to be much affected and told her he was extremely happy in having sufficient reason to assure her that Ministry were so well inclined to serve her that she might depend upon the addition of £100 a year which she had solicited either from the Admiralty or some other Department and strenuously recommended her immediate return to London. This she complied with and very soon had the satisfaction to find it was granted in the Department of Lord Sidney and Evan Nepean Esq. agreeable to the following letter from her agent Mr. James Bowman. (the date is omitted)

"Madam"

"I was yesterday with Mr. Nepean on your business and he informed me His Majesty had ordered him to pay you £100 per annum during his pleasure that it commenced about two months ago and would be paid

every six months. Also that no warrant was necessary. I would have called on you afterwards but could not get so far—”

I am Madam

Yours etc.

James Bowman

That Your Memorialist's Mother received the first half yearly payment of this pension in London and then returned to France. Her Agent remitted the second payment (which compleated the Year 1784) to her in France. That from that period no further payments were made to her notwithstanding repeated applications made for the purpose.

That Your Memorialist has strong grounds to believe that his Mother is now dead⁶. That from the Services of his late Father to this Country in the expedition above alluded to — the hardships he underwent therein — the loss he sustained of property of his own (estimated at near £10,000 Sterling) besides the loss of property his friends and relations bequeathed from him on account of his entering into the Service of this Country all bore heavy on Your Memorialist's late father and family which facts Your Memorialist has now been induced to lay before you conscious of your being ready to listen to the distresses of those who have Served or wish to Serve this Country.

That Your Memorialist has himself had the honour to Serve and is now Serving in the Royal Navy of Great Britain in the rank of Lieutenant and he begs leave to represent to Your Honour the Services he has been in since his entering into the Navy.

Your Memorialist entered into the Service in the Year 1770 on board the Somerset then commanded by his particular friend Captain Hughes (afterwards Sir Edward Hughes). That Your Memorialist Served under Sir Edward Hughes in India when Commodore on that Station and afterwards under the Command of Sir Edward Vernon and again under the Command of Sir Edward Hughes (then Admiral).

That Your Memorialist when under the last Command and Service of Sir Edward Hughes had the rank of Lieutenant and hoped to have been in a short time further promoted had not he been shortly afterwards unfortunately taken by a French frigate when on a cruize and kept on board the French fleet for four months and then delivered over to Tippoo Saib when he with other officers was kept in Irons for twenty two months.

That Your Memorialist under this confinement and imprisonment had his health much impaired and most probably lost his preferment after having Served his King and Country upwards of ten years.

That Your Memorialist after his return to England finding his health somewhat recovered and still anxious to be active in the Service offered himself and was employed in the West Indies under the Command of Commodore Gardener where Your Memorialist had not been long till he was taken ill and after a tryal of upwards of twelve months and not recovering he was invalided and advised by the faculty that from his treatment in India his health would not admit him to be further employed.

Your Memorialist begs leave to refer Your Honor with respect to his late father's conduct to the present Marquis Townsend, Sir John Jarvis, and Sir Hugh Palliser who amongst other Officers now living were witnesses to the conduct of Your Memorialist's father and to Evan Nepean Esq, the present Sir Philip Stephens, Lord Dorchester, and many distinguished personages who are perfectly well acquainted with the case — with respect to the rank and family of Your Memorialist's father in France. Your Memorialist begs leave to observe to your Honor his alliance to the late Count de Vergennes⁷ who died Prime Minister. The Marquis of Lotbinières Knight of Saint Louis and one of the most ancient families in Canada, The Count de Repentigny whose father was Governor of Senegal and Brigadier General, The Chevalier Denis de Bonaventure a Captain in His Most Christian Majesty's Navy etc.⁸.

Your Memorialist hopes Your Honor will be induced from the facts above stated to take the matter into consideration and think Your Memorialist has some just claim on Government for the losses Your Memorialist's father and the family sustained. At least that he may be paid up the arrears of his Mother's Annuity or Pension of £100 per annum and have the same continued to him. Begging Your Honor to take into Your consideration not only the losses of Your Memorialist's father which he stated at near £10,000 Sterling but since that time the loss the family have sustained by being deprived of an inheritance amounting to £8,000 by the death of a near relation Mr. Denis de St. Simon of Louisiana, who was Captain of a Company of Grenadiers in the Service of His Most Christian Majesty and who bequeathed his fortune to a Brother Officer not at all allied to him. By the same chain of misfortunes they are now deprived of an estate in Canada worth £600 a year the property of Your Memorialist father's sister, who sold it for an annuity to the prejudice of his children⁹.

Under these circumstances Your Memorialist hopes Your Honor will be pleased to condescend to pay attention to the request of Your Memorialist.

And as in Duty bound will ever pray

(Signed) Jn. DENIS de VITRÉ.

NOTES

Siege of Québec in 1759 Narrative

(1) At the beginning of the Seven Years' War, France sent 6,000 men as reinforcements to Québec. In 1757, about one hundred recruits arrived, followed, in 1758, by between 300 and 400 privates. Because of the length and difficulty of the crossing, a great number of these arrived sick in Québec. The General Hospital received most of these unhappy men. Despite the tender care of the nuns, about 600 men, soldiers and seamen, died between 1756 and 1758 in the General Hospital.

(2) From Orange, now Albany. Reflects its Dutch beginnings.

(3) The author passes rather rapidly to the crucial moment of the siege, the installation of the English batteries at Point Lévi. It was there that the systematic bombardment of the capital would begin. It is about three quarters of a mile from Point Lévi to the Lower Town. The English set up batteries of 33 pieces including 13 mortars of varying calibre. The cannon could send shot of up to 32 pounds and the mortars could use bombs with a maximum diameter of 13 inches. But the nun is mistaken as to the date: the bombardment began on July 12, not on July 24.

Cf. *The Siege of Québec*, note 18.

(4) The Upper Town witnessed much destruction during the siege: the Cathedral was demolished; the Jesuit's church and the Recollets' church were seriously damaged. Only the Ursuline Chapel escaped without too much harm. The Chateau Saint Louis, the Bishop's Palace, the Seminary and the Jesuit College remained standing but were heavily damaged. Even the Hotel Dieu suffered greatly.

(5) The General Hospital, now situated on Boulevard Langelier, had been built somewhat beyond the town (about 1½ miles). The building escaped bombardment by the English, remaining to this day one of the finest and best preserved examples of the monumental architecture of the French Régime. The Hospital's origins go back to 1692, the year Mgr. de Saint-Vallier bought the church and monastery built by the Recollets between 1671 and 1680.

(6) Carcasses: projectiles filled with incandescent material. They were projected by mortars to start fires. Red-hot shot: cannon balls placed in a fire until red hot. Also used to set fire to the town.

(7) The Lower Town was even more seriously affected than the Upper Town. It possessed very fine houses, the property of important merchants. The Lower Town, under the French Régime, was the business center, while the Upper Town consisted mainly of religious and administrative buildings. The purpose of the Place Royale restoration project is to restore the original splendor of these Lower Town houses.

(8) Montcalm was convinced that one good battle could decide the final victory.

(9) Upon reading the three accounts, it appears that the English were on the point of giving up Québec through fear of a second defeat such as the one at the Montmorency Falls and because of the approach of the cold season.

(10) It was one Cugnet who indicated the landing spot and Captain Donald MacDonald of Fraser's Highlanders who, being fluent in the French language, is supposed to have used the password which fooled the sentries. Cf. Pierre-George Roy: *La ville de Québec sous le régime français*, Vol. II, pp. 343-347-348.

(11) This oath of allegiance, political and religious in character, meant a great deal to the English at the time. But, actually, it does not seem to have bothered the resisters in the least.

(12) The nuns nevertheless had to pay the bill and one feels the bitterness toward the French Court which turned a deaf ear, 3,000 pounds being quite a large amount at the time.

(13) A gunner whose artillery boat had sunk like a stone off Cap-Rouge.

(14) The English usually spared the churches. Wolfe had already given an order to that effect. It may be recalled however that St. Joachim's was also burned.

(15) The French Court, then, had not yet paid the costs incurred in caring for the soldiers of both camps. Were the nuns in disfavor for having helped the English as well? Their loyalty to the French cause, however, was never questioned. Nor is the situation without paradox since the English Court was itself pleading their cause.

A Journal of the Expedition up the River St. Lawrence

(1) Admiral Durell was guided by De Vitre who, once a prisoner of the English, had betrayed his country. *Memorial of Lieutenant John Denis de Vitre*.

(2) The fire-ships were vessels transformed into floating torches which, intelligently guided, could be expected to set fire to the English vessels riding at anchor. As briefly pointed out in the Journal, these fire-ships caused much more damage to the dreams of their creators than to the enemy fleet.

(3) The Journal published by Fauteux describes one of these floating batteries in some detail: "60 feet long, 30 broad and 7 above water: they would draw about 2½ feet with artillery on board..." According to the same source, the French had baptized it *Le Diable*, expecting it to cause great havoc among the enemy. As noted in the Journal, the fate of the batteries was no happier than that of the fire-ships.

(4) Throughout the Journal, the author stresses the rôle played by the Indians from many different tribes, who seem to have inspired great terror in himself and his companions at arms, particularly because of their custom of scalping.

(5) Faggots of brushwood, cylindrical in form, used to protect the batteries during sieges.

(6) The date of the first fire in the town is precise: July 17, at noon. But the Journal brought back by Viger puts it on July 16.

(7) To spike a cannon: to drive a spike into the vent of a canon to render it useless. The cannon used solid shot whereas the mortars generally used explosive bombs. During excavations at Place Royale, a large number of these projectiles were found. One strange discovery made was a shot bar, made of two balls joined by a chain and used to unmast ships. The permanent exhibition at Maison Fomel in Place Royale displays various specimens.

(8) The author here acknowledges the heavy losses inflicted on the English at the Montmorency Falls, the rudest engagement before the battle of September 13. He contradicts the word of the nun from the General Hospital, however, who stated that the French had been lacking in discipline.

- (9) (a) Battery: a line of cannon. The battery is sometimes in the form of a bastion like the Royal Battery
- b) Redoubt: a fortification; a sort of isolated bastion.
- (c) Bastion: a fortification making a salient angle; part of a fortified whole.
- (10) General Amherst had taken Louisbourg in 1758. In 1759 he took Carillon (Ticonderoga) and it was he who forced Vaudreuil to surrender at Montréal in September 1760.
- (11) Confirmation of the nun's narrative: the lack of food supplies seriously affected the besieged people.
- (12) The narrative becomes almost cynical: "handsome houses . . . good farms . . ." everything is destroyed to break Québec's resistance.
- (13) So the English take to the same practice as the Indians they were denouncing. And it is the French they scalp! The war, then, becomes a sort of settlement of accounts.
- (14) The churches are strong points for the troops; they are preserved. Cf. the *Narrative*, note 14.
- (15) Sloop: a single-masted coastal vessel.
- (16) This however was not a planned manoeuvre. The bad weather and the overloaded boats explain the reembarking of the troops.
- (17) No mention of Cugnet's betrayal. Cf. the *Narrative*, note 10.
- (18) An important rôle of the artillery.
Royal howitzers: a kind of mortar used by the English artillery. As in France, the English artillery codes were under royal jurisdiction.
- (19) By praising his own comrades the author hopes to erase the memory of Cugnet's betrayal.
- (20) Cf. the table of losses added at the end of the *Journal*.
- (21) The General Hospital.
- (22) This is unjust to Vaudreuil who did not flee like a coward.
- (23) The author is exaggerating here. The number of houses burned is estimated at 180.

The Siege of Québec in 1759

- (1) A small island in the St. Lawrence, about 190 miles from Québec. For strategic reasons, Wolfe had not concentrated all the vessels of the fleet in the same place.
- (2) Another island of the St. Lawrence, near Bic, about 70 leagues from Québec.
- (3) For the Lower Town batteries, see note 8 below. The Upper Town was principally defended, on the ramparts, by the Batterie du Clergé which, in 1755, according to the Chevalier Le Mercier's inventory, consisted of 57 cannon. It was reinforced by 20 cannon in anticipation of the siege of 1759 and afterwards called the Grande Batterie. Cf. Michel Gaumond: *l'Artillerie de Québec in Culture vivante*, August 1969, no. 14. The inventory drawn up by the English on September 18, 1759 indicates that the fortifications of Québec consisted of 259 pieces of every caliber. Note in passing that the cannon of that period were highly ornamented. Their manufacture, moreover, was subject to royal ordinance. The same applies to English artillery.
- (4) The Traverse: at the northern end of the Island of Orleans at the entrance to the channel between the south shore and the island. Although the spot is wide enough (about 9 miles) it is very difficult to navigate because it is full of rocks, sand bars and small islands.
- (5) The French fathom of 6 feet is 6 feet, 4 inches in English measures.

(6) These are rafts, which, once set on fire, would burn the English vessels. Their rôle was similar to that of the fire-ships. The idea is supposed to have originated with Charles-François Tarieu de Lanaudière, Madeleine de Verchères' son.

(7) This supply officer was Joseph-Michel Cadet (1719-1781). He was born in the maison Saint-Amand on St. Pierre St. near Place Royale and lived there until 1735. Joseph-Michel Cadet was the most important butcher in Québec. As Bigot's confidence man, he was named general supply officer for New France in 1750, that is, he had to provide the colony with everything the King might need. He profited from this post to accumulate a huge fortune. During the siege of Québec in 1759, Cadet made a large profit from the fire-ships he had equipped, drawing 80,000 pounds for each one. Imprisoned in the Bastille in 1761, he was condemned to repay 6,000,000 pounds. He extricated himself from the situation without too much difficulty. He continued to speculate in France but finally lost all he had. Cadet owned several properties in New France. The best known was the house named after him on St. Paul St. in Québec, which was unfortunately destroyed a few years ago.

(8) Four batteries constituted the Lower Town's principal defence: the Batterie Saint-Charles, the Batterie Dauphine, the Batterie Royale, and the Batterie de la Construction (shipyard) or de la Reine. Their cannon were 36, 24, 18, 12 or 8-pounders. The approximate weight of the cannon ball, is its caliber. There is a table which gives the diameter for a ball of a certain caliber and the diameter of the cannon. Theoretically, the caliber gives the cannon's range; for example, a 24-pounder has a range of 2250 fathoms, and so on. The greatest caliber in the French batteries at Québec, then, was 36. In November 1755, the Chevalier Le Mercier requested 10 36-pounders from France for the battery at Carcy.

Excavations are under way at Place Royale to uncover the Batterie Royale, a very important element in the restoration of Place Royale.

(9) It is rather surprising that the French had not at that time mastered this technique which the English used extensively against Québec. Cf. the *Narrative*, note 6.

(10) Cf. the *Narrative*, note 8.

(11) Allusion to the veiled rivalry supposed to have existed between Vaudreuil and Montcalm.

(12) The English laughed at these machines invented by the French, but, in their narratives, they confess that for a while they were terrified of them.

(13) L'Anse-des-Mères is the land depression in which Notre-Dame de la Garde church is now situated. Work on the port has changed it considerably and it can hardly be distinguished today. It was so called in honour of the Ursulines who owned the land.

(14) This exchange of courtesies was part of the gallantry in favor in the 18th century: "After you, Gentlemen!", inviting the enemy to take the first shot.

(15) There is a special password for the Indians whose lack of discipline was always feared.

(16) Trysail or snow: a square-rigged ship with two sails and a jigger; it resembled the Canadian schooner of the end of the 19th century. The xebecs mentioned on page 112 were small vessels which could be propelled with oars and which were used in particular on the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain.

(17) This lamentable failure was due to over hasty preparation and the recruitment of very young men, even of children. It was in fact named the "schoolboys' attack".

(18) Fatal date for Québec: July 12 at 9 o'clock in the evening, and not July 24 as stated in the *Narrative*. Cf. the *Narrative*, note 3.

(19) Losses in human life were relatively few especially if compared to the amount of material damage.

(20) Neuville

- (21) The importance accorded the Indians shows the extent to which they were feared by the English.
- (22) Cf. note 12.
- (23) Sailing vessels with three masts with lateens.
- (24) Cf. *A Journal of the expedition up the River St. Lawrence*, note 8.
- (25) Letter from Wolfe in which he stresses the devotion of the ladies of the General Hospital.
- (26) These figures are realistic since it is estimated today that the English 33-piece batteries on the heights of Lévis shot 40,000 cannon balls and 10,000 bombs on the town. As a support force, the 49 vessels of the English fleet mounted only 2,000 cannon! Cf. Gustave Lanctôt, *Histoire du Canada*, Montreal, Beauchemin, 1964, p. 230.
- (27) The estimate of the material damages seems exact since of the 180 houses destroyed in the bombardment, 150 were in the Lower Town. Cf. *A Journal of the expedition up the River St. Lawrence*, note 23.
- (28) Wolfe himself spoke very good French. In addition, there were 300 rather intractable German mercenaries in the English camp.
- (29) Lack of discipline, like desertion, was not peculiar to the French as can be seen here!
- (30) Vauquelin, Jean: Lieutenant-Commander from Dieppe, he commanded the two frigates *Atalante* and *Pomone*. He would only go down to Québec in April 1760 as an escort for Lévis' troops. Lévis was forced to raise the siege of Québec because of the arrival of the English ships, on May 15, and the *Pomone* ran aground off Sillery while setting sail. The *Atalante* was taken after a two-hour battle off Pointe-aux-Trembles (Neuveville). Although almost his entire crew was wounded or killed, Vauquelin refused to strike his colors. A monument beside the Montréal City Hall commemorates this heroic combat.
- (31) The schooner *Terror of France*: This incident is mentioned in the *Journal of the expedition up the River St. Lawrence*.
- (32) Montcalm's *Journal* notes that horse meat was first distributed in Québec on December 9, 1757. Montcalm wished to set an example by writing on his menu: cheval à l'espagnole, escalopes de cheval . . . It can be seen here that this did not take everyone's fancy.
- (33) Confirmation of the impression given by the first two texts: the discouragement of the English who seem unable to take Québec. An impression the anonymous English commentator is quick to correct! Cf. the *Narrative*, note 9.

Memorial of Lieutenant John Denis de Vitré

- (1) Like most of the families which played a part in the history of New France, that of Mathieu Théodose Denys de Vitré had its roots in Place Royale. Towards the middle of the 17th century, in fact, the houses of several members of the Sovereign Council of New France were among the first to go up in the Lower Town: that of Ruelle d'Auteuil, the sieur Cailhaut de la Tesserie, the sieur de Villeray (Maison Fornel) and Charles Denys de Vitré. According to Mgr. Tanguay and Benjamin Sulte, Vitré left several descendants some of whom became naval officers. The family seems to have died out, at least in the Province of Québec.
- (2) De Vitré in fact piloted Admiral Durell's vessels. It was Martin Dechinique, grandfather of the apostate Chiniquy, and Augustin Raby who guided Saunders, Cf. P.G. Roy, *La ville de Québec sous le régime français*, vol. II pp 315 and 320.
- (3) William Pitt the elder. It was he who charged Wolfe with the conquest of Canada. Upon the ascension of George III to the throne, he retired as Prime Minister and, in 1766, took the title of Lord Chatham.

(4) De Vitré's son faithfully follows the account his father had written of his odyssey. An unlikely story in spots. Seeing that he refused to help them, the English had supposedly threatened to hang him from the main yard, giving him one hour to think it over. Then, to gain time, De Vitré is supposed to have requested that the Traverse be sounded. The suspicious English had him accompanied, and at that point he threw himself into the water to put an end to it all. Saved in time by the English, he claims to have realized that the difficult passage had been crossed . . . with the help of two Canadian fishermen. How could he have obtained such a large pension from the English, if he had really acted in this manner?

(5) The statement is convincing. Denis De Vitré surrendered to the English and betrayed his country.

(6) John Denis De Vitré remained in England.

(7) Minister of Foreign Affairs under Louis XVI.

(8) De Vitré really wants to impress William Pitt.

(9) His financial problems clearly indicate the difficulties into which his father's actions led him.

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
Le siècle de Québec (1759)
par trois témoins

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